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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL FORMS FOR SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISES IN THE UK AND THAILAND 
 
by 
 
Prapin Nuchpiam 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis studies legal forms for social enterprises in the UK and Thailand. The 
reason for the focus on these two countries is that the recent development of social 
enterprise in Thailand has been significantly influenced by the UK. I will show how 
a legal form specifically designed to suit the nature of social enterprise is important 
to its operation as well as the fostering of the social enterprise sector. Given this 
importance of such a legal form, and its unavailability in Thailand, a question arises: 
does the country need such a specially designed legal form? My argument in favour 
of its need runs as follows. Although the UK and Thailand rely on several legal 
forms, the Thai social enterprise sector, unlike its UK counterpart, still does not 
enjoy the benefits and advantages of a legal form like the Community Interest 
Company (CIC), which is devoted to the social enterprise by being purportedly 
designed specifically with its needs in mind. The Thai social enterprise sector’s 
reliance on the existing traditional legal structures has been found to suffer from 
serious limits: not only do these legal forms not facilitate the functioning of social 
enterprises, but the unavailability of a specialised legal structure becomes a 
disincentive to social entrepreneurship. A legal blueprint designed to suit the nature 
of social enterprise has thus been proposed to meet Thailand’s need. To establish 
its practical relevance, the blueprint has been used to evaluate the CIC and the legal 
forms adopted by social enterprises in Thailand. On the basis of the results of this 
evaluation it has been used as a model for the development of a specialised legal 
form for social enterprises in Thailand – which is the main purpose of my thesis. 
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 Chapter 1 
A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Legal Forms 
for Social Enterprises in the UK and Thailand 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
I propose in this thesis to study the legal forms for social enterprises in the UK and 
Thailand. It will be shown what these legal vehicles for social enterprises are and 
how they are important to both the operation of social enterprises and the fostering 
of the social enterprise sector. The reason for focusing on these two countries is that 
the development of Thai social enterprise in recent years has been influenced 
particularly by the UK, although, unlike the latter, Thailand still does not have a 
legal vehicle specially designed to effectively serve the dual purpose indicated 
above. Hence, it is argued, it is essential that Thailand create such a legal form. For 
this purpose, it is also argued, the country could learn from the UK experience in 
developing its social enterprise legal regime. 
 
The thesis thus centres on two main themes. The first theme involves the legal forms 
for social enterprise – what these are and how they are important to this type of 
business. The second theme is related to the need, in view of the importance of the 
legal forms for social enterprise, for Thailand to develop its legal infrastructure that 
is conducive to further growth of the social enterprise sector; and how, for this 
purpose, the country could learn from the UK experience.  
 
The following objectives are set forth for the purpose of investigating the two main 
themes:  
 
1) to establish an understanding of social enterprise in the UK and Thailand (with 
some references to social enterprises in other European countries and the USA);  
 
2) to identify and analyse issues relating to the legal forms for social enterprise and 
specify certain deficiencies of social enterprise in Thailand which require the need 
for a legal form specially designed for social enterprises;  
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3) to construct a blueprint of legal forms for social enterprise (with the specified 
deficiencies experienced by Thai social enterprises in mind);  
 
4) to assess, on the basis of the legal blueprint, the existing legal forms adopted by 
social enterprises in the UK and Thailand (in the latter case, the identification of the 
deficiencies of the existing legal forms used by Thai social enterprises would 
answer the question why the CIC, not the charity, is so desirable for Thai social 
enterprises; and  
 
5) to propose a legal form specifically designed for Thai social enterprises.  
 
Objective 4 actually requires further explanation. Therefore, before I present the 
organisational structure of my thesis, allow me to explain why it does not cover 
charities, and why I chose to study the CIC rather than, say, the new charity legal 
entity, the charitable incorporated organisation (CIO). In Thailand, as in the UK, 
social enterprises and charities have both made valuable contributions to social and 
economic development. Social enterprises and charities have similarities. However, 
they are also significantly different and have separate landscapes. Social enterprises 
are more enterprising than charities: the scope of charities is narrower, and social 
enterprises should not be restricted in the same way. Of course, the results of 
activities are more important than the types of activities, and there are useful things 
that social enterprises can learn from charities. Therefore, I shall cross-reference in 
certain parts but not in full detail.   
 
The thesis comprises four parts. The first part provides a “conceptual perspective” 
for the thesis. This includes the framework for analysis (elaborated in Chapter 1) 
and a survey, in chapter 2, of the development of social enterprise and the social 
enterprise landscapes in the UK and Thailand to establish a theoretical 
understanding of this type of business. This part accomplishes the first objective. 
 
Part 2 develops a “blueprint of legal forms for social enterprises” on the basis of 
the theoretical understanding established in Chapter 2. Both Chapters 3 and 4 are 
devoted to this task and, in accomplishing it, fulfill the second and third objectives. 
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Part 3 proposes an “evaluation of existing legal forms for social enterprise” on the 
basis of the legal blueprint designed in Chapters 3 and 4. These legal forms include 
the UK community interest company (CIC) and a number of Thailand’s for-profit 
and non-profit legal structures, which also serve as the main legal forms for social 
enterprises in Thailand. The evaluation of the CIC is attempted in Chapter 5, while 
the Thai legal forms are assessed in Chapter 6. The purpose of this evaluation is to 
determine the extent to which the existing legal forms for social enterprises match 
the ideal-type. This part fulfills the fourth objective. 
 
The last part examines, in Chapter 7, the social enterprise landscape in Thailand, 
and, on the basis of this investigation and the evaluation of the country’s main legal 
forms for social enterprises attempted in Chapter 6, proposes, in Chapter 8, the 
creation of a legal form specifically tailored to suit Thai social enterprises. The 
proposed legal form is modeled upon the legal blueprint for social enterprise. This 
part accomplishes the last objective, and, together with Chapter 9, fulfills my 
purpose in undertaking this study of social enterprises in the UK and Thailand. 
 
The proposed legal form for Thai social enterprises is designed not only on the basis 
of the ideal-type legal blueprint but also in reference to the practical experience of 
the UK in initiating the CIC. Before fully covering the objectives set out for this 
thesis in the following chapters, I would like to engage in a preliminary discussion 
of the two main themes in the following two sections. 
 
1.2 Legal forms for social enterprises 
 
The problem of the legal forms for social enterprises is related to the latter’s vast 
and varied nature. Because it is not the legal structures, but rather their activities, 
that identify organisations as social enterprises, this makes it virtually impossible 
to rely on any single legal vehicle for the regulation of all types and forms of this 
type of business. Social enterprises in the UK and Thailand (and presumably other 
countries) assume numerous legal vehicles. In the UK the legal structures for social 
enterprise are, among others, the limited company (other than the CIC), the charity 
(especially the charitable incorporated organisation (CIO), the co-operative, the 
CIC, and the sole trader or business partnership. In Thailand, social enterprises also 
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operate in a variety of legal forms, including the partnership, the limited company, 
the association, the foundation and the co-operative. However, unlike its UK 
counterpart, the Thai social enterprise sector still does not enjoy the benefits and 
advantages of a specialised legal vehicle devoted to the social enterprise, and 
purportedly designed specifically with its needs in mind, such as the CIC. A 
fundamental question nevertheless arises from this comparison: does Thailand 
really need a legal form for social enterprise like the CIC? To answer this question, 
we need to address the broader theme of the importance of the legal forms for social 
enterprises. There are, of course, other legal issues relating to social enterprise, but 
in my view the legal forms for this type of business is the central one. As will be 
shown in this thesis, legal forms involve important features facilitating the 
operation of social enterprises, such as personal liability, ownership, funding, 
governance and profit distribution of the social enterprise, as well as those assuring 
their accountability to stakeholders. 
 
The importance of the legal and public policy infrastructure is evident in historical 
experiences, especially in Western Europe, where the social enterprise sector is 
more developed than those in most other parts of the world. It is indeed in Western 
Europe that the development of social enterprise is clearly attributable to its 
enabling “legal environment”. I take the initiation of the CIC in 2005 as an 
indication of the importance of legal forms for social enterprise (though some other 
European countries had actually developed specific legal vehicles for social 
enterprises well before the UK). As we shall see in Chapters 2 and 5, the UK 
government wanted to support the operation of social enterprises by creating such 
an appropriate legal form, which was at the same time expected to help raise their 
profile. In my view, this means that the social enterprise sector needs such a legal 
form – one which would enable organisations to run most effectively as social 
enterprises and make them formally recognisable as such. It is such a clear profile 
of social enterprises that potentially contributes to the growth of the social 
enterprise sector. This latter point, which will be discussed in Chapter 8, helps us 
find an answer to the question whether Thailand really needs a legal form 
specifically designed for social enterprises. The answer is definitely in the positive.  
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Social enterprises are usually characterised by their hybrid nature – that is, they are 
understood as lying between traditional for-profit and non-profit entities. Though 
this understanding is fundamentally correct, we shall see in the next chapter that 
they have other aspects and it is more appropriate to characterise them as 
stakeholder business ventures. The legal forms for such ventures should thus meet 
their need for rules both to facilitate their business operation and to meet their 
stakeholder requirements. In other words, a legal vehicle specifically designed to 
provide facilitative rules for the business purpose and mandatory rules for assuring 
the stakeholding accountability of social enterprises is required. 
 
In the UK it is the CIC that meets the dual purpose of providing the facilitative and 
mandatory rules for the running of social enterprises as stakeholding entities as well 
as a social enterprise “brand”. Thailand, on the other hand, lacks an equivalent of 
the CIC, and it is in view of this shortcoming that I propose a legal vehicle for Thai 
social enterprises modeled on the ideal-type legal blueprint and developed with the 
benefits from the UK experience in creating the CIC. Now let me present a brief 
preliminary discussion of this issue. 
 
1.3 For a legal form specially designed for social enterprises in 
Thailand 
 
Thai social enterprises still rely on the existing legal structures, both those under 
the Civil and Commercial Code and other laws. Their problems and needs arising 
from this reliance are addressed in chapter 2. Although, as will be shown in 
Chapters 7-8, much progress has actually been made in the development of the 
public policy support and regulatory regime of social enterprises in Thailand, this 
still remains, in my view, inadequate, especially for the purpose of promoting 
further development of the social enterprise sector. To fulfill this purpose, a legal 
vehicle specially designed for social enterprises will be proposed. 
 
In the UK and Thailand alike, social enterprises still need to rely on several legal 
forms mainly because, given the differences in their types and shapes, no “one-size-
fits-all” legal form for this type of business is available, or even feasible. The crucial 
difference between the UK and Thailand is, of course, the existence of the CIC in 
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the UK. However, though the CIC is a legal form tailored to meet the facilitative 
and mandatory requirements of social enterprises, it has been initiated to provide a 
practical addition to the existing legal structures, which are still required to cater 
for the vast diversity of these organisations. 
 
But this continued reliance on a variety of legal forms gives rise to a question: what 
difference can the introduction of one particular legal form make to the social 
enterprise landscape in either the UK or Thailand, if they still need a variety of legal 
forms to cater for the vast diversity of their social enterprises? 
 
Since Thailand has not yet developed a specific legal form for social enterprises, 
we certainly cannot empirically show what impact such a legal form would make 
on the Thai social enterprise sector. All we can say at this stage is that the legal 
form, such as the one I am proposing in this thesis, will definitely introduce 
qualitative differences to the legal infrastructure of Thai social enterprises. We shall 
have, in other words, a legal form that provides proper rules governing the operation 
of social enterprises as stakeholder entities. Moreover, the British experience in 
deploying the CIC gives us additional clues for the answer to this question; that is, 
despite the continued reliance on a variety of legal vehicles, the growing popularity 
of this specific legal form for social enterprises means that the British social 
enterprise sector could be increasingly identified with the “CIC brand”. 
 
Another question still needs to be raised: how could Thailand fulfill this 
requirement for a legal form specially designed for social enterprise? In view of the 
UK influence on the development of Thai social enterprise, one possible approach 
is to adopt the CIC as a model for the development of its Thai version. However, I 
consider this kind of “legal transplant” not particularly appropriate. Let me explain 
in greater detail why I decided not to rely upon this approach. As I have pointed 
out, my main purpose is to demonstrate that Thailand needs a legal vehicle like the 
CIC, which is specifically designed for social enterprise. A question might thus 
arise why I did not try to achieve my purpose by directly transplanting the CIC law 
into Thailand. There are certain reasons why I did not adopt this approach. 
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First, the CIC was particularly designed to meet the needs of social enterprises in 
the UK. That is, the initiation of the CIC had its own rationale and purpose, which 
might not be relevant to the Thai social enterprise sector. It can of course be said 
that the needs of social enterprises are in general more or less the same. However, 
we must recognise social and cultural differences, which are normally reflected in 
the legal systems of different countries. To put it more graphically, I am of the 
opinion that putting a square peg in a round hole will not work. Though the CIC 
usefully serves its purpose in the UK, it could not be expected to be similarly useful 
in other national or cultural contexts. Therefore, transplanting the CIC law into 
Thailand is not, in my view, an appropriate approach. 
 
Second, although I recognise the usefulness of legal transplantation, it is also a very 
complicated matter requiring an in-depth analysis of certain related issues. 
Adopting a legal transplant approach would have bloated the scope and framework 
of my thesis. For example, I might have to look into Thai legal history regarding 
the introduction of foreign law or legal ideas into Thailand. A case in point is the 
Civil and Commercial Code, whose development could be traced back to the 
colonial era. 
 
In view of these considerations, I shall opt for another approach – i.e. to construct 
a blueprint for designing a specific legal form for Thai social enterprises. To 
construct such a blueprint, we need first to understand the nature of this type of 
business. As I have already indicated, Chapter 2 is devoted to establishing this 
understanding. Admittedly, my understanding is significantly based upon social 
enterprise as it has been conceived and developed in Europe and North America. 
My reliance on the Atlantic context (particularly in the UK and the US) should 
nevertheless be acceptable, because it is mainly in these areas where both the 
concept and practical forms of social enterprise have been most clearly developed. 
 
With such understanding as established in Chapter 2, I am able to construct the legal 
blueprint for social enterprises in Chapters 3-4. Chapter 3 explores the role of legal 
forms for organisations and social entrepreneurs’ needs from the legal forms they 
opt for. The focus is on how the legal blueprint meets these needs, i.e. especially by 
providing facilitative rules for the running of social enterprises. Chapter 4 expands 
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the regulatory function of the legal blueprint to cover the stakeholding requirements 
of social enterprises. The rules proposed and developed for the blueprint are mainly 
mandatory in character. The purpose is to assure accountability of social enterprises 
to their stakeholders. 
 
The usefulness of the legal blueprint lies in its capacity to serve as a model against 
which to assess actual legal structures adopted by social enterprises – to what extent 
these legal structures meet the normative requirements in the form of both 
facilitative and mandatory rules incorporated in the model – and on which to 
construct a specific legal form for Thai social enterprises. I attempt such an 
evaluative exercise in Chapters 5 and 6: the CIC and the main legal forms used by 
social enterprises in Thailand are evaluated on the basis of the legal blueprint. The 
purpose is not merely to assess how much all these legal forms satisfy the 
requirements of the blueprint. In view of the UK influence on the development of 
Thai social enterprise, how the CIC is measured against the model legal form, offers 
significant practical guidelines for designing the required legal vehicle for social 
enterprises in Thailand. 
 
As is examined in greater detail in a sub-section in Chapter 7, the UK has, during 
the past several years, provided both expertise and guidance for the development of 
Thai social enterprise. In the UK social enterprise has thrived since at least the late 
1990s. Social enterprises are not new in Thailand; they have been in existence for 
sometime in various forms. However, it is only recently that the concept “social 
enterprise” was introduced to this country. For this reason understanding of its 
nature and implications is not particularly widespread. Most importantly, the sector 
is much less developed than its British counterpart. The UK’s practical experience 
in developing its legal regime for social enterprise, especially with the initiation of 
the CIC, is of practical value to Thailand, particularly in confirming the benefits 
and advantages of having a legal structure specially designed for social enterprises. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
This study of social enterprises in the UK and Thailand is comparative in 
orientation.  The need for a comparative study is almost self-evident. For a country 
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like Thailand, where the social enterprise sector is relatively underdeveloped, 
learning from other countries, especially those whose social enterprise sectors are 
more developed, seems advisable – if not imperative. But experiences just cannot 
be directly transferred, and learning only occurs in specific national contexts. 
Therefore, learning from the UK experience is not a matter of constructing a Thai 
legal infrastructure by taking some bits from the UK’s legal forms or provisions as 
its components. 
 
Clearly, this comparative study is not exactly within the domain of “comparative 
law” whose main purpose is to study or compare the legal systems of different 
countries to establish their similarities and differences. It is “comparative” mainly 
in the sense that in the present era characterised by growing internationalism, 
economic globalisation, and democratisation, cross-cultural experiences are often 
relevant, and learning from one another is sometimes even imperative. As should 
have become clear, my intention in engaging in this “comparative” study of social 
enterprises in the UK and Thailand is to establish how much the latter can learn 
from the UK to further develop its social enterprise sector.  
 
The study relies almost entirely on documentary research. I engaged in only limited 
“fieldwork” by interviewing a number of social enterprise operators in Thailand 
with a view mainly to confirming my understanding about the problems and 
difficulties they are encountering in operating within the existing traditional legal 
forms. There are clearly not enough hard quantitative data that I can manipulate 
statistically, and, despite my best efforts, those from the interviews have many 
sidetracks with some replies being irrelevant. However, given that mine is a legal 
study requiring an in-depth exploration of the development and nature of social 
enterprise and other related issues together with a normative analysis, especially of 
what components an optimal legal form for social enterprise should be composed 
of, I am confident that I can downplay the fieldwork. 
 
The documentary research examines the social enterprise landscapes in the UK and 
Thailand and their respective social enterprise legal regimes. The survey of the 
social enterprise landscapes covers the origins and development of social enterprise 
as a concept and as a business activity. The main bulk of the study is nevertheless 
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on the development of the legal blueprint and its use as a model for the assessment 
of the existing legal forms for social enterprises in the UK (the CIC) and Thailand 
as well as the construction of a specific legal structure for Thai social enterprises. 
 
The research follows the line of enquiry embodied in the objectives set out in 
section 1.1. My primary goal in undertaking this doctoral research is to reaffirm 
that an enabling public-policy framework well equipped with proper legal forms is 
required to promote the growth of the social enterprise sector. In this respect, the 
crucial issue for Thailand is whether its existing legal regime is adequate for this 
purpose; if not, we should determine whether, or to what extent, it is profitable to 
learn from the UK experience in developing its own legal regime for social 
enterprise through the initiation of the CIC. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
 
The central issue, which is formulated as the main research question for my thesis, 
is: does Thailand need a legal form for social enterprise? I shall argue that Thailand 
does need a legal form specially designed for social enterprises. The purpose of 
such a legal form has been only briefly discussed in this chapter. I shall further 
elaborate it as an answer to my main research question in relation to other relevant 
issues, which are set out below. 
 
1) What is the nature and role of social enterprise, and how shall we account for its 
development? This issue will be discussed with special reference to social 
enterprise in the UK. The discussion will be found in Chapter 2, where we analyse 
the nature of social enterprise in the Atlantic context and trace its specific 
development in the UK. 
 
2) What principles should be adopted to design an optimal legal vehicle for social 
enterprise? The answer is provided in Chapters 3-4, where a legal blueprint for 
social enterprise will be developed on the basis of our understanding of the nature 
and role of social enterprise as settled in Chapter 2. 
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3) How are existing legal forms for social enterprises performing, and to what extent 
are they “successful” in meeting the requirements set out in the legal blueprint? 
Given our focus on social enterprise in the UK, the CIC will be measured against 
the legal blueprint in Chapter 5. How the CIC matches the ideal-type legal form 
will be taken as being of practical value for Thai social enterprise. 
 
4) How has Thai social enterprise developed, and what is the current state of the 
Thai social enterprise sector? I shall explore the social enterprise landscape in 
Thailand in Chapter 7 as part of an attempt to reaffirm that Thailand needs a legal 
form for social enterprise. 
 
5) What are the legal forms currently used by Thai social enterprises, and what are 
their advantages and shortcomings as measured against our legal blueprint? I shall 
evaluate the main legal forms currently relied upon by Thai social enterprises in 
Chapter 6. The evaluation represents a further attempt to reaffirm the need for a 
legal structure specially designed for Thai social enterprises. 
 
6) What would a legal form specially designed for Thai social enterprises look like? 
That is, given the specific conditions of the Thai social enterprise context, what 
would be the configuration of a possible legal vehicle for social enterprises in 
Thailand? A legal vehicle for Thai social enterprises will be proposed in Chapter 8, 
together with an alternative arrangement to more or less the same effect based on 
an existing legal form. This completes my attempt to answer the main research 
question.
 Chapter 2 
Understanding Social Enterprise 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The term “social enterprise” may still be unfamiliar to many people, though the 
“triple bottom line” concept of social enterprise having financial, social and 
environmental goals is not new.1 Unfortunately, the term ‘means different things to 
different people across different contexts and at different points in time’;2 it remains 
‘a contested concept constructed by different actors around competing discourses,’3 
without any ‘consistently applied definition of social enterprise’.4 Recent attempts 
to define social enterprise have encountered both linguistic and practical problems, 
and ‘any fixed definition tends to privilege one group of social enterprises over 
others’.5 Part of the difficulty in conceptualising social enterprise involves its varied 
nature. Social enterprises come in many forms and sizes, ranging from small 
community-owned village shops to large charities delivering public services, and 
from individual social entrepreneurs to national businesses. Several organisations 
have had the label attached to them or have tried to claim the label for themselves.   
 
Though causing conceptual confusion, this situation is not hopeless. It is possible 
to make sense of the movement by identifying some common threads that most 
social enterprises share, no matter what legal or organisational form they take. That 
is, ‘Whilst we may not have a “universal” definition of a social enterprise, we do 
have a number that are frequently cited and which capture the ethos of the relevant 
sector. They are broadly similar.’6 Moreover, a concept often comes with practice; 
                                                                 
1
 A social audit framework for worker co-operatives developed at Beechwood College in Leeds, 
West Yorkshire, in the 1970s already mentioned “the emphasis on social, environmental and 
financial benefit”. Rory Ridley-Duff and Cliff Southcombe, ‘The Social Enterprise Mark: A Critical 
Review of Its Conceptual Dimensions’ (2012) 8(3) Social Enterprise Journal 178, 182.  
2
 Simon Teasdale, ‘What’s in a Name? The Construction of Social Enterprise’ (2010) Third Sector 
Research Centre Working Paper 46, 4   
<www.birmingham.ac.uk/generic/tsrc/documents/tsrc/working-papers/working-paper-46.pdf> 
accessed 8 October 2011 
3
 ibid 3. 
4
 ibid.  
5
 Ridley-Duff and Southcombe (n 1) 179.  
6
 John L Thompson, ‘Social Enterprise and Social Entrepreneurship: Where Have We Reached? A 
summary of issues and discussion points’ (2008) 4(2) Social Enterprise Journal 149, 150. 
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therefore, one way of understanding social enterprise is to see how it has emerged 
and evolved in a particular national or cultural context. I shall try to come to grips 
with social enterprise in both respects. This chapter deals with how social enterprise 
is conceived and how it has developed in two national contexts, namely the United 
Kingdom and Thailand. As we shall see, my understanding of social enterprise is 
mainly based upon how it has developed in the Atlantic world. Social enterprise in 
the UK, which is part of this world, essentially embodies social enterprise as it has 
thus developed. However, Thai social enterprise, though belonging to a different 
culture, shares many of the central features of social enterprise as will be 
highlighted in this chapter. 
 
2.2 Concept and orientation of social enterprise 
 
In view of the confusion surrounding the concept of social enterprise, I propose to 
begin this section with an attempt to clarify the concept. Then, I shall consider the 
emergence of social enterprise as a type of business. 
 
2.2.1 Dealing with conceptual confusion 
 
Social enterprise as a concept has been fraught with confusion and ambiguities. 
This problem has arisen partly from its association with terms whose meanings are 
similar to it, or which are related to it in some way or another. Even though I cannot 
hope to dispel all or even part of the confusion or ambiguities, this sub-section 
attempts some clarification. 
 
2.2.1.1 The use of the terms “Social Enterprise” and “Social Entrepreneurship” 
 
I deem it imperative to make clear the way I use the terms “social enterprise” and 
“social entrepreneurship”; ‘whilst there are links between them they are not bound 
together in a seamless manner’.7 “Social enterprise” will be used in this study 
simply as a type of business with social mission, whose characteristics and 
orientation will later become clear. A social enterprise may or may not be 
innovative and entrepreneurial – characteristics normally associated with the term 
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“entrepreneurship” – but those who engage in this business will be referred to as 
“social entrepreneurs”. 
 
“Social entrepreneurship” is more problematic. Although the term cannot be used 
interchangeably with social enterprise, I find it not very helpful to confine it to the 
fundamental meaning of “entrepreneurship” as ‘a way of thinking and behaving that 
has opportunity at its heart. Creativity and innovation are typically in evidence’.8 A 
problem is that not all social enterprises are “entrepreneurial” in this sense; so if we 
make a distinction between those which are entrepreneurial (and therefore entitled 
to the term “entrepreneurship”) and those which are not (and, hence, qualified only 
as “social enterprises” in general), the attributes they share (and which are to me 
more important) will be lost. 
 
For this reason, when I use the term “entrepreneurship”, I generally mean a 
business-oriented venture. This sense of the term is embodied in the word 
“enterprise”. In this sense, a venture such as a voluntary organisation, even when it 
is “enterprising” or “entrepreneurial” (that is, innovative and creative), does not 
represent an “enterprise” – that is, it is not a business venture. 
 
2.2.1.2 Third Sector vs Social Economy vs Non-Profit Sector 
 
Another source of confusion surrounding social enterprise is its association with the 
“third sector”, the “social economy” and the “non-profit sector”. We generally 
know that the sector variously identified by these terms occupies the intermediate 
space between the private and public sectors (the market and the state). But how is 
social enterprise, which also belongs to neither the market nor the state, related to 
them?   
 
Historically, the social enterprise concept in Europe made its first appearance in 
Italy in the early 1990s closely linked with the co-operative movement.9 The report 
                                                                 
8
 ibid 153. See also J Gregory Dees, ‘The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship’ (Duke Innovation & 
Entrepreneurship, 30 May 2001) <https://entrepreneurship.duke.edu/news-item/the-meaning-of-
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9
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on a seminar on “Reviewing OECD Experience in the Social Enterprise Sector” in 
2006 has indicated that ‘social enterprises have developed from within the “social 
economy” sector, which lies between the market and the State’.10 Likewise, Pearce 
has introduced the idea of a “three-sector economy” consisting of the first system 
or the private sector, the second system or the public sector, and the third system or 
the third sector. He defines the social economy as part of the third system, 
functioning as the latter’s “trading side”. In his view, the social economy sector 
comprises all those community and voluntary organisations, which are involved in 
trading and social activities.11 Finally, Ridley-Duff and Bull introduce nuanced 
differences, stressing that the social economy and the third sector are not the same: 
 
[T]he social economy and third sector are not the same thing. At the EU level, 
third sector organisations that do not produce any goods or services for 
household or business use are excluded from the definition of the social 
economy. Moreover, definitions of social economy are more explicit about the 
‘social’ aspects of organisation. While third sector organisations may have a 
social purpose, social economy organisations value ‘social’ rather than ‘private’ 
ownership and control (e.g. democratic member control and/or decision-making 
power not based on capital ownership.12  
 
The confusion that is evident in the above examples may be said to have arisen from 
different ways of theorising the relationship between the third sector, the social 
economy, and social enterprise. Differences in this respect have resulted in different 
understandings or definitions of social enterprise itself. I see social enterprise as 
being closely associated with the “new entrepreneurship” that has developed in the 
third sector. However, given the confusion we have seen above, we need to be clear 
about what the third sector, the social economy and the non-profit sector are. I shall 
begin with Pearce’s idea of the three-sector economy.13 
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The first system is generally known as the private sector. Rooted in the principles 
of maximising return for investors or shareholders, the private sector is naturally 
profit-driven. Apart from the focus on individual gain and profit maximising above 
all else, this sector is also characterised by competition among enterprises. 
 
The second system or the public sector is involved with redistribution and planning. 
In this system, which is based on the principle of public services being provided by 
democratically elected institutions, the state and local districts assume 
responsibility, which consists not only in providing services for the people but also 
in managing aspects of the economy to that end.  
 
Finally, the third system relies on participation and collaboration of citizens to meet 
and satisfy their own needs. Unlike the private sector, in particular, it relies on the 
principles of self-help and mutuality and care for others, and of meeting social needs 
instead of maximising profit. The problem it is still facing is that its value and 
contributions are still not as widely recognised as those of the other two systems. 
 
Theorists have proposed some theoretical approaches to our understanding of a set 
of organisations and initiatives that are neither in the public nor private for-profit 
sector – the so-called third sector. As Teasdale notes, ‘the different theories are 
often used to explain different phenomena…[They] are not incompatible. It is 
conceivable that each explains the emergence of different forms and aspects of 
social enterprise’.14 Two approaches have been internationally recognised.15 
 
Influenced by the North American perspective, the first approach is the “non-
profit” one, according to which the third sector comprises “all non-profit 
organisations”.16 These entities are taken as representing this sector because they 
tend to be perceived as complementing the main pillars of society – ‘the market and 
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the state [that] represent the normal way to circulate goods and services’.17 The role 
of the third sector in society is therefore conceived as coming in to fill the gaps if 
the market and the state fail in their tasks. According to Defourny and Nyssens, the 
social enterprise in the United States is viewed as ‘an innovative response to the 
funding problems of non-profit organizations, which are finding it increasingly 
difficult to solicit private donations and governments and foundation grants.’18 As 
Ridley-Duff and Bull have stated, ‘Typically, TSOs [third sector organisations] 
deliver goods and services that are not available through the state or market; offer 
an alternative to the private sector; and extend or replace services offered through 
the state’.19 
 
In sum, dominating the North American thinking, the third sector-based analysis of 
non-profit organisations is founded on the neo-classical economic perspective, 
which conceives of their role in terms of the market’s failures in the provision of 
individual services and the state’s failures in the provision of collective services. 
The approach focuses on the separation and the hierarchy between the two 
mainstays of society – the public and private sectors – and the so-called third sector. 
In this conception, the non-profit sector represents ‘a second-rank or third-rank 
option, when the solutions provided by the market and the state prove inadequate’.20  
 
According to Laville, this conception of the third or non-profit sector coming in to 
fill the gaps left by the private or public sectors is invalidated by history, and 
particularly by “European reality”, which confirms that “associationism”, for 
example, came before public intervention.21 Because of this weakness of the non-
profit analysis, in Europe the second approach comes in, which defines the third 
sector as the “social economy”. Unlike the non-profit approach, the social economy 
perspective covers a wide set of organisations such as co-operatives, mutual 
societies, and associations. The criterion for distinguishing these entities is not the 
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non-distribution constraint but rather the limits on the distribution of profits to 
investors.  
 
The border is thus not the one drawn between for-profit and non-profit 
organisations but rather between “profit-driven” and “social economy” 
organisations. For Laville, the latter are characterised by what he calls ‘a collective 
patrimony over the return on individual investment’.22 
 
Generally speaking, therefore, in the North American view, the third sector mainly 
involves non-profit organisations, whose counterparts in the UK are the “voluntary 
sector” organisations. However, the so-called third sector in the UK, which is more 
influenced by the social economy tradition, covers a wider range of organisations. 
To understand this situation, we also need to go into some more detail about the 
idea of the non-profit sector.  
 
Salamon and Anheier have proposed a set of definitions of the non-profit sector. 
They nevertheless find the structural and operational definition ‘relatively 
economical and significant, and [having] considerable combinatorial richness and 
organizing power’,23 as it defines a broad range of organisations with just five basic, 
but considered most compelling, characteristics, which are still in use today. Using 
these key features, we can define the non-profit sector as comprising organisations 
that are formal, i.e. having a certain degree of institutionalisation; private, i.e. 
institutionally separate from government; non-profit distributing to their owners or 
directors; self-governing, i.e. having their own internal procedures for governance 
or decision-making process; and voluntary, i.e. involving some level of voluntary 
participation. To be considered part of the non-profit sector under this definition, 
an organisation must make an attempt to show that it satisfies all these criteria.24  
 
This approach holds that because there are failures in the private and public sectors, 
people tend to turn their attention to an alternative – the so-called third sector or 
non-profit sector. The first crisis is the failure of the state-run social welfare system. 
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In this view, the state is considered overloaded and over-bureaucratised. The second 
problem involves the crisis of development, which has caused severe poverty in 
developing countries, where, in order to survive poverty, people have degraded 
their surroundings. This situation has led to a global environmental crisis and 
thereby stimulated greater private initiatives. Indeed, in the developed and 
developing countries alike, people have grown increasingly frustrated with the 
government and become eager to take up the challenges themselves. Moreover, the 
decline of welfare state system has also resulted in the rise of the third or non-profit 
sector. People have been in a search for new ways to satisfy their social and 
economic needs. As a result of these problems, people have widely and 
enthusiastically been involved in non-governmental organisations.25 
 
Nevertheless, some criticisms have been raised against such a view. One is that it 
is one-sided, i.e. focusing only on “interest-oriented individual choices”, and seeing 
individuals “only as consumers”.26 ‘The role of organisations is thus only perceived 
through their function of production of services; other dimensions are not taken into 
account. Social integration and democratic participation are overlooked issues.’27   
 
Another criticism involves the implicit hierarchisation. As has been indicated, the 
non-profit sector approach views the private and public sectors as the main pillars 
of society while the third sector is seen only as a complement. As we have noted 
already, Laville believes that such a view is not supported by historical evidence; 
what he calls “associationism” came before “public intervention”.28 Moreover, 
according to Ridley-Duff and Bull, ‘There is a narrow, perhaps misleading, 
definition that the third sector is ‘non-profit’ in its outlook. This obscures both the 
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notion of ‘not for private profit’ and a century of history and knowledge about the 
effectiveness of co-operatives and mutual societies.’29 
 
Still another criticism of the third- or non-profit approach is related to its emphasis 
on non-distribution of profits. Defining the third sector as a non-profit sector 
comprising non-profit organisations, the North American approach places an 
emphasis on the non-distribution constraint. Its focus is thus on foundations, with 
co-operatives and mutual societies being excluded on the ground that these 
organisations can distribute part of profits to their members.  
 
However, this is not true in the European context, where some co-operatives, such 
as building co-operatives in Sweden, have never distributed any profit, and where 
distribution of profits in all cases are limited.30 This is because, in Europe, co-
operatives and mutual societies follow the same principles as those of associations 
(non-profit organisations), the latter being created not for the purpose of obtaining 
return on investment but rather for meeting general or mutual interests or 
contributing to public welfare.31 
 
The non-profit approach thus ‘… does not capture the essence of co-operative and 
fair trade networks’.32 On the contrary, the “social economy”, which is more 
dominant in Europe, covers the set of organisations such as co-operatives, mutual 
societies, and associations that tend to be left out by the non-profit analysis. 
Moreover, it is perhaps too simple to conclude that the third sector has emerged 
from debates about the limitations of the private and public sectors. As we have 
seen, what Laville has called “associationism” actually predated public 
intervention. This approach is thus unable to embrace the whole reality of the so-
called non-profit or third sector. 
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We need therefore to find some other more profitable way of looking at the different 
sectors of the economy. Following Pearce, the point is that instead of focusing on 
the first and second systems, we attach greater importance to the third sector as 
‘another way of doing things’.33 ‘An argument can be made that public and private 
organisations have advanced economic efficiency. More recent analyses question 
whether they are socially efficient due to increasing rates of suicide, a widening gap 
between rich and poor, community breakdown and endemic health issues, even in 
the most “developed” nations…’34 
 
In the UK, as we shall see in section 2.4, the third sector has gained greater attention 
when questions were raised whether the public and private sectors were socially 
efficient in solving social issues such as increasing rates of suicide, a widening gap 
between rich and poor, community breakdown, and endemic health problems.35 The 
New Labour Government, in particular, saw the social enterprise concept as a “third 
way” of solving many social problems.36 
 
2.2.1.3 Social enterprise and the third sector 
 
For my practical purpose, with a focus on the third sector, I propose to see it simply 
as the sector that occupies the intermediate space between the private and public 
sector, that is, between the market and the state. While recognising the nuanced 
differences between the third or non-profit sector and the social economy, I believe 
that this focus is helpful to our understanding of the emergence of social enterprise, 
which is the subject of the next section. However, taking this position requires 
further clarification. 
 
To begin with, I shall follow the European, with a focus on the UK social enterprise, 
not the North American, perspective, that is, focusing on the limits on the 
distribution of profits rather than the ban on profit appropriation. In this sense, 
                                                                 
33
 Pearce (n 11) 26. 
34
 Ridley-Duff and Bull (n 12) 13.  
35
 ibid. 
36
 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Polity Press 1998); 
Stephen Driver and Luke Martell, ‘Left, Right and the Third Way’ (2000) 28(2) Policy & Politics 
147; Alibeth Somers, ‘The Emergence of Social Enterprise Policy in New Labour’s Second Term’ 
(DPhil thesis, Goldsmiths College University of London 2013).  
22 
 
organisations like co-operatives and mutual societies come under the umbrella of 
the third sector.  
 
Moreover, I shall take differences between the third sector and the social economy 
earlier identified by Ridley-Duff and Bull as representing different traditions within 
the third sector, particularly differences between the more traditional third sector 
organisations, such as charities and voluntary associations, and those of the more 
radical tradition of social economy with its focus on economic democracy and 
social ownership.  
 
Finally, given my focus on the UK context, I attach particular importance to the 
third sector generally understood in this context as comprising the range of entities 
that include community-based and voluntary organisations; charities; self-help, 
family and informal economies; and, of course, social enterprises.37 
 
It must also be pointed out that in the UK different views exist on the third sector’s 
relationship to social enterprise. On the one hand, social enterprises are differently 
perceived as “outsiders” to the third sector; as building “links” between traditional 
organisations and the trading cultures and markets; and as “potent organisational 
devices” to be employed in tackling social problems and needs in a business-like 
manner, that is, in ways which are efficient and financially viable, and in which 
traditional voluntary and third sector organisations are often deficient.38 On the 
other hand, there exist views that social enterprise is a “particular organisational 
form”, which is part of the third sector, but is at the same time different from other 
third sector organisations, such as voluntary and community organisations; that all 
third sector organisations are social enterprises; and that social enterprise is “a form 
of activity”. This latter view is one which avoids linking it to a particular 
organisational form, seeing it as applicable to any third sector organisation, as long 
as the latter is at least partially dependent on earned revenue.39 
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My particular position in this study is that I see social enterprise as a type of 
business that is part of the third sector, belonging to neither the private nor public 
sector. As such, this business does not belong to the for-profit type. Like a 
traditional business, it remains financially viable through revenue generated by 
commercial activities, but unlike a traditional for-profit organisation, it is not 
oriented towards private profit-sharing. For me social enterprise can be 
distinguished from other third sector organisations such as community and 
voluntary organisations. Even though these organisations also engage in trading like 
social enterprises, they are unlike social enterprises in that they remain substantially 
dependent upon grants and donations. 
 
Many third sector organisations (voluntary associations, charities and co-
operatives) have claimed to be “social enterprise”. But whether or not they are 
social enterprises depends on the extent to which they are market or community 
oriented. ‘The more market oriented they are, and the more they are oriented 
towards public and community benefit, the more they are accepted as part of the 
social enterprise mainstream.’40 That is, only the third sector organisations that are 
more market and community oriented could have a claim on the term “social 
enterprise”.  
 
2.2.2 From the third sector to new entrepreneurship 
 
As we have seen, social enterprise as a concept seems to have developed on both 
sides of the Atlantic. For my practical purpose, to understand the concept and 
orientation of social enterprise, at least two aspects of its development need to be 
considered.  
 
First, we need to understand the conditions under which social enterprise emerged 
in the past two or three decades. Focusing on the “Atlantic” experience, I consider 
the development of “new entrepreneurship” from within the so-called third sector 
as most relevant to our understanding of the emergence of social enterprise. Second, 
we need to recognise the existence of different perspectives on the third sector as 
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well as social enterprise – which are often seen as reflecting differences in 
orientation that exist on the different sides of the Atlantic. 
 
I propose here to deal with both aspects of the development of social enterprise; 
that is, to trace how a “new entrepreneurship” developing in the third sector has 
spawned “social enterprise”, and to touch upon the different perspectives on this 
new sector – those that will be later seen as influencing the development of social 
enterprise in the UK in the late 1990s.   
 
Occupying the intermediate space between the traditional private and public 
sectors, the third sector has assumed increasing economic roles, especially in 
allocating resources through the production of quasi-public goods and services – 
those in the areas of health, culture, education, social action, proximity services, 
sport, leisure, and the environment, among others. It has also been involved in 
providing a wide range of free or virtually free services to deprived people through 
voluntary contributions (in money or through voluntary work), as well as in 
regulating economic life, as in cases of associations or social co-operatives serving 
as partners of the public sector in bringing back to work low qualified unemployed 
people who risk being permanently excluded from the labour market.41  
 
As the third sector has assumed a larger profile, it has experienced change in recent 
decades in its nature. For example, volunteering has profoundly changed. Voluntary 
workers have been increasingly involved in “entrepreneurial” activities. Paid work 
has also undergone important change. Many third sector organisations have created 
new types of employment by hiring salaried workers under unemployment 
reduction programmes or developing semi-voluntary formulas or part-time work. 
Moreover, employees have found themselves in a new status – as members of the 
governing bodies of their organisations with the resultant control and decision-
making powers that such a status entails.42 
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Another significant “new” movement, which is particularly relevant to this thesis, 
is the creation of new legal forms especially designed to suit this new social 
entrepreneurship trend of reflecting the more entrepreneurial element as well as 
ensuring social objectives.43 As Defourny notes, ‘The recent introduction of new 
legal frameworks in the national legislation of various European states tends to 
confirm that we are dealing with a somewhat original kind of entrepreneurship.’44 
 
This new entrepreneurship was viewed, especially in the United States during the 
early 1990s, as an innovative response to the funding problem being experienced 
by non-profit organisations.45 In other words, finding it increasingly difficult to 
raise funds from private donations and state or foundation grants, these 
organisations had to become more entrepreneurial in their orientation.  
 
We must also note that other important changes in the wider socio-economic 
contexts in the OECD countries were also relevant. The seminar report referred to 
in sub-section 2.2.1.2 above succinctly summarises these changes: 
 
The demographic and fiscal pressures for welfare state reforms during the 1980s 
resulted in a shift from the traditional advocacy role of the non-profit sector 
towards the development of activities aimed at responding to new social needs 
through the autonomous production of social and community-driven public 
goods and services. Governments meanwhile sought to decentralise the 
provision of services in both labour and social policy areas, paving the way for 
outsourcing public services.46 
 
Other explanations for the increased tendency of third sector organisations to 
engage in commercial activities have also been proposed. To take but one example, 
the “institutional” theory focuses on the influence of “market disciplines”. That is, 
the language and practices of the market, which influenced the state sector through 
                                                                 
43
 Examples of these new legal forms for social enterprises are such as Italy’s social co-operatives, 
France’s Société Co-opératif d’Intèrêt Collectif (Scic), the UK’s Community Interest Company 
(CIC), Belgium’s social finality companies, and Finland’s Social Enterprise Law. Frabrizio Cafaggi 
and Paola Iamiceli, ‘New Frontiers in the Legal Structure and Legislation of Social Enterprises in 
Europe: A Comparative Analysis’ (2008) European University Institute Working Papers Law 
2008/16, 31   
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/8927/LAW_2008_16.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=> 
accessed 12 February 2015 
44
 Ibid 23-24 (emphasis added).  
45
 Dees, ‘The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship’ (n 8).  
46
 OECD (n 10) 3. 
26 
 
“new public management” (NPM),47 have also permeated civil society and come to 
be accepted by third sector organisations as a preferred way of “doing things”.48 
The result is the increased reliance on revenue generated through trading. 
 
One important result of these developments is that third sector organistations have 
increasingly assumed an entrepreneurial character. That is, they have come to 
possess an increasing number of features in common with traditional companies. 
They have nevertheless not been transformed into such entities. One central aspect 
of this new entrepreneurship is ‘the requirement (absolute or in part) for the 
production surplus to be ‘socialised’, that is to be reinvested in the development of 
the activity or to be used for the benefit of people other than those who control the 
organisation’.49 Moreover, its organisational methods also help to preclude such a 
transformation.  
 
Here we see the influence of the social economy orientation with its emphasis on 
the “social” aspects of the organisation. As we shall see, the private/entrepreneurial 
as against social tendencies would always be present in the development of social 
enterprise. Defourny succinctly describes this “social” aspect of organisation, 
 
The two concepts [non-profit and social economy approaches] embody the view 
that a third sector organisation should be autonomous or even independent, with 
its own decision-making bodies. The social economy approach also stresses that 
there should be a democratic decision-making process. Such features are often 
found in social enterprises since they are generally founded on a participatory 
dynamic which involves their members (paid workers, volunteers, users and/or 
other partners representing for instance the local community) in management 
and controlling bodies and since members’ power is generally not proportional 
to any capital stake they may hold. So we clearly have here characteristics which 
may be classified as social.50 
 
Of course, we can trace the development of social enterprise in other ways. Ridley-
Duff and Bull have explored the definitions of social enterprise that appeared in (1) 
a Social Audit Toolkit for worker and community co-operatives; (2) the EMES 
European Research Network; (3) consultation by the UK government on the CIC; 
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and (4) a report for the Inter-American Development Bank. Their purpose was to 
see if all these definitions display common threads. They have found that ‘In all 
cases, social enterprises are seen as socially driven organisations with social and/or 
environmental objectives combined with a strategy for economic sustainability’.51  
 
What I nevertheless see in the effort to identify such definitions is that all of them 
have their origins. For instance, the definition that first appeared in the 1979 edition 
of Spreckley’s Social Audit Toolkit had adopted the language characteristic of the 
co-operative movement.52 Moreover, a definition, once adopted (as in the case of 
social enterprise in the UK), would much influence the development of social 
enterprise in a particular country or society.  
 
However, without denying the validity of other explanations for the development 
of social enterprise, for me seeing it as having developed from within the third 
sector is more helpful. For one thing, there exist within this sector the “social” 
traditions, either in its more “traditional” form or the more “radical” orientation of 
the social economy, which today represent a central aspect of social enterprise. 
Moreover, this conception of social enterprise as having developed from within the 
third sector has both historical and spatial dimensions; that is, covering a time frame 
(the past two or three decades) and at least both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
The emergence of social enterprise as the development of a new entrepreneurship 
from within the third sector has had the important effect of expanding the latter’s 
field, thereby resulting in the blurring of sector boundaries. As Dees has pointed 
out, even though the movement is not a new phenomenon, its new name implies a 
new development, that is, the blurring of sector boundaries.  
 
In addition to innovative not-for-profit ventures, social entrepreneurship can 
include social purpose business ventures, such as for-profit community 
development banks, and hybrid organizations mixing not-for-profit and for-
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profit elements, such as homeless shelters that start businesses to train and 
employ their residents. This new language helps broaden the playing field.53 
 
Apart from broadening the playing field, this new term has also caused a conceptual 
confusion of what is or is not subsumed under it. It is largely in view of this situation 
that I have decided to go without a rigorous definition of social enterprise. A major 
benefit of adopting this approach is that it does not exclude organisations that do 
not neatly fit in with a rigorous definition: social enterprise is so diverse that such 
a definition would not do justice to its diversity. I thus opt for a deeper 
understanding of the concept in its various dimensions including its development 
in particular national contexts (the subject of sections 2.4 and 2.5). 
 
I fully recognise the intellectual as well as practical drawbacks of having to dispense 
with a rigorous definition.54 But such deeper understanding provides us with at least 
some idea of what we are dealing with – and, in so far as my research interest is 
concerned, how it has been legally regulated. 
 
In fact, the inclusiveness of the social enterprise concept still serves some practical 
purposes. Given the evolving roles of social enterprises, it is impossible to stick to 
any particular model of this movement. In the UK, as we shall see, its meanings 
have evolved and expanded considerably during the past decade or so. In the wider 
OECD context, the fundamental “triple bottom line” goal seems to have been 
superseded by a multiple bottom line orientation. Many social businesses are 
already going ‘one step further to include governance as an objective to be met, 
adding democratic decision making processes to social, economic and 
environmental objectives pursued’.55 
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2.3 Characteristics and orientations of social enterprises 
 
If, as I have argued, it is more useful to identify the characteristics and orientations 
of social enterprises than fix on a specific definition, what are these characteristics 
and orientations? 
 
2.3.1 Social enterprise: Characteristic features and different orientations 
 
Inherent in the discussion so far are two different orientations. According to Ridley-
Duff and Southcombe, one involves the move towards businesses with a social 
purpose, called a social purpose perspective on social enterprise. This perspective 
emphasises the social objectives of the entrepreneurs and the social purposes of the 
enterprises they have created. The other is a socialisation perspective on social 
enterprise, which is ‘based on advocacy of mutualism in worker co-operatives, 
employee-ownership and other societies and associations in the social economy 
...’
56
 The social purpose perspective is rooted in writings on social entrepreneurship 
that have been influenced by US thinking on business with a social mission,57 
whereas the socialisation perspective is more dominant on the other side of the 
Atlantic.  
 
Equally important, the discussion of the change in the third sector has also helped 
us identify some central features of social enterprise. It has become apparent from 
this discussion that social enterprise, either in the traditional third-sector 
organisational form or as a new entrepreneurship, is most notable for its “social 
orientation”. That is, ‘the ultimate goal of an entrepreneur is to create economic 
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wealth whereas, for a social entrepreneur, the priority is to fulfill their social 
mission’.58  
 
Practically, the concept of social enterprise is often associated with the idea of social 
entrepreneurs assuming the role of social change agents. ‘Social entrepreneurship 
signals the imperative to drive social change, and it is that potential pay-off, with 
its lasting, transformational benefit to society, that sets the field and its practitioners 
apart.’59 This idea is echoed in all definitions and understandings of social 
enterprise. As Ashoka puts it, 
 
Just as entrepreneurs change the face of business, social entrepreneurs act as the 
change agents for society, seizing opportunities others miss and improving 
systems, inventing new approaches and creating solutions to change society for 
the better. While a business entrepreneur might create entirely new industries, a 
social entrepreneur comes with new solutions to social problems and then 
implements them on a large scale.60 
 
According to Dees, social entrepreneurs take up this challenge in various ways. 
These include adopting a mission to create and sustain social value (not just private 
value); recognising and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities with a view to 
serving that mission; engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation, 
and learning; acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in hand; 
and exhibiting heightened accountability to the constituencies served and for the 
outcomes created.61 
 
It is the primacy of this social aim that significantly marks social entrepreneurs off 
from their for-profit cousins. I would like to round off the discussion of this aspect 
of social enterprise by quoting Martin and Osberg, who clearly explain the general 
orientation of social entrepreneurs as follows: 
 
The social entrepreneur…neither anticipates nor creates substantial financial 
profit for his or her investors…or for himself or herself. Instead, the social 
entrepreneur aims for value in the form of large-scale transformational benefit 
that accrues either to a significant segment of society or to society at 
large…[T]he social entrepreneur…targets on underserved, neglected, or highly 
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disadvantaged population that lacks the financial means or political clout to 
achieve the transformative benefit on its own.62 
 
Another important aspect of social enterprise that has emerged from our discussion 
thus far is its increasingly economic or entrepreneurial orientation. As we have 
seen, the efforts of non-profit organisations to achieve their social objectives by 
engaging (at least in part) in commercial activities have produced the new 
entrepreneurship. It is this entrepreneurial orientation that marks social enterprise 
off from its traditional non-profit counterpart, and that has already become one of 
its defining features. 
 
The idea of social enterprise as a business enterprise rather than a charity or other 
related entities is thus now inherent in all its definitions. As has been pointed out 
earlier, social enterprise as a business enterprise is not for-profit in orientation. To 
be financially viable, it needs to generate revenue through trading, but the revenue 
thus generated is principally used for social and community purposes rather than as 
private profits. In the UK, in particular, social enterprise has become well 
established as a business that trades for a social and/or environmental purpose.63 
Conceptualising social enterprise in this way at the very least has the important 
effect of distinguishing it from other socially oriented activities such as 
philanthropy, social activism or voluntarism, traditional companies with charitable 
foundations, or CSR activities of corporations. Moreover, it is worth re-
emphasising that it is in this respect that social enterprises can be distinguished from 
other third sector entities, such as voluntary and community organisations, which 
also engage in trading. That is, whereas social enterprises are mainly business-
oriented (with a social purpose), the other third sector organisations still 
considerably rely on grants and donations.  
  
Apart from the features of social enterprise that have emerged from our discussion 
of the changing nature of the third sector, we may add the environmental concern 
as another one of its central features (though this feature now tends to be regarded 
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as part of the “social” objective). This aspect of social enterprise reflects worldwide 
concerns about the global environmental situation rather than changes in the nature 
of third-sector organisations that have led to their new orientations and forms. 
  
The relevance of environmental concerns to social enterprises lies in the 
opportunities social entrepreneurs are now offered to take up these challenges by 
filling the gaps in the public services in this area which, like many others in the 
social sector, have been left by public authorities. Indeed, ‘the opportunities for 
social enterprises have increased in recent decades in parallel with the growth of 
national and international policy towards sustainable development, regeneration 
policy and specific areas of environment-related regulation and fiscal incentives, 
public sector reforms and the outsourcing of public services’.64 
 
With the growing importance of environmental concerns all over the world, it is not 
surprising that we have witnessed in recent years the growth of entrepreneurship 
motivated by environmental values. Social enterprise activity in this area has been 
known by various names, including environmental or green entrepreneurship, eco-
preneurship or enviropreneurship, and sustainable and sustainability 
entrepreneurship. ‘Entrepreneurial actors, with their propensity for innovation, 
experimentation and risk taking, are seen by some authors as the driving force of a 
sustainable society.’65 
 
This environmental goal has now become an important aspect of social enterprise. 
It forms part of the movement’s “triple bottom line” orientation. But as I have 
pointed out, this orientation might have been superseded by a new multi-bottom 
line one that also stresses the importance of the independent or democratic 
governance of social enterprise. Actually, as has also been made clear earlier, this 
specific aspect of social enterprise may be regarded as part of its “social” 
orientation. However, given the importance given to it by many quarters in the UK, 
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I consider it appropriate to mark it off as a separate defining characteristic of social 
enterprise. 
 
2.3.2 Social enterprise as identified in this study 
 
I am now in a position to broadly characterise social enterprise as possessing three 
central features that mark it off from other socially beneficial activities, namely, 
entrepreneurial (economic) orientation, social objectives, and social control over 
its assets and activities. 
 
As in the case of tracing its development, it is certainly possible to characterise 
social enterprise in other ways. Pearce has proposed six “defining characteristics” 
of social enterprise, namely: ‘(1) having a social purpose or purposes; (2) achieving 
the social purposes by, at least in part, engaging in trade in the marketplace; (3) not 
distributing to individuals; (4) holding assets and wealth in trust for community 
benefit; (5) democratically involving members of its constituency in the governance 
of the organisation; and (6) being independent organisations accountable to a 
defined constituency and to the wider community’.66 
 
Pearce’s characterisation of social enterprise is in essence close to the one I have 
proposed. However, he has helped us to see the nature of this business in finer detail. 
Moreover, the explanation he offers for each of these characteristics is also helpful 
to our understanding of social enterprise. Therefore, I would like to take a look at 
his idea in some more detail. 
 
For Pearce, having social purpose is the most important feature of social enterprise, 
since this means that it aims to benefit the community or a specific beneficiary 
group. The “social” is taken to include environmental concerns. Engaging in 
commercial activity is secondary in importance, because, as a main source of 
revenue, this is the means to achieving the social purpose. When social enterprises 
generate profits, these are not to be distributed to their owners or shareholders but 
reinvested in the business or for the benefit of the community. Moreover, the assets 
of a social enterprise may not be sold off and divided among members, directors or 
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other group of stakeholders. Finally, social enterprise governance should involve 
participation of stakeholders.67 
 
In essence seeing no difference between Pearce’s characterisation of social 
enterprise and mine, I shall focus on the three defining characteristics of social 
enterprise rather than six as proposed by him. However, I would like to add a final 
note to the way I have characterised social enterprise.  
 
As already pointed out, the emergence of the new entrepreneurship does not signal 
the transformation of non-profit organisations or other socially beneficial activities 
into traditional companies (and nor does this amount to the privatisation of public 
services).68 Apart from its clear “social” purpose, this new entrepreneurship is 
subject to social and legal mechanisms that impose control over both its assets and 
activities. Equally important, this “economic” orientation also sets it apart from a 
traditional non-profit organisation that mainly depends on donations and grants. It 
is in these terms that social enterprise can, from my point of view and for my 
practical purpose, be sufficiently characterised. 
 
The practical utility of this way of conceptualising social enterprise may be seen 
from the characteristics and orientation of social enterprise in the UK today. The 
following section has been included partially for this purpose. 
 
2.4 Analysis of the social enterprise landscape of the UK 
 
This section offers a historical analysis of the social enterprise movement in the UK 
with a view to illustrating how the movement emerged and developed in a national 
context. The UK social enterprise movement is very much part of the “Atlantic 
landscape” I have presented in sections 2.2 and 2.3, and the three aspects of social 
enterprise I have identified (entrepreneurial orientation, social objectives, and social 
control) are very much relevant to UK social enterprise. A fuller understanding of 
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social enterprise in this country nevertheless requires tracing both its origin and 
development especially from the late 1990s.  
 
2.4.1 Origin of social enterprise in the UK 
 
Social enterprise in the UK can be traced very far into the past – to at least the 19th 
century, and its modern form began to take shape as late as the 1970s (the case of 
the social audit toolkit in sub-section 2.2.2). As we shall see, the emergence of 
social enterprise in this country, as in most other OECD countries, is the result of 
the institutionalisation of this movement, especially within the non-profit sector.69 
 
The UK social enterprise is a diverse movement: it comprises ventures such as co-
operatives, credit unions, housing associations, community development trusts, 
social firms, and community businesses. The main principle fueling the movement 
during this period was that of a “third way”, focusing on the ideas of stakeholding, 
social inclusion and community. According to this principle, responsible citizens 
need to have a sense of shared purposes. They should not simply claim rights from 
the state but should also accept their individual responsibilities and duties as 
citizens, parents and members of communities. Therefore, a third way should 
promote the value of community by supporting the structures and institutions of 
civil society, such as the family and voluntary organisations.70 Social enterprises 
driven by economic and social goals represent an organisational exemplar of the 
third way. In tracing the origin of social enterprise in the UK, this is where we may 
start.  
 
2.4.2 Emergence and development of social enterprise in the UK 
 
Teasdale has already mapped out a chronological path of the development of social 
enterprise policy and discourse in the UK.71 However, whilst drawing upon this, I 
propose a different interpretation of the trends in the development of social 
enterprise in this country, one which seeks to understand this development in line 
with the concept and orientation of social enterprise presented above. 
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Prior to the emergence of social enterprise in the UK, there had already existed, 
apart from traditional third sector organisations, a strong social economy tradition, 
most notably in the form of worker co-operatives and community enterprises, which 
placed strong emphasis on economic democracy and social ownership. As I see it, 
social enterprise emerged not only as a result of the New Labour Government’s 
policy to use it, initially, as a tool for regeneration of deprived areas but also, 
eventually, as the success of what has been referred to as the “social purpose” 
perspective on social enterprise in gaining growing recognition within the third 
sector. Even so, however, we shall see that the influence of both traditional third 
sector organisations and the social economy tradition is still there. 
 
2.4.2.1 1999: Emergence of social enterprise in the UK 
 
The term “social enterprise” first officially appeared in the UK with the launch of 
the HM Treasury’s Enterprise and Exclusion in November 1999.72 This report 
appeared just after the setting up of Social Enterprise London (SEL) in the previous 
year, and these two events may be taken as signaling the emergence of the social 
enterprise movement in this country. 
 
It is significant that SEL came into being not only with a label attached to it –  in 
the name of the new organisation, which is now the largest social enterprise network 
in the UK with over 2,400 members, linking and inspiring social enterprises in the 
country and beyond – but also with its first tentative definition: 
 
Social enterprises are businesses that do more than make money; they have 
social as well as economic aims and form the heart of what is now coming to be 
known as the “Social Economy”. Aims include the creation of employment, 
stable jobs, access to work for disadvantaged groups, the provision of locally 
based services and training and personal development opportunities.73 
 
 
With the creation of an organisation with a “social enterprise” label and a proposed 
tentative definition, the social enterprise movement in the UK tangibly took shape. 
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The definition clearly shows that SEL at that time had a strong focus on 
employment opportunities and democratic ownership. This orientation was 
probably influenced by the worker co-operative elements in the network, and 
reflected what has been called the socialisation perspective on social enterprise. 
 
However, apart from the influence of co-operatives, community enterprises led in 
part by the Development Trusts Association were also trying to claim being part of 
the social enterprise movement. Their aim was to keep wealth in local communities 
and to establish social ownership of local assets.74  
 
The main difference between co-operative and community enterprise proponents 
lies in the extent to which the social enterprise to be established is financially 
sustainable through trading. Many community enterprises during that time relied 
primarily on trading for their income, but they were financially viable only to the 
extent of their success in attracting grants and donations. 
 
The significance of the year 1999 lies in the fact that it marks the expansion of the 
meaning of social enterprise as closely affiliated with the co-operative movement 
to incorporate community enterprises. For a small group of people closely related 
to, or affiliated with SEL, and adhering to the co-operative discourse influenced by 
the social economy tradition, social enterprise did not involve local regeneration. 
However, social enterprise was then portrayed by the government as a policy tool 
to tackle market failure and regenerate deprived areas, and the meaning of the 
“social” shifted its focus from economic democracy based on democratic ownership 
to what some describe as ‘a regenerative tonic’ for ‘hard pressed areas’.75 This new 
orientation is inherent in what may be regarded as a provisional definition of social 
enterprise in Enterprise and Exclusion: 
 
Social enterprises, which together make up the social economy, are in most ways 
like any other private sector businesses, but they are geared towards social 
regeneration and help, rather than simply the generation of profits. As such social 
enterprises do not fall within the standard definitions of private or public sector 
enterprises.76 
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2.4.2.2 1999-2001: The Institutionalisation of social enterprise 
 
The second phase in the development of social enterprise in the UK may be taken 
to represent what I would term the institutionalisation of the movement. This 
happened in 1999-2001, when the Social Enterprise Unit was established within the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Its initiation was announced by Douglas 
Alexander, minister for e-commerce at that time, in October 2001. This move 
should be regarded as a groundbreaking development. The Unit was an important 
focal point during this time as it established the government’s definition of social 
enterprise and served to coordinate the government, the third sector and funding 
agencies. During this time, however, there were regular clashes among differing 
ideological interests.  
 
On the one hand, more traditional third sector organisations were unhappy with the 
placement of the Social Enterprise Unit within the DTI, which was mainly 
responsible for promoting trade and industry. For them the focus should rather have 
been placed on community cohesion or inclusion through the placement of the Unit 
within a different government department.77 They were keen to demonstrate that 
charities and other non-profit organisations had a long tradition of trading for a 
social purpose. Moreover, those from the co-operative movement, which represents 
another tradition in the third sector, were committed to promoting economic 
democracy and collective ownership as defining characteristics of social enterprise, 
having commitment to the socialisation perspective on social enterprise. 
 
However, the social business representatives attempted to convince the government 
of the need to promote what was practically effective rather than focus on the 
process as advocated by community enterprises and co-operatives. In particular, 
they attacked the latter’s focus on democratic control and the limits on non-
distribution of profits which, they argued, would exclude private entrepreneurs who 
also create social values. They were, from my point of view, committed to the social 
purpose perspective on social enterprise.  
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Despite the clashes of these different perspectives, the period 1999-2001 marks the 
initial movement of social businesses into the social enterprise sector. An important 
consequence of this development was the widening of the social enterprise concept 
to incorporate the notion of businesses operating in the social sector. This clearly 
points to the growing influence of the “social purpose” orientation in the third 
sector. 
 
Though the period was notable for the clashes of competing ideas and interests and 
intensive lobbying by representatives of co-operatives, community enterprises, and 
social businesses, I see this period as the time when social enterprise in the form of 
“new entrepreneurship” (described in sub-section 2.2.2) became institutionalised 
on the social enterprise landscape in the UK. As Teasdale has noted, the 
‘…positioning of social enterprise within the DTI was seen by some commentators 
as prioritising a social business discourse over and above those for whom the 
process was as important as outcome’.78 
 
2.4.2.3 2001-2005: Establishment of the meaning and orientation of social 
enterprise 
 
The early work of the Social Enterprise Unit focused upon defining the term social 
enterprise. The definition was kept deliberately vague so as to permit the inclusion 
of as wide a range of forms as possible. The official definition of social enterprise 
contained in Social Enterprise: A Strategy for Success (used until May 2010) was 
as follows: 
 
A social enterprise is a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses 
are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, 
rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders or 
owners.79 
 
In reaffirming that social enterprise is a business, this definition reflected a 
dominant discourse within the DTI at that time, which was pushed strongly by 
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social business representatives. We can therefore conclude that the years 2001-2005 
witnessed the incorporation of social enterprises as social businesses. 
  
On the other hand, from my point of view, this development actually represents a 
shift in the direction described above – that is, from the third sector or social 
economy (as the sector lying between the traditional public and private sectors and 
including co-operatives, mutual societies, associations, and foundations) to what 
has been referred to as “new entrepreneurship”. 
 
This was evident in the inclusion of for-profit organisations with a social mission, 
as well as co-operatives and community enterprises, in the meaning of social 
enterprise. The significance of the inclusion of such for-profit entities lies in the 
fact that, though charities and other non-profit organisations had a long tradition 
of trading for a social purpose, it was the for-profit organisations with social 
objectives that primarily relied on earned income. The shift to social business is 
also inherent in Teasdale’s observation that ‘The assimilation of social businesses 
necessarily diluted the influence of the co-operative movement and community 
enterprises’.80 
 
2.4.2.4 2006-2010: Reassertion of the third sector 
 
Given the long tradition of charities and non-profit organisations engaging in 
trading as a source of their income, it was natural for the voluntary and community 
sector in the UK to be interested in the potential utility of social enterprise as an 
“activity” (not as an organisational type) being carried out by a variety of entities 
in this sector. The purpose was to increase the role of voluntary organisations, in 
particular, in delivering public services. I shall not elaborate on this concept of 
social enterprise as an activity. So suffice it just to point out “the fatal flaw” of this 
idea. 
 
…activities [frequently] evolve into institutional forms. Whatever they do, 
questions arise regarding governance, liability, power, ownership, control and 
managerial authority that have to be resolved both on paper and in practice. 
Social enterprise therefore may be an activity and a process, but it is also has to 
decide upon form.81 
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We should note in this connection that the chief concern of organisations such as 
the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations (ACVO) was to 
enhance the role of non-profits in delivering public services. As a result of intense 
lobbying by the strategic alliances of voluntary organisations, the official 
responsibility for social enterprise was moved from the DTI to the Cabinet Office, 
where the Office of the Third Sector (OTS), which replaced the Social Enterprise 
Unit in 2006, was located. This Office came into being with a new policy priority: 
 
Social enterprises are part of the ‘third sector’, which encompasses all 
organisations which are non-governmental, principally reinvest surpluses in the 
community or organisation and seek to deliver social or environmental 
benefits.82 
 
However, though this period may be said to have witnessed the reassertion of the 
third sector, I tend to see the thrust of social businesses or for-profits with social 
objectives as more dominant, as evident in the re-labeling of voluntary 
organisations delivering public services as “social enterprises”. The first national 
survey of social enterprise found that almost half of third sector organisations 
identified themselves as social enterprises. Moreover, a large number of private 
businesses also adopted this label.83  
 
Of course, social enterprise as a label can be attached to non-profits relying at least 
in part on earned income as well as for-profits with social objectives. But the trend 
was unmistakable that social enterprises increasingly relied on earned income. The 
period was characterised not so much by the return of the third sector as the effort 
to promote the “business model” within this sector.84 This is because ‘Earned 
income is likely to remain the most important source of revenue for many charities. 
Certainly it is unlikely that government grants to charities will increase significantly 
in the near future’.85 
 
Significantly, though in 2010 the Office of the Third Sector was renamed the Office 
for Civil Society, no single actor has so far managed to capture social enterprise for 
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itself. This was partly because the government chose to keep the movement loosely 
defined to permit its inclusion of as wide a range of forms as possible.86 We may 
expect that, in the future, some other entities, in addition to co-operatives, 
community enterprises, social businesses, and not-for-profit and voluntary 
organisations, might feel the need to describe themselves as social enterprises.  
 
We have clearly seen how the development of social enterprise in the UK was 
shaped by the country’s traditional third sector or social economy as well as the 
influence of what has been term “new entrepreneurship”. Let us now consider social 
enterprise in another national context – one which is not culturally part of, and lying 
far away from, the Atlantic world. The following section focuses upon recent efforts 
in Thailand to come to grips with the meaning and concept of social enterprise – 
how this has been influenced by the global trends in the development of this type 
of business – as well as the problems and needs of social enterprise in Thailand. 
Chapter 7 provides a fuller account of how social enterprise in this country has 
developed – with emphasis on the national and international influences relevant to 
its emergence and growth. 
 
2.5 Understanding social enterprise in Thailand 
 
The development of social enterprise in Thailand is very recent, although, as we 
shall later see in Chapter 7, social enterprises may be said to have been in existence 
in this country since at least the 1970s. The development of social enterprise in 
Thailand has been profoundly influenced by ideas and initiatives that have emerged 
elsewhere, particularly in the Atlantic world. However, as in the case of the UK 
social enterprise, Thai social enterprise must be understood in its specific national 
context. As indicated above, this section focuses on the concept and meaning of 
Thai social enterprise as well as a brief overview of its problems and needs.   
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2.5.1 Concept and meaning of social enterprise in Thailand 
 
The concept and meaning of Thai social enterprise have been profoundly influenced 
by the development of social enterprise in other countries. In view of the extensive 
global social enterprise networks today, this is understandable. Even though social 
enterprises of one form or another have been in existence in Thailand for some time, 
the concept of social enterprise is quite new. This section explores the development 
of concept of social enterprise in this country and how its meaning has been 
formalised. 
 
As we have seen in sections 2.2 and 2.3 above, social enterprise in Europe and the 
United States, in particular, has developed from within the third sector. Thailand 
may be said to have its own “third sector”, but it is difficult to determine how 
extensive its coverage is. Apart from its two main types of non-profit organisations, 
associations and foundations, the country has many other social or public-oriented 
entities in the form such as community enterprises, co-operatives, NGOs, and state 
enterprises. Moreover, organisations playing a crucial role in “filling the gaps” left 
by the state and the market include Buddhist monasteries and other religious 
institutions. All these organisations have their own specific purposes and 
orientations, but they may be regarded as providing the social foundation for the 
development of Thai social enterprise. This means that while the concept and even 
some forms of “practice” of social enterprise have been imported, it is the domestic 
social ground that has in no small way contributed to the growth of this “new” 
business model in Thailand. 
 
Academic literature on social enterprise in Thailand is still very limited. In my 
search I have come across only a few articles, theses, and research works. The 
articles mainly provide basic understanding of social enterprise,87 and those of 
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critical nature are hardly available,88 as are those addressing the legal aspects of 
social enterprise.89 A few theses which are available are naturally more focused in 
their scope,90 and one of them deals with the legal forms for social enterprise.91 
Existing research works are also limited in number;92 therefore, during a recent 
workshop run by Bob Doherty, participants called for more academic research in 
the Thai context to help build the capacity of the sector.93 
 
However, though academic knowledge on social enterprise in Thailand is still 
limited, the sector is quite notable for its rapid growth (this will be shown in Chapter 
7). The concept of social enterprise, particularly the mainstream one, has also 
become more or less widespread within the sector and in other interested quarters. 
This is probably the result of the support by strong social enterprise networks (as 
will also be shown in Chapter 7). Thai social entrepreneurs have perhaps been 
“learning by doing”, and members of the interested public have on their part been 
more regularly exposed to the idea of social enterprise via channels such as the 
media, seminars and workshops, and other more or less regular activities to promote 
this type of business. 
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It is quite interesting to note how understanding of social enterprise has permeated 
various quarters in Thai society. For instance, Sathit Limpongpan, Chairman of the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), in declaring SET’s support for investment in 
social enterprise, referred to social enterprises as ‘business models operating with 
missions to tackle and improve society and [the] environment through efficient 
business operation, while generating profits back into the business and the local 
community towards sustainable changes’.94 To cite just one more example, an 
article on the Thailand Creative Design Centre website has characterised “the 
business of social entrepreneurs” in the following terms:   
 
The business of social entrepreneurs is a profit-oriented one, but the so-called 
profit is measured by various indicators, such as profit measured from the earned 
cash, or profit in the form of better quality of life or better social structure. 
Moreover, the profit does not exclusively belong to shareholders or owners of the 
business but rather to all stakeholders – namely, consumers, the company, its 
employees, the community, and the environment. To put it more simply, the heart 
of the matter lies in the fact that once the business operation becomes profitable, 
both the company and the community are self-reliant. They no longer need to wait 
for assistance from the government or to depend wholly on donations. This will, 
in turn, result in upgrading or changing the living conditions of the disadvantaged 
in the community in the long run.95 
 
The Thai concept of social enterprise may be said to be mainly attributed to 
Elkington’s idea of the triple bottom line of profit, people, and planet.96 This idea 
has become more generally known as the “triple bottom line” of financial, social 
and environmental goals. In Thailand it has become a mainstream, if still quite 
recent, idea of social enterprise. Nittayakasetrawat, for example, uses the triple 
bottom-line idea as a model97 to identify the characteristics of Thai social 
enterprise.98 From some of his “indicators”, we can clearly see that the 
characteristics of Thai social enterprise are essentially those we have found in the 
                                                                 
94
 Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), ‘Thai Bourse Supports Investment in Social Enterprise’ News 
Release: SET News (Bangkok, 4 March 2014)   
95
 Chatcharaphon Penchom, “Business of the social entrepreneurs: A new economic model to create 
an ideal society” [in Thai], TCDC: Thailand Creative Design Centre <http://www.tcdc.or.th/14862> 
accessed 20 August 2015. 
96
 This idea was originally developed in John Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom 
Line of the 21st Century Business (New Society Publishers, 1998). 
97
 Nittyakasetrawat, ‘The Development of Social Enterprises in Thailand and Other Countries’ (n 
92) 6.  
98
 He has constructed 17 indicators of social enterprise for the purpose of comparing Thai social 
enterprises with those of other countries. The two sets of cases share most of the social enterprise 
characteristics he has identified in his work. ibid (n 92) 25. 
46 
 
general understanding of social enterprise,99 especially as a business with social 
mission and features such as good corporate governance and potential for financial 
viability. 
 
Another important research product represents a collective effort in listing 50 
“good” social enterprises – Thailand Social Enterprise 50,100 which currently serves 
as a very useful “handbook” and very important source of information on Thai 
social enterprises. It defines social enterprise as ‘an enterprise that clearly has the 
main goals of solving the problems of, and developing, the community, society, and 
the environment, and that has as its main source of revenue profits from the sale of 
goods and/or services in accordance with its goals’.101 This definition clearly 
reflects the triple bottom line of community and society, the environment, and 
profit. 
 
Still another important document I would like to refer to here is Master Plan for the 
Promotion of Social Enterprise 2010-2014.102 Approved by the Cabinet in July 
2010, Master Plan not only gives a definition of social enterprise but also sets forth 
the general orientation of this type of business activity in Thailand. The definition, 
which clearly embodies the triple bottom line concept, is given as follows: 
 
Social enterprise is an enterprise that gains its revenue from the sale and 
production of goods and/or services, and that is set up with clear objectives at the 
very beginning of solving the problems of, and developing, the community, 
society, and/or the environment, and not maximising profits for its shareholders 
or owner. New objectives may be added to the original ones, or the latter may be 
modified [but only in keeping with this non-private profit principle].103  
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Master Plan elaborates on this definition of social enterprise by delineating its 
“special” characteristics: having the production process and operation in providing 
goods and services that do not cause any permanent or long-term damage to society, 
popular well-being and the environment; having good corporate governance; 
having a potential for financial viability; re-investing most of the profits in 
expanding the business to achieve its objectives or returning those profits to society 
and users of its goods and services; being able to operate in various organisational 
structures; and adhering to the principles of sufficiency economy.104 
 
Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Social Enterprise Promotion 
(hereinafter called “Social Enterprise Promotion Regulations 2011”) were also 
issued the following year,105 which restate in a more precise manner the definition 
of social enterprise and its characteristics as proposed in Master Plan: 
 
“Social enterprise” refers to the activity of the private sector, either as an 
individual, a group of individuals, or the community, who engages in a venture 
or an operation with clear objectives at the very beginning of mainly solving the 
problems of, and developing, the community, society and the environment, 
generates revenue from the sale and production of goods, or provision of services, 
which is not meant at maiximising profits for the shareholders or owners of the 
venture or the operation, and has the following characteristics: 
 
(1) relying on the production process and operation in providing goods and 
services that do not cause any permanent or long-term damage to popular 
well-being, society and the environment; 
(2) making use of the philosophy of sufficiency economy; 
(3) having a potential for financial viability; 
(4) re-investing most of the profits in expanding the business to achieve its 
objectives of solving the problems of, and developing, the community, 
society, or the environment, or returning those profits to society; 
(5) being able to operate in various organisational structures; and 
(6) having good corporate governance.106 
 
The most recent and significant move is the introduction of the Social Enterprise 
Promotion Bill (to be further dealt with in Chapter 7), which has been placed as the 
Special Agenda 1: Social Enterprise by the National Reform Council.107 This 
Special Agenda has crystallised the Thai social enterprise concept, which, following 
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the enactment of the Bill in the near future, will be formalised, especially in an 
official definition of social enterprise. Now a “working definition” has been 
proposed which makes a distinction between two sides of social enterprise – the 
business side and social and public organisation side. 
 
On the business side, social enterprise is defined in the following terms: ‘social 
enterprise is a type of business, which is set up mainly for social purpose and 
objectives, and which re-invests most of the profit it generates for the social purpose 
it sets for itself and not for the creation of private wealth and interests’.108 On the 
social and public organisation side, social enterprise is defined with a more or less 
different focus:  
 
…social enterprise represents a new organisational type formed to tackle social 
problems by adopting business models with efficient management and mainly 
depending on market mechanisms in its operation without abandoning its original 
purpose and objectives but with a belief that the reliance on the new 
organisational type will lead to financial self-reliance and reduction of the state’s 
financial support and donations, which are not consistent and certain, thereby 
making it impossible for the organisation to plan its operation for the achievement 
of its objectives.109 
 
As part of the definition given above, Special Agenda identifies four characteristics 
of social enterprise, which, it states, are similar in all national contexts. These 
characteristics are as follows: 
 
(1) being an organisation set up with the main purpose of tackling social problems (not 
that of maximising profits and interests of shareholders); 
(2) relying on a business model in its operation, its main source of income thus being the 
sale of goods or services, not grants from the state or donations; 
(3) managing the profits by re-investing them back into the business or distributing them 
for public, not private, benefit; and 
(4) having good governance in management in relation to the people in the organisation, 
society and the environment.110 
 
Finally, the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill supplies a formal definition of social 
enterprise. The Bill is now being subjected to public hearings by the Thai Social 
Enterprise Office (TSEO);111 hence, certain modifications can be expected before 
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it eventually becomes law. However, by now the concept of social enterprise seems 
to have been firmly established, as embodied in the definition of social enterprise 
provided in section 4 of the Bill: 
 
“Social enterprise” refers to a legal person, who produces goods, provides 
services, or engages in other activities in the private sector, with a clear objective 
at the very beginning of mainly solving the problems of, and developing, the 
community, society and the environment, and not that of principally maiximising 
profits for the shareholders or owners, and with the following special 
characteristics: 
 
(1) setting social objectives as the main purpose of the venture; 
(2) having a potential to become financially sustainable; 
(3) relying on the production process and operation in providing goods and 
services that do not cause any continuing or long-term damage to society, 
popular well-being, and the environment; and 
(4) re-investing most of the profits in expanding the business to achieve its 
stated objectives, or returning those profits to society or its consumers.112 
 
It is Special Agenda together with the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill attached to 
it that have most clearly and fully defined the concept of social enterprise, which is 
actually in line with the idea of social enterprise now generally adopted in many 
other countries. We may now conclude that the Thai concept of social enterprise 
has been conceptualised as a profit-oriented venture with social mission and 
environmental concerns and “special characteristics” such as those identified in the 
Social Enterprise Promotion Regulations 2011 and Special Agenda. 
 
Master Plan explicitly acknowledges the practical relevance of the experiences of 
other countries in developing their social enterprises. In this respect, the UK 
experiences seem to have been particularly important. However, the development 
of social enterprise in each country has also been influenced by its specific problems 
and needs, and indigenous social or cultural innovations. In Thailand, a special 
mention should be made of the philosophy of “sufficiency economy”113 developed 
by H.M. King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The idea has been adopted as a general 
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guideline for the country’s sustainable development,114 and its principles have also 
been incorporated into the concept of Thai social enterprise. 
 
Despite an existence going back several decades, Thai social enterprises ‘…just 
came into formal identification in 2010’.115 That means that virtually no official 
documentation of this type of business existed prior to that year: to date, only 
Master Plan and the Social Enterprise Promotion Regulations 2011 can be found 
on the TSEO website, other official documents available there being orders 
appointing various committees. However, on the basis of other sources of evidence, 
we can say that the Thai social enterprise sector has experienced significant growth, 
which will be shown in Chapter 7. Now let me offer a very brief overview of the 
problems and needs of social enterprise as it its being developed in Thailand. 
 
2.5.2 Problems and needs of social enterprise in Thailand 
 
I have already established an understanding of social enterprise as a business with 
social mission. As a business, it mainly relies on the revenue from its trading, and 
this orientation clearly distinguishes it from other public-oriented entities, such as 
some forms of charities, which also generate revenue in a similar way, but which 
still largely rely on donations and grants, especially from public sources. As will 
become clearer in subsequent chapters, Thai social enterprise has been conceived 
of and is being developed as such a business. However, a crucial problem for social 
enterprise in Thailand, as will be further elaborated in Chapters 6 and 8, is that it 
still lacks a legal form specifically designed to meet its needs. What then are these 
needs, and why such a legal form is required to satisfy them? 
 
It is generally recognised that ‘[a] social enterprise is not defined by its legal status 
but by its nature: what it does that is social, the basis on which that social mission 
is embedded in a form of social ownership and governance and the way it uses its 
profits it generates through trading activities’.116 Social enterprise in Thailand is 
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actually being developed without a specifically designed legal form: Thai social 
enterprises can operate within any of the existing legal structures or none at all. 
Though, as will be shown in Chapters 7-8, the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill 
particularly recognises the usefulness of social enterprises operating as limited 
companies under the Civil and Commercial Code, there are limits to this usefulness. 
In fact, as I shall demonstrate in Chapters 6-8, there are limits to the usefulness of 
reliance on any of the traditional legal forms. 
 
As will also be shown in Chapter 8, though given the vast and varied nature of social 
enterprise in Thailand (and elsewhere in the world), the need for the diversity of 
legal vehicles is undeniable. Nonetheless, as will fully explored in Chapters 3-4, 
social enterprise is not just a type of business: it is essentially a stakeholding entity. 
As such, it needs not only legal rules to facilitate its operation as a business 
organisation but also those that assure accountability to its stakeholders. In this 
respect, I shall argue that, while the existing legal forms (most notably the limited 
company under the Civil and Commercial Code) provides most of the facilitative 
rules required by social enterprise, none of them fully meets its need for those that 
assure its accountability to stakeholders. 
 
Both types of legal rules represent the fundamental needs of social enterprise as a 
stakeholding entity. That is why a legal form specifically designed to meet such 
needs is required. In the case of Thailand, as I shall point out, the unavailability of 
such a legal vehicle has further implications. It is my argument that a legal form 
properly designed for social enterprise not only satisfies its needs as a stakeholding 
entity but also contributes to the development of the social enterprise sector. How 
such a legal form, or more generally how a proper legal regime for this type of 
business, fosters its development is more fully explored in Chapter 8. Here, 
however, I deem it important to briefly discuss the importance of legal form in this 
respect with particular reference to the countries in Europe and the United States. 
 
To begin with, we might simply say that the importance of a legal form specifically 
designed for social enterprise can clearly be seen in its creation, or currently being 
under preparation, in many European countries and the United States to promote 
this type of business. As Fici has observed, 
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…ad hoc legal forms for social enterprise began to be adopted by European 
legislatures in the 1990s. The social cooperative of Italian law No. 381/91 initiated 
this process. Today, at least 15 EU countries have laws specifically dedicated to 
the phenomenon of the social enterprise…while, in other EU countries, bills 
addressing this object are under either discussion or approval…Moreover, the 
matter of the social enterprise does not concern only the EU; it also extends to the 
US, among other countries…117 
 
However, it is important to point out that still some other countries in Europe do 
not now see the need for such a legal form. As Lavišius has noted, ‘[s]o far it is up 
to the particular country to decide whether the social enterprise is supposed to 
obtain [a] special legal form or not’.118 In other words, different approaches to social 
enterprise development may be adopted that suit the specific conditions in different 
countries, and not all these approaches require a specially designed legal form. So 
why do I see the unavailability of a legal structure specifically developed for social 
enterprise in Thailand as a problem?  
 
In addressing this issue, what must first be emphasised is that the countries with 
more developed social enterprise sectors significantly rely on a proper legal 
environment. Lavišius has identified two broad approaches adopted by such 
countries in Europe. One involves adapting existing legal forms or creating new 
legal structures that satisfy the needs of social enterprise described above. The other 
resorts to providing social enterprise with a “legal status” or “legal qualification”.119 
 
The countries adopting the first approach have created new legal structures for 
social enterprise, especially by adapting or modifying existing legal entities. For 
example, France, Greece, Italy and Poland have created a legal vehicle for social 
enterprise by adapting the co-operative legal structure,120 whereas other countries, 
including Portugal and Spain, recognise social co-operatives in their existing legal 
form which covers co-operatives in general. The UK has developed a separate legal 
form (the CIC) for use only by social enterprises. The countries using the second 
approach have introduced what is called “a social enterprise legal status”:  
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The idea of this concept is that the legal status of social enterprise can be adopted 
by different types of organizations, but these organizations have to meet the pre-
defined criteria…The legal status can be obtained by…most of traditional 
organizations: cooperatives (traditional and social), investor-owned companies 
(share companies), associations, or foundations…121 
 
The countries resorting to this approach include Belgium and Demark. The latter 
has adopted a “certification scheme”: a law introduced in 2014 entitles enterprises 
that meet certain standards to the right to use the term “registered social 
enterprise”.122 In Belgium the law giving the legal status to the “social purpose 
company” was adopted back in 1995: the law sets out conditions that an 
organisation must satisfy in order to be provided with this status.123 As will be seen 
Chapters 7-8, Thailand has resorted to a similar scheme of creating a legal status of 
social enterprise, and now a certification scheme has been introduced principally as 
a basis for providing support for ventures satisfying certain conditions. However, 
as I shall argue in Chapter 8, this approach is still not adequate, especially for the 
need to further develop the Thai social enterprise sector.  
 
It should also be pointed out here that, in the United States, many states have 
recently adopted new legal structures. These include the low-profit limited liability 
company (L3C), the benefit corporation and the flexible purpose corporation.124 
The L3C was first enacted by Vermont 2008, and many other states have adopted 
it. The flexible purpose corporation (FPC) was first introduced in California 2010 
and became law the following year. However, in January 2015, it was given a new 
name: a social purpose corporation (SPC). Maryland was the first state to pass the 
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law on the benefit corporation, which has now been recognised by many other 
states. 
 
How can a legal form properly designed for social enterprise foster its development 
(apart from facilitating its operation)? In discussing this issue in Chapter 8, I focus 
on the problem of “branding”. So let me highlight this problem by again referring 
to the two authors I have drawn upon in this sub-section. According to Fici, ‘…the 
primary, essential and irreplaceable role of social enterprise law is (and should be) 
to establish a precise identity of social enterprises and to preserve their essential 
features. This justifies, per se, the existence of specific legislation on social 
enterprise and helps to identify its minimum and essential content’. In particular, it 
is imperative that social enterprise have ‘…a specific identity, operating with an 
identity distinct from those of other organizations and appearing different under a 
legal designation that conveys objectives and modes of action…’125 Moreover, 
Lavišius has driven home the point I shall later make: 
 
Probably the biggest challenge in the countries seeking further development of 
the social entrepreneurship is to develop company law rules that ensure that social 
enterprises actually pursue their social purposes, avoiding the misuse of the status 
of social enterprise on [the] one hand and ensure sufficient flexibility in their 
regulation on the other, eliminating obstacles in further development of social 
entrepreneurship sector in general.126 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Social enterprise, together with terms related to it, such as the third sector and the 
social economy, still remains a contested concept. We thus still lack conceptual 
clarity in terms of how these terms are related to one another – and especially how 
the third sector and the social economy are related to social enterprise, in particular. 
Hence while I see the emergence of social enterprise as related to the development 
of “new entrepreneurship” within the third sector, academics like Ridley-Duff and 
Bull see it as more closely associated with the social economy. Anyway, for my 
practical purpose, I hope that I have achieved some conceptual clarity and 
understanding about both the concept and orientation of social enterprise.  
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This understanding is crucial for my next task, which is to develop a blueprint for 
legal forms for social enterprises. That is, for this purpose, I need to understand 
what an ideal-type legal form for social enterprise would look like, i.e. one which 
is most compatible with the orientation and characteristics of social enterprise 
identified in this chapter. The following two chapters will be devoted to this task.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 3 
Designing a Legal Form for Social Enterprises: 
Legal Forms for Organisations and Entrepreneurs’ Needs 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
I have discussed the concepts and orientation of social enterprise in Chapter 2, and 
I hope that this discussion has clarified what social enterprise is and what roles in 
society and the market it is performing. We now turn to the question of “legal 
forms” (also called “legal vehicles”) for social enterprises. In this chapter and the 
next one, we shall develop a “blueprint” for such a form, seeking to identify the 
most important features that it should possess. Chapter 5 will then measure the 
Community Interest Company (CIC) – the legal vehicle the UK has most recently 
made available to social enterprises – against our blueprint, asking how far, in 
theory, this satisfies our recommendations as to the ideal content of a social 
enterprise legal form. 
 
To develop this blueprint, we need further understanding of social enterprise 
specifically in terms of its organisational needs. Like starting any business, 
launching a social enterprise involves various concerns, most notably those relating 
to (1) rules facilitating its operations and (2) those regulating its governance. All 
organisations, large and small, engage in internal as well as external contractual 
relationships that need to be both facilitated (primarily to reduce the transaction 
costs these incur) and regulated (to provide appropriate protection for those 
involved with the organisations). Thus, my concern in this chapter and the next one 
is to explore how a legal form available to social enterprises can meet their specific 
needs in terms of both these facilitative and regulatory rules. 
 
This chapter starts, in section 3.2, by exploring some of the conceptual issues that 
arise in respect of the design of a legal form for any organisational type. It considers, 
in sub-section 3.2.1, what is meant by a “legal form”, and, in sub-section 3.2.2, why 
the choice of form is important. As alluded to above, legal forms typically consist 
of a mix of both facilitative rules, which are typically in the form of “default rules”, 
and regulatory rules, in the form of “mandatory rules”. Sub-section 3.2.3 looks at 
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some explanations for why the law should bother itself with supplying default rules 
(rather than leaving the parties to draft their own) and what these explanations might 
tell us about the proper content of such default rules. Sub-section 3.2.4 considers 
some explanations and justifications for the inclusion of mandatory rules within a 
legal form. The conceptual discussion finishes in sub-section 3.2.5 with an analysis 
of the main types of legal form available, distinguishing between unincorporated 
and incorporated forms. 
 
Sections 3.3 and the next chapter seek to apply this conceptual analysis to the 
specific nature of the social enterprise, as Chapter 2 of this thesis has shown it to 
be, particularly by showing just what mix of default and mandatory rules, with what 
particular content, a good legal form for social enterprises would exhibit, given its 
specific nature. Section 3.3 does this primarily in respect of the facilitative aspect 
of the legal form. It concentrates, in particular, on three requirements that social 
enterprises exhibit, and to which the legal form for this type of business must 
respond. First, it requires a corporate form. Second, to deal with risk, it requires a 
form that delivers limited liability. Third, it requires a form that facilitates the 
raising of capital, but which does so in a way that is consistent with the social 
mission of the social enterprise (and the limits on distributing profits that this social 
mission necessarily entails). 
 
Given the connection between this chapter and the next one, it is appropriate to 
highlight here what Chapter 4 contains. It seeks to address the regulatory aspect of 
the rules constituting a good legal form for social enterprises, focusing on two 
governance issues that need to be addressed: first, the problem of agency costs 
within social enterprises, and, second, the issue of accountability to stakeholders 
within the social enterprise. Once again, the aim is to relate the discussion of the 
peculiar nature of social enterprises, settled in Chapter 2, to the regulatory content 
of a good legal form for social enterprises. 
 
3.2 Legal forms for organisations: some conceptual issues 
 
Modern society is characterised by the proliferation of organisations. Of course, the 
underlying nature of these organisations varies massively, depending upon the 
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activities, the individuals involved, the wider society in which the organisation is 
located, organisational history, etc. For the production of economic goods or 
services, the underlying organisational type is “the firm”. According to Jensen and 
Meckling, a firm is a kind of organisation whose essential function is to serve as a 
nexus for specific set of contracting relationships among individuals.1 Theorists 
believe firms exist not only as a way to lower transaction costs of going to the 
market, but also as a device for allocating resources.2 The “firm” is an economic 
concept. It is not a legal form for an organisation to adopt. Firms might vary a good 
deal one from another, and different firms could choose different legal forms 
through which to structure, legally, their activities. A diversity of legal forms for 
firms has been created as a ‘rational institutional response to the function of the 
firm’.3 
 
3.2.1 The meaning of “legal form” 
 
What then do we mean by a “legal form”? In business, and indeed in most other 
sectors, organisations’ operational modes are recognised and/or regulated by the 
law. We call such formal organisational modes the legal forms for organisation. A 
legal form, then, describes a package of legal rules that will structure some aspects 
of the relationships between those involved in the organisation.  
 
Bates, Wells and Braithwaite and Social Enterprise London define “legal form” as 
‘the way in which a business is set up and the rules and regulations that govern it 
i.e. it provides the operating framework for an organisation’.4 Similarly, Hansmann 
and Kraakman conceive of “legal forms” as a set of standard-form legal entities 
provided by the law: standard-form contracts among the parties who participate in 
an enterprise, including most notably the owners, the managers and the creditors of 
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the enterprise.5 A legal form is a ‘standard set of default rules that govern when 
contracting parties have not specifically decided otherwise, and perhaps providing 
as well some mandatory rules that protect the interests of parties who would 
otherwise be disadvantaged in the contracting process’.6 Hessen observes that legal 
forms function as ‘ready-to-wear clothes: if they fit well they can be worn without 
alteration, or they can be modified until they fit better. With the right legal 
craftsmanship or tailoring, any form can be modified to suit the needs of any group 
of clients, but the underlying core in every form is contract’.7 Finally, Ogus 
observes that ‘each form carries with it a concomitant set of mutual rights and 
duties, the majority of which are nevertheless subject to being overridden by 
explicit provision in contracts or other legal instruments, such as the company 
articles or memorandum’.8 
 
Each legal form will typically have some “trigger” that helps us identify whether 
those creating an organisation have chosen to employ that particular legal form. So, 
for example, under UK law, there are clear procedures for the creation of each type 
of registered company i.e. private companies and public companies limited by 
shares; private companies limited by guarantee; the unlimited companies; and the 
community interest company,9 and it is evident whether an entrepreneur has 
followed those procedures, created a company, and thereby chosen that legal form 
for her business. 
 
It is worth stressing that the rules that make up a legal form will not deal with all 
aspects of all relationships with the organisations. Some aspects of some 
relationships will be dealt with by separate bodies of rules that apply irrespective 
of the legal form that is chosen. So, for example, many of the rules that govern the 
relationship with consumers will typically apply irrespective of whether the 
consumer happens to be dealing with a company, a partnership, or whatever. Our 
law tends to adopt other labels – “employment law”, “consumer law”, 
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“environmental law”, and so on – to describe these bodies of rules that apply 
irrespective of the chosen legal vehicle through which an organisation is being 
conducted. 
 
In this thesis, as we develop our “blueprint” of a legal form for social enterprise, 
we are concerned only with those rules that will be peculiar to that legal form. We 
are not concerned with the employment law rules, consumer law rules, etc., that 
will admittedly apply to social enterprises (as well as non-social enterprises), but 
will exist outside of the legal form. 
 
3.2.2 The importance of the choice of legal form 
 
Rules governing organisations will be determined by the choice of legal form, 
because for many (even if not all) one of the most important decisions anyone 
planning to set up an organisation has to make involves choosing a proper legal 
form. To be sure, the choice of form is not necessarily “set in stone” at the outset. 
Thus, firms may choose one legal form of organisation at start-up and may then 
change it later when they grow larger or their mission changes.10 However, it is 
better to make the right decision in the first place to minimise the need for later 
changes, which can be difficult or expensive.  
 
However, if it is important for those creating organisations to consider carefully 
their choice of legal form, it is surely as important that the law also offers a choice 
of legal forms that are “well-tailored” to the distinctive character of the different 
organisations to which they are being offered. We must therefore turn to consider 
the question: how shall we decide whether a legal form for social enterprises is 
indeed “well-tailored”? To answer this question, we first need to think more 
carefully about why the law creates distinctive legal forms in the first place. We 
have seen that they represent packages of rules, but why should the law present 
organisations with such packages? 
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3.2.3 The facilitating role of legal form 
 
Suppose a business were organised through the vehicle of the corporate form. That 
legal form, as provided by corporate law, might be defined by its core 
characteristics, namely, legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, 
deregulated management under a board structure, and investor ownership.11 With 
the exception of legal personality, as Armour et al have indicated, these defining 
characteristics of the corporate form could in theory be put in place simply by 
contract. That is, the relationships among the participants in a corporation are, to a 
significant degree, contractual in nature. Given that, they ask why it is that ‘…we 
today have, in every advanced economy, elaborate statutes providing numerous 
detailed rules for the internal governance of corporations?’12 To move towards an 
explanation, they point out that a significant part of corporate law, more in some 
jurisdictions and less in others, consists of what they refer to as default provisions 
– those applying only if the parties do not explicitly provide for something different. 
 
Thus, many of the rules that make up a legal form will – as the quotes from 
Hansmann and Kraakman, Hessen, and Ogus above emphasised – be provided as 
“mere defaults”. They provide rules that the parties could themselves have supplied 
by contract, and which the parties remain free to exclude or modify by contract if 
the default rules do not optimally fit the parties’ situation. But still, why should the 
law go into this trouble of providing such default rules? Several explanations can 
be given for the law’s role in supplying default rules in this way. We shall consider 
them in turn, and ask what, if any, these explanations then tell us about the proper 
content of these default rules.13  
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3.2.3.1 Reducing transaction costs 
 
The dominant explanation for the law’s role in supplying default rules is that they 
can reduce transaction costs.14 Transaction costs have been defined by Cooter and 
Ulen as ‘the costs of exchange’ and include 1) search costs, 2) bargaining costs, and 
3) enforcement costs.15 Thus, if the law supplies default rules, it can avoid at least 
some of these transaction costs. In particular, it can avoid the costs of the parties 
having to negotiate, or express, their own terms. 
 
A good example of rules that seem to serve this transaction cost saving function is 
given by the “Model Articles of Association” that UK company law supplies.16 
These are “default rules” – prescribed by law, and applied unless a company 
chooses to exclude them.17 They govern a number of matters relating to the internal 
organisation of registered companies, such as the division of managerial power 
between shareholders and directors, the calling of meetings, payment of dividends, 
and so on. These are all matters shareholders might reasonably easily foresee as 
being prudently covered in a constitution, but the parties are spared the costs of 
doing just that. The models are widely adopted.  
 
If the aim in supplying default rules is indeed to save transaction costs, then does 
this tell us what rules – with what content – the law should offer? In simple terms, 
the usual prescription is that the law should supply the rule that the majority of 
contractors, to whom the rule is being offered, would themselves choose.18 Or, for 
the purposes of this thesis, the law should offer social enterprises the default rules 
that a majority of such enterprises would themselves choose. By providing the 
“majoritarian defaults”, the law saves the greatest number of organisations the costs 
of drafting their own rules.   
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This prescription requires us to consider carefully the likely population of social 
enterprises to whom the legal form is to be made available, and attempt to anticipate 
what rules most social enterprises would choose. Of course, their choices are likely 
to be determined, to some extent, by the underlying purposes and values of social 
enterprises, the interests of those involved in social enterprises, and the 
relationships between those participants. The better we understand those things, the 
better we can anticipate the terms they would be likely to choose. And the analysis 
of social enterprises offered in Chapter 2 provides much material to deal with these 
issues.  
 
However, we must now say a little more to question, and to refine, the prescription 
for default rules based on this rather simplistic “majoritarian default rules” 
approach. For, even if one were concerned only to reduce transaction costs as far as 
possible, it is not always the case that we can do that by supplying the rule most 
parties would choose.  
 
Suppose, for example, we were deciding whether to include, in our legal form, a 
restriction on owners of the social enterprise transferring their shares in the social 
enterprise to an “outsider” (someone not currently a member of the organisation).19 
Suppose that drafting a rule to provide a restriction on transfers would be extremely 
expensive for the parties themselves. It might be so because, for example, it would 
need to be fairly long and complicated – containing detailed procedural machinery 
to give effect to the restriction on transfers to outsiders, detailed valuation 
machinery to determine the price at which insiders are to buy the shares, and so on. 
If the law’s default rule provides, then, that there is no restriction on such transfers, 
the costs for those parties who want a restriction, and have to draft their own rule, 
are very high. If, however, the law does provide a rule restricting transfers, the costs 
for those who do not want that term may be relatively low (they do not have to go 
to the trouble of drafting a detailed rule; instead they can simply “cross out” the 
law’s default). It may well be, then, that even if the majority would prefer there 
being no restriction, more transaction costs would be saved by including such a 
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rule; doing so is likely to generate a lot of contracting (as the majority have to 
exclude the rule) but it will be relatively cheap contracting.  
 
The lesson here might be summarised as follows: it may be better for the law to err 
on the side of generosity, supplying more default rules, and rules that tend to be 
“over-specified” compared to what most parties might want, because the costs of 
striking them out in whole or part will usually be less than parties’ costs in drafting 
such rules from scratch if the law fails to help them. 
 
A second reason why the “choose the majoritarian rule” might not always be 
appropriate follows on from the work of Barnett.20 He has argued that sometimes 
the law should deliberately choose a rule it knows most parties would not in fact 
choose themselves. He accepts that this may well incur more transaction costs, as 
lots of parties choose expressly to exclude the law’s defaults. But he argues that this 
is beneficial if such contracting results in the better informed party having to release 
valuable information to the less well informed party.21 The example often cited to 
illustrate this concerns second-hand car sellers and buyers. Typically, the vendor is 
likely to know more about the car’s quality than does the buyer – the vendor, in 
other words, is better informed than the buyer.22 How can we get the vendor to 
release the information they have – about defects in a car – to the buyer? A default 
rule whereby the vendor warrants the car is free of defects might achieve this. 
Suppose that the law imposed a default rule whereby the vendor gives such a 
warranty. Suppose in practice such a default is more often than not excluded by car 
vendors. Nevertheless, in having to exclude expressly the law’s rule, the vendor 
puts the buyer on notice that the vendor may know that the car has defects that make 
the vendor want to exclude the warranty. 
 
To recap, then, the transaction cost explanation for the law supplying default rules 
suggests that we should devise a legal form for social enterprises, the default rules 
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of which aim to replicate what most contractors would choose, subject to two 
caveats. First, sometimes it will be appropriate for the law to be rather more 
“generous” by drafting expansive clauses notwithstanding most parties might want 
to reject them. Second, sometimes rules might be designed “against” the better 
informed party, even where this produces more contracting, if such contracting 
releases valuable information to the lesser informed party. 
 
3.2.3.2 Imperfect information and “bounded rationality” 
 
The second explanation for the law to offer defaults is that this may be appropriate 
where parties would fail to appreciate a contingency that needs to be covered in 
their contract. Humans are recognised as having bounded rationality, which 
includes “limited cognitive capacities”.23 These limitations include limited 
foresight: the failure to anticipate some contingencies – especially more remote 
future contingencies – which might arise and which it would be prudent to contract 
for. The law, however, has a sort of “collective wisdom” from its longer 
institutional experiences of dealing with such matters. It can see further than the 
parties themselves, providing rules for contingencies that parties themselves never 
anticipate. 
 
Perhaps, for example, most owners forming a social enterprise would not even think 
to ask whether they want to prevent any one of them transferring their shares to 
outsiders in the future. But when the state devises a legal form for social enterprises, 
it is of courses aware of this (and many similar “remote”) issues, and can ensure 
that a rule is provided to deal with it. 
 
Does this explanation for the law supplying default rules tell us anything about their 
content? It does suggest again that the law might err on the side of generosity, in 
the sense of supplying a larger number of rules than most parties might choose. 
Suppose that most organisations would wish to restrict themselves from voting on 
transactions in which they are interested. Including a default rule that imposes such 
a restriction on directors might go against the preferences of most organisations, 
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but might also prompt some organisations to consider the need for such a rule when, 
in the absence of a default to that effect, the matter would never have occurred to 
them. 
 
3.2.3.3 The dynamic quality of the law 
 
A third reason why the law might usefully offer default rules concerns their dynamic 
quality. This is a point that has been developed by Hansmann.24 He notes that 
default rules are updated whenever the law itself is updated – with each decided 
case, or when the statute is amended. An organisation that has chosen to adopt any 
legal default rule is usually treated as being bound by the current version of that 
rule. An organisation, therefore, needs to do nothing itself to update the default rules 
it has adopted; the updating is done for it by the courts or by Parliament.25 
 
By contrast, if an organisation drafts its own rules, it must itself update those rules 
over time. Given the likely long duration of organisations, some updating is likely 
to become necessary. But not only is such updating by the organisation itself is an 
inconvenience; it also creates the possibility of “blackmail” by individual members. 
Where rules are settled by contract, typically the consent of all contractors will be 
required to change them. Even if the rules are put in a constitutional document, 
changing that may well require a substantial majority of members.26 As Hansmann 
notes, individual members may be perfectly happy with some proposed change, but 
refuse their consent in order to secure private benefits. By accepting the law’s 
defaults, the parties effectively give to the party they trust – the state itself – the 
authority to update their contract for them, avoiding the possibility of individual 
blackmail. 
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Once again, this tells us something interesting about why the state has a role to play 
in supplying default rules, and also why contractors may choose to accept those 
defaults rather than replace them with their own privately drafted rules.   
 
3.2.4 Legal forms and mandatory rules 
 
So far, we have explained why legal forms would include default rules, and said 
something about what the content of those default rules should be. We now turn to 
consider the position with regard to mandatory rules – rules that the parties are not 
free to exclude. To understand how mandatory rules are based on a different 
understanding of the proper role of law, it is worth considering Ogus’ analysis.  
 
Ogus refers to the tension between two systems of economic organisation – the 
market system and the collectivist system. In the market system, individuals and 
groups are generally left free, being subject only to certain basic restraints, to pursue 
their social or commercial goals. In this system ‘the law has a primarily facilitative 
function: it offers a set of formalized arrangements with which individuals can 
“clothe” their welfare-seeking activities and relationships. The arrangements carry 
with them mutual rights and obligations which, if necessary, a court will enforce’.27 
In contrast to the market model, the collectivist system incorporates a directive 
function of law. Here the term “regulation” is used to denote this function of the 
law, and, ‘[in order to] achieve the desired ends, individuals are compelled by a 
superior authority–the state–to behave in particular ways with the threat of 
sanctions if they do not comply’.28 Similarly, Freedman believes that a legal form 
comprises two main elements: one is an external element which has a regulatory 
function aimed at protecting the interests of outsiders; and the other is the internal 
element, which provides a facilitative function aimed at protecting owners of an 
organisation where ownership and management are separated.29 
 
Nonetheless, Ogus has cautioned that if we accept such basic distinctions we might 
overlook the diverse and complex aspects of the law’s function resulting from any 
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system of economic organisation.30 That is, whereas in the market system the state 
still needs to provide ‘a minimum degree of order and security’ through its 
imposition and enforcement of obligations and even decision to overrule ‘private 
agreements’, in the collectivist system ‘regulation is not always directive’. Indeed, 
in some areas, the regulation is initiated and enforced not by the state but rather by 
‘self-regulatory agencies’.31   
 
Freedman also accepts that legal forms (at least those that offer limited liability) 
must be a mixture of both default rules and mandatory rules. She notes that ‘[a]s 
soon as a firm ceases to be a one person concern, some minority protection may 
become necessary’;32 in particular, ‘[u]ltimately, it must be accepted that regulatory 
provisions will be essential for any legal form offering the benefits of limited 
liability’.33 
 
But why exactly do we need the law to play this “protective” or “regulatory” 
function? Why, in other words, should there be any mandatory legal rules? The 
need for mandatory legal rules and the merits of “freedom of contract” have of 
course long been debated.34 This debate has been seen especially in relation to 
corporate law, where “contractarians” and “anti-contractarians” have argued at 
length35 over whether corporate law should include mandatory legal rules.36 
 
3.2.4.1 Arguments against mandatory rules 
 
We do not have space here to consider this debate in detail, or provide a 
comprehensive defence of mandatory rules. Typically, two arguments are put 
forward in favour of freedom of contract.  
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The first is that such freedom helps to promote the parties’ own autonomy. 
“Personal autonomy” is something that most political, and legal, systems place a 
high value upon.37 Parties should be free to work out for themselves what ends they 
wish to pursue, and should be free to enter into private bargains with others in order 
to pursue those ends. In the context of social enterprises, a social entrepreneur 
should be free to determine what social ends he or she wishes to promote, and what 
relationships the enterprise will engage in with others to do so. If, to anticipate an 
example we shall return to later in the next chapter, he or she wants to give the 
organisation’s stakeholders a say in the running of the organisation, then he or she 
should be free to do so; conversely, if he or she wants to exclude stakeholders from 
such a say, then he or she should be free to do that too. To impose mandatory norms 
requiring the organisation to treat stakeholders in a particular way would restrict 
the entrepreneur’s personal autonomy. 
 
The second argument advanced in favour of freedom of contract is a more economic 
argument.38 It is that people are usually the best judges of their own welfare, and of 
the bargains they should make to promote their own welfare. Interfering in private 
exchange by imposing mandatory rules on the parties is therefore likely to reduce 
their welfare. Suppose that a worker, W, decides that, given her own options, she is 
better off working for £5 per hour, whilst some employer, E, is prepared to employ 
her for that rate, but no more. To insist, as a mandatory rule, that all employees must 
be paid a minimum hourly rate in excess of £5, thereby preventing W from entering 
into this bargain, not only interferes with the autonomy of W and E, but it also 
undermines the welfare of W and E. Each is left materially worse off by their 
inability to reach an exchange that would have been mutually beneficial. 
 
3.2.4.2 Arguments in favour of mandatory rules 
 
The arguments in favour of mandatory rules, in turn, typically invoke a range of 
values. Armour et al, for example, note that corporate law is itself comprised of 
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important rules that are mandatory – those leaving the concerned parties with no 
option but to conform to them. Taking an approach based on economic analysis, 
they regard the existence of mandatory rules as being based on some form of 
“contracting failure”, which is inherent in certain situations. One such situation 
involves some parties being taken advantage of because they are not well informed. 
Another possible situation is the case of third parties’ interests being affected. Still 
another situation is when ‘collective action problems’ such as ‘the prisoners’ 
dilemma’ might give rise to contractual terms which are ‘inefficient and unfair’.39 
Moreover, according to the same legal theorists, mandatory rules may also have a 
‘useful standardizing function’, as when accounting rules, for example, give rise to 
‘the benefits of compliance increase if everyone adheres to the same provisions’.40   
 
Picking up on some of these points, contracting parties may, because of their 
ignorance, or cognitive problems,41 misunderstand what terms will benefit their 
own welfare. They might then agree to contractual terms that leave them worse off, 
rather than better off. The mandatory rules might therefore be appropriate to protect 
people from their own ignorance. To give one example of how this might apply to 
social enterprises, suppose that the label of “social enterprise” induces in those 
dealing with such enterprises a set of beliefs about the activities and values of such 
enterprises, including the extent to which profits are maximised or extracted. If 
erroneous, acting on these mistaken beliefs (by dealing with a social enterprise) 
might undermine the welfare of those who do so. Mandatory rules might therefore 
be necessary to ensure that any organisation that uses this “trigger” term of being 
social enterprise must behave in ways that roughly reflect these social expectations. 
 
A second reason in favour of mandatory rules is to control “externalities” – where 
an action imposes uncompensated costs on a third party (i.e. costs which the third 
party is not paid to bear).42 The easy example often given for an externality is 
pollution. A factory that operates so as to emit pollution on its neighbours thereby 
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causes an externality if the pollution causes a loss to the neighbours which the 
factory owner does not pay the neighbours to accept.  
 
In the context of our social enterprise, an example of an externality might again 
relate to the usage of the very term social enterprise. Suppose that that term is indeed 
a valuable “brand”. Suppose that (regardless of what the law said) most social 
enterprises did restrict their pursuit and distribution of profits, and therefore 
enhanced this brand value. Suppose also that the public responded to this positively, 
and “rewarded” enterprises operating under the badge of social enterprise. That 
badge would, however, become tarnished if some enterprises operated under its 
label but acted contrary to its profit-sacrificing values. An enterprise doing so would 
impose a cost (or, externality) on other social enterprises that made use of, and 
upheld the values of, the social enterprise label. 
 
Much economic analysis accepts the two foregoing arguments in favour of 
mandatory rules, because those arguments both focus on “inefficiencies” in private 
contracting (based on informational problems, or externalities).43 Mandatory rules 
might therefore make contractual arrangements more efficient. Economists tend to 
be less ready to accept a third argument that can be put in favour of mandatory rules, 
namely to “redistribute” benefits from stronger (including richer) to weaker 
(including poorer) parties. Return to our worker and employer example. The worker 
does not appear to be misinformed when she concludes that she is better off working 
for £5 per hour. Yet we may still feel that the only reason the employee reaches this 
conclusion is because of her weak bargaining position compared to the employer; 
too many workers are chasing too few jobs. Mandatory legal rules – minimum wage 
rates, rent controls, ceilings on energy prices, and so on – may be explained as 
attempts not to constrain ignorance, but rather to constrain more powerful 
contractors for the benefit of weaker ones, and thereby achieve a redistributory 
outcome compared to what the “market” – free contracting – would deliver. 
 
Opponents of mandatory rules on redistributory grounds typically either do not 
support redistribution per se (which we shall not consider here), or else argue that, 
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even if one favours redistribution, nevertheless interfering in private contractual 
arrangements is a poor means to achieve that (compared, for example, to using the 
tax and welfare system). We can briefly note here two points often made in support 
of this second, “poor means”, argument. The first point is that a stronger party that 
is unable to change one term in a contract (say an employer mandatorily required 
to provide health insurance) will simply respond by adjusting other terms of the 
contract to compensate (say, reducing other non-mandatory benefits for the 
worker). The end result will be the same overall distribution of benefits and burdens 
between the two parties, yet in a less efficient way (both parties might prefer the 
worker foregoing health insurance and receiving the other benefits instead). The 
second point is that the stronger contracting party may simply choose not to contract 
on the mandatory terms at all.   
 
We do not have space here to consider these counter-arguments in full, but they 
clearly do have some force. In the specific context of legal forms, our concern in 
this chapter, we might note that they do have some relevance. Suppose that we 
regard the social entrepreneur as generally the stronger party, and some of those 
“stakeholders” dealing with social enterprises as weaker ones. Suppose we were, 
for redistributory reasons, to include within the legal form for social enterprise 
mandatory rules designed to enhance the position of stakeholders, as against the 
social entrepreneur. The burden of these mandatory elements may make the social 
entrepreneur choose to conduct his or her business under some other legal form 
whose constitutive rules do not include those mandatory rules. The end result is that 
the intended redistributory effect is not achieved anyway (it is avoided by the choice 
of the other legal form) but efficiency is sacrificed as the social entrepreneur is 
forced to operate under a less suitable legal vehicle.  
 
Finally, we might just observe that some writers have questioned whether the 
distinction between facilitative (default) rules and regulative (mandatory) rules is 
always as clear as might be assumed.44 So, for example, Armour et al note that 
mandatory rules, when used in conjunction with a choice of corporate forms, can 
                                                                 
44
 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’ (1982) 41(4) Maryland Law 
Review 563. 
73 
 
assume an enabling function similar to that provided by default provisions. In this 
respect, mandatory rules can facilitate freedom of contract by enabling corporate 
actors to signal the terms they offer and to formally commit themselves to adhering 
to those terms.45 The law accomplishes this by, first, offering a menu of different 
standard-form legal entities from which parties may choose in forming their 
business enterprise, and, second, with respect to a particular type of legal entity, 
such as the publicly traded business corporations, allowing the organisers of a firm 
to choose among different jurisdictions’ law – a situation leading to what they call 
“regulatory competition in corporation law”.46 
 
3.2.5 A synoptic view of existing legal forms 
 
I have explained the meaning of the legal form as an operating framework for an 
organisation. In real life, we indeed need a diversity of such formal frameworks to 
accommodate a myriad of business objectives and activities. In any modern 
economy there are many different types of organisation. The range of differences 
makes it very difficult even to categorise them – for-profit, non-profit, and not-for-
profit organisations; pure business and social enterprises; big and small business 
organisations, some more risky and others less risky; joint owner and single 
business organisations, and so forth. Freedman provides another perspective on this 
diversity: 
 
In practice, there is a continuum from the one person firm, through the husband 
and wife company, the family company, the private company which brings in 
outside finance, the unlisted public company and the quoted company to the 
multinational group. Even this list understates the variety of the firms for which 
the law of business organisations must cater and fails to recognise their changing 
character: some firms will transmute through a number of these categories over 
their life cycles.47 
 
Since my purpose in this chapter is to establish what a well-designed legal form for 
social enterprises would look like, it is not necessary to describe all existing legal 
forms available for this type of business. However, since, in Chapter 5, I shall 
attempt to determine whether the UK does provide a legal form which fits the needs 
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of a social enterprise, it will be useful to establish here a brief overview of the main 
types of legal form. The basic division between types of legal form is between those 
forms that create a separate body with its own legal personality, and those which 
do not do so. 
 
3.2.5.1 Unincorporated legal forms 
 
Examples of UK unincorporated legal forms include the sole trader, the general 
partnership, and the unincorporated association. Where a business or organisation 
is pursued through one of these forms, the form does not confer any separate legal 
personality upon the business or organisation itself. Activities undertaken by those 
involved with the business or organisation are carried on by the human beings who 
act for it. Thus, a sole trader his/herself enters into contracts with others, a partner 
does so on behalf of his or her fellow partners, and so on. 
 
Equally, property used by the organisation must be owned by individuals on its 
behalf, since the organisation has no legal personality of its own. This, as we shall 
see later, can be administratively inconvenient where those holding the property 
sever their relationship with it, probably resulting in the transfer of the property to 
those whose relationship with the organisation is continuing. 
 
Because contracts are entered into personally by individuals connected with the 
organisation, those individuals will typically have personal liability in respect of 
those contracts. Equally, they will be personally liable for civil wrongs committed 
in their management of the organisation. This means that all their personal assets 
are at risk of being taken to satisfy such liability. In this sense, their liability is 
“unlimited”. 
 
The rules governing unincorporated forms are typically default rules that govern 
the “internal relationship” between, say, multiple owners of the organisation, and 
address the authority of individuals acting for the organisation.48 On the other hand, 
the rules governing unincorporated forms typically tend to impose fewer 
restrictions on the management of the organisation than do incorporated legal 
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forms. This is explicable, and justifiable, by the absence of limited liability. Much 
of the regulation that constitutes a part of incorporated legal forms, which do confer 
limited liability, is designed to protect the interests of creditors. Accordingly, 
unincorporated legal forms tend to be cheaper (and quicker) to form, and easier and 
cheaper to run. 
 
3.2.5.2 Incorporated legal forms (corporation) 
 
Examples of incorporated legal forms in the UK include a number of different types 
of registered company,49 the limited liability partnership (LLP)50 and the charitable 
incorporated organisation (CIO).51 The essence of these legal forms is that the law 
permits those setting up the organisation to create a separate body corporate, which 
the law recognises as having a legal personality of its own. 
  
Where a legal form entails the creation of a separate body, with its own legal 
personality, a number of legal consequences follow, which in turn produce a 
number of commercial advantages. First, the separate legal entity will be able to 
own property, avoiding the inconveniences mentioned above. Second, the corporate 
entity continues in existence until, in accordance with the rules governing the legal 
form, it is brought to an end. This “perpetual succession” means that it survives 
changes in the identity of those who, say, own it from time to time. Third, the 
corporate body is able to contract with others. Human beings may still conduct 
activities for the organisation, but legally speaking they do so as the agents of the 
separate corporate entity. It is that entity which will be liable for contracts made on 
its behalf by its agents.  
 
This ability of the corporation to become the contracting party, in place of the agents 
who act on its behalf, provides the basis for the limited liability of those agents 
(whether they be owners or managers of the corporate body). It does not entirely 
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tell us, however, what liability those owners or managers may continue to face, 
notwithstanding the primary liability of the corporate body itself. For example, 
whilst they will not be liable for contractual obligations entered into as agents of 
the corporate body, they may be liable for torts which they commit in pursuing 
corporate activities.52   
 
The usual downside of the corporate form is a larger body of mandatory rules which 
deal with the process of creating the form, or designed to protect creditors. 
However, quantitatively speaking, the predominance of corporate forms suggests 
that, for most organisations, the benefits of incorporation (legal personality, 
perpetual succession and limited liability) outweigh its disadvantages (greater 
regulation).53   
 
3.2.5.3 The architecture of the legislation creating corporate legal forms 
 
Given that the law must offer a range of corporate legal forms, how should the 
legislation allowing for these forms be structured? One way would be for each 
corporate form to stand alone, governed by a comprehensive, and self-contained, 
separate piece of legislation. There would thus be a separate legislative instrument 
creating, and entirely dealing with, the private company limited by shares, one 
dealing with the private company limited by guarantee, one the public limited 
company, one the unlimited company, one the LLP, one the CIO, and so on. If a 
new corporate form were to be introduced, such as the CIC, this too would be a 
separate, stand-alone, corporate entity, governed by its own statute. 
 
However, it may be that whilst some of the rules that make up each of these forms 
need to differ in some respects (the rules governing accounts for the private 
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company, for example, may need to differ from those for the public company) some 
issues may require the same rule for different legal forms.  
 
Given this possibility of overlap, it looks better instead, to some extent, to create a 
separate core corporate entity and then allow variations to those core rules for the 
different corporate variants. This is essentially what UK legislation achieves. It 
creates the core form of a “registered company” under the Companies Act 2006. 
However, the Act then permits different types of registered company to exist, each 
of which is subject to some rules that are distinctive to it. The advantages of this 
structure are at least fourfold.  
 
First, the law itself should become clearer and more certain. Since the core rules, 
which apply to all registered companies, are the same, they are likely to be litigated 
more frequently. This generates a body of precedents applicable to the whole 
population of registered companies. If different rules were drafted for each different 
form, differences in language between those rules would undermine this process. 
 
Second, and relatedly, it likely creates greater familiarity, especially for 
professional advisers (including lawyers). The core rules that govern any registered 
form are likely to become more familiar, since they are encountered in respect of 
all registered companies (of whatever sub-species). As Cross noted at the time of 
the initiation of the CIC, comparing its structure with that of the LLP,54 the CIC’s 
company form would subject it to the existing provisions of company law. In 
contrast with the LLP, the CIC’s structure would benefit from ‘a level of certainty 
for potential users, advisers, and judiciary who, when dealing with CIC’s, will 
simply to the existing principles of company law on most routine matters’.55 
 
Third, the legal form is likely also to be more familiar to the public at large. The 
public will encounter the core type more often, albeit in its various embodiments 
(as a private company, or a public company, or a guarantee company, and so on). 
And they may therefore be readier to trust that form. A legal form that exists as 
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something separate (as, for example, the CIO does) is likely to appear as novel, and 
perhaps less trustworthy. 
 
Finally, the updating56 of the rules governing the form may be more efficient and 
therefore undertaken more frequently. One exercise – for example, in the UK, 
updating the Companies Act 2006 – ensures that the rules for all the different types 
of registered company are modernised. With multiple stand-alone forms, a number 
of separate updating exercises must be conducted, and there is a risk that some 
forms will be addressed less frequently, and their rules may become outdated in 
consequence.57 
 
To conclude this discussion of “architecture” of the legislation, it is worth 
contrasting the manner of introducing two new corporate forms into the UK. 
Although introduced by a separate statute, the CIC, which we shall address further 
in Chapter 5, was created as a sub-species of registered company. It therefore shares 
many of the familiar rules which other registered companies are subject to under 
the Companies Act 2006. And it should therefore enjoy the four benefits of this sort 
of legislative structure outlined above. The CIO, by contrast, was introduced as a 
separate, stand-alone legal form. Although some of its rules are borrowed from the 
law of registered companies, it remains a separate form that stands apart from the 
family of registered companies.58 
 
3.3 What do social entrepreneurs need from their legal form? 
 
3.3.1 Social Enterprises: similarities to, and differences from, for-profits 
 
In Chapter 2 we started with the consideration of the nature of social enterprise. 
Recall that I characterise the social enterprise as a not-for-profit venture lying 
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somewhere between for-profit firms and non-profit organisations. It has many 
things in common with other for-profit businesses. Like them, it is privately owned, 
and pursues revenue-generating activities. To some degree, it seeks to make a profit. 
In this respect, the needs of social enterprise generally resemble those of other for-
profit business enterprises. Accordingly, much of what we already know about the 
needs of for-profit businesses – and thus what such businesses might need from a 
legal form – can be applied to the social enterprise. 
 
However, social enterprises are also distinguishable from for-profit businesses in 
ways we have already noted in Chapter 2. Being not-for-profit ventures, social 
enterprises are notable for their triple bottom-line mission: they simultaneously 
pursue financial, social, and environmental goals. For such a mission social 
enterprises require what I shall call a corporate-plus legal vehicle, in two important 
respects. 
 
First, social enterprises require a corporate-type legal form to satisfy their revenue-
generating needs; and, at the same time, such a legal vehicle must incorporate 
mechanisms to limit profit extraction.  
 
Second, we have seen that the tradition of democratic accountability, which remains 
powerful in the third sector, is particularly relevant to social enterprise. Thus, social 
enterprise requires a legal form that also meets this democratic need, which in 
practice requires it to be accountable to stakeholders other than those normally 
associated with a traditional company. A legal form for social enterprise should thus 
be embedded with rules that facilitate participation by such constituents. 
 
To take points further, we can begin by considering three needs held by social 
enterprises in common with for-profits, namely: legal personality, protection 
against risk and the organisation’s need to raise finance. 
 
3.3.2 An organisation with its own legal personality 
 
For several reasons, social enterprises may benefit from a legal vehicle that provides 
them with “legal personality”. First, as Armour et al note, legal personality 
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facilitates a firm’s functioning as a “nexus for contracts”.59 It is, in this respect, 
enabled by corporate law to serve as a single contracting party distinct from the 
various individuals who own or manage the firm, and, as such, it enhances the 
ability of these individuals to jointly run the business.60   
 
Second, it simplifies the ownership of assets. Just as all contracts can be concluded 
by the single corporate entity, so too all assets can be held by that same entity, rather 
than in the hands of some, possibly fluctuating group of individuals on behalf of the 
enterprise. This can be particularly significant if that group of individuals does, 
indeed, fluctuate frequently.   
 
Third, it enables the entity to sue, and be sued, in the name of the company, rather 
than in the name of individual owners. The ability to be sued more easily may seem 
a rather questionable “advantage”. However, one prominent reason for the 
introduction of the registered company into British law in 1844, was precisely to 
overcome the problems being encountered in suing “joint stock companies” which 
lacked legal personality.61  
 
Fourth, the separate personality of the company may also give a sense of stability 
and prestige to the enterprise. This was one of the conclusions reached by Freedman 
in her study of small businesses.62 Freedman found that many small companies did 
not, in fact, confer limited liability upon their owners, because of the proliferation 
of personal guarantees that lenders often demanded63 (we consider financing 
questions in the next section below). Nevertheless, entrepreneurs still opted for the 
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corporate form, and often did so because it was felt that the public accorded a higher 
status to incorporated businesses. 
 
Fifth, the company does not come to an end simply because those connected with 
it – its founding shareholders, or its directors – come and go. By contrast, a 
partnership, for example, is deemed to dissolve on the death or the retirement of 
one of the partners (assuming it is a partnership at will), or on the expiry of any 
fixed term.64 The importance of longevity is clearly reflected in Freedman’s 
survey.65 The survey found that 28 per cent of the unincorporated firms believed 
that being unable to survive the owners was the second most significant 
disadvantage after the lack of limited liability.66 Even though the survey did not 
cover social enterprises, we can presume for the reason given above that this is one 
of the specific needs which are particularly pertinent to this type of business.  
 
Indeed, taking the last two advantages (status and longevity) together, we might 
note a feature of the corporate form which, I would argue, is especially important 
for social enterprises, but which the existing literature has failed to emphasise 
sufficiently. Both these advantages stress the “separateness” and the autonomy of 
the corporate entity. It has a life of its own, and the public arguably recognise that 
it has a stature separate from, and more than, its individual creators. Social 
enterprises, like other businesses, may at some point face the problem of how to 
survive their founders. But, in the absence of a separate corporate personality, a 
social enterprise might be even more closely associated with the personality of its 
founding social entrepreneur(s) than is a for-profit business. It is often through the 
personal “passion” and devotion of these people that many social enterprises come 
into being. The founders will be responsible not only for the “enterprise” of the 
venture but also its specifically social aspect. As we have seen, it is important that 
the public trust this social commitment and ability to survive any change in the 
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ownership of the organisation. Giving the organisation its own autonomous 
existence can, I would argue, provide some reassurance that the organisation is 
separate from, and in some sense bigger than, its current owners. 
 
3.3.3 Protection against risk 
 
Any venture typically involves risk. The question arises who is to bear the risk of 
losses that may arise. In the absence of any special provision, the usual rule would 
be that the owners of the enterprise would face liability for contracts entered into 
by them (or by their agents) in pursuit of the venture. Likewise, they would be 
vicariously liable for torts incurred by their employees. If the sum total of these 
contractual and tortious liabilities exceeded the value of the firm’s assets, they 
would remain personally liable for the difference. This is the legal position that 
faces, say, the sole trader, or the partner of a general partnership. In such a legal 
structure there is no difference between the owner-operator of the business and the 
business itself. This is a situation of unlimited liability.  
 
Of course, the owners might divert some of the risk to a third party by insuring. 
However, it is unfeasible for a business to insure, at a realistic premium, against its 
costs simply exceeding its revenues. Alternatively, owners could avoid risky 
ventures in the first place. However, this is somewhat undesirable for any economy, 
since it would deter entrepreneurial activities, precisely what our choice of a well-
designed legal form is trying to encourage. 
 
A further possible strategy, in the face of unlimited liability, would be for those 
who would otherwise be liable to monitor intensively the way the business is being 
run, to ensure that the risks of failure are substantially reduced. However, this 
“monitoring strategy” would throw up a lot of further problems in turn. It would 
again lead to overly cautious management, and also impose substantial costs on the 
owners-investors, forced to monitor how riskily the business is being operated. This 
is only feasible if the owners own a substantial part of the enterprise and thereby 
stop the latter from being “widely owned” by a large number of small investors. 
This possibility is clearly indicated by Easterbrook and Fischel as follows: 
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If investors could be required to supply unlimited amounts of additional capital, 
wealthy people would be reluctant to make small investments. Every share of 
stock would place all of their personal assets at risk. To guard against this risk, 
the investor would reduce the number of different forms he holds and monitors 
each more closely.67 
 
A fourth strategy for owners, facing unlimited liability, would be to try to include, 
in every contract the enterprise enters into, a term limiting the owners’ liability (for 
example, limiting it to the assets of the enterprise). Yet this would raise transaction 
costs. A legal form such as the registered company, which operates to give limited 
liability to the owners of the company, might be said to be operating as a “default 
rule” that in every contract entered into by the company, the other party’s claims 
shall be limited to the company’s assets. As Easterbrook and Fischel observe, ‘If 
limited liability were not provided by law, firms would attempt to create it by 
contract. The legal rule enables firms to obtain the benefits of limited liability at 
lower cost’.68 Similarly, Armour et al note, ‘The corporate form effectively imposes 
a default term in contracts between a firm and its creditors whereby the creditors 
are limited to making claims against assets that are held in the name of (‘owned 
by’) firm itself, and have no claim against assets that the firm’s shareholders hold 
in their own names’.69 
 
Thus, “limited liability” can be said to be the second feature of a legal form that is 
attractive for traditional businesses and social enterprises alike. Such a rule would 
still be a “default rule”, in that it would remain open to those dealing with a social 
enterprise, in any particular case, to insist on the owners being liable, up to the full 
extent of their assets, for the debts of the enterprise. But in the absence of such a 
“personal guarantee”, the default rule of limited liability would protect investors 
from the types of liability to which they would otherwise be exposed. They could 
then feel secure that their personal assets would not be at risk and would be 
encouraged to invest their money in an enterprise. Even the less wealthy would be 
encouraged by limited liability to start a business or to make investments.70   
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It is worth expanding on the benefits of limited liability a little. The limited 
company has been described as ‘the greatest single discovery of modern 
times…Even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited liability 
corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it’.71 It 
especially facilitates “sleeping investors”, who do not need to expend time and 
money monitoring those who run the organisation. It encourages diversification of 
investment (there is no greater risk of personal liability owning shares in 10 
companies than owing shares in one company). And with diversification comes the 
growth of liquid share markets and the benefits they bring.72 
 
Moreover, as Armour et al make clear, the mechanism by which limited liability is 
created, namely through endowing the company with its own separate personality 
(and limited liability) also works to the benefit of the creditors in some cases. In 
providing for a separate legal personality, the law actually creates what they refer 
to as a “separate patrimony”, whose function is also to provide “entity shielding” – 
that is, shielding the assets of the entity – the corporation – from the creditors of the 
entity’s owners.73 
 
Moreover, again according to Armour et al, ‘…by shifting downside business risk 
from shareholders to creditors, limited liability enlists creditors as monitors of the 
firm’s managers, a task which they may be in a better position to perform than are 
the shareholders in a firm in which share ownership is widely dispersed’.74 Other 
writers make similar points. Cheffins, for example, argues that ‘In important ways 
limited liability helps to distribute risk away from poor risk bearers in favour of 
those better positioned to deal with the consequences...creditors can take 
precautionary measures when negotiating debt contracts to deal with the burden of 
limited liability’.75 Likewise, Posner also maintains that creditors might be 
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“superior” risk bearers because they may be in a better informed position and less 
risk averse than shareholders.76  
 
So far we have explained the problems of unlimited liability, and the benefits of 
limited liability. Two final points should be considered to complete our analysis. 
 
First, none of the above should be taken as meaning that a legal form that gives 
limited liability should not also impose conditions for, and exceptions to, that 
principle. Some of these may come through the law relating to that particular legal 
form. So, for example, UK company law provides for duties on directors to protect 
the interests of creditors in certain situations.77 It imposes a range of “capital 
maintenance” rules designed to ensure that share capital which the company claims 
to have raised has indeed been acquired, and is not improperly returned to 
shareholders.78 Other protections may come through insolvency law, with rules 
designed to swell the assets available for distribution to creditors.79 Moreover, there 
will have to be substantial disclosure requirements on any legal form which 
provides for limited liability. Such requirements enable those dealing with that 
entity to discover that limited liability will apply,80 and to find out enough about the 
company’s financial circumstances to assess the riskiness of dealing with this 
entity.81 We shall not consider these rules in detail in this thesis, other than to 
suggest that there seems no obvious reason why such protective rules as already 
exist in this case of the registered for profit company would not be equally 
appropriate in a legal form that gave limited liability for a social enterprise. 
 
The second, and arguably more fundamental, point is to ask whether it is indeed the 
case that social enterprises do require a legal form that delivers limited liability. 
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Whilst we have noted the general benefits of limited liability in managing the risks 
faced by an enterprise’s owners, we have also noted that any legal form that 
provides for limited liability is likely to include some potentially costly conditions. 
Can we be sure that, specifically for social enterprises, the benefits of limited 
liability to owners will outweigh these costs? 
 
Two observations might be made. First, the desirability of limited liability does not 
appear to be undermined by the social objectives of a social enterprise. Indeed, if 
anything, the argument seems to go the other way. The desirability of limited 
liability is arguably even greater in the case of a social enterprise compared to a 
for-profit. That is because the not-for-profit orientation of social enterprises 
subjects them to limits on the distribution of profits. In the case of a for-profit, the 
entrepreneur stands to capture all the surplus and can weigh that prospective gain 
against the risks of potential liability. For a social enterprise, limits on the extraction 
of profits will severely constrain the benefits earned. With the prospect of gains so 
reduced, the protection against risk seems to be particularly essential. Otherwise, 
how could social investors and financial backers be expected to invest in a venture 
that offers neither attractive profits nor protection for their personal assets? 
Therefore, even though many existing legal vehicles are useful for social 
enterprises, a corporate form with limited liability appears to be especially 
attractive. 
 
However, secondly, the desirability of limited liability depends on the perceived 
risk of losses occurring. There may be some social enterprises that will have 
operations that generate relatively low risks of insolvency. If the enterprise has 
relatively low running costs, mainly relying on the labour of its founding social 
entrepreneur, the “outputs” may be modest. If the enterprise primarily sells services 
which are only produced when a particular client demands them, there may well be 
less risk than where an untested product is being produced, in advance, at great cost, 
without any guarantee that the product will be bought by anyone. In some cases, 
the only real risk may be where services are provided negligently, but against such 
a risk something approaching full indemnity insurance may be available. Where 
risks are very low, the benefits of limited liability may be marginal, and may not 
outweigh the substantial regulatory costs that must accompany a limited liability 
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form. Thus, for example, for a professional firm the personal liability protection 
provided by a corporate legal form might be outweighed by other considerations, 
such as the need to protect confidential information.  
 
However, the reality is that ‘today limited liability has become a nearly universal 
feature of the corporate form,’82 and the corporate form is very widely chosen.  
Freedman’s survey also found that whilst limited liability is not absolute, and does 
not always suit every type of organisational form and every need, ‘lack of limited 
liability is the main perceived disadvantage of non-incorporation’.83 Moreover, 
recall that limited liability, if part of the legal form for social enterprise, will operate 
as a default rule (sub-section 3.2.3). The general principle when deciding which 
defaults to include within a form is guided by transaction cost saving 
considerations. And these considerations generally imply that a rule should be 
chosen which most (but not necessarily all) enterprises would want. Provided that 
a majority of social enterprises would desire limited liability, it makes sense to 
provide for that. That a minority of social enterprises, especially those providing 
services to others, with modest outputs and good insurance cover, may see limited 
liability as an unnecessary luxury, does not challenge this conclusion. 
 
3.3.4 The social enterprise’s need for, and sources of, finance 
 
Starting a business enterprise, especially a small one like most social enterprises, 
requires an initial funding from those who are creating it. Ordinarily, the start-up 
capital consists of cash, property, or services – or the personal guarantee to provide 
any or all of these in the future.84 The initial start-up capital often needs to be 
supplemented by “insider loans” (e.g. from family members). Nonetheless, there 
are limits to such initial and “internal” sources of funding. Very often, personal 
capital and insider loans are not enough, and also inside lenders are usually reluctant 
to lend large amounts of money without some personal guarantees.85 Hence, the 
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entrepreneur needs to seek outside funding. This is also likely in a social enterprise, 
as it develops in size.  As a not-for-profit venture (as distinct from a charity 
depending mainly on grants and donations), a social enterprise cannot avoid the 
need to raise finance.86 
 
There is no question that social enterprises actually rely on several funding sources. 
The point here is that social entrepreneurs should be encouraged to rely more on 
“market resources” rather than grants and donations in order to be financially viable 
for long-term growth. In the UK social enterprises are regarded “first and foremost 
as businesses”;87 thus, in its effort to encourage the growth of the social enterprise 
sector, the British government has been trying to stop grant dependency of the 
sector and overcome what it describes as the sector’s ‘cultural aversion to 
borrowing’.88  
 
Generally, two sources of external financing are available, namely, equity capital 
provided by new additional owners of the enterprise, and loan capital (or debt 
finance). The legal form’s rules about whether the organisation can borrow, create 
security, pay interests, sell shares to members, and, if so, pay dividends back to 
members are crucial here, for they determine how easily it can raise equity and debt 
finance. I shall consider what rules would facilitate a social enterprise to raise each 
type of finance in turn. 
 
3.3.4.1 Equity (share) capital 
 
The corporate form, especially if the corporation has limited liability, provides a 
number of key advantages to raising “equity” capital from investors who become 
part owners of the enterprise. The first arises from the owner’s promise of limited 
liability, which tempts outside investors. We have already seen how limited liability 
works to give protection against risk to personal assets and how this has the 
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important effect of encouraging outside investors to invest in a business enterprise 
which offers such protection  
 
The second advantage follows from the first one: with no threat to their other 
property, outside investors have much less need to monitor the way the business is 
being run. The third advantage is related to how easy it is to recover one’s 
investment. One important characteristic of the corporate form is its transferable 
shares.89 Transferability amounts to the investors’ shares being tradable. This 
means that one’s investment is always recoverable (though probably not at the same 
prices for which the shares have been paid) – this is still not to mention the 
recoverability in the form of the return on investment.  
 
Thus, it would seem that most social enterprises, like for-profit enterprises, would 
generally welcome a legal form that provides limited liability and transferable 
shares in order to facilitate capital raising. However, for social enterprises this is 
only one half of the story. The other half concerns the need to impose limits on 
social enterprise’s ability to reward investors (whether the original social 
entrepreneur, or outsider investors) by distributing profits to them. Even in a for-
profit, there are some limits on the company’s ability to make payments to 
investors. This restriction is to protect creditors, and typically requires that 
payments to shareholders be made out of “distributable profits”. For social 
enterprises, more extensive limits are appropriate. Why is this so? This issue will 
be more fully dealt with in Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.3.2.1) and Chapter 5, where we 
consider how this mechanism functions as a feature of the CIC (sub-section 
5.5.2.1). 
 
To summarise, then, the need to raise finance suggests that social enterprises will 
want a corporate legal form, with limited liability, but one which imposes a limit 
upon the amount of profit that can be returned to investors. 
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3.3.4.2 Loan capital 
 
The corporate legal form also has a number of advantages in terms of raising loan 
capital. At first sight, this might seem implausible. After all, a creditor (say a bank) 
contemplating lending to a company (rather than, say, a sole trader) should 
appreciate that the loan will be recoverable only from the company itself. The 
creditor will be unable to seize the personal assets of the company’s owners. A sole 
trader will be liable to the full extent of his or her assets. 
 
However, we have already noted the credibility that normally comes with a body 
corporate, with Freedman’s survey noting that ‘The most often mentioned reason 
for incorporation after obtaining limited liability was prestige and credibility (50 
per cent)…’90 We might doubt whether sophisticated financial institutions are really 
quite so impressed by a company’s supposed status when deciding whether to lend 
to it, but there is a second factor that certainly does establish why companies can 
find it easier to borrow. They can provide more security to the lender, because they 
can create floating charges over those assets which are not amenable to being made 
subject to a fixed charge.91 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has begun the task of devising a blueprint of a legal form for social 
enterprises. It began by explaining the importance of legal forms, and offered some 
examples of existing forms in the UK. It then noted some of criteria that govern the 
design of a good form, which should contain a mix of default rules and mandatory 
rules. Its defaults should usually, but not always, offer what best meets the needs of 
most organisations. The rules should also well fit in with the architecture of 
legislation governing other similar legal forms. In addressing what will best serve 
most social enterprises, we suggested three needs that the legal form should try to 
meet. First, it should confer legal personality. Second, it should provide limited 
liability. Third, it should facilitate the raising of capital.  
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All the elements echo features of for-profits. However, I also argued that a legal 
form for social enterprises should have a corporate plus structure. Thus, it requires 
rules to limit the return of profit to ensure that it adheres to its social purpose. 
Additionally, it requires rules that will ensure their democratic and social 
accountability. In part, this latter requirement encompasses mechanisms to ensure 
the control of agency costs, an area of governance that again overlaps with for-
profits. But it entails much more than that. To these issues, the next chapter now 
turns. 
 Chapter 4 
Designing a Legal Form for Social Enterprise: 
Regulatory/Governance Rules in a Legal Form for Social 
Enterprises 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
We now turn to what we earlier called the “regulatory” (as opposed to “facilitative”) 
rules constituting a good legal form for social enterprises. The main focus is on two 
regulatory issues that need to be addressed. The first concerns the problem of 
agency costs. The second concerns the issue of accountability to stakeholders. Once 
again, the aim is to relate the discussion of the peculiar nature of social enterprises, 
settled in Chapter 2, to the regulatory content of a good legal form for social 
enterprises.  
 
The thrust of the argument in this chapter will run as follows. Although the two 
regulatory issues mentioned above are both important in designing a good 
governance regime for social enterprises, only the second of these – accountability 
to stakeholders – deserves prolonged analysis in this thesis.  
 
Why? The agency cost problem, identified in section 4.2, focuses primarily upon 
the difficulties in ensuring that those managing the social enterprise – its “agents” 
– serve the interests of all its owners, rather than pursuing their own self-interest, 
or only the interests of the majority (but not the minority) owners. The extent of 
this problem varies according to the number of owners the organisation has, 
whether there are owners who do not participate in running the organisation 
(“sleeping investors”) and whether there is a split between minority and majority 
owners. Typically, social enterprises tend to be relatively small organisations with 
few sleeping investors; hence, as a practical matter, agency problems associated 
with protecting owners are likely to be less intense in most social enterprises than 
in other larger companies where there is a sharper separation of ownership and 
control.  
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However, agency costs still exist and cannot be completely ignored in the social 
enterprise. And a good legal form for social enterprise must ensure that appropriate 
provisions are in place to control such costs. But these provisions will largely 
replicate those that are seen in a for-profit. I shall say more, briefly, below about 
the sort of regulatory strategies that may be appropriate to control such costs, but 
no prolonged discussion of them is required, because such strategies are well-
covered in existing accounts of company law and corporate governance regimes, 
and there is little that is peculiar about the control of agency costs in the context of 
the social enterprise to warrant any expanded discussion of them here. 
 
4.2 Controlling agency costs 
 
It has come to be widely accepted that one of the central tasks of the governance 
regime for any organisation – and thus something that any legal form for an 
organisation must also address – is the reduction of “agency costs”. Agency costs 
are seen as inherent in any “agency relationships”; they are not something that only 
arises within organisations. This section presents a brief review of this concept and 
tries to relate it to social enterprise. 
 
4.2.1 Agency costs and social enterprise 
 
An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling as ‘a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent’.1 Similarly, according to Armour et al, ‘…an 
“agency problem”—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the 
welfare of one party, termed the “principal”, depends upon actions taken by another 
party, termed the “agent”. The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the 
principal’s interest rather than simply in the agent’s own interest’.2 It is such a 
                                                                 
1
 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 308.  
2
 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems and Legal Strategies’, 
in Reiner Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 35. 
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problem, which is inherent in all contractual relationships, that gives rise to “agency 
costs”: 
  
The core of the difficulty is that, because the agent commonly has better 
information than does the principal about the relevant facts, the principal cannot 
easily assure himself that the agent’s performance is precisely what was 
promised. As a consequence, the agent has an incentive to act opportunistically, 
skimping on the quality of his performance, or even diverting to himself some 
of what was promised to the principal.3 
 
Armour et al have identified three relationships, within the company, where agency 
problems may arise. The first arises between all the company’s owners and its hired 
managers. The second is between, on the one hand, the owners who possess the 
majority or controlling interest in the company and, on the other hand, the minority 
or the non-controlling owners. The third is the conflict between the firm itself – 
especially in so far as this involves its owners – and the other parties with whom 
the firm contracts, including creditors, employees, and customers.4 Armour et al 
include this within their agency-cost analysis framework, but I shall delay 
discussion of this issue until the section on “stakeholding”, in section 4.3. Relevant 
to social enterprises is the difficulty to assure that the firm, as the agent, does not 
behave opportunistically towards various other principals (or “stakeholders”) – for 
example, by expropriating creditors, exploiting employees, misleading customers, 
or exploiting or neglecting the welfare of the community. 
 
Before we come to a definition of agency costs themselves, let us see how the 
principal could limit the divergences from his or her interest. According to Jensen 
and Meckling,  
 
The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the agent 
to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain 
actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be 
compensated if he does take such actions.5 
 
In view of the measures and efforts taken by the principal to limit the problem 
arising from the agency relationship, we can define the agency costs as ‘the sum of: 
                                                                 
3
 ibid.  
4
 ibid 36-37. 
5
 Jensen and Meckling (n 1) 308. 
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(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by 
the agent, [and] (3) the residual loss’.6 Monitoring and bonding costs are those 
necessary to enforce the contract defining the agency relationship: expending 
resources on enforcement pays only to the point where the reduction in the losses 
resulting from aberrant activities equals the increase in the enforcement costs. It is 
nevertheless the residual loss,7 in Williamson’s view, that is ‘…the key feature, 
since the other two are incurred only in the degree to which they yield cost-effective 
reductions in the residual loss.’8 It is thus the key cost that the principal would seek 
to reduce by incurring monitoring costs and making the agent incur the bonding 
cost. 
 
I shall say a little more, shortly, about the sorts of strategies that can be employed 
to control agency costs. Before doing so, however, it is worth saying something 
about the issue of the “separation of ownership and control”.9 As we have defined 
agency costs, they arise because the company is being run by agents who are 
different from the principal. It is the separation of ownership from management of 
the company that gives rise to an agency relationship, not the separation of 
ownership and control. However, the severity (but not existence) of the agency cost 
problem will depend upon whether there is a separation between ownership and 
control. 
 
The separation of ownership and control typically arises where there are many 
individual shareholders, each of whom holds a relatively small proportion of the 
company’s shares. This “dispersion” of the company’s ownership usually means 
that each individual shareholder feels relatively powerless in intervening to ensure 
                                                                 
6
 ibid. 
7
 The residual loss actually affects the interest of shareholders as the “residual claimants” of the 
company. According Armour et al, ‘Shareholders are a corporation’s “residual claimants” in the 
sense that they are entitled to appropriate all (and only) the net assets and earnings of the corporation 
after all contractual claimants—such as employees, suppliers, and customers—have been paid in 
full’. John Armour, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘What is Corporate Law?’, in Reiner 
Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 
(2nd edn, OUP 2009) 28.  
8
 Oliver E Williamson, ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’ (1988) 43(3) The Journal of 
Finance 567, 572.  
9
 See generally Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (Transaction Publishers 1932); Eugene F Fama and Michael C Jensen, ‘Separation of 
Ownership and Control (1983) 26(2) The Journal of Law & Economics 301.   
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that those managing the company – its agents – behave well and serve shareholder 
interests. Each shareholder normally doubts that they can make much difference to 
ensuring that the company is well run. That is, they do not think they would be able 
to intervene and make a difference. Moreover, they would bear all the costs of their 
own intervention to secure only a small proportion of the benefits. All other owners 
would also share in the fruits of any one owner’s action to improve the company’s 
management, even though they had not taken any part in the intervention. This is, 
in other words, a classic situation of “collective action”,10 in which it becomes 
rational for each shareholder to sit back, do nothing and hope they can free ride on 
the efforts of others. But the end result is that all shareholders reason in this way, 
ensuring little effective shareholder oversight. As a result, shareholders not only do 
not manage their company, but nor do they control those who do manage it on their 
behalf. 
 
Clearly, the extent of this separation of ownership and control depends upon the 
pattern of share ownership in the company. Dispersed ownership, amongst many 
small shareholders, gives rise to the greatest separation of ownership and control.  
 
How does all this relate to social enterprises? Typically, social enterprises will be 
relatively small companies, owned by a single person, or a small number of 
shareholders. With relatively concentrated share ownership, it is less likely that 
shareholders will lose control of the company. It may well be that all the owners of 
the enterprise will also be involved in managing it, reducing agency costs 
substantially, and giving those owners effective control over the organisation. 
However, while problems of separation of ownership and control, and hence also 
of agency costs, are likely reduced in many social enterprises, they will not be 
wholly avoided. The potential for agency cost problems is greater in the case of a 
social enterprise having multiple owners. This is particularly the case if some of 
those owners are not involved in the management of the enterprise. 
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 For the issue of collective action problem, see Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton and Alisa Röell, 
‘Corporate Governance and Control’ (2005) ECGI Working Paper 02/2002 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=343461> accessed 5 July 2014 
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4.2.2 Strategies for reducing agency costs 
 
As noted already, there is no need in this thesis to discuss in detail the best strategies 
to control agency costs, so as to protect owners against managers, or minority 
owners against majority ones. The problem of protecting owners against agency 
costs in the social enterprise are not significantly different from the problems of 
protecting owners, including minority owners, in the for-profit enterprise. The 
problems, and the best strategies to address the problems, are well covered in 
existing literature, and there are no special considerations applicable to social 
enterprises that require detailed analysis here. It will suffice, then, simply to give a 
very brief sense of the main strategies that are available to reduce such costs, and 
to assume that a good legal form for social enterprise would pay due regard to these 
strategies.11 
 
One strategy involves ensuring effective disclosure of information to owners, so 
that they are able to ascertain how well the social enterprise is being managed, and 
use whatever power of intervention they enjoy to act where problems are 
disclosed.12 
 
A second strategy is to impose standards of conduct, i.e. legal duties, on the most 
senior tier of the organisation’s management, namely its directors. Such standards 
will provide an indication of the sort of conduct that is, or is not, permitted by 
directors, with the threat of legal action if those standards are breached. Clearly, if 
this strategy is to work well, then certain conditions must be satisfied. First, the 
standards of conduct must be well defined and clear in their content, so that all 
parties can see clearly what is required. Second, the standards must be sufficiently 
demanding so that they properly capture all the harmful behaviour in which 
directors might engage, but they must not be excessively strict so that they preclude 
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 For a detailed analysis on agency cost reduction strategies, see Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman, 
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desirable managerial conduct by directors, or make the risk of being a director so 
great that few would take on the position. Third, there must be effective means of 
enforcing the standards against directors.13 
 
A third strategy moves beyond the protection of shareholders against managers, and 
towards the protection of minority against majority shareholders. A well-designed 
vehicle for a social enterprise, like a well-designed vehicle for a for-profit, must 
ensure some effective protection for minority owners against oppressive majority 
shareholders. Again, because this is a feature that is not unique to the social 
enterprise, I shall not examine it in any detail here. However, we might just note 
that there are several ways in which minorities can be protected. For one, they can 
be given the right to bring proceedings on behalf of the company for a breach of 
directors’ duties, where the majority are otherwise blocking action by the company 
(typically, because the majority are also the directors against whom the action 
would be brought). For another, the minority might be given “personal rights” to 
insist on certain procedures being followed in the company, and the rights to take 
proceedings personally to enforce those rights. Finally, minorities might be given 
the right to escape from the company, at a fair price, where they have legitimate 
complaints about the way the company is being run, or the way they are being 
treated within the company. In many smaller companies, where there are few 
shareholders, the third of these protections can be especially valuable. In such 
companies minorities who have fallen out with the majority will find it practically 
unappealing simply to remain a shareholder and take steps to protect the company’s 
rights, or take steps to protect their own rights. In such cases, exit from the company 
– what is sometimes called a “corporate divorce” – will be the only realistic way of 
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resolving disputes where the relationship between majority and minority has broken 
down.14 
 
We shall now turn to focus on the area of governance where the social enterprise is 
clearly different from the for-profit, and, accordingly, where a good legal form for 
social enterprise would include provisions different from those found in the for-
profit legal vehicle. This concerns the position of stakeholders within the social 
enterprise. 
 
4.3 Assuring accountability to stakeholders within social 
enterprises 
 
Governance promotes accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness within social 
enterprise. According to Connolly and Kelly, three questions should be raised to 
‘contextualise’ the consideration of accountability: namely, who the organisation is 
accountable to; what they are accountable for; and how that accountability is to be 
discharged. However, the “who”, “what” and “how” of the accountability 
relationship are not so obvious.’15  
 
This section starts, in sub-section 4.3.1, with a brief discussion of two leading 
theories of governance, one focusing on the shareholder value and the other 
stressing the stakeholder interest. In my view, both theoretical models are relevant 
to the governance rules social entrepreneurs are looking for in a legal form for social 
enterprises. Together they address the concern to reduce agency costs, which have 
already been dealt with in section 4.2, as well as answering the question to who the 
social enterprise is accountable. Sub-section 4.3.2 then seeks to identify what sort 
of package of governance rules a legal form for social enterprises should have, 
which could assure accountability to stakeholders as well as democratic decision-
making. The difficulties in applying these two governance models to social 
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enterprises, with their “multiple goals”, will also be discussed. 
 
4.3.1 Shareholding versus Stakeholding                                                                                                                             
 
It is useful to start by clarifying the difference between a shareholder value 
approach (also called “shareholder primacy”) and a stakeholder approach.16 
 
4.3.1.1 Conventional concepts of shareholding and stakeholding 
 
Shareholder primacy argues that managerial decisions should be informed by the 
interests of shareholders. The decision maker sees the objective of each individual 
decision to be the satisfaction of shareholder interests. If shareholders are assumed 
to want to maximise their financial return from the company, then this likely means 
that each decision should have, as its objective, the maximisation of shareholder 
wealth or, perhaps, something more easily calculable, such as the maximisation of 
the company’s own profits (assuming the maximisation of profits will lead to a 
maximisation of the shareholder’s wealth).  
 
The main argument in favour of shareholder primacy is that shareholders have the 
greatest stake in the company and bear residual risk, they are thus residual 
claimants. And in order to run the company efficiently, there should be one single 
objective for directors to focus on, which is the maximisation of shareholder value. 
If directors have to take into account other social purposes, it could give them 
opportunities to abuse their power. Shareholder primacy is thus believed to best 
address the agency problems which exist in all organisations having principal-agent 
relationships and at every level of management.17 
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 For an overview of the shareholding versus stakeholding issue, see Steve Letza, Xiuping Sun and 
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In response to concerns over the effectiveness of shareholder primacy, stakeholder 
theory was introduced and categorised into normative, instrumental and descriptive 
approaches.18 Stakeholder approach sees the interests of stakeholders as deserving 
independent weight in their own right. The argument is that ‘[s]takeholders have a 
right to be regarded as an end, and not a means to an end (i.e. they are not used to 
benefit the corporation in the long run, but their benefits are an end for the 
corporation).’19 A decision on the pay rate for a group of employees, for example, 
would attempt to determine what wage rate would be in the interests of those 
employees. Having done so, that interest would then need to be balanced against 
the interests of other stakeholders, rather than merely being a factor in calculating 
the overall profit maximising, wage rate. 
 
Thus, the crucial difference between the two approaches is about how individual 
decisions are taken. Shareholder primacy requires each decision to be taken with 
the goal of maximising profits, and views the impact (including, if the decision 
maker is sophisticated, the very long-term impact) of each potential decision as 
merely a factor to be taken into account in calculating what will maximise profits. 
Stakeholder approach abandons profit maximisation as the goal to guide at least 
some individual decisions.  At least some individual decisions instead are to be the 
product of a balancing of competing interests, which enjoy weight in their own 
right. 
 
In respect of for-profits, there are a variety of arguments that have been put in favour 
of stakeholder approach. It is useful, however, to distinguish between two different 
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types of argument.  The first type – which I shall call the “anti-shareholder” 
argument – does not seek to justify the approach by reference to the interest of 
shareholders themselves.  Rather, it accepts that shareholders may be less well off 
as a result of companies adopting a stakeholder approach, but nevertheless asserts 
that there is some overriding reason why this might be justified.  So, for example, 
it might be asserted that stakeholders simply have a right to have (at least some of) 
their interests given genuine weight, and whilst this may cause a loss to 
shareholders, shareholders are morally obliged to accept this (moral basis). Or, 
focusing on economic considerations (instrumental ground), it might be argued that 
corporate governance rules should be designed to maximise social wealth, and that 
a stakeholder approach will produce greater social wealth, in aggregate, although it 
will leave shareholders worse off. 
 
A second type of argument for stakeholder approach – which I shall call the 
“shareholder-friendly” argument – seeks to justify it as improving the position of 
both stakeholders and, crucially, shareholders themselves too. ‘Stakeholding is the 
instrument through which efficiency, profitability, competition, and economic 
success can be promoted on the basis that if one removed cohesion among 
stakeholders it would not be possible for corporations to be competitive.’20 Thus, 
shareholders themselves should favour stakeholding, because they, as well as 
stakeholders, will be better off under such a regime.   
 
It is easy – but wrong – to think that the shareholder-friendly argument for 
stakeholding simply collapses back into shareholder primacy.  After all, as we noted 
above, shareholder primacy does require decision makers to take account of the 
impact of decisions on stakeholders. If stakeholding will leave shareholders better 
off, then why will decision makers not take as much account of stakeholder interests 
under a shareholder primacy regime as they would under a stakeholder regime?  But 
this is to ignore the crucial difference between the two regimes. Under a true 
stakeholder regime, decision makers no longer calculate, at the level of each 
individual decision, about what shareholders’ interests require. They pursue a 
different target. Even if the shareholder-friendly argument for stakeholding is 
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correct, it still suggests that rational shareholders want those running the 
organisation to abandon shareholder value as their guide when they take individual 
decisions. 
 
Why, however, might shareholders want this? Again I think that, two different types 
of reason can be offered.  The first – and that most commonly made by stakeholder 
proponents – accepts that shareholders are interested in maximising their financial 
returns, but then seeks to argue that a company run under stakeholder principles is 
likely to be financially more profitable, and thus produce higher returns even for 
investors. One influential version of this reason is found in the literature on “team 
production”, which views the firm as a team to which different persons contribute, 
and from which they can expect returns.21   
 
The second reason why it might be asserted that shareholders would be better off 
under stakeholder approach is related to the idea that shareholders themselves did 
not in fact want to maximise their financial returns, but wanted instead some of the 
interests of stakeholders to be given some genuine weight, regardless of whether 
that would generate greater financial returns for investors. Some investors, in other 
words, may be more altruistic than is usually assumed.22  Now, this argument does 
not seem wholly implausible, even with regard to for-profit companies. After all, 
there has been a growth of “socially responsible” investment vehicles, which 
promise to select companies in which investments will be made according to ethical 
criteria other than return on capital. Their proliferation may provide some evidence 
that some investors do not themselves seek profit maximisation. But such ethical 
investments are only a small fraction of total investments in companies,23 and so 
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provide less than compelling evidence of widespread investor altruism.   
 
4.3.1.2 Shareholder vs stakeholder debate: who won? Or a move towards a new 
approach? 
 
An answer to this is not as simple as whether to choose either shareholder primacy 
or stakeholder approach since they both have merits and weaknesses, i.e. depending 
on a particular point in time or different organisational objectives. However, there 
have been calls for and attempts to create a new approach, such as a compromise 
between the two, combining the strong points of each. According to Keay, ‘The 
problem is not so much in finding weaknesses in shareholder primacy, it is replacing 
the theory with something else. Stakeholder theory is the obvious answer, but it too 
has significant shortcomings. There is a desperate need for a new approach’.24 
Similarly, Letza et al argue that these two traditional approaches are ‘over-
abstracted and over-static in modelling and theorising corporate governance…far 
removed from the current modern business environment where, for example, the 
boundary of the firm has become blurred…’25  
 
One of the moves towards a new model is the introduction of the “enlightened 
shareholder value” approach, 26 which has been put statutorily in the UK. The main 
concept is that even though profit maximisation is the objective of the organisation, 
stakeholder interests are not ignored. As managers take each decision, seeking to 
maximise profits, they will inevitably have to consider how their decisions impact 
upon the interests of their non-shareholder stakeholders. They will have to do that 
because such an impact will affect how those stakeholders will respond to the 
organisation, and their responses will in turn affect the company’s profitability. 
When working out, for example, the profit maximising decision regarding how 
much to pay a group of employees, such calculation must take into account how 
different pay rates will impact on those employees, in terms of their work-output, 
their loyalty, and so on, because their work-output and their loyalty will in turn 
affect future profitability. Thus, the enlightened shareholder value is ‘believed to be 
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an emerging third position, a compromise between shareholder value and the 
stakeholder model’.27 
 
But the interests of stakeholders feature only instrumentally: they are relevant only 
as a means to calculate better the profit maximising decision. Decisions are not 
guided by the aim of satisfying the interests of stakeholders as an independent 
objective in its own right.28 Gamble and Kelly view the enlightened shareholder 
value as rather a modified version of the traditional shareholder primacy than a new 
model as ‘[m]any of the interests and the ideas which have sustained shareholder 
value as the dominant conception of the company are still in place’.29 Also, Letza 
et al see it just as part of the paradigmatic shift from the shareholder model to the 
stakeholder model, which ‘does not necessarily represent a true dominance of 
stakeholder forces...’30  
 
Then, what should a new model look like? Letza et al, being quite hostile towards 
the traditional models, call for a new governance approach which could work in 
practice. Such a model should ‘better explain the idiosyncratic workings of local 
governance, rather than try to force-fit reality into the established abstracted 
templates’.31 Instead of establishing a new approach, they provide some 
characteristics of a rather ideal than practical governance model as follows. It 
should be “processual” reflecting the changing nature of the business environment; 
“balanced” reflecting the diversity of firms; “relational” recognising the corporate 
reality as interconnected and independent; “pluralist” recognising various players 
i.e. economics, politics, social norms and so on; “dynamic and flexible” not 
attaching itself to a once-and-for-ever view; and “enlightening” being ready to 
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change ways of thinking about governance.32 Even though this model is aimed to 
be workable and explicable in practice, rather it does not really distance itself from 
the abstract themes of the traditional models.  
 
There is actually an attempt to create a new governance model, seeking its own 
justification different from those of the traditional concepts. It is called the “Entity 
Maximisation and Sustainability” model (EMS), which was introduced by legal 
theorist Andrew Keay.33 The model has two main elements: first, a commitment to 
maximising the entity; and second, a sustainability of the entity to ensure its 
survival. Its core justification is 
 
…[the] focus on the company as an entity or enterprise, that is the company is 
an institution in its own right. The fact of the matter is that the entity exists 
separately from those who invest in it, and continues to exist notwithstanding 
changes in the identity of the investors.34 
 
The EMS is different from shareholder primacy in that it maximises the company’s 
interests, rather than shareholders’. Such maximisation does not solely focus on 
financial return, but also ‘research and development, the training of employees, and 
to make investments in the local and broader community because it intends to be 
located there for a long haul’.35 Even though the EMS values stakeholders just like 
the stakeholder approach does, balancing differing interests to keep everyone happy 
is not its main goal (though preferable if possible). For the EMS, directors can make 
decisions that might make investors (including shareholders and stakeholders) less 
well off if that enhances the company’s interest.36 Whether this new approach will 
be widely accepted still depends on its effective enforcement.37 For now it confirms 
the need for an alternative to the traditional governance approaches. 
 
4.3.1.3 Social enterprise and its governance approach 
 
Turning now to the social enterprise, we have already seen in Chapter 2 that this is 
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an organisation which is defined precisely in terms of its owners’ desire to forego 
profit maximisation and to elevate the interests of other stakeholders affected by the 
organisation. It is rather obvious that the traditional shareholder primacy is not 
compatible with the nature of social enterprise in that it mainly focuses on 
maximising shareholders’ wealth. Even the enlightened shareholder value, which 
seems to take consideration of stakeholders, cannot completely fulfil its needs.38 
The stakeholder approach, which seems to be the most compatible model, has one 
primary weakness, that is, it does not provide a guideline on how to balance various 
interests of stakeholders. The process of balancing could cause opportunism since 
directors end up accountable to no one in particular (or too many stakeholder 
groups), distracting them from the true (social) objective which could lead to 
mission drift. The strongest argument for a social enterprise governance is likely to 
be what we labelled the shareholder-friendly argument for stakeholding. It will 
indeed be beneficial not only to stakeholders, but even to owners themselves, and 
this will be so because it better reflects those owners’ own preferences, in terms of 
compromising profits in order to fulfil the social goal of the organisation.  
 
It may also be the case that some owners of the social enterprises believe that the 
social objectives of the organisation will eventually make the organisation 
outperform, financially, a for-profit company. Such owners, then, subscribe to the 
reason in favour of shareholder-friendly stakeholding – the belief that stakeholder 
approach will make the organisation financially more successful than if it adopted 
a profit maximising approach. However, this is probably a secondary consideration 
for most social entrepreneurs, if it features in their calculations at all.39    
 
To sum up, the social enterprise, it must be emphasised, is by its very nature, a 
stakeholder entity. To be sure, it needs to be, and actually strives to become, 
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financially viable, but it must in any case adopt a stakeholder approach – that is, no 
matter whether this approach results in greater or lesser “financial” success. 
 
4.3.1.4 Should the stakeholder elements of social enterprise be mandatory or 
default? 
 
Thus, the legal form for social enterprises should reflect this, and should include 
provisions – “governance rules” – that reflect and implement this philosophy in 
order to serve the interests of stakeholders. However, should these rules be 
mandatory or merely default rules? The argument advanced so far might seem only 
to justify the stakeholder governance requirements being “default rules”. We are 
trying here to “help” or “facilitate” the social entrepreneurs; we are presuming that 
they want their social enterprise to pursue a stakeholder approach, and so we include 
stakeholder governance provisions as default rules to help them to achieve that. 
However, perhaps some social enterprises would not wish to adopt this approach, 
and so, in order to remain facilitative, the rules for social enterprises should permit 
such exceptional cases to exclude the law’s stakeholder provisions if they do not 
reflect the exceptional, non-stakeholder, philosophy of their particular social 
enterprise. 
 
However, I shall now argue that making the stakeholder governance provisions 
mere defaults would be dangerous, and that accordingly the stakeholder governance 
regime should be made mandatory for social enterprises. There are, I shall suggest, 
three arguments in favour of this argument.   
 
First, a social entrepreneur only gets the full benefit of the stakeholder provisions 
if the public can reliably assume that the social enterprise they are dealing with is 
bound to be a true social enterprise – to be a true stakeholder entity. It is only if they 
know that the social enterprise is “handcuffed” in this way that they will truly trust 
it, and favour it with their business, custom, loyalty and so on. So the social 
entrepreneurs benefit by handcuffing themselves in this way – they benefit by being 
able to secure the public’s trust more fully. But for this the rules must be mandatory 
– the public must believe the rules requiring stakeholder elements will undoubtedly 
apply and will not have been modified or excluded by the social entrepreneur. Only 
mandatory rules provide that guarantee or reassurance to the public. 
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Second, switching from benefits for the social entrepreneur to the public, we need 
a stakeholder regime to fulfil the expectations of those dealing with social 
enterprises. As noted above, the “social enterprise” label is a brand inducing 
expectations in those dealing with it that it is not an organisation that maximises 
profits and treats all others as a mere means to profit maximisation. It represents 
itself as an organisation that compromises profits to elevate the interests of 
stakeholders. Those expectations that others have about the mission of the social 
enterprise must be respected; otherwise the public is being conned or cheated.  
 
But this argument surely requires mandatory rules; the public expects social 
enterprises to be stakeholder organisations, and the public is not going to peer into 
the private contractual or constitutional affairs of the social enterprise to discover if 
its owners have in fact chosen to exclude any legal stakeholder governance rules 
that were merely “defaults”. So, whether or not mandatory rules would indeed 
benefit social entrepreneurs, the public expects stakeholder norms, and to fulfil this 
expectation, the norms have to be followed by the social enterprise – i.e. they must 
be mandatory. 
 
Third, and finally, to protect the brand – for the benefit of the genuine social 
entrepreneur, if the public sometimes “rewards” the social enterprise – dealing with 
a social enterprise in preference to dealing with a for-profit, then there is clearly a 
danger that some unscrupulous individuals would pretend to be a social enterprise 
in order to win the public’s trust and patronage, but in fact acting as a normal for-
profit. This would cheat other true social enterprises and risk bringing the whole of 
the social enterprise sector into disrepute when it is discovered that some social 
enterprises are really just for-profits in disguise. This again requires a mandatory 
stakeholder governance framework. 
 
4.3.2 Devising efficient governance rules in a legal form for social enterprises 
 
We have established that social enterprise is by definition a stakeholder organisation 
and learned that the stakeholder approach will be beneficial to social enterprises in 
the long term. In achieving such benefits, I argue that mandatory rules are needed 
to secure stakeholder elements. The problem now is how a social enterprise could 
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develop an effective relationship with its stakeholders and find an efficient method 
of involving the latter in its operation. Moreover, since social enterprises are 
normally related to more than one stakeholder group – if not the whole community 
– they often face the task of managing multi-stakeholder involvement. My focus is 
thus on the systems and rules needed to achieve the stakeholder governance 
approach.  
 
4.3.2.1 Asset lock and non-distribution constraint 
 
There is a lot of discussion of “asset lock”, which is one of the social dimensions 
of social enterprise,40 and which Hansmann calls non-distribution constraints for 
not-for-profits.41 The social objectives of social enterprise are clearly linked to 
stakeholder interests as opposed to those of the shareholders or owners. Therefore, 
this must be the first governance regulation that should be embedded in a legal form 
for social enterprise for the purpose of protecting social or public interests and 
reducing opportunism. Hansmann sets out a typical non-distribution constraint as 
covering the following principles:42 
 
(1) The owners could promise that no more than, for example, five percent of 
the income they receive from all sources will be distributed to the owners as 
compensation and profits.  
 
(2) The owners could promise that the total amounts distributed to themselves as 
compensation and profits will not exceed a given dollar limit.  
 
(3) The owners could promise that the amounts distributed to themselves will 
not exceed "reasonable" compensation for the services and capital they 
contribute to the organization. 
 
In practice, however, a legal form with a complete lock on assets would be 
undesirable. As defined in Chapter 2, social enterprise has both social and 
commercial dimensions. We want to limit profit taking, not to wholly exclude it. A 
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complete lock would be unattractive to investors, particularly private investors who 
would expect some financial return. Unlike non-profits like charities, the social 
enterprises are allowed to seek private investment and even encouraged to rely more 
on equity finance. The problem for social enterprises as not-for-profits is how to set 
the limits. That is, how much profit taking is appropriate, or to what extent is this 
considered “reasonable”? This is clearly a matter of how to strike a balance. 
 
Actually, a non-distribution constraint, which is normally in the form of an “asset 
lock”, may be voluntary or mandatory. Social enterprises opting for the legal 
structures that are not statutorily required to have an asset lock may impose this on 
themselves through appropriate provisions in their constitutions. Dunn and Riley 
have nonetheless indicated that there are difficulties for companies in incorporating 
such a provision into their constitutions. 43 The provisions are not protected from 
change or removal by the members of the organisation subject to the law under 
which it operates. Also, a non-distribution constraint that is merely self-imposed is 
likely to poorly “signal” to the public and is thereby unlikely to gain the latter’s 
trust.44 According to Dunn and Riley,  
 
...it is crucial to not-for-profits that they are indeed able to signal clearly to the 
public their assets are indeed locked in, for by doing so they should be able to 
engender greater trust from those whose support they hope to win. Donors will 
likely be happier to contribute their time, labour or money to organisations that 
are constrained in this way. And others will probably be happier to purchase the 
goods or services supplied by not-for-profits, knowing that they have, compared 
to for-profits, less incentive to act opportunistically.45 
 
In my view, a statutory asset lock is required in social enterprises. In practice, this 
will result from such an organisation opting to operate within a legal vehicle that 
statutorily requires an inclusion of this mechanism in its governing document. 
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4.3.2.2 Social benefit requirement 
 
One way in which stakeholder interests might be protected is through restrictions 
on the activities which any social enterprise can pursue. Whereas a for-profit entity 
can pursue any business objectives it wishes (provided they are not illegal,46 and 
subject to any self-imposed restrictions in the company’s own constitution),47 it 
would be possible to provide that the legal vehicle made available to social 
enterprises can be used only by organisations pursuing some, pre-determined, 
business activities, but not others. This restriction would address, then, not how the 
social enterprise must approach whatever line of business it chooses to pursue but, 
more fundamentally, what lines of business are available to the social enterprise to 
begin with. 
 
Thus, the law would identify which area of business would be considered, by 
whatever criteria, as sufficiently “social”, and would restrict the availability of the 
legal form to organisations pursuing those lines of business. I opt for the view that 
there should be such restrictions, and shall argue that the law should include such 
restrictions. Three compelling arguments can be made for this view. 
 
First and foremost, as a guide on social enterprise legal forms has made clear, ‘A 
social enterprise is not defined by its legal status but by its nature…’48 In particular, 
it is what it does that essentially designates it as “social”. Hence, restricting the 
activities the social enterprises can engage in would have the important effect of 
not only making them more or less readily identifiable but, more significantly, 
protecting the public from being misled or deceived by a commercial venture 
disguised as a social enterprise. Protecting the public in this way is very important, 
because the public is normally not sufficiently informed about particular social 
enterprises and their activities. Restrictions can at least guarantee that the activities 
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a social enterprise is pursuing are for the public benefit, even though we need an 
effective regulator to monitor them.  
 
Secondly, restricting the activities of social enterprises would actually amount to 
protecting their “core mission”, i.e. the social benefit requirement, by elevating it 
to the status of law. That is, the restrictions would ensure that by opting to operate 
within the legal vehicle for social enterprise, they would not be able to deviate from 
such a mission. No “mission drift” would occur in the event of the social enterprises 
having a new management or new investors, who would be obligated to follow the 
enterprises’ pre-defined line of business.49  
 
Thirdly, the restrictions would also benefit social entrepreneurs. As has been 
indicated above, with such restrictions, the social enterprises would be more or less 
readily recognisable. Moreover, sometimes it is difficult to make clear to the public 
how certain lines of business could have social benefit. The restrictions could serve 
to communicate with the public how they do. The social entrepreneurs can therefore 
focus on achieving their social aims rather than wasting their time and effort in 
explaining they are social enterprises. There are at least three counter-arguments to 
my view. None, however, are persuasive.  
 
First, there is the idea that it is difficult to justify what types of activities should not 
be made available to social enterprises, since it seems that most, if not all, business 
activities have potential social benefit of one kind or another. However, it hardly 
needs emphasising that the social benefit requirement is plainly not a requirement 
for a business enterprise to have a potential social benefit. It is a requirement that 
the social enterprises create social benefits. A potential for this might not always be 
actualised. To be a social enterprise, a business must create social benefit, and there 
must be a guarantee that a drift from this “core mission” would not occur. 
 
Secondly, it might be argued that restrictions on the activities of the social 
enterprises would result in the obstruction of the growth of social entrepreneurship. 
My view is nevertheless that this is not true. Social entrepreneurship is itself full of 
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creative potential. Extensive opportunities exist for entrepreneurial initiatives to 
“fill the gaps” left by the state and the market. In other words, there are extensive 
unmet needs in the community that remain to be satisfied by entrepreneurial 
initiatives.50 
 
Thirdly, it might be argued that restrictions on social enterprise activities would 
limit the financial potential of social enterprises. This objection could be rebutted 
by the argument raised above. Though social enterprises must strive for financial 
viability, as stakeholder organisations, they are not concerned about whether they 
could achieve greater or lesser financial success. Moreover, empirically, we cannot 
definitely say that following a certain, pre-defined line of business activities would 
limit the financial potential of social enterprises.  
 
Dunn and Riley raised some objections to the idea of restricting not-for-profits to 
public benefits, especially because they did not see “clear advantages” in doing so.51 
However, I believe that not only are their objections rebutted by my argument in 
favour of the social benefit requirement, but the practical experience of the CIC, 
which we will see in the next chapter, particularly its growing popularity, also 
seems to contradict the concerns they expressed in those objections, which I shall 
not elaborate here. 
 
4.3.2.3 Stakeholder participation 
 
Two questions are posed to constitute the central theme of this sub-section. First, 
why should there be stakeholder participation in social enterprises? And, second, 
how can stakeholder participation, through different techniques, contribute to the 
achievement of protection of stakeholder interests? The first question is apparently 
the more fundamental of the two; we thus turn to it first. 
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There are both pragmatic and moral or normative reasons for stakeholder 
participation in social enterprises. From the pragmatic point of view, the 
involvement of stakeholders in their governance is a way to help them secure their 
access to critical resources such as information, expertise, and funds.52 For social 
enterprises as stakeholder entities, however, the normative reason seems 
particularly compelling. Social enterprises require what Argyrou et al refer to as the 
“internalisation of stakeholders in the decision-making process”.53 This 
requirement stems from their need to be ‘...accountable to a large variety of 
stakeholders with diverse interests’ that need to be prioritised, and this 
accountability can be achieved only through the “active participation” of their 
stakeholders, ‘...which ultimately leads to more open and democratic decision-
making processes...’54 Indeed, in Young’s words, it is such ‘…governing 
arrangements that help insure an enterprise pursues the right combination of social 
and private goals’.55 
 
The need for such a right combination is related to social enterprise being, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, a business with a social mission. As such it is encouraged 
to generate their income through trading, depending on a more entrepreneurial, 
market-based mechanism in much the same way as traditional businesses do.56 But 
this entrepreneurial, commercial activity risks a “mission drift”; participatory 
governance thus helps ensure against such a risk. Moreover, in so far as stakeholder 
interests are concerned, it would be strange if the responsibility for making 
decisions in a social enterprise is left entirely to people with no direct involvement 
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whatsoever with the interests of stakeholders. The latter presumably know their 
needs best; they should thus be directly involved, or effectively represented, in the 
governance of social enterprise. Involving particular stakeholders will therefore 
enhance organisational legitimacy. Referring to the CIC, Cooperatives UK 
reaffirms the significance of stakeholder involvement in the following terms: 
 
There would be no exceptions, with even the smallest CICs required to show 
some effort to involve stakeholders. We recognise, however, that the 
Government may wish to make the CIC form available to entrepreneurs who 
have little interest in stakeholder involvement. What is important, therefore, is 
transparency.57 
 
We can clearly see why participatory governance is so important.58 Alternatively, 
we may say that stakeholder involvement is important to not-for-profits mainly 
because by their very nature they are participatory communities. Many 
stakeholders see the value of such organisations as providing them with the 
opportunities to participate in their activities as well as their governance and, in 
doing this, to express their own values and commitment.59 In short, serving such a 
participatory purpose provides these organisations with both legitimacy and 
trustworthiness in the eyes of participants.  
 
...stakeholders may participate in not-for-profits not to achieve control, but 
because they find it rewarding to have an area of life in which they have the 
chance to speak, and in which they can share and defend ideas for change.60 
 
Various techniques are available for achieving stakeholder participation. ‘A 
continuum of involvement can be highlighted, from rather passive strategies 
(stakeholder information) to the more active ones (stakeholder representation).’61 
Or, as Argyrou et al have pointed out, ‘[s]takeholders can either participate in the 
organisational decision-making processes as formal members and co-owners of the 
social enterprises, or they can influence informal processes of decision-making...’62 
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Taking cue from these views, we may separate the stakeholder involvement 
techniques into two main types: the direct and indirect participation of 
stakeholders.63 Indirect participation can take various forms, especially consultation 
and coordination with corporate and institutional stakeholders. The latter technique 
may take the form of joint ventures or partnerships.64 Direct participation, on the 
other hand, may preferably take the form of a “stakeholder board”. 
 
The issue of stakeholder board will be discussed below, but it may be pointed out 
here that providing for direct stakeholder participation is not easy in practice. 
Defining acceptable, multiple missions suitable to all stakeholder groups can be 
tricky. As Mason has pointed out, ‘SEs cannot be all things to all people, and key 
stakeholder groups will possess different views on a range of issues such as greater 
entrepreneurship, as well as conformity with expected standards of ethical 
conduct’.65 However, though we can expect to face difficulty in managing multi-
stakeholder participation, I agree with Pearce that ‘structures exist which allow 
efficient management to coexist with active participatory and democratic 
structures’,66 perhaps in the form of a mechanism for what Vidal calls “multi-
stakeholder dialogue” for multi-stakeholder governance.67 
 
4.3.2.4 Stakeholder board 
 
In my view, the arguments in favour of direct participation of stakeholders in the 
form of “stakeholder board” are compelling. Therefore, let me just briefly discuss 
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how to organise a stakeholder board.68 Two issues will be considered: (1) who 
should be on the stakeholder boards, and (2) how should we select board members 
to represent either directly or indirectly the different stakeholder groups? Let us first 
consider the first question. 
 
Social enterprises are normally multi-stakeholder organisations; multi-stakeholder 
boards could thus be an effective form of multi-stakeholder governance.69 In view 
of this need for multi-stakeholder participation, and for my practical purpose, 
stakeholders are categorised for this purpose into two groups.  
 
The first group can be further divided into two sub-groups. One is composed of the 
internal stakeholders such as owners, shareholders and investors. They are 
stakeholders because they directly risk their capital which they have invested in the 
organisation. The other comprises the employees, including the hired professional 
managers, whose stakes are nonetheless not derived from investing capital but are 
rather in the form of their skills, experience and labour. They are, in other words, 
part of the human capital investments.  
 
The second group comprises external stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, 
users, social investors including philanthropists and even members of the general 
public. These stakeholders do not have direct ties with the social enterprises, 
because they do not bear any risks or liability if these organisations go bankrupt. 
Also, in the case of social investors, even though they make financial contributions 
to the social enterprises, they normally do not expect financial, but rather social, 
returns.  
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However, there are arguments pointing to the disadvantages of having a stakeholder 
board.70 In particular, if one particular group of stakeholders dominates the board, 
this is clearly in conflict with the nature of social enterprise, whose mission is to 
protect the interests of all stakeholders. In addition, it is not an easy task for a social 
enterprise to identify different stakeholders and balance their conflicting interests. 
However, this task is part of its operation as this type of business. Social 
entrepreneurs who decide to set up a social enterprise thus need to accept this from 
the beginning. 
 
There are indeed arguments in favour of stakeholder boards being composed of 
multiple or diverse board members.71 Stakeholder boards of the social enterprises 
should be formed of people of diverse stakeholder groups, internal and external, as 
well as independent directors who do not have any ties with the organisations or 
stakeholders. Such a board composition will truly represent stakeholder 
organisations like social enterprises. 
  
Having the board members with both business and not-for-profit backgrounds is 
beneficial to the social enterprises financially and morally. Internal stakeholders 
such as shareholders and managers with business background could support the 
trading side of the social enterprises, whereas external stakeholders could help 
ensure the achievement of the social objectives, since they tend to be more sensitive 
to public benefits. This could bring a great advantage to the social enterprises if 
they could complement each other’s qualities. 
 
There are other advantages of creating a multi-stakeholder board, but I shall not 
discuss them here.72 We turn now to the second question raised in this sub-section: 
how should we select board members to represent, either directly or indirectly, the 
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different stakeholder groups? Two types of stakeholder boards will be considered 
here.73 
  
The first type may be identified as a self-selecting board. A big advantage of self-
selecting board is that the members can be recruited from a wide range of networks. 
It helps strengthen and fill the gaps in the board. For example, it is generally not 
easy for the social enterprises to compete with mainstream businesses. If they would 
like to widen their business opportunities and networks, the social enterprises might 
consider hiring a business consultant or appointing a representative from majority 
shareholders as their board member. The appointment process is neither 
complicated nor costly and can be expected to most directly fulfill the needs of the 
social enterprises.  
 
However, one great danger of the self-selecting boards involves the issue of 
accountability to stakeholders representing the wider public or community interests. 
Such a board does not generally have direct accountability to stakeholders, and this 
is in conflict with the nature of stakeholder organisations. It therefore requires a 
much stronger regulatory system to ensure transparency and compliance of actions 
of the social enterprises with their public benefit purpose. 
 
The second type of stakeholder boards includes those which have a democratic, 
member-based structure (membership boards). The democratic structure with “one 
person one vote” method is the fairest way to elect board members. It has direct 
accountability to stakeholders, which helps ensure the delivery of private and social 
benefits. However, the practicality of such a board structure as used in the social 
enterprises is still in doubt. Most social enterprises are small with no or very few 
membership. To arrange the board election might be difficult in practice or might 
not ensure or guarantee true democracy. For example, if the election is made among 
internal stakeholders, the board might end up mainly with those who hold the 
majority shares. Or if the election is made among external stakeholders, the process 
will be complicated, costly and time-consuming. 
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4.3.2.5 Directors’ duties   
 
The main issue of this sub-section is how to normatively frame the directors’ duties 
such that they reflect the nature of social enterprise. Two questions are raised in 
connection with this issue: first, whose interests must directors serve, and second, 
what standard of competence would we expect of the directors, especially if they 
are drawn from various stakeholder groups unlikely to be able to satisfy a level of 
competence usually expected of those sitting on the board of a business firm? 
 
4.3.2.5.1 Whose interests? 
 
Clearly, the law must require the directors to represent “stakeholder interests”, 
because social enterprises are stakeholder organisations by nature. The directors’ 
duties, in other words, cannot be solely to maximise profits for the owners 
(shareholders/investors), as directors in for-profit organisations do, even though the 
social enterprises, unlike charities, are expected to generate revenue. This is still 
not to mention the directors’ general duties under the Companies Act 2006, which 
will not be discussed here.74 
 
One complaint against framing the duty of directors in terms of “balancing 
interests” is that directors cannot easily balance differing and sometimes conflicting 
interests. In the context of social enterprises, this objection is easily addressed. 
Stakeholder directors must follow the social enterprise’s objectives, which normally 
show how the social enterprise can benefit its stakeholders and relevant members 
of the general public. Together with the social benefit requirement, the objectives 
of the social enterprise prescribe the line of business, as well as how to pursue such 
a business line and who would benefit from it. In doing all this, the directors must 
not set profit-making as a priority, but only as a way to obtain sufficient funds for 
the pursuit of the social mission of the social enterprise.75   
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However, this gives rise to another question: what if there is a conflict between the 
interests of the group which has nominated the director, and the pursuit of the social 
enterprise’s social objective? Can the director prioritise the former at the expense 
of the latter? Can, in other words, a director put the interests of the group he or she 
represents above the interests of the whole organisation? 
 
Four arguments may be put forward in favour of saying that each stakeholder 
director should be able to prefer or prioritise the interests of the group he or she 
represents. First, to be able to do so is precisely the reason why he or she has been 
chosen by that group to start with. The group actually wants a director 
“championing its interests” on the social enterprise board. Second, if a stakeholder 
director cannot prefer the interests of the group he or she represents, what then is 
the point in having a stakeholder director in the first place? He or she serves no 
purpose if he/she is not a champion for his/her nominating group. Third, it does not 
make sense to think of the “interests of the organisation” as a whole – the 
organisation does not have any “overarching” interests of its own that transcend the 
interest of individual groups within it; all we have are the conflicting interests of 
different groups. 
 
Finally, rather than expecting each individual director to understand, and then 
decide how to “merge”, the different interests of different groups affected by the 
organisation, it is better to see the board as a “pluralist” arena, in which each 
individual director should be allowed to be “partial” and to champion the group he 
or she represents: board decisions will then be the outcome of the negotiations, 
compromises, trade-offs, and/or straightforward votes within this group of 
individually “partial” directors (in the same way, we might say, Members of 
Parliament should not try to advocate what is in the “national interest” – instead, 
different MPs representing different interest groups should do their best for the 
group they represent, and Parliament’s decisions will be the outcome of the political 
trade-offs, compromises, votes, horse trading, etc., that occur between these 
individual representatives of different groups of electors). 
 
On the other hand, three counter-arguments can be advanced. First, stakeholder 
directors can still do much to benefit the group she represents, though she cannot 
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prefer the interests of that group against the organisation’s interests: they make sure 
that others understand the position and needs of the stakeholder group; they can 
better appreciate how organisational decisions will impact on the group, and how 
that might in turn affect the organisation; they can make sure that the group is better 
informed about organisational decisions, and so on. 
 
Second, against argument 3 above, it does make sense to think of “what is in the 
interest of the organisation as a whole”, because the organisation – and especially 
the social enterprise – has its own purpose – and achieving that overall purpose 
most effectively is what is in its interests. That gives us a standard which each 
director should aim for, and is higher than the “sectional” interests of individual 
groups within the organisation. 
 
Finally, seeing the board as an arena in which different directors representing the 
interests of different groups fight it out is a recipe for conflict within the 
organisation. It also means that decisions will depend on which groups have most 
representation on the board, or which groups have the most articulate, powerful or 
aggressive representatives on the board. It is better to require all directors to be 
pulling in the same direction – i.e. in the interests of the organisation. Representing 
different groups, and influenced by different considerations in different ways 
different, directors may think differently about what the good of the organisation 
requires. But at least they will be trying to answer the same question – what best 
serves the purpose of the organisation. 
 
Having presented both sides of the question, I do not see that they are in total 
conflict, such that we can only opt for one and reject the other. My position is that 
stakeholder directors can advocate the interests of the groups they represent without 
losing sight of the overall purpose of the organisation. Moreover, in much the same 
vein as how politics is played out at the national level, in the organisational setting 
not only “interest aggregation” is possible but, in case the interests of different 
stakeholder groups are in actual conflict, we can always resort to acceptable, i.e. 
“democratic”, principles and mechanisms to resolve such conflict. 
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In practice, a social enterprise cannot always make arrangements for equal 
representation of all stakeholder groups. A very important normative expectation 
of the stakeholder directors is thus required; that is, we expect that their duty is to 
make sure that the interests of all groups are fairly and suitably catered for. This 
normative expectation leads us to the second question raised in this sub-section – 
that of the “competence” of stakeholder directors. 
 
4.3.2.5.2 Competence 
 
This question covers issues which we have to separate out – one involves the 
activities that we expect our directors to carry out (“care”) and the other is that of 
how well we expect them to perform those activities (“skill”).  Let me begin with 
the first issue: what activities do we expect of our directors? This is really about the 
level of “care” we want from directors – in the sense of the sorts of activities we 
expect them to perform. 
 
Are there certain “core” activities which are absolutely central to being a director, 
and which every director must perform? The usual candidate for such a core activity 
is to ensure the company is “well governed” – which means exercising some degree 
of oversight over the management of the company, ensuring it has a reasonably well 
functioning board, and so on. Attendance at board meetings is necessary to perform 
this core activity.    
 
The alternative possibility is to assert that although ensuring that the company is 
well governed is a core activity of the board, this does not need to be a core activity 
of each and every director. Some directors – especially those appointed as 
representatives of stakeholders – may be excused this governance function. In other 
words, we could have a “division of responsibility” on boards. 
 
There are some arguments for requiring all directors to perform a governance role. 
So, perhaps the more directors who deal with governance, the better it will be 
handled. And more directors responsible for it should produce a wider range of 
characters and skills in those who are responsible for it. However, the argument 
against seems compelling.  If every director thinks that all directors are responsible 
for governance, each one may tend to do much less, believing their fellow directors 
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will attend to it. Moreover, it is surely more efficient to have a smaller number of 
directors focused on this task, than expecting all the members of the board to 
duplicate each other’s efforts.   
 
Most importantly, it is not appropriate with a stakeholder board where different 
directors have very different roles.  Some, to be sure, are there to ensure that the 
company is well governed.  But others are there for other reasons – in particular, to 
represent stakeholders and to cement relationships with other people or 
organisations that are important to the company    (“resource dependency”). The 
law should recognise that different directors are appointed to play different roles, 
and should not burden those who are appointed for “non-governance” purposes with 
performing a governance role.76 
 
Let me now deal with the second issue: should all directors be subject to at least an 
objective standard of competence i.e. should all directors have to perform as well 
as a reasonably competent director?   
 
Again, the crucial issue seems to me to be that, for the social enterprise, where we 
want a “stakeholder board”, there might be people who would make excellent 
stakeholder directors, but would not have the skills necessary to perform to the 
minimum objective standard expected of every director. This would be particularly 
likely for organisations whose activities mean their key stakeholders are quite likely 
to lack these skills. A social enterprise involved with, say, drug addicts, the 
homeless, those with mental health problems, and so on, might (at the risk of some 
stereotyping) have stakeholders who are less likely to possess the skills of a 
“reasonable director”.   
 
I think that this argument is very strong, and may well justify having a subjective 
standard.  However, its strength does depend somewhat upon how one resolves the 
issue of “care” addressed above. If we accept that different directors can have 
different roles, then there is less of a risk in imposing an objective standard. Even 
if every director must exhibit the skills, at least, of a reasonable director, we would 
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then say “of a reasonable director carrying out the role actually being carried out by 
the defendant director in this company”.  
 
Hence, someone appointed to be a governing director would have to demonstrate 
the skills of a reasonably competent governing director – at least, a reasonable 
ability to read and understand accounts, to spot fraud, etc. But a director who has 
been appointed, for instance, to represent a particular stakeholder group, and who 
has no responsibility for or role in governance, would not be expected to carry out 
governance, and so would not need to demonstrate any of those skills. Instead, they 
would only need to demonstrate the skills of a reasonably competent stakeholder-
representing director. An objective standard would mean those accepting 
appointment to the board would need to ask if they have the skills necessary to carry 
out, reasonably, the role to which they are being appointed.   
 
4.3.2.6 External regulator and public disclosure 
 
Unlike the for-profit company, in which much of the policing of its management is 
carried out “internally”, the social enterprise is endowed with the internal 
mechanisms that may work poorly, particularly in ensuring that the stakeholder-
oriented features of the governance work well. Shareholders are unlikely to be 
especially diligent in enforcing those mandatory rules, which primarily benefit 
stakeholders (and themselves only in a very indirect way). Shareholders do not exist 
in some social enterprises, and even where they do, they can hardly be expected to 
enforce the asset lock, to take action against stakeholder board members who fail 
to give stakeholder interests precedence over shareholder interests, and so on.  
 
Social enterprises thus seem to have a much greater need for an effective external 
regulator to ensure that the stakeholder governance mechanisms outlined above are 
effectively enforced. What might an effective external regulator look like? First and 
foremost, the external regulator must be independent, structurally and financially.   
 
This is not just a matter of being independent of government interference. Equally 
important, there is the problem identified by Nobel Laureate economist George 
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Stigler as “regulatory capture”. The problem involves regulatory agencies coming 
eventually to be dominated by the very industries they were created to regulate.77 
 
In a structural sense, the social enterprise regulator should be a body or agency 
separate from the government or other governmental organisations. Being 
independent also involves independence of participants in the sector, particularly 
by dealing with them fairly and straightforwardly, keeping any personal 
relationship at an arm-length, and not bowing to any external influence. Failing to 
maintain such an independent stance would obviously compromise the regulator’s 
work, i.e. failing to protect stakeholder interests or to resolve disputes in such a way 
as to protect these interests, especially against those with negotiating power. 
Providing the social enterprise regulator with structural independence will thus help 
him or her to work in a fair and timely manner and help reduce the possibility of 
political or industrial influence.  
 
Structural independence alone might not be sufficient to ensure successful 
development of the social enterprise sector. The regulator should also have financial 
independence, being free from political and private funding. The sources of the 
regulator’s funds and the process by which these funds become part of the actual 
budget of the regulator can directly impact on the degree of his or her autonomy 
and competence when carrying out his or her responsibilities. The funds should 
mainly come from taking good care of the sector and receive payments, in the form 
such as administrative and service fees, in return.  
 
However, independence certainly does not amount to the regulator being able to do 
whatever he or she wants. Independence must also come with transparency and 
accountability in order to ensure effectiveness. The external regulator of the social 
enterprises therefore should be monitored so that he or she is accountable for his or 
her actions.  
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Then, who should monitor the social enterprise regulator? Ideally, as an 
independent body or agency, the regulator should be held accountable to all 
stakeholders in the sector as well as the general public. As it is not easy in practice 
for the stakeholders and members of the general public to directly monitor the work 
of the regulator, accountability may be achieved through a reporting mechanism 
such as a publication of an annual report that describes the regulator’s activities or 
decisions and claims which are made for public access. Some might argue that the 
social enterprise regulator should also be accountable to the government since it 
would significantly contribute to building investor security and confidence, 
particularly for the newly-established sector like the social enterprises.  
 
In considering the social enterprise external regulator’s accountability, we need to 
understand clearly what his or her duties and responsibilities are. This 
understanding will enable us to see how this regulatory mechanism works. First and 
foremost, the regulator must ensure that the social enterprises comply with all the 
rules and regulations. There are several requirements to which the regulator must 
pay a close attention (effective enforcement is required). Failure to do so could 
result in the mission drift or emergence of social enterprises in disguise, which 
could affect the interests of stakeholders. 
 
There is ongoing debate over the degree of control to be exercised by the regulator. 
On the one hand, it is argued that the social enterprise regulator should apply a light-
touch approach to regulating social enterprises, because the sector is still new and 
small. Too much control would make the sector unattractive and thereby scare 
people from joining, and this, in turn, could affect the growth of the sector in the 
future. The regulator should only intervene when necessary. On the other hand, it 
is argued that a stricter approach is needed, since the sector involves the interests 
of communities and society at large. If the sector is abused, it would affect a lot of 
people. It is the regulator’s responsibility to make sure that social entrepreneurs 
understand why such regulatory requirements are necessary. An approach that is 
“too light” in its application of rules could affect the confidence and trust of 
supporters and investors.  
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Apart from being a law enforcer and protector of the sector, it is also the duty of the 
social enterprise regulator to act as a promoter of the sector. The social enterprise 
sector still lacks funding and other resources, and even understanding among 
members of the general public. The regulator has a duty to provide information and 
give advice to the current participants in the sector as well as prospective ones.  
 
There are other aspects of the functions and responsibility of the external regulator. 
However, for lack of space, let me proceed to very briefly discuss the issue of 
disclosure. For social enterprises with various stakeholders, disclosure needs to be 
designed not only to protect shareholders and creditors, just as for a normal for-
profit venture, but also to cater for the interests of others in society. In this respect, 
disclosure is particularly relevant to our concern to assure accountability of the 
social enterprises to their stakeholders. 
 
Disclosure is a fundamental aspect of accountability.78 That is, together with 
compliance with mandatory obligations to fulfil the organisation’s mission, 
disclosure, minimally in the form of financial report, represents a most fundamental 
accountability requirement for a business organisation. Disclosure may be 
voluntary; however, as Connolly and Kelly point out (in connection with the idea 
of having voluntary bases of accountability driving the mission of social 
enterprises), ‘...it is unlikely that appropriate voluntary mechanisms will be in place 
without first complying with legal obligations’.79  
 
Now, with regard to the social enterprises, I would like to begin with a basic 
question: why should we need to incorporate a mandatory public disclosure rule 
into the legal vehicle for social enterprises? The stakeholding orientation of social 
enterprise governance is directly associated with its social performance, and this 
requires public disclosure. In other words, stakeholders as well as the general public 
expect to know how stakeholder organisations like social enterprises pursue their 
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social objectives. Public disclosure would therefore greatly benefit a broader 
community of stakeholders.  
 
In for-profit companies, disclosures generally come in the form of financial 
reporting, since shareholders naturally expect financial return on their investment. 
Such a financial disclosure provides many benefits to shareholders, particularly the 
reduction of transaction costs and information asymmetry. In a similar vein, a 
public disclosure could benefit stakeholders by reducing transaction costs for those 
who wish to see social achievements from the social enterprises they support, and 
helping them to decide whether to provide long-term support. 
 
According to Richardson and Welker, public disclosure can reduce the cost of 
equity capital directly through investor preference effects. ‘Investor preference 
effects arise if investors are willing to accept a lower rate of return on investments 
by an organization that supports a social cause for which some investors have an 
affinity.’80  
 
Public disclosure is also used as a strategy for providing an enterprise with 
legitimacy. To put it simply, it is a way to communicate to stakeholders and the 
general public that one engages in social activities, and, through public disclosures, 
one can reassure the stakeholders that the organisations through which one pursues 
such activities are social enterprises.  
 
However, while public disclosure certainly provides legitimacy for the social 
enterprises, this mechanism should rather be used to ensure accountability in social 
enterprise governance; that is, as a means of evaluating social performance and 
monitoring the management of social enterprises. If the social enterprises perform 
well in the pursuit of their social mission, the disclosure will signal their hard work 
and commitment, and this can help them to gain more support. On the other hand, 
if the social enterprises have poor performance, the disclosure would serve to signal 
warning. Stakeholders might decide to stop their support or take actions such as 
informing the external regulator.  
 
                                                                 
80
 Alan J Richardson and Michael Welker, ‘Social disclosure, Financial Disclosure and the Cost of 
Equity Capital’ (2001) 26(7) Accounting, Organizations and Society 597, 599.  
131 
 
There might be those who argue against public disclosure, whose views should also 
be taken into account. One such view is that public disclosures might be used for 
self-promotion. Poor performers might attempt to gain acceptance and legitimacy 
by reporting the positive social contributions that they make and under-reporting 
negative social effects. It is also possible that if the social enterprises are required 
to disclose information which may be used in litigation against them, they might 
choose to minimise the disclosure of such important information and to increase 
unnecessary disclosures instead, which could directly affect the quality of the 
information disclosed.  
 
Preparing public disclosures such as public benefit reports is much more 
complicated than managing financial disclosures. Public disclosure is characterised 
by greater uncertainty and fuzziness both in terms of which issues are to be 
considered important and which measure better depicts the performance of firms. 
This means that although stakeholders’ pressure might be high, the reliability of the 
disclosures made by firms is also harder to discuss and evaluate.  
 
To assure accountability to stakeholders, enhanced disclosure (in the sense of full 
mandatory disclosure of all relevant information and not simply voluntary 
disclosure) is thus required. To ensure such a disclosure, we need an effective 
regulator. Moreover, it needs to be clearly provided what type of information should 
be disclosed, and what stakeholders would want to know. An effective public 
disclosure must also be transparent, factually reliable and publicly accessible. To 
put it simply, enhanced social disclosure must provide sufficient information about 
social activities undertaken by the social enterprises, which could help the 
stakeholders to forecast their social as well as financial returns.81 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
As a follow-up to the previous chapter with its focus on legal forms for 
organisations and social entrepreneurs’ needs, this chapter has pursued a discussion 
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on the need for a legal form particularly designed to suit the multiple-stakeholder 
character and the multiple-goal nature of social enterprises. These two chapters 
represent the central theme of my thesis – i.e. the legal aspects of social enterprise. 
I have addressed the issues relating to the meaning of legal form for organisations, 
what social entrepreneurs expect from the legal form they adopt, and, most 
significantly, I have tried to deal with issue of whose interests social enterprises 
serve – who the “principals” and “agents” are in terms of agency relationship – and 
how a legal blueprint for social enterprises should cater for stakeholder involvement 
in their governance and activities.  
 
Essentially, in presenting a legal blueprint or model for social enterprises, these two 
chapters serve as a “framework” for the discussion of relevant issues in, as well as 
organisation of, the subsequent chapters, especially those dealing with the CIC and 
its regulatory regime, the main legal forms for social enterprises in Thailand, and 
my proposed development of a legal vehicle for Thai social enterprises. I now 
propose to measure the CIC against the legal model we have developed. 
 Chapter 5 
The Community Interest Company (CIC):  
 An Evaluation of a Legal Form for Social Enterprise 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
I have mapped out a model legal form for social enterprise in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Now, in this chapter, I propose to take the UK community interest company (CIC) 
as a case study of an actual legal form for social enterprise. The purpose is to see 
how closely the main features of the CIC, which has been specially designed for 
social enterprises, match the requirements in my blueprint. The CIC has already 
been in use for a full decade; its popularity1 and growth in registration2 testify, at 
least indirectly, to its usefulness. Therefore, if we can show that the CIC closely 
matches the blueprint, this testifies to the practical value of the latter as well.   
 
Section 5.2 explains the initiation of the CIC, focusing upon the rationale for its 
introduction, the architecture of the legislation, and the general character of the law 
governing this legal form. The following two sections deal with the CIC’s main 
features, i.e. those (in section 5.3) catering for the needs of social entrepreneurs, 
and those (in section 5.4) representing its governance (mandatory) rules and meant 
to ensure accountability to its stakeholders.  
 
5.2 Initiation and legislation of the CIC 
 
I have pointed out in Chapter 2 that the emergence of social enterprise in the UK in 
the late 1990s, especially in terms of its institutionalisation, was closely associated 
with the New Labour Government’s policy to create entrepreneurial culture and 
                                                                 
1
 Sam Burne James, ‘Analysis: The Rise and Rise of Community Interest Companies’ (Third 
Sector, 1 June 2015) <www.thirdsector.co.uk/analysis-rise-rise-community-interest-
companies/governance/article/1348096> accessed 3 January 2016  
2
 According to the CIC Regulator, ‘2015 sees the 10 year anniversary of the opening of the CIC 
Office. When the office opened in July 2005, it was predicted that we would be registering about 
200 applications a year. We are currently registering this number each month and passed the 10,000 
mark in November 2014. CICs are an amazing success story…’ Office of the Regulator of 
Community Interest Companies, Annual Report 2014/2015 (10th Anniversary edn, CICs 2015) 16.   
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build a more enterprising society. It was against this backdrop of the emergence and 
development of social enterprise in the UK that the CIC was initiated.3   
 
The CIC concept was proposed in the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit Report, Private 
Action, Public Benefit, in 2002.4 The report raised concerns about outdated law and 
regulations that might obstruct the efficiency and rapid growth of the sector. Legal 
and regulatory reform therefore was called for,5 which led to the creation of the 
CIC. 
 
The rationale for the proposal for the CIC involved the difficulties faced by social 
enterprises to explain their business model to stakeholders, especially funders, who 
might be concerned that the money could end up in private pockets. The CIC was 
expected to bring about big improvements in access to finance, asset-lock approach 
and branding. The report received a positive support as evident in the response to 
Private Action, Public Benefit.6 It was recommended that the proposed CIC be 
established with certain characteristics, including lock-in assets for a community 
interest purpose, the use of surpluses to further social aims, the improvement of 
access to finance by permitting the issue of shares, and the introduction of a strong 
brand.7   
 
The CIC was introduced as a new type of registered company. This basically meant 
that the users of this new legal vehicle could enjoy the flexibility and certainty of 
the company form under company law.8 However, since the CIC belonged to a 
special type of company whose profits and assets would be used for the public good, 
there need to be some special features such as those indicated above. It was also 
viewed as a “new brand” for social enterprise and as an addition to the existing legal 
forms such as charities and industrial and provident societies. A change in the law 
                                                                 
3
 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Enterprise for Communities: Proposals for a Community 
Interest Company (2003).  
4
 Cabinet Office, Private Action, Public Benefits: A Review of Charities and the Wider Not-for-
Profit Sector Strategy Unit Report (2002).  
5
 ibid 6.  
6
 Home Office, Charities and Not-for-profits: A Modern Legal Framework – The Government's 
Response to “Private Action, Public Benefit” (2003).  
7
 ibid 2. 
8
 ‘The CIC will be a transparent model; clearly defined, easily recognisable and understandable by 
users, staff and the wider community they serve. It will be a flexible structure, allowing organisations 
that use the CIC model to thrive and grow, while being accountable to local communities.’ ibid 3. 
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would certainly not in itself create all the conditions to enable social enterprises to 
grow and to become significant players in the economy, but it was an important 
step in removing barriers to their growth, and in the process of cultural change.  
 
A proposal paper launched in March 2003 received extensive support.9 Most of the 
proposals were supported by over 80 per cent of the respondents.10 However, the 
proposal on whether a statutory requirement for CICs to seek views of their 
stakeholders, with an exemption for small CICs, would be appropriate gained only 
43 per cent of the respondents supporting it.11 
 
Many of those who favoured a statutory requirement for stakeholder consultation 
thought that it would ensure stakeholder involvement in CICs while those who 
argued against a statutory requirement viewed that such a measure was 
unnecessary, burdensome or difficult to enforce. Though the government 
reaffirmed the need for stakeholder involvement, since it was one of the 
characteristics of social enterprise, it believed that a statutory requirement for 
stakeholder consultation could raise genuine technical and practical difficulties. 
And in view of the clear practical difficulties and the lack of a consensus on the 
need for a statutory requirement, the government did not propose to introduce one.  
 
The Government believed that the requirement that CICs should report annually on 
the extent of their engagement with stakeholders, together with the provision for 
the Regulator to issue guidance on stakeholder engagement, should achieve, at a 
significantly lower cost in terms of practical difficulty and regulatory burdens, most 
of the benefits that could be obtained by a statutory requirement.  
 
The paper discussed other important issues in the consultation responses,12 but here 
I shall touch upon only one of them – internal governance. It was suggested that 
CICs adopt democratic governance structures, or the “one member, one vote” 
principle: without this, the operation of CICs could be counter-productive. 
Moreover, directors should have a duty to observe the community interest purpose 
                                                                 
9
 DTI, Enterprise for Communities: Proposals for a Community Interest Company – Report on the 
Public Consultation and the Government's Intentions (2003).  
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 ibid 5. 
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 ibid 25-27. 
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 ibid 36-50. 
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of CICs in their decision-making. The structure of the board of directors could be 
used to incorporate key stakeholders. However, believing that the company law on 
corporate governance was sufficient to regulate CICs, the Government did not wish 
to impose additional rules on governance for CICs. If a CIC or its directors were 
found not to be pursuing the community interest, the Regulator should be able to 
take practical steps to compel them to do so.  
 
With this brief account on the introduction of the CIC, let me now proceed to 
consider how a legislative measure was taken to create it. It is important to note 
what has been referred to as the architecture of the legislation creating a corporate 
legal form in Chapter 3 (sub-section 3.2.5.3). We shall see that the Government 
opted to create the CIC as a variant of the core form of a “registered company” 
rather than as a stand-alone one. The advantages of this strategy were fully 
presented in that sub-section. 
 
The proposal for the creation of the CIC was incorporated as part of the Companies 
(Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Bill, which was introduced into 
the House of Lords in December 2003, and received Royal Assent on 28 October 
2004.13 Measures on the CIC were set out in part 2 of the Companies (Audit, 
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (hereafter “CAICE Act 2004”) 
which had two objectives: (1) improving confidence in companies and financial 
markets; and (2) promoting social enterprise. With regard to the CIC, the main 
provisions include: 
 
 a statutory “lock” on assets and profits of CICs; 
 a “community interest test”, which companies must pass in order to be 
registered as CICs; 
 an annual community interest report, which CICs must provide to show how 
their activities have benefited the community; and 
 a CIC Regulator, who is responsible for ensuring that CICs comply with 
their legal requirements.  
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 DTI, Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Bill [HL] (2004).   
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In creating this new type of company, the Act also provided the Secretary of State 
with power to make regulations on CICs and the Regulator of Community Interest 
Companies.14 The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005 (hereafter “CIC 
Regulations 2005”)15 were laid in Parliament in February 2005 and from the 
following July the take-up and registration of CICs started.   
 
CICs are limited companies formed under the Companies Act 2006; they are thus 
subject to that Act and company law generally.16 However, in order to ensure that 
CICs operate their businesses for the benefit of the community and the wider public, 
they have to abide by some additional statutory requirements, particularly the 
community interest test and the asset lock. In the following two sections, we shall 
consider the main features of the CIC in more or less the same format as set forth 
in the previous two chapters. 
 
5.3 The CIC start-up process 
 
Creating a CIC is actually easy, quick and cheap, though there is still room for 
improvement. The CIC Regulator provides the forms and step-by-step guidelines, 
including those on the conversion procedure: how to convert from other legal forms 
to the CIC and vice versa.17 However, I shall focus only on how to set up a new 
CIC. Here, as we shall see, even though the process is very simple, certain 
procedural issues should be addressed. 
 
Since the CIC adopts a corporate-type form, applicants must first register a 
company (private or public). It is easy, cheap and convenient for first-time 
applicants to register a company by themselves. The IN01 form must be completed: 
necessary information about the company is required by the form, i.e. company 
                                                                 
14
 For this latter purpose, the Government launched the Consultation on Draft Regulations for 
Community Interest Companies on 11 October 2004.   
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 The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005, SI 2005/1788; The Community Interest 
Company (Amendment) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1942; and The Community Interest Company 
(Amendment) Regulations 2014, Draft SI 2014/2483  
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 The legislation on the creation of CICs is mainly in the CAICE Act 2004. More detailed 
requirements containing the rules under which CICs operate are contained in ibid. 
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 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, ‘Guidance: CIC Business Activities: 
Forms and Step-by-Step Guidelines’ (GOV.UK, updated 5 February 2016) 
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-interest-companies-business-activities/cic-
business-activities-forms-and-step-by-step-guidelines> accessed 10 March 2016 
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name, address, the names of directors, capital, and shares or guarantee. Company 
registration costs only £15, the registration can be easily undertaken online, and the 
process takes 24 hours. However, to register a CIC, the applicants must also submit 
Form CIC36: “Declarations on Formation of a Community Interest Company”, 
which cannot be completed online. Only postal application is available to CIC 
applicants, which costs £35 (£20 for the Companies House fee and £15 for the 
Regulator fee). The fee can be paid only by cheque payable to Companies House. 
It is important that the company name has the tag “community interest company” 
or “CIC”; otherwise the application will be rejected. Both forms can be downloaded 
free of charge from the government website.18 Together with the company form 
IN01, the CIC form CIC36 will be placed on the public record. 
 
Moreover, for CICs, the forms and other required documents need to be approved 
by two independent bodies, i.e. both Companies House and the CIC Regulator. The 
Registrar of Companies cannot incorporate a company as a CIC until the CIC 
Regulator has decided that it is eligible to be a CIC and notified the Registrar of 
this decision. It is this approval process that may actually be streamlined, for 
example, through online completion of Form CIC36 to facilitate the registration of 
CICs and thereby encourage the increase in the number of CIC registrations. 
Therefore, registration of a CIC can take 8-10 days. 
 
Apart from the forms IN01 and CIC36, there are two other documents – the 
Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association – which comply with 
requirements under section 32 of the Companies Act 2006 and part 3 of the CIC 
Regulations 2005. CIC applicants are not allowed to adopt the Model Articles 
provided by the Companies Act 2006 but are instead required to attach bespoke 
articles to the application. They are encouraged, for this purpose, to use the model 
constitutions provided by the CIC Regulator (to be discussed below).  
 
Parts A and B of the CIC36 form require the applicants to declare that they will 
carry on their activities for the benefit of the community, or a section of the 
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 Companies House, ‘Form: Register a Private or Public Company (IN01)’ (GOV.UK, updated 28 
October 2015) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/register-a-private-or-public-company-
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community; to explain what and how their activities can benefit the community; 
and to clarify whether their activities would generate surpluses and how to manage 
them (e.g. reinvestment). This is the community interest test, which is a statutory 
requirement under section 35 of the CAICE Act 2004 and regulations 3-5 of the 
CIC Regulations 2005. The test will enable the CIC Regulator to make an informed 
decision about whether a company being submitted for registration is eligible to 
become a CIC.  
 
The community interest test, which will be further dealt with in section 5.5.2.2 
below, is one of the most important and necessary requirements for being a CIC. 
Though the form provides some explanatory notes, they are not very clear. Further 
information on this matter can be found in the CIC Regulator’s Information and 
Guidance Notes.19 The document explains what the test is and how to satisfy it. It 
is important that the applicants understand the test well, because if they fail the test, 
they are not permitted to register a CIC.  
 
Clearly, it is relatively easy and cheap to set up a CIC. However, the approval 
process seems inefficient. When the social enterprise sector grows larger, this might 
cause a problem. The issue here is whether there should be the “two approvals” 
required both by Companies House and the CIC Regulator, or only a “one shop” 
process; or whether, perhaps, there should be automatic approval, but with the right 
of the CIC Regulator to quash registrations after the event if she subsequently 
decides they should not have been registered in first place. In my understanding, a 
two-approval process might be unavoidable: CICs operate under the Companies 
Act 2006 (this requires approval by Companies House) and, as a special type of 
companies, they need a regulator – hence, the “two approvals”. Moreover, for a 
regulator of public affairs a post ante strategy is not advisable. Thus, in so far as 
this matter is concerned, we need just a quicker turnaround by the CIC Regulator 
in approving ex ante. This is possible, particularly through online completion of the 
CIC36 form, and in cases where the model constitutions provided by the CIC 
Regulator are adopted. 
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 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes – 
Chapter 4: Creating a Community Interest Company (CIC) (BIS 2013).   
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5.4 Rules facilitating the operation of the CIC 
 
The model legal form for social enterprise comprises three main components 
functioning as default rules facilitating the running of this type of business, namely 
legal personality, limited liability, and rules facilitating the raising of capital. All 
these components are covered in the Model Memorandum and Articles constituting 
a CIC, which have been prepared by the CIC Regulator. So it is appropriate that we 
begin this sub-section by gaining an overview of the model CIC constitutions. 
 
5.4.1 Model Constitutions 
 
Six model constitutions for CICs can be used mainly in accordance with the 
company format (by share or by guarantee), the company’s size (having small or 
large membership) and profit distributions (whether profits can be distributed to 
private investors, but with restrictions). The models prescribe all the things required 
by the CAICE Act 2004 and the CIC Regulations 2005, so they greatly save time 
and cost. CIC applicants can easily adopt one of the models even though they have 
limited legal knowledge. However, no model constitution is available for a public 
company, even though it is possible for a CIC to be registered as a public limited 
company.20 
 
A model constitution consists of the model memorandum and articles of 
association. The model memorandum provides a short form which confirms that 
the subscribers wish to form a company and agree to become a member of the 
company. If the company is limited by shares they agree to take at least one share 
in the company. In contrast, the model articles supply detailed information about 
the internal allocation of powers between the directors and members of the 
company, rules governing a company’s internal affairs, such as appointment and 
powers of directors, conduct of meetings and rules for the transfer of shares. These 
are details on how to run a traditional company, but CICs are different from for-
profit companies, in that they must operate under certain restrictions, particularly 
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 In such a case the CIC will be called “a community interest public limited company (community 
interest plc)”. Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Leaflets: Frequently Asked 
Questions (BIS 2013) 21.  
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the asset lock and the limits on profit distribution. The model articles cover such 
restrictions in the form of statutory rules.  
 
The availability of the model constitutions greatly facilitates the creation of a CIC. 
CIC applicants are thus encouraged to use one of the model constitutions, though 
its adoption is not compulsory. Amendments to the models are allowed with the 
CIC Regulator’s approval in order to make sure they comply with the law. The 
following discussion is based mainly on Model 6,21 which is targeted at companies 
limited by shares, and which permits dividend payments to shareholders who are 
not asset-locked bodies, including private investors, though the payment of a 
dividend to a private financial investor is subject to a dividend cap. 
 
5.4.2 Legal personality and limited liability 
 
It is widely accepted that the two outstanding qualities of the company form are the 
legal personality and the limited liability. We have engaged in in-depth discussion 
of these two components of a corporate legal form in Chapter 3. Here I shall simply 
measure the provisions contained in the model constitution against the principles 
and rules proposed in Chapter 3. 
 
The CIC model constitution adopts such a form in order to obtain those benefits. 
The model articles clearly prescribe that the CIC has a legal personality, in that ‘To 
further its objects the Company may do all such lawful things as may further the 
Company’s objects and, in particular, but, without limitation, may borrow or raise 
and secure the payment of money for any purpose including for the purposes of 
investment or of raising funds’.22 With regard to limited liability, it also clearly 
specifies that ‘The liability of the shareholders is limited to the amount, if any, 
unpaid on the shares held by them’.23 
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 Office of the Regulator of the Community Interest Companies, ‘Community Interest Companies: 
Model Constitutions - CIC Model Constitution 6: Private Schedule 3 Company Limited by Shares 
with a Large Membership’ (GOV.UK, updated 1 August 2013)   
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5.4.3 Financing CICs 
 
Before we proceed to consider the issue of financing the CIC, we should note one 
important aspect of the CIC, which is related to this issue. This involves the choice 
remaining available to social entrepreneurs of two limited company forms. The CIC 
has been designed to be able to operate like for-profit companies. One of the good 
things about the CIC is that it retains that choice: social entrepreneurs are permitted 
to create a CIC as either a company limited by guarantee (CLG) or a company 
limited by shares (CLS). Such a choice facilitates social enterprises. Moreover, the 
very fact that today we have thousands of each type suggests that this is important 
– social enterprises clearly are not all the same; one size does not fit all – some want 
guarantee CICs; others share CICs. This is really a positive aspect of the CIC.  
 
It should nevertheless be noted that during the decade following the initiation of the 
CIC the CLG form has been far more popular than the CLS. Though the CLS is the 
most used form in the mainstream market and CIC applicants are encouraged to 
adopt this format, the number of CICs with the CLG form is much greater than the 
number of those adopting the CLS. According to the CIC Regulator’s Operational 
Report Fourth Quarter 2014-2015, the total number of CICs up to that time was 
10,639, of which 8,322 are CLGs and only 2,317 are CLSs.24 However, the CIC 
Regulator confirmed that she started to see small increases in the number of CLS 
CICs and would work hard to raise social entrepreneurs’ awareness of the potential 
of this form.  
 
Does the comparatively lower take-up of the CLS suggest that this particular form 
has not been well designed for social enterprises and is thereby not attractive 
enough? The CIC Regulator urges that CIC applicants consider carefully the 
company form they consider most appropriate for their proposed CIC. Once 
incorporated a company limited by guarantee cannot be converted into a company 
limited by shares (or vice versa).25 Each of the two forms is good in its way; 
however, their differences and the implications thereof should be noted here. 
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 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Operational Report: Fourth Quarter 
2014-2015 (BIS 2015) 17. 
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 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes – 
Chapter 3: Limited Companies (BIS 2012) 3.  
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5.4.3.1 The CLG: Poor at raising finance 
 
A CLG represents a traditional form of organisational set up without a profit-
sharing motive. This fact has nevertheless led to a surprisingly common 
misconception that a company which aims to benefit the community in some way 
must be formed as a CLG. Such a misconception sometimes leads to funding 
agencies such as local authorities insisting on an organisation being registered as a 
CLG. 
 
A social enterprise established as a CLG can be exempted from having the word 
“Limited” (or “Ltd”) attached to its name, if it is set up for certain objects, i.e. the 
promotion of commerce, art, science, education, religion, charity or any profession. 
This has become a signal to the public that such a company is “public-oriented” and 
not “profit-oriented”.  
 
Generally speaking, this is because of the fact that shares are associated with 
profit and, in particular, the individual shareholder's ability to take profit out of 
a company, for personal gain, in the form of dividends. As most social 
enterprises exist to benefit a community or charitable cause rather than to make 
money for the people who run them, such a constitutional form is sometimes 
seen to be incongruous to the overall aims of the business, and the guarantee 
model is in turn seen as providing a more suitable framework.26   
 
A major difference between a company limited by share and a company limited by 
guarantee is that the latter does not have a share capital or any shareholders; they 
only have “members” who control it. The members will be entitled to attend 
member meetings and vote with a “one member one vote” system, which is 
considered more democratic than “one share one vote”. This better reflects the equal 
member ethos of not-for-profit. This may be regarded as the real advantage of 
forming a CLG. 
 
It is easier to leave a CLG, that is, by simply ending the membership without having 
to find a new member as a replacement. In a CLS, one needs to find someone to 
buy one’s shares. In addition, the members of a CLG do not have to invest anything 
                                                                 
26
 Company Law Solutions, ‘Companies Limited by Guarantee’ (Company Law Club)  
<www.companylawclub.co.uk/companies-limited-by-guarantee> accessed 11 February 2015 
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upfront. They simply promise to pay when they are requested to do so, normally 
during winding up. But shareholders have to pay share prices upfront fully or partly.  
 
However, a major disadvantage of CLGs is that they are not allowed to raise capital 
(in a form of equity finance) from their members or private investors. That is why 
CLGs, including CICs limited by guarantee, are poor at raising finance. Most 
guarantee companies depend mainly on grants and donations. It is also important to 
note that adopting the ordinary, non-CIC company limited by guarantee does not, 
in itself, give any assurance that the company will operate on a “not for profit” 
basis. If one wants to ensure that one’s company is “not for profit”, either in the 
sense that it does not aim to make a profit, or in the sense that its profits will not be 
distributed to its employees or members, one will need to insert appropriate 
provisions into the company’s constitution. Incorporating as a CIC limited by 
guarantee will achieve this result, because of the asset lock rules – to which we shall 
shortly turn.  
 
5.4.3.2 The CLS: Good enough at raising capital? 
 
In view of the fact that guarantee CICs have so far greatly outnumbered share CICs, 
I would now like to answer the question raised above by asserting that there is 
actually nothing wrong with the CLS version that is putting people off, forcing them 
to opt for the CLG. One reason why most CIC operators have opted for the CLG 
might be just the misconception mentioned above. Even though CICs can trade in 
much the same way as for-profit companies do, most of them still rely on grants 
and donations and forming as a guarantee CIC might facilitate them in getting those 
funds. 
 
However, we still need to ask: what is peculiar about this form that could prevent 
people from adopting it? The answer might lie in the restrictions that come with 
such a form – dividend cap in particular. Is it because they are too strict? Another 
explanation might be that there is nothing wrong with the CLS; it is just that the 
CLG is more familiar, and the form also provides most of the other characteristics 
and obligations of other forms of limited companies including the ability to pay 
directors. So to put it simply, why bother with the share CIC which comes with 
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complicated and unattractive rules. However, in the long run the CLG might not be 
as flexible and can be a burden when CICs become bigger and seek more capital.  
 
In so far as the financing need of the CICs is concerned, the CLS form is, in my 
view, more practical. I shall now consider the extent to which the CIC, particularly 
if it is incorporated as a CLS, provides the rules which facilitate the raising of 
capital. Two types of funding will be touched upon here – share capital and debt 
finance. 
 
The CIC model constitutions for company limited by share prescribe all the 
necessary things relating to shares of the CIC, that is, share issues and share 
transfers.27 This facilitates CIC operators when raising funds from private investors, 
because the familiarity and credibility of the rules could ensure investors that they 
will be treated in the same way as when dealing with ordinary companies though 
the reward such as a dividend might be limited and the potential for both “upside” 
and “downside” with equity investment is therefore greater than it is with debt 
finance. 
 
Another way to raise funds is to borrow from financial institutions such as banks. 
However, being a CIC is not entitled to a privilege in the form of special treatments, 
such as lower interest rates. However, the CIC Regulator recommends a number of 
financial institutions that look particularly favourably on social enterprises. These 
include Charity Bank, Triodos Bank, Co-operative & Community Finance, The 
Prince's Trust and the Unity Trust Bank.28 
 
In conclusion, there are no specific/default rules which facilitate the raising of loan 
capital of the CICs. Adopting a company form with separate legal entity as well as 
limited liability provides familiarity to lenders who deal with CICs. In addition, the 
CICs are permitted to use their assets as collateral for normal trading.  
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Chapter 7: Financing Community Interest Companies (BIS 2016) 7.  
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5.5 Regulatory/Governance Rules of the CIC 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, several components are required to function as 
mandatory governance rules for social enterprises, particularly those ensuring their 
accountability to their stakeholders. There is also the issue of reducing agency costs, 
which needs to be only briefly mentioned below because it has been sufficiently 
addressed in Chapter 4 (section 4.2) and will form part of the discussion of other 
related matters. 
 
5.5.1 Reducing agency costs 
 
Provisions for the reduction of agency costs actually form part of some other 
regulatory strategies to be addressed shortly, in particular the disclosure of 
information and the directors’ duties and competence. Still another strategy, the 
protection of minority owners, is well covered by English Company Law, under 
which CICs operate. The mention of agency costs in this sub-section is to re-
emphasise that this is a problem in the social enterprises as in private and public 
companies in general (though social enterprises are mostly small enterprises), and 
hence must be accounted for in their governance. 
 
Given its full corporate form governed by English Company Law, which contains 
provisions covering the three regulatory strategies already identified in Chapter 4 
(sub-section 4.2.2) for the reductions of agency costs, there is no need for the CIC 
legal form to be incorporated with specific mechanisms for this purpose. However, 
as also suggested in the same sub-section, particularly important to social 
enterprises is the need to assure that the social enterprises, as the “agents”, do not 
behave opportunistically towards the “principals” (or, in this case, their 
“stakeholders”) by expropriating creditors, exploiting employees, misleading 
customers, or, most significantly, exploiting or neglecting the welfare of the 
community. The mechanisms for assuring accountability to stakeholders to be 
discussed below in sub-section 5.5.2 are thus generally relevant to the need to 
reduce the agency costs. 
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5.5.2 Assuring accountability to stakeholders 
 
Given the importance of stakeholder involvement and other aspects of 
accountability to the stakeholders, governance rules on these matters are designated 
as mandatory rules. However, as we shall shortly see, not all these components of 
accountability are incorporated in the CIC as mandatory rules.  
 
5.5.2.1 Asset lock and dividend cap  
 
The “asset lock” is the generally known term in the UK for the non-distribution 
constraint concept, which was dealt with in Chapter 4. The term is used to cover all 
the provisions designed to ensure that the CIC assets (including any profits or other 
surpluses generated by its activities) are used for the benefit of the community.29 It 
is thus a central feature of the CIC. Like all other companies, the accounts of CICs 
are open to stakeholders and the public, which can be checked whether CICs are 
complying with the statutory lock.30 
 
A statutory asset lock results from an organisation choosing to operate within a legal 
vehicle that statutorily requires an inclusion of this mechanism in its governing 
document.31 With regard to the CIC, the general provisions for the asset lock can 
be found in the CIC Regulations 2005. Let us briefly review some of these. 
 
It is required that the organisations opting to incorporate as a CIC include in their 
memorandum or articles the provisions on asset locks on their residual assets 
prescribed by schedules 1, 2 or 3, depending on whether they are companies limited 
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 The asset lock helps to protect the assets of social enterprises by preventing the members or 
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after its liabilities have been settled) among themselves but must transfer them to another common-
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by guarantee without a share capital, company limited by shares or a company 
limited by guarantee with a share capital. Assets here include profits or other 
surpluses generated by the CICs’ activities.32 
 
The general provision laid down in Schedules 1 and 2 is that the CICs cannot 
transfer any of their assets other than for full consideration. The companies may set 
out, elsewhere in the memorandum or articles, restrictions on the transfer of assets 
for less than full consideration; hence, in compliance with these restrictions, a 
transfer of assets may be made to any asset-locked body specified in their governing 
document, or (with the consent of the CIC Regulator) to any other asset-locked 
body; and a transfer of assets may also be made for the benefit of the community 
other than by way of a transfer of assets to an asset-locked body. The point of all 
these provisions is that assets of the CICs may be transferred at any time, provided 
that the specified requirements are satisfied. 
 
Schedule 3 covers permissible asset distributions in a CIC. In compliance with 
conditions set out in sub-paragraph 3 of this schedule,33 transfers of assets, apart 
from the cases mentioned above, are permitted in the following matters: 1) payment 
of dividends in respect of shares in the company, 2) distribution of assets on a 
winding up, 3) payments on the redemption or purchase of the company’s own 
shares, 4) payments on the reduction of share capital, and 5) extinguishing or 
reduction of the liability of members in respect of share capital not paid up on the 
reduction of share capital. Some of these matters, including the distribution of assets 
on a winding up, the redemption and purchase of shares, and the reduction of share 
capital, are covered in part 6 (Restrictions on distributions and interest) of the CIC 
Regulations 2005, together with other cases of restrictions on distribution such as 
those relating to dividends and interest. Moreover, part 8 (Remuneration) permits 
payment of a manger out of the income of the CIC. I shall here limit my discussion 
to only on the cases of payment of directors, payment of dividends, and distribution 
of assets upon winding up. 
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 CIC Regulations 2005, regs 8 and 9.  
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 ‘3) The conditions are that the transfer of assets must (a) comply with any restrictions on the 
transfer of assets for less than full consideration which may be set out elsewhere in the memorandum 
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The payment of directors for their services to the company is permissible. However, 
their remuneration should never be more than is reasonable, and arrangements to 
this effect should always be transparent. The CIC Regulator, or the company’s 
members, may take action if a director’s remuneration appears to be too high.34 
With regard to the payment of dividends, if the company is a CIC limited by shares, 
and if provided for in the governing document (adopting schedule 3), the payment 
of dividends to shareholders who are not asset-locked bodies, including private 
investors, is permitted. The payment of dividends to private investors is 
nevertheless subject to a dividend cap.35 However, a CIC which is a company 
limited by shares adopting Schedule 2 may only pay dividends to specified asset-
locked bodies or other asset-locked bodies with the consent of the Regulator.36 
 
In the case of the distribution of assets upon winding up, the CIC’s residual assets 
may be distributed as prescribed by Regulation 23 of the Community Interest 
Company Regulations 2005 “to those members of the community interest company 
(if any) who are entitled to share in any distribution of assets on the winding up of 
the company according to their rights and interests in the company”. However, this 
distribution of residual assets to members is limited to no more than the paid up 
value of the shares which they hold in the company. After any distribution to 
members has been made in accordance with this rule, any remaining residual assets 
of the company are to be distributed to an asset-locked body (or bodies) specified 
in its governing document. If the document does not specify any asset-locked body, 
the remaining residual assets will be distributed to such asset-locked body (or 
bodies) as the CIC Regulator will direct.37 
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There is no question about the need for the asset lock in the CIC. The problem rather 
involves the extent of the non-distribution constraint.38 Of course, the limits should 
not be absolute; otherwise, this would make it even more difficult for social 
enterprises to attract investors. But to what extent should distribution be 
constrained? Cross pointed out this fundamental issue at the creation of the CIC: 
 
If the cap is overly restrictive there is the risk that no new market will open up 
for potential investors and only those who are already motivated to invest in 
such activities and organisations on a largely philanthropic basis will find 
investment in CICs attractive. If the cap is unduly lenient the market for 
investors may be larger but the resulting distinction between CICs and 
unregulated companies may be so minimal that those contemplating a new 
community venture may choose not to opt for CIC status, particularly given the 
increased regulatory burden associated with such status.39 
 
There used to be three elements of the dividend cap in the CIC. The first element 
was called the “maximum dividend per share”,40 which limited the amount of 
dividend that can be paid on any given share. The second element involved the 
maximum aggregate dividend,41 which limited the total dividend declared in terms 
of the profits available for distribution. Finally, the capacity to carry forward unused 
dividend capacity42 from year to year was limited by the third element of the cap. 
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These restrictions were criticised for being too harsh and thereby failing to strike 
the right balance yet between having some lock on assets and also allowing 
appropriate rate of return to investors. Hence, in October 2014, changes were made 
by the Secretary of State, which removed the dividend per share cap linked to the 
paid up value of the share, as well as the capacity to carry forward unused dividend 
payment to future years, though it was decided that the maximum aggregate 
dividend cap was retained at the current level. This means that CICs are no longer 
subject to the maximum dividend per share cap which restricted dividend payments 
to 20 per cent of the paid up value of a share. As explained by the CIC Regulator, 
this cap was now seen as complex and restrictive and prevented shareholders from 
sharing in the success of the CIC. Moreover, it also discouraged investors from 
investing in CICs. The maximum aggregate cap is nevertheless retained at 35 per 
cent. The dividend cap thus now has a single element – the maximum aggregate 
dividend cap. On this occasion, the Regulator also took the opportunity to increase 
the performance related interest (any rate which is linked to the company’s profits 
or turnover to any item in the balance sheet of the company) from 10 to 20 per 
cent.43 
 
These changes plainly show that the caps must not be too restrictive. But it remains 
difficult to determine an optimal extent of the constraint. In case of the CIC, the 
current constraint following the latest changes, which ‘…ensures that 65% of the 
CICs profits are reinvested back into the company or used for the community it was 
set up to serve’,44 is in my view acceptable. The law has been trying to strike a 
balance between protecting the public through a strong asset lock and fostering the 
social enterprises through facilitating the raising of finance. However, there might 
be no perfect answer, i.e. what the ideal rate of permissible dividend and interest 
payment should be. Time will tell whether the new balance is yet right, and this will 
be demonstrated by the rate of future take-up of share CICs and any evidence that 
the public is being misled, believing that they are dealing with more tightly 
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constrained than they in fact are.45 
 
5.5.2.2 Community Interest Test  
 
The social benefit requirement involves restrictions on the activities any social 
enterprise can pursue. Hence, in creating the CIC the UK government designated 
the public and community interest as the defining characteristic at the heart of this 
new legal form for social enterprise.46 It is thus important to emphasise that this is 
one of the positive aspects of the CIC. 
 
The CIC Regulations 2005 contains provisions on political and other activities not 
to be treated as being carried out for the benefit of the community.47 The CIC 
incorporates a mandatory rule for “community interest test”, which as stated by the 
CIC Regulator ‘…is a test of the motivation or underlying purpose of a CIC’s 
activities and how they will benefit its community’.48 The importance of this rule is 
also clearly stated in a document of the CIC Regulator Office:  
 
Community interest test is the heart of the community interest company (CIC) 
and the community interest test is what differentiates CICs from other not-for-
profit organisations... To become a CIC, an organisation would need to satisfy 
the Regulator as being in the community or wider public interest. It will be asked 
to confirm that the access to the benefits it provides will not be confined to an 
unduly restricted group...49 
 
To become a CIC, an organisation would thus have to satisfy the Regulator that its 
purposes are beneficial to the community or wider public. ‘A company satisfies the 
community interest test if a reasonable person might consider that its activities (or 
proposed activities) are carried on for the benefit of the community’.50 Moreover, 
it needs also to confirm that the benefits it provides will be widely available, not 
only to certain groups of people. The Regulator needs to apply a robust test at the 
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time of registration of CICs to make sure that their objectives are beneficial to the 
community or wider public. However, whereas this is the ‘most obvious 
manifestation of the new regulatory regime’, what is not clear from the very 
beginning is ‘the fundamental reason why the Community Interest Test and the 
Regulator are the only and most effective mechanisms which should be adopted’.51 
 
According to the Explanatory Note to the CIC Regulations 2005, a company which 
is to become, or to be formed as, a community interest company must not only 
satisfy the “community interest test” but must also not be an “excluded company” 
which will never satisfy the community interest test. The CIC Regulations 2005, 
reg 6 provides that: ‘For the purposes of section 35(6) of the 2004 Act,52 the 
following are excluded companies:  
 
(a) a company which is (or when formed would be) a political party;  
(b) a company which is (or when formed would be) a political campaigning organisation; 
or  
(c) a company which is (or when formed would be) a subsidiary of a political party or of 
a political campaigning organisation. 
 
The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the CIC Regulator does not get 
involved in debates about whether particular political purposes are beneficial or 
have to reach any views on the merits of particular political aims or campaigns. In 
addition, to satisfy the test, all companies wishing to be incorporated as CICs must 
provide the Regulator with evidence by delivering a community interest statement53 
to the Registrar.54 Though not every activity a CIC undertakes might in itself be 
directly beneficial to the community, everything it does should somehow contribute 
towards achieving a purpose beneficial to the community. It must also continue to 
satisfy the test for as long as it remains a CIC.  
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Because the community interest purpose is a crucial condition for the existence of 
a CIC, social entrepreneurs need to understand the definition of “community”.55 
Before creating a CIC, the entrepreneurs should have a clear picture of the 
community they intend to serve. The community for CIC purposes can embrace 
either the community or population as a whole or a definable sector or group of 
people either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. Moreover, the CAICE Act 2004 
provides that for the purposes of the community interest test, it includes a “section 
of the community”.56 
 
Activities a reasonable person may consider to benefit only the members of a 
particular body or the employees of particular employers without contributing 
towards any wider community do not meet the community interest test. It is 
therefore expected that the community will usually be wider than just the members 
of the CIC. For example, the community for which a CIC is formed to run a 
community bus service would include the whole of the population of the area 
served, not just those residents who had invested in the company. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that “social benefits” can actually take numerous forms 
and the activities undertaken to create them are wide-ranging. It is therefore 
legitimate to ask whether this mandatory rule for the community interest test for the 
CIC are adequate for the purpose of assuring the CIC’s accountability to the 
community by operating to the latter’s benefit. On the other hand, it is also 
important to ensure, as has been suggested above, that the community interest test 
should not, in practice, affect the flexibility of CICs.  
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 CIC (Amendment) Regulations 2009, reg 4 provides the amended definition of “Section of the 
community”. For the purposes of the community interest test, any groups of individuals may 
constitute a section of the community if (a) they share a common characteristic which distinguishes 
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5.5.2.3 Stakeholder participation 
 
Neither the Companies Act 2006 nor the CIC Regulations 2005 contains mandatory 
rules on stakeholder participation.57 Nonetheless, the CIC Regulator reaffirms the 
importance of stakeholders by clearly stating that ‘…it is an important principle that 
a CIC should have particular regard to its major stakeholder i.e. the community, 
which is intended to benefit from its activities’.58  
 
With such a confirmation of the importance of stakeholders, the CIC Regulator 
provides a crucial voluntary rule that ‘The involvement of stakeholders…be 
integrated in the corporate governance of the CIC’.59 However, recognising the vast 
differences among the social enterprises operating with the CIC form, the Regulator 
allows that ‘The extent of this will clearly vary according to the size, purpose, 
geographical extent etc of the CIC and the cost needs to be proportionate to the 
scale of the operation’.60 
 
A basic operation to effect stakeholder participation involves providing adequate 
information. This is a starting point for the consultation process, which can be easily 
effected by methods of feedback ranging from circulating newsletters and holding 
stakeholder meetings to setting up an interactive website or issuing formal 
consultation documents before initiating a major policy. Alternatively, other 
stakeholders (i.e. those apart from members and directors) could be given an official 
standing under a company’s constitution that might require, for example, that they 
are consulted before the directors or members of the company make certain types 
of decisions, and/or be invited to attend an open forum linked to the company’s 
annual general meeting.61 
 
It is a good idea to have “non-executive” directors, though if things go wrong 
(particularly if they have not performed their duties diligently) they may well be 
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held equally liable for any consequences with the “executive” directors. By 
implication, it is advisable that stakeholders are encouraged to participate in 
running the organisation. In many organisations the setting up of user and advisory 
groups or a club committee separate from the board of directors can be an effective 
way of bringing stakeholders into the running of the organisation. 
 
Many other methods and procedures could be used to this effect. It is important, in 
so far as corporate governance is concerned, to make a clear distinction between 
the directors’ roles and responsibilities and those of others who are involved in 
running the organization. This is because, apart from the appointed directors, there 
might be de facto or “shadow” directors – those stakeholders who are very 
influential in the affairs of a CIC.62 
 
It should be also noted that though stakeholder participation is not mandatory, the 
CIC Report, which is a statutory requirement, has to show specifically what the 
company has done to benefit the community and how it has consulted those affected 
by its activities and the outcome of such consultation. As clearly indicated in the 
CIC Regulator’s Information and Guidance Note,  
 
The purpose of the CIC Report is to show that the CIC is still satisfying the 
community interest test, and that it is engaging appropriately with its 
stakeholders in carrying out activities, which benefit the community.63 
 
Hence, though not being a mandatory feature of the CIC, stakeholder participation 
as strongly recommended for incorporation in its governance may be regarded as a 
positive aspect of this legal form for social enterprise. Even though, in view of the 
differences among the CICs in various respects, it might not be possible for all of 
them to accept the same extent and depth of stakeholder involvement, the 
Regulator’s guidance reaffirms a very important principle – that is, the CIC 
governance needs to be inclusive in the sense that CIC must demonstrate its 
awareness of the community and constituents – both who benefit from, and who are 
affected by, its activities – by seeking information from multiple sources and 
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establishing policies and structures to foster stakeholder involvement. The CIC 
Regulator makes this point very clear: 
 
A wide view should be taken of who may be affected by your activities and 
should include not only those who currently benefit but also potential 
beneficiaries. You should also consider those indirectly affected such as the 
other residents of the area of your operations.64 
 
Of course, having already given my preference for a mandatory requirement for 
stakeholder participation, I naturally feel that the voluntary rules for this CIC 
governance need are not sufficient. In so far as they remain voluntary, the rules can 
always be ignored; and in so far as stakeholder involvement is central to social 
enterprises, failure to abide by this principle is a serious deviation from the crucial 
normative requirement for this type of organisations. Such a failure thus implies a 
“mission drift”. 
 
5.5.2.4 Stakeholder board 
 
The idea of having a stakeholder board is clearly one specific way of catering for 
stakeholder participation in social enterprises. In this case, it involves participation 
in their governance – i.e. representation at the board level. I have argued in Chapter 
4 that an ideal social enterprise legal vehicle requires a “stakeholder board”, one 
which is represented by various stakeholder groups.  
 
Neither the Companies Act 2006, nor the CIC Regulations 2005 provides a 
mandatory rule for this aspect of CIC governance. The Act only requires that there 
is at least one director in a private company or at least two in a public company. 
Hence, as in the case of stakeholder participation, a stakeholder board may only be 
put in place as a result of default rules to this effect being included into the 
governing documents of a CIC. The CIC Regulator only advises that ‘...it is often a 
good idea to have “non-executive” directors, who do not work fulltime in the 
business, but who have particular skills and experience and can contribute an 
independent perspective to the management of the company’.65 
 
                                                                 
64
 Office of the Regulator of CICs (n 34) 6.  
65
 ibid 4. 
158 
 
This, in my view, is not sufficient. Therefore, I consider it unfortunate that a 
mandatory rule for a stakeholder board has not been included in the CIC structure, 
which would otherwise have made it most distinct from other legal forms adopted 
by social entrepreneurs. Although the inclusion of a default rule to this effect in the 
CIC governing document might serve this purpose, as such it can always be omitted, 
and thereby makes the assurance of accountability of social enterprises to 
stakeholders less strong. 
 
5.5.2.5 Directors’ duties and competence  
 
UK company law, particularly the Companies Act 2006, designates for the directors 
of all types of companies, including public, private and community interest 
companies, a range of powers and duties, their extent and limitations, and related 
rights, remedies and liabilities. Specifically, ‘[a]t the most abstract and general 
level, UK company law imposes on directors the duties to be loyal to the company 
and to be competent when acting as a director.’66 This general duty of loyalty is 
referred to as the duty to promote the success of the company under section 172 and 
the duty to avoid conflicts of interest under section 175, whereas the degree of 
competence required of directors can be seen through the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence under section 174.67  
 
In Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.3.2.5), I nonetheless raised two issues particularly 
relevant to directors of the social enterprises. These were:  
 
• the duty to balance the interest of owners (in maximising profits) with the 
interest of other stakeholders; and 
• the appropriate duty of care and skill for directors (and especially the level 
of competence properly demanded).   
 
I therefore propose, in this sub-section, an analysis of UK company law (especially 
sections 172 and 174) with a view to finding out whether, or to what extent, it 
effectively deals with the two issues.  
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5.5.2.5.1 Section 172  
 
This states that: 
 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (among other matters) to  
 
a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment, 
e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct, and 
f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include 
purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the 
reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
were to achieving those purposes. 
 
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule 
of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the 
interests of creditors of the company. 
 
From a glance, particularly at the wording of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), we might 
think that under section 172 directors of all companies are expected to always take 
stakeholder interests into account. However, it is important to realise that there has 
been an ongoing debate68 over whether directors should adopt a more inclusive 
consideration of stakeholder interests when exercising corporate powers. Even 
though the debate mainly focuses on for-profit companies whose main purpose is 
profit maximisation, the importance of the directors’ duty to balance interests of 
different interested groups is particularly relevant to not-for-profits. In Chapter 4 
(sub-section 4.3.1), I discussed the shareholding and the stakeholding concepts and 
concluded that social enterprise is, by its very nature, a stakeholder entity. It needs 
to be, and actually strives to become, financially viable, but it must in any case 
adopt a stakeholder approach – that is, no matter whether this approach results in 
greater or lesser financial success. Now let us see if section 172 truly represents a 
concern for stakeholder interests.  
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During the reform process preceding the Companies Act 2006, the Company Law 
Steering Committee proposed two approaches to stakeholder interests, i.e. the 
enlightened shareholder value approach and the pluralist approach.69 The first 
approach prioritises the maximisation of shareholder value but at the same time 
requires the consideration of other stakeholders’ interests, believing that attention 
to the stakeholder interests could increase the shareholder value. The second 
approach on the contrary argues that the shareholder-value maximisation goal will 
not lead to ‘maximum prosperity and welfare’. Company law should be modified 
by including other goals, obliging a company to meet a wider range of interests. For 
this purpose it should not be subordinate to, or serve as a means of achieving, 
shareholder value. This inevitably involves balancing potentially conflicting 
interests – a situation resulting in ‘some sacrifice of the interests of shareholders...in 
favour of some other interests’.70   
 
It seems clear that the pluralist approach better suits the social enterprises. 
However, with the domination of for-profits in the business sector, the Committee 
unsurprisingly recommended a rejection of pluralism in favour of the enlightened 
shareholder value for the reason that pluralism ‘would create a dangerously broad 
and unaccountable discretion, unless sufficient additional safeguards can be 
devised.’71  
 
I shall not address the issue of whether the pluralist approach would lead to such a 
broad and unaccountable discretion for directors of for-profits. It is nonetheless 
clear that section 172 prioritises the enlightened shareholder value approach,72 
according to which shareholder interests always come first.73 This is apparently in 
conflict with the CIC’s community-benefit objective. That is, though the duty 
requires directors to take into account stakeholder interests when making decisions 
regarding the success of the company, it does not seem to allow the decisions to be 
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made to the detriment of shareholders’ interests. According to Kershaw, ‘[i]f 
enlightened shareholder value means that the directors may act to promote the 
interests of non-shareholder groups to the extent that so doing promotes the interests 
of shareholders, then section 172 does not explicitly confirms this.’74 What is 
certain is that section 172 does give the priority to members/shareholders. 
 
CIC directors are certainly required to assume the duty under section 172 of the 
Companies Act. Though the CIC’s Model Articles cover many important issues on 
directors, particularly the directors’ powers and responsibilities and decision-
making by the directors, they do not explicitly mention anything about their duties. 
With regard to the issue of whose interests CIC directors must serve, there is no 
question that the CIC was designed to serve the community interest; the directors 
have mandatory direct duties and responsibilities to the community – their most 
important stakeholder. In other words, the priority must be given to the community, 
not the members/shareholders as required by section 172. This is clearly explained 
by the CIC Regulator: 
 
In addition to...general responsibilities, CIC directors (and, when they take 
collective decisions about the company, members) are also responsible for 
ensuring that the company is run in such a way that it will continue to satisfy the 
community interest test. In practice, this will mean having regard to the interests 
of the community the CIC is intended to serve, and in some cases giving more 
weight to those interests than to generating financial returns for investors in the 
company.75 
 
Will this then be problematic as section 172 expects directors to prioritise 
shareholder value whereas the CIC directors’ duties are mandatorily directed 
towards community interests? This was a problem Cross identified at the initiation 
of the CIC. As he argued,  
 
Retention of the proposed stakeholder engagement mechanism would have 
given rise to a number of difficult issues in respect of the interaction of existing 
directors’ duties and the stakeholder mechanism. Directors at present owe their 
duties to the members of their companies and even under the present proposals 
for a statutory statement of directors’ duties that position remains unchanged. A 
statutory engagement mechanism would have placed directors of CICs in a 
position where their duties as directors were clearly not the same as those owed 
by directors of non-CIC companies.76 
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The law says practically nothing about how directors should balance differing and 
sometimes conflicting interests.77 Of course, in case of the conflict between the 
owners (shareholders or investors) and the community/stakeholders, it is the 
community interests that take precedence over those of the owners. But how should 
the CIC directors balance interests of the various stakeholder groups – still not to 
mention the more complicated issue of individual directors themselves representing 
certain specific groups, who naturally expect them to “champion” their respective 
interests?  
 
It is not easy to answer this question. The CIC is a new corporate legal form, and 
problems associated with it are still not clearly understood, with not sufficient case 
law to substantiate such understanding. Moreover, if a problem actually arises, it 
could be referred to the CIC Regulator for assistance in dealing with it. Section 172 
(2) makes it appear that the law cares about companies having “unselfish” 
objectives, especially charitable companies and CICs, by functioning as a default 
rule.78 This means that the priority given to shareholder value can be changed to 
stakeholder interests by stating it in the constitutional documents. In fact, the 
community interest test amounts to saying that CICs’ priority is community interest, 
by which CIC directors have to abide. Hence, with the law covering this matter 
(though not explicitly), there seems to be no need to specifically make it a 
mandatory duty of CIC directors. 
 
5.5.2.5.2 Duty of care and skill  
 
I pointed out in Chapter 4 two different issues here, one involving “care” and the 
other relating to “skills”.  
 
On the first issue, I was in favour of the law recognising that different directors are 
appointed to assume different roles. The law should not burden those appointed for 
“non-governance roles” (i.e. to perform the functions of “stakeholder directors”) 
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with governing functions. For this purpose, the CIC, which is likely to have both 
governance and stakeholder directors, should have at least some guidelines for 
directors’ activities, which allow for some form of “division of responsibilities” 
among the directors, so that they can perform their respective functions more 
efficiently.  
 
The second issue regarding the skill requirement of directors follows from my 
argument on the “division of responsibilities”. As I have also argued in Chapter 4, 
we expect a governing director to demonstrate the skills of a reasonably competent 
governing director – at least, a reasonable ability to read and understand accounts, 
to spot fraud, etc; whereas a “stakeholder director” would not be expected to engage 
in governance, and would therefore not need to demonstrate the skills required for 
a governing director. 
 
As in the case of the competence of CIC directors, the CIC Regulations, the model 
articles or the CIC Regulator’s Information and Guidance Notes do not offer any 
specific mention of this matter. This means that CICs follow the general duties of 
directors under section 174 of the Companies Act 2006 on the duty of care, skill 
and diligence in particular.79 Now let us see if this section can meet the requirements 
set out in Chapter 4.   
 
174 Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence 
(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. 
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a 
reasonably diligent person with—  
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected 
of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to 
the company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. 
 
Section 174 seems to recognise that different directors have different roles, which 
is inherent in the word “functions”. According to Kershaw, ‘[c]learly directors have 
different functions. Some are executive directors; others are non-executive directors 
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 According to Davies, this Section on the general duties of directors, which provides for the 
standard of competence they are expected to meet in the course of carrying out their functions, 
incorporates into the Act a recent theme of the common law, ‘…namely that the law should impose 
on directors a higher standard of skill and care than has traditionally been expected of them by the 
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who are not involved in the operational aspects of the company’s business. Some 
non-executive directors will receive specific roles such as serving on the audit 
committee or acting as the senior independent director.’80 Although the law does 
not say this straightforwardly, it should be sufficient for CICs. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the Regulator should clarify these different functions in her 
guidance.  
 
In addition, section 174 also covers the issue of how well directors should perform 
their functions. It adopts the dual objective/subjective standard,81 meaning that the 
qualities of the hypothetical director who sets the benchmark of care include the 
attributes of the average director carrying out the same function (objective test); 
where the director possesses the skill, knowledge, and experience above that level, 
such additional skill, knowledge, and experience amount to a subjective test.82  
 
Therefore, in view of the law’s substantial coverage of the director’s competence, 
especially with the imposition of the dual standard test, we might argue that there 
is no need for the CIC to incorporate additional rules or regulations. If the CIC is 
subject to too many rules and regulations, few people would want to become CIC 
directors. By the nature of the CIC, it is not easy to recruit skilled directors for it; 
this may be because they cannot expect as much financial reward for their services 
as they would receive from a for-profit company.  
 
However, Kershaw has raised an interesting point which could involve the 
appointment of stakeholder directors in a CIC board. He notes that though the law 
recognises that directors have different functions, the appointment of directors with 
no business skills and experiences might result in the court concluding that the CIC 
could not satisfy the standard of care test under section 174.83 This means that 
whereas it is possible to determine specific functions for directors, for example, 
giving stakeholder directors the responsibility to take care of stakeholder groups 
with a view to making sure there would be no mission drift, in practice the directors 
                                                                 
80
 Kershaw (n 66) 449.  
81
 Companies Act 2006: Explanatory Notes, para 337. On the issue of objective and subjective 
standards, see CA Riley, ‘The Company Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous 
but Subjective Standard (1999) 62(5) Modern Law Review 697.  
82
 Kershaw (n 66) 449.  
83
 ibid. 
165 
 
have to make decisions, including business decisions and to vote. Allowing 
directors with no business skills to do this could have an impact on the operation of 
the organisation. CICs pursue both social and commercial objectives. Therefore, to 
appoint stakeholder directors without any decision-making authority would defeat 
the real objective of CIC stakeholder boards. Eventually, such a CIC board would 
be dominated by directors with business skills and interests. The law functions in 
this way because it clearly focuses on for-profit companies.   
 
In summary, we have seen that the CIC Regulator sees the benefit of having “non-
executive” directors. By implication this would also mean having stakeholders 
involved in running the organisation with a clear division of responsibilities 
between the governance functions of executive directors and those of other directors 
who are involved in running the organisation in other capacities. This more or less 
amounts to the same arrangement I proposed in Chapter 4 (though the Regulator 
indicates that if things go wrong, particularly if the “non-executive” directors or 
those involved in running the organisation have not diligently carried out their 
duties, they may be held equally liable for any consequences with the “executive” 
directors). Even though the Regulator’s recommendation does not carry the weight 
of a mandatory rule, I accept this “default” provision, especially in view of the vast 
differences, especially in size, among CICs. Though, in view of our ideal-type 
corporate legal form for social enterprise, the CIC’s lack of a mandatory provision 
for this aspect of its governance is a “flaw”, it is, in my view, not a serious one. 
 
5.5.2.6 CIC Regulator and public disclosure  
 
The mandatory provisions for these two elements of the CIC governance are 
contained in the CAICE Act 2004 and the CIC Regulations 2005. With such 
provisions the CIC may be said to have come up with still another positive aspect. 
The Act has established the Regulator as an independent statutory office-holder 
appointed by the Secretary of State.84 The CIC Regulator can be expected to assume 
a more or less ideal role envisaged in Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.3.2.6).  
 
                                                                 
84
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The Regulator’s independence is fundamental to the CIC regulatory regime but the 
exercise of CIC Regulator’s functions must also be transparent. For this latter 
purpose the Regulator is required to prepare an annual report for the Secretary of 
State, who will lay it before Parliament, and a copy of it will then be placed on the 
Office of the CIC Regulator’s website. In addition, the Secretary of State may direct 
the Regulator to prepare financial accounts, which will be examined and reported 
upon by the National Audit Office and included in the report. Moreover, the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman can also consider and investigate 
complaints of alleged maladministration about the Regulator and the Regulator’s 
Office. Such complaints can only be considered if they are submitted to the 
Ombudsman by the complainant’s Member of Parliament.85 
 
The CAICE Act 2004 provides the Regulator with a wide range of enforcement 
powers but constrains the use of these powers to the extent necessary to maintain 
confidence in CICs. The government has thus indicated its aspiration for a “light 
touch” Regulator with a view to encouraging the development of the CIC “brand” 
and providing guidance and assistance on matters relating to CICs. The Regulator 
emphasises that ‘The light touch approach to regulation does not envisage pro-
active supervision of individual CICs by the Regulator’.86 Instead, the Regulator 
sees his or her task as facilitating the formation of CICs, hence avoiding a 
“bureaucratic approach”.  
 
I presented, in Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.3.2.6), the profile of an ideal-type external 
regulator, whose main characteristics include the regulator’s independence, 
accountability, roles and responsibilities, as well as other aspects of the regulator’s 
duties and functions. I have found that the law governing the CIC Regulator 
practically covers all of these features. Apart from the CIC Regulator’s 
independence, accountability, and approach to the regulatory functions, all of which 
are, in my opinion, the central aspects of the Regulator, the law also provides the 
Regulator with wide powers of investigation87 and enforcement (ranging from 
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bringing civil proceedings in the name of the CIC to appointing and removing 
directors and manger). The law also lays down a framework for appeals against the 
Regulator’s decisions.  
 
In my view, all these provisions represent a reasonable basis for the CIC regulatory 
regime. Moreover, in carrying out his/her functions, the Regulator has also assumed 
a valuable role in promoting the social enterprise sector, especially by providing 
advice and guidance (which would minimise the need to seek costly professional 
advice), facilitating the incorporation of CICS, as well as undertaking activities 
such as attending meetings and publicising the CIC on various occasions.  
 
Another important role prescribed in the model external regulator is that of the 
protector of CICs – which presumably has implications for the social enterprise 
sector as a whole. This, in my view, particularly involves the Regulator’s role in 
preventing and eradicating fraudulent practices to protect the image of, and 
maintain confidence in, CICs. However, one cannot but wonder how this role could 
be really effective if, in adopting the “light touch” approach to regulation of CICs, 
the Regulator “does not envisage pro-active supervision of individual CICs”. The 
promoting and protecting roles must go hand in hand, and a flaw in one could 
adversely affect the other.88 This issue deserves further elaboration here. 
 
I shall focus on the way the Regulator deals with complaints. As the Regulator has 
herself emphasised, ‘…it is complaints that help the Regulator to challenge activity 
that is being questioned’.89 As the Regulator’s intervention ‘to challenge activity 
that is being questioned’ is still not published, we need to rely on the information 
the Regulator has provided on the way he or she has tackled this matter.90 Two 
aspects of this modus operandi can be identified. 
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The first aspect involves the Regulator’s general approach to complaints. In this 
respect, it is stressed that each and every complaint is considered, with most 
complaints being resolved very quickly. Given the light-touch approach, the 
Regulator’s enforcement powers are used sparingly, but these powers will be used 
if the Regulator deems it necessary to take action against a CIC. The Regulator has 
criteria for consideration when deciding whether to take action91 and for the types 
of complaints that the Regulator is not likely to pursue.92  
 
The second aspect involves actual cases in which the Regulator has intervened,93 
and how certain types of cases have been dealt with.94 178 complaints were filed 
against CICs from 2006 to 2014;95 many of them were of relatively minor nature. 
The Regulator has explained the way complaints have practically been dealt with, 
as follows:96 
 
As a matter of routine, we draw the director’s attention to the concerns raised 
and we give the CIC an opportunity to address them. The Regulator considers 
the CICs response and determines whether it has acted appropriately, if not we 
will offer guidance on the way forward with a view to resolving the issue…The 
small percentages of CICs that have acted in a more serious manner are carefully 
considered and appropriate action is taken.97 
 
Now we have a clearer picture of what the CIC Regulator’s light-touch approach 
looks like in practice – especially in so far as this involves complaints. Needless to 
say, without further information on how specific cases have been dealt with (the 
Regulator maintains a policy of not revealing full information about such cases), it 
is not possible to assess the overall effectiveness of the light-touch Regulator. 
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However, given that the number of complaints has remained more or less steady, 
or proportionally decreasing, the light-touch approach can be interpreted to be 
effective at least in so far as it has been able to steer CIC activity in the right 
direction. 
 
Now we turn to the last component envisaged in the model legal form for social 
enterprise – public disclosure. As I have pointed out in Chapter 4 (sub-section 
4.3.2.6), “disclosure” for the social enterprises is aimed to cater for the stakeholder 
interests rather than mainly to protect investors and creditors. A CIC is therefore 
statutorily required to prepare and deliver annually, to the Registrar of Companies: 
(i) annual accounts, (ii) annual CIC report, and (iii) annual return.98 
 
1) Annual accounts: The directors of CICs are obligated, in much the same 
vein as their counterparts in ordinary companies, to deliver copies of their 
accounts for each financial year to the Registrar of Companies who will 
place them on the public file. 
 
2) Annual CIC report: The directors of a CIC are statutorily required to prepare 
an annual CIC report to be filed with their accounts. The purpose of this 
report is to show that the CIC is still satisfying the community interest test, 
and that it is engaging appropriately with its stakeholders in carrying out 
activities, which benefit the community. 
 
3) Annual return: The annual return is in effect a snap shot as at the made up 
date of the essential information about the company. This must be submitted 
in an annual return form to Companies House. 
 
Clearly, apart from the financial report companies are normally required to submit, 
it is the “annual CIC report” that is central to the CIC as a social enterprise. The 
CIC Regulator really expects that ‘…CICs should aspire to provide the fullest 
possible information rather than simply comply with the minimum requirements’.99 
Moreover, the Regulator also expects that the CIC report ‘…be sent to shareholders 
and other stakeholders with the directors’ report and annual accounts’. Indeed, as 
the Regulator emphasises, ‘[c]onsideration of CIC Reports is an important element 
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in the Regulator’s monitoring role’,100 in so far as they provide an ‘insight into the 
ways CICs are operating…’101 
 
I accessed 12 CIC annual reports (CIC 34) covering the period from 2009 to 2015, 
with the majority (5 out of 12) being the reports lodged in 2014.102 The form CIC34 
is a template, and all 12 CICs practically fulfilled the minimum requirement by 
filling the form, especially its part 1 (general description of the company’s 
activities) and part 2 (consultation with stakeholders), only a few CICs failing to 
supply information on part 3 (directors’ remuneration) and part 4 (transfers of assets 
other than for full consideration).103 Notably, many CICs have not simply 
perfunctorily fulfilled this statutory requirement but also taken advantage of this 
opportunity to ‘showcase the fantastic work that they have involved in’.104 
 
In view of the information I have seen in the reports, I cannot help but share the 
Regulator’s enthusiasm about the usefulness of these documents.105 Most 
significantly, of course, the CIC reports provide a good practical means whereby 
the Regulator can monitor CICs’ activities – and, by this means, to determine 
whether they are still satisfying the community interest test, being accountable to 
their stakeholders and carrying out activities that benefit the community.  
 
It is the CIC Regulator’s role in this latter respect that is of particular importance. 
As I have noted in Chapter 4, preparing public benefit report, as statutorily required 
in the form of the CIC report, is much more complicated than managing financial 
disclosures. Public disclosure, in other words, is susceptible to uncertainty and 
fuzziness both in terms of which issues are to be considered important and which 
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measure better depicts the performance of firms. This has a potential effect on the 
reliability of such disclosures, which are thus harder to discuss and evaluate than 
financial accounts. To ensure such a disclosure, we need an effective regulator. 
Hence, to the extent that the CIC Regulator carries out her work efficiently, I accept 
the mandatory provision on this matter and consider it still another positive aspect 
of the CIC. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Although the CIC as a legal form for social enterprise does not fully incorporate the 
features of the ideal-type legal vehicle for this type of business proposed in Chapters 
3-4, it most closely satisfies the latter’s normative requirements. Hence, while the 
“model legal form” mapped out there provides a normative guideline for the 
development of a legal form for social enterprise in a country like Thailand, which 
still does not have one, the CIC most usefully serves as a practical guide for the 
same purpose. In particular, the practical experiences in implementing the CIC form 
in the UK enable us not to lose sight of what is possible in our search for what is 
normatively desirable. In concluding this chapter, by way of a recap, an overall 
view of the strong and weak points of the CIC as a legal form for social enterprise. 
 
First, with regard to the asset lock, the strong point of the CIC is that this governance 
need is statutorily provided. However, problems remain as to whether the asset lock 
rule is so harsh, particularly in so far as this involves the non-distribution constraint. 
Although new dividend and performance-related interest caps have recently been 
introduced, further adjustments are possible to maintain a balance between the need 
to attract investment in CICs and compliance with the central CIC concept that the 
assets and profits of the CIC should be distributed to the benefit of the community. 
 
Second, whereas the statutory provision for the community interest test more or less 
satisfies the social benefit requirement of the ideal-type legal form and thereby 
represents a positive aspect of the CIC, rules on stakeholder participation and board 
composition are not sufficient. Even though the CIC Regulator’s recommendation 
on stakeholder involvement is particularly strong (and various aspects of the 
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Regulator’s activities are also closely involved with CIC stakeholders), this, in 
principle as well as in practice, is not a substitute for statutory rules to this effect. 
 
Third, that the directors are mandatorily oriented towards stakeholder interests 
represents another strong point of the CIC. However, with regard to the issue of 
directors’ competence, relevant provisions are clearly inadequate. As I have pointed 
out above, without sufficient rules on this issue, the governance structure of the CIC 
is not as effective as it should be as a stakeholder organisation. 
 
Finally the statutorily provided external regulator for the CIC may be regarded as 
still another strong point of this legal form. In my view, the CIC Regulator closely 
resembles the model external regulator presented in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, as I 
have noted above, it is the “light touch” approach to regulation that could be 
problematic. While this approach may actually promote CICs by facilitating their 
creation and providing various types of assistance to CIC operators, the Regulator’s 
role as a CIC protector is still in doubt, particularly whether the Regulator 
sufficiently engaged in CIC supervision and investigation. 
 Chapter 6  
Main Legal Forms for Social Enterprises in Thailand 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Like its UK counterpart, the Thai social enterprise sector relies on a variety of legal 
vehicles. There are social enterprises operating as sole traders, which are not 
governed by any specific law but are only subject to general law such as the law of 
contracts and obligations, and community enterprises under the Community 
Enterprise Promotion Act 2005,1 which permits them to rely on any legal vehicle, 
or none at all. A new legislative project being considered by the National Reform 
Council – the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill – also does not designate any 
specific legal form for social enterprises in Thailand, though it formally posits 
certain specific features directly relevant to this type of business. We shall consider 
this legislative project in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
I propose to evaluate the legal forms for Thai social enterprises in this chapter 
before considering the Thai social enterprise landscape in the next one. The purpose 
is to complete the evaluation of the existing legal forms for social enterprises in this 
part of my thesis, following the evaluation of the CIC in Chapter 5. Legal forms for 
social enterprises do not represent a prominent subject in the Thai social enterprise 
landscape; this means that its understanding is hardly a prerequisite to the analysis 
of the legal forms for social enterprises in Thailand. 
 
According to my findings, social enterprises in Thailand now operate within six 
main legal forms: 1) partnership, 2) limited company, 3) co-operative, 4) 
foundation, 5) association, and 6) private school. Governed by specific laws which 
define them as particular legal entities, these six main types may be subsumed under 
three categories: (1) for-profit organisations under the Civil and Commercial Code 
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1992 (B.E. 2535),2 (2) non-profit organisations under the same Code, and (3) 
organisations governed by other laws.3  
 
There is insufficient space to address all aspects of those forms. Two for-profit 
forms and one non-profit type will be assessed here. The main point here may be 
summarised as follows.  As I have noted before, a good legal form for a social 
enterprise must meet both the business aspects of social enterprises, and their social 
objectives. For Thailand, the for-profit legal forms meet business needs. Their non-
profit counterparts meet social needs. But no single form successfully comprises 
both elements of the social enterprise. 
 
6.2 For-profit legal forms under the Civil and Commercial Code  
 
A social enterprise may adopt any of the legal forms of for-profit or business 
organisations under the Civil and Commercial Code 1992. Thai for-profit 
organisations can be categorised into: (1) partnership and (2) limited company. This 
section offers a brief account of each of these forms and a review of their advantages 
and disadvantages as legal vehicles for social enterprises. 
 
The core criteria for the establishment of each of these legal forms are specified by 
section 1012 of the Civil and Commercial Code 1992, providing an overall 
requirement that at least two persons (or three for a limited company)4 must enter 
into a contractual agreement to set up a partnership or a limited company with the 
purpose of sharing profit.5 Section 1012 makes it clear from the very beginning that 
the partnership and company are for-profit legal forms with the profit-maximising 
objective. It is therefore not surprising that their legal provisions do not include 
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social or stakeholder elements, which are regarded as the central features of a social 
enterprise legal structure.  
 
In view of this shortcoming alone, we might assume that the partnership and 
company forms are not suitable for social enterprises. But this does not mean that 
they are unworkable or unusable. This rather means that these two for-profit legal 
forms do not have the right qualities, thus making it difficult for social enterprises 
to run efficiently and grow.   
 
6.2.1 Partnership 
 
There are two main types of partnership in Thailand, namely, ordinary partnership 
and limited partnership. A partnership is simply set up by at least two persons 
agreeing to run a business together and to share profits. Such an agreement can be 
made either explicitly or implicitly, and no formal or written contract is required.6  
 
6.2.1.1 Start-up process 
 
The creation of an ordinary partnership is very simple and cheap. Only a verbal 
contract is sufficient for this purpose with any need for registration, so its creation 
is very simple and cheap, and only a verbal contract is sufficient for this purpose. 
But since all types of partnerships are for-profit entities, they have a duty to pay 
tax. Ordinary partnerships thus need to apply for personal income tax7 and sign an 
ordinary partnership agreement with a stamp duty of 100 baht (around £2)8 as 
required by the Revenue Department.9  
 
                                                                 
6
 Sophon Ratanakorn, Textbook on the Civil and Commercial Code: Partnerships and Companies 
(12th edn, Nitibannakarn 2010) 14.  
7
 Since ordinary partnership is not a juristic person, it is treated as an ordinary person meaning that 
it has a duty to pay personal income tax. The Revenue Department has recently introduced a new 
regulation on income tax on ordinary partnership. From 1 January 2015, the new rule has cancelled 
the tax exemption on the profits shared among the partners, which was used as a way to avoid tax. 
This newly introduced tax status of the ordinary partnership seems to affect the current popularity 
of this legal form. Income Tax of Ordinary Partnership or Non-Juristic Group of Persons 
(Amendment of Tax Exemption) Revenue Department Order 2015, Por 149/2558 (20 January 2015).  
8
 Bank of England, £1 can be exchanged for 50.43 Thai Baht (10 March 2016). 
9
 Ordinary partnership agreement form can be downloaded free of charge at the Revenue Department 
website <http://download.rd.go.th/fileadmin/tax_pdf/request/promise02_040652.pdf> accessed 3 
March 2015 
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Nonetheless, if ordinary partnership decides to register, it will be provided with the 
legal status of a juristic person (hereafter “registered partnership”), just like limited 
partnership and limited company.10 Section 1016 of the Civil and Commercial Code 
1992 requires a partnership or a company to be registered at a local registration 
office in the area where its main office is located. The Department of Business 
Development (DBD), Ministry of Commerce, is in charge of the registration 
process. The registration of registered partnerships and limited partnerships 
undergoes the same process of filling application forms and supplying required 
documents and fees. The fees vary with the starting capital contributed by the total 
amount of the contributions subscribed by the partners but these add up to no more 
than 5,000 baht (around £100)11 for the maximum capital of 5,000,000 baht (around 
£100,000),12 plus document fees of a few hundred baht.13 Thus, the registered 
partnership and limited partnership are more expensive to set up than ordinary 
partnership, and they are also more costly to operate as they have accounting and 
auditing burdens. In addition, as a juristic person, they are subject to corporate 
income tax. 
 
6.2.1.2 Legal personality and limited liability 
 
Ordinary partnerships are non-juristic persons and thereby have no legal personality 
separate from the partners. They are treated like ordinary persons, who can enjoy 
greater simplicity, flexibility and confidentiality than any incorporated legal 
vehicles, for which a minimum requirement is that their profiles appear on the 
public register. For enterprises relying on unincorporated legal forms, disclosure 
requirements are far less. A major disadvantage for social enterprises adopting the 
ordinary partnership is that it does not give their partners limited liability. As a 
result, the partners’ personal assets are always at risk.  
 
                                                                 
10
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1064 provides registration requirements for registered 
partnerships; and s 1078 for limited partnerships.  
11
 Bank of England (n 8).  
12
 ibid.  
13
 Registration application forms can be submitted either online or at one of the 87 registration 
offices nationwide. The detailed guidance on how to register partnerships and all the application 
forms are provided online free of charge. DBD, ‘Partnership Registration According to the Civil and 
Commercial Code’ <www.dbd.go.th/dbdweb_en/ewt_news.php?nid=3973&filename=index> 
accessed 18 August 2014 
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We might presume that the law allows ordinary partnerships to register in order to 
better protect the partners in the following ways. First, registered partners’ liabilities 
against creditors of the partnership will remain for two years after they resign,14 
whereas ordinary partners have to be liable until the debts are fully paid off.15 
Second, if any partners, who are requested by the creditors of the partnership to pay 
off debts, can prove that the registered partnership still has sufficient assets to cover 
the debts, the court may enforce such assets before the partners’ personal assets.16 
Finally, if a registered partnership is still in operation, the creditors of the partners 
are not able to request their debts to be paid off from the partners’ shares in the 
partnership.17 These benefits nevertheless provide very little protection for partners, 
compared with benefits of limited liability. Under Section 1025, both registered 
partnership and its partners have to be liable to the creditors of the partnership 
unlimitedly, even though the partners may be able to delay their liabilities for a 
while. In theory, all partners of a registered partnership still have to bear unlimited 
liability.18 
 
Let us now consider the protection against risk provided by a limited partnership. 
Under section 1077 of the Civil and Commercial Code 1992, a limited partnership 
has two kinds of partners. The first type consists of one or more partners whose 
liability is limited to such an amount as they may respectively undertake to 
contribute to the partnership, and the second type is composed of one or more 
partners, who are jointly and unlimitedly liable to all the debts of the partnership. 
Also called managing partners, they have full authority to manage the partnership.19 
But if a partner with limited liability interferes with its management, she becomes 
jointly and unlimitedly liable to all the obligations of the partnership.20  
 
                                                                 
14
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1068. 
15
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1051. 
16
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1071. 
17
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1072. 
18
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1070: The creditor of an obligation due by a registered 
ordinary partnership is entitled, as soon as the partnership is in default, to demand the performance 
of the obligation from any of the partners (emphasis added).  
19
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1087. 
20
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1088. This is similar to the limited partnerships which may 
be formed in the UK under the Limited Partnership Act 1907.  
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The partners with unlimited liability have to face the same legal consequences as 
the ordinary partners do.21 That is, the managing partners are not well protected by 
law and their personal assets will always be at risk. In contrast, the partners with 
limited liability are protected by section 1095, which stipulates that as long as the 
partnership is still in operation, the creditors of such a partnership can take no legal 
action against the partners with limited liability even though they have partly-paid 
contributions.22 The creditors can only force the partnership and its managing 
partners to be liable. But as soon as the partnership is dissolved, legal actions may 
be taken by the creditors of the partnership against the partners with limited 
liability. However, their liability will be limited to (1) contributions that are still 
unpaid, (2) contributions that have been withdrawn from the partnership’s assets, 
and (3) dividends and interests which the partners have received in bad faith and 
contrary to section 1084.  
 
If we compare a registered partnership with its ordinary counterpart, it is evident 
that the registered form is better since it comes with separate legal personality as 
well as some protection for partners under sections 1068, 1071 and 1072. However, 
an ordinary partnership is in fact more popular than registered partnership.23 A main 
reason for this preference might be that entrepreneurs see tax benefits (which have 
been revoked) and the maintenance of secrecy as more important than the benefits 
of limited liability. Registering an ordinary partnership incurs time and cost for little 
additional advantage. 
  
Is limited partnership, which is seen as a mix between ordinary partnership and 
limited company,24 a suitable legal form for social enterprises? In fact, despite the 
limited liability it provides, limited partnership has its disadvantages as a legal 
vehicle for business in general as well as for social enterprises. First and foremost, 
it does not provide limited liability protection for all partners. Second, since the 
                                                                 
21
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1080 provides that ordinary partnership law will be applied 
to limited partnership (particularly to the partners with unlimited liability), if the limited partnership 
law does not suggest otherwise.   
22
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1083 provides that contributions provided by the partners 
with limited liability can be in a form of either money or assets.  
23
 Yos Nakakes and Kritika Limlawan, ‘Types of Business Organizations under Civil and 
Commercial Code’ (2010) 30(2) Executive Journal 132, 134.  
24
 Ratanakorn (n 6) 177.  
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legal provisions for the ordinary partnership also generally apply to the limited 
partnership, the latter actually operates in much the same manner as an ordinary 
partnership, especially entailing the same disadvantages for social enterprises.  
 
Another related aspect of partnerships should also be noted here. That is, 
partnership can easily terminate. Apart from the possibility of being terminated 
under contractual conditions or by court order, an ordinary partnership is dissolved 
if a partner dies, becomes bankrupt or incapacitated, or withdraws.25 This also 
applies to the registered and the limited partnerships.26 Thus, the “legal personality” 
of the registered partnership does not give it the “perpetual succession”. Even the 
status of the limited partnership is not particularly stable, as this can be affected by 
the death, bankruptcy, or incapacitation of unlimited liability partners. Given these 
shortcomings of the partnership, limited company seems to be a more popular and 
probably more suitable legal form for mainstream businesses and even social 
enterprises, which we shall shortly turn in sub-section 6.2.2.  
 
6.2.1.3 Raising of finance 
 
Ordinary partnerships have two capital raising problems.27 First, they may struggle 
to find new partners to put more, new capital into the partnerships since section 
1040 forbids them from introducing new partners without consent from all other 
partners. Second, potential partners know they cannot easily sell their shares,28 so 
it is harder to persuade anyone to become an investing partner in the first place. 
 
                                                                 
25
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1055.  
26
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1069 states that apart from the reasons in s 1055 a registered 
ordinary partnership terminates if it goes bankrupt. For limited partnership, s 1080 stipulates that 
ordinary partnership law will be applied unless otherwise specified by limited partnership rules. The 
limited partnership law does not provide reasons causing its termination. Therefore s 1055 applies, 
but only to partners with unlimited liability since s 1092 specifies that the death of the partners with 
limited liability or them becoming bankrupt or incapacitated does not terminate the limited 
partnership. 
27
 Ordinary partnerships might be more favourable than sole traders in terms of raising finance from 
partners and dispersing risks among them. Prachuab Permsuwan, An Introduction to Business (6th 
edn, Bangkok University 2010) 24.   
28
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1041 stipulates that even if a partner transfers all or part of 
her share of profits to a third party, the transfer without consent from all other partners will not make 
such a third party a new partner. This means that with only one partner refusing to give consent, 
recruiting new partners or transferring shares to other people is invalid. However, this section is a 
default rule which can be amended.  
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A limited partnership has better prospects of recruiting people with investment 
capital and/or professional expertise as limited liability partners from among wider 
groups of prospective partners than an ordinary partnership can normally do.29 This 
could attract private investors since the contributions provided by limited liability 
partners can be transferred without consent from other partners30 and can also be 
transmitted to the heirs of the partners who pass away.31 Despite some benefits32 
and protection, limited partnerships still suffer from certain shortcomings, which 
make them unattractive to investors (we shall consider this issue below). This type 
of legal form has been popular among relatives and acquaintances, or among 
professionals such as lawyers and medical doctors, who want to set up a business 
venture.   
 
6.2.1.4 Controlling agency costs   
 
The ordinary partnership law provides certain packages of rules facilitating the 
controlling of agency costs. Section 1033 of the Civil and Commercial Code 1992 
provides that if not specified otherwise, every partner can manage the ordinary 
partnership; in other words, they all become managing partners. In principle, there 
is no separation of ownership and control. Therefore, no agency costs are incurred. 
They are also being accountable to each other with the law further stipulating that 
no partners may enter into a contract to which another partner objects.33 In addition, 
partners are not entitled to any remuneration in exchange for their part in the 
management.34 This makes sense since they are owners of the partnership, not 
agents.  
 
Nonetheless, allowing all partners to operate an ordinary partnership might not be 
efficient in practice, especially if the partnership has a complex internal structure, 
or grows bigger. If the partners agree to relegate management power to a certain 
                                                                 
29
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1083. 
30
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1091. 
31
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1093. 
32
 For example, limited liability partners are allowed to compete with the partnership under s 1090.  
33
 This does not mean that they have to ask for other partners’ consent before making a decision. 
However, it is advised that in order to make decisions on important and complex business 
transactions, partners should adopt a majority rule under s 1034. Pasakorn Chunha-urai, A Textbook 
on the Civil and Commercial Code: Partnership and Company (Nitibannakarn 1988) 612. 
34
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1046. 
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few with a view to running the partnership more efficiently, to ensure that such 
power is not abused for personal gains, the law grants monitoring power to the non-
managing partners.35 If the managing partners misuse their power, they could be 
fired36 or even sued for damages, though the lawsuit must be filed within one year 
after the incident is discovered. However, these rules are not a guarantee that 
partners will not seek personal benefits. 
 
Limited partnership law provides a rather different approach on controlling agency 
costs. A limited partnership must be managed only by the partners with unlimited 
liability.37 If a limited liability partner interferes with the management, she will be 
liable to all the debts and obligations of the partnership unlimitedly. But this does 
not give such a partner a right to become a managing partner. Managing partners 
thus do not have to be accountable to limited liability partners, but only to unlimited 
liability partners38 and other managing partners.39 This gives the managing partners 
an opportunity to seek personal benefit, causing agency costs. The law provides the 
managing partners with almost total power as they have to bear unlimited liabilities. 
Limited liability partners only have the right to give opinion and advice, and vote 
for the appointment or withdrawal of managing partners without being able to 
object to any decisions made by managing partners.40 In conclusion, both ordinary 
and limited partnerships do not seem to be able to deal with agency problems 
efficiently, which might be a reason why they are not as attractive as the company 
form.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
35
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1037 allows non-managing partners to enquire into the 
management of the business anytime, and to inspect and copy all files and documents of the ordinary 
partnership.  
36
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1036. 
37
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1087. 
38
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1037 gives unlimited liability partners monitoring power to 
inquire about management anytime, to inspect and copy all the files and documents of the 
partnership. 
39
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1035 provides that if the partners agree to appoint certain 
partners as managing partners, no managing partners can enter into a contract which is objected by 
another managing partner.  
40
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1088. 
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6.2.1.5 Asset lock and non-distribution constraint  
 
Thai partnership law comes with neither the asset lock nor non-distribution 
constraints. However, one good thing about such law is that most provisions are 
default rules, thus social entrepreneurs might agree to limit the profit distribution 
as they wish. An agreement to do so can be achieved verbally in ordinary 
partnerships, although a written contract is preferable. Registered and limited 
partnerships are required to register the agreement.  
 
For the liquidation of a partnership, its assets must be distributed respectively as 
follows: (1) as repayment of the debts to creditors, (2) as reimbursement of 
advances made or expenses incurred by the partners in managing the business, and 
(3) as return of the contributions made by the partners when starting the partnership. 
The residual assets should be treated as profits and shared among the partners.41 
Even though partners are not permitted to agree differently, in my view, partners 
might agree among themselves that after paying off debts to creditors and effecting 
the return of contributions, the residual assets would be transferred to, say, a non-
profit organisation or a social enterprise, as this is unlikely to affect creditors or 
third parties. Such an agreement is considered “self-imposed asset lock”. However, 
this sort of self-imposed asset lock has major weaknesses as already mentioned in 
Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.3.2.1).  
 
6.2.1.6 Social benefit requirement 
 
The partnership is a business organisation under the Civil and Commercial Code 
1992. If social entrepreneurs adopt this business legal form, they must find a way 
to communicate to the public that their activities are primarily geared towards social 
benefit. Though partners might be able to insert a social purpose in the partnership’s 
constitution and even register them, the law does not allow them to amend or deny 
that partnerships (and also companies) maximise profits and share them among 
partners, which is acceptable in my view since social enterprises obviously aim to 
generate income and profit in order to sustain. However, the problem is no matter 
how much they try to explain that they engage in a business with social mission, 
                                                                 
41
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1062. 
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most people in Thailand still believe that business organisations will always seek 
profit first and foremost. We cannot blame them since the law confirms this too.   
 
6.2.1.7 Stakeholder participation 
 
As the not-for-profit concept is still not a familiar one in Thailand, it is not 
surprising that the meaning and significance of stakeholders are still rarely 
recognised among members of the general public or even among Thai social 
entrepreneurs. Though Thai partnership law has provisions on the relationship 
between partners and third parties, it aims at protecting the third parties, including 
stakeholders, who could be affected by a partnership’s activities rather than 
facilitating stakeholder participation.  
 
In fact, since unlimited liability partners are given absolute power in managing a 
partnership, if they want to have a stakeholder as a partner, they can do so easily. 
Such a stakeholder partner will be granted the same management and decision-
making power, or if she is not a managing partner, she still has monitoring power. 
If a stakeholder is a limited liability partner, she is not allowed to manage the 
partnership. However, she is still able to give advice and vote on the appointment 
or withdrawal of managing partners. This shows that though the law does not 
facilitate stakeholder participation, it still gives partners freedom to do so via private 
agreements. However, we have learned from Chapter 3, the benefit of the 
facilitative role of law, without such a benefit, the partnership form is not desirable 
for social enterprises.  
 
6.2.1.8 Public disclosure 
 
The minimum disclosure requirements for registered and limited partnerships 
include their names, objectives and location; the partners’ names, addresses and 
professions; the managing partner(s)’ name(s) and the restrictions (if any) imposed 
upon the powers of the managing partners to bind the partnership. The registration 
certificate must also be signed by all the partners and affixed with the partnership’s 
seal.42  
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 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, ss 1064 and 1078. 
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The regulations of the Department of Business Development specify that registered 
and limited partnerships are among the business organisations required to deliver 
their annual financial statements, together with a certified auditor’s report.43  
 
Only ordinary partnerships are exempt from this requirement. Hence, in operating 
as social enterprises, they tend to suffer from lacking credibility as such ventures. 
By their very nature, they are close-knit business organisations. Indeed, being not 
legally subject to “disclosure” or “transparency”, they can keep their affairs secret 
or confidential. Though they are subject to the accounting and auditing 
requirements, basically they remain highly close-knit business organisations. 
Hence, without a legal rule for greater transparency, a registered or ordinary 
partnership as a social enterprise would hardly sustain a public trust, making it 
difficult not only to compete with mainstream businesses but also to be recognised 
as a social enterprise.  
 
Clearly, we can say that the main advantages of partnerships are their flexibility: 
partners have great freedom in running their business. Although the law more or 
less provides for the “good governance” of the partnerships, in operating as legal 
vehicles for social enterprise, they clearly suffer from “gaps” in terms of the lack 
of legal provisions for disclosure and transparency as well as the social and 
participatory elements of social enterprises. Together with their other shortcomings, 
notably their lack of sufficient limited liability protection and perpetual succession, 
partnerships are not particularly useful for social enterprises. 
 
6.2.2 Limited company 
 
Thailand has only one type of company, the limited company by share.44 Like the 
partnership, the limited company is a for-profit venture aiming to maximise profit 
and share it among shareholders.45 As a legal form for business organisations, the 
limited company has many distinct advantages over the ordinary and limited 
                                                                 
43
 The Department of Business Development has prepared a Manual for the Delivery of Financial 
Statements (DBD 2015), which contains all relevant laws and regulations.  
44
 Thailand has no “guarantee” company like in the UK, and obviously no CIC.  
45
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1012.  
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partnerships. It presumably better facilitates and supports the business side of the 
social enterprise than any other legal forms. I shall also examine whether it would 
be useful for the social benefit side of the social enterprise. 
 
6.2.2.1 Start-up process 
 
Setting up a limited company in Thailand involves a rather simple process. The 
Department of Business Development (DBD) provides all the necessary 
information and registration forms free of charge on its website.46 To set up a 
limited company,47 at least three persons called “promoters”48 sign their names in a 
memorandum of association49 and reserve the purchase of at least one share.50 The 
company must divide its investment capital into shares of equal value.51 The 
minimum value of one share is five baht (around £0.10);52 hence, the minimum 
registered share capital can be as low as fifteen baht (around £0.30).53 However, in 
practice no company starts off with just the minimum capital requirement since this 
can affect its financial status and credibility.   
 
In Thailand, it is a common practice to register a start-up share capital of one million 
baht (around £20,000).54 One reason is that the minimum registration fee is 5,000 
baht (around £100).55 This means that whether the registered share capital is 15 baht 
or one million baht, the minimum registration fee is the same, and that is 5,000 baht. 
For a registered share capital that is larger than one million baht, a 500-baht (around 
                                                                 
46
 DBD, ‘Company Limited Registration According to the Civil and Commercial Code’ 
<www.dbd.go.th/dbdweb_en/ewt_news.php?nid=3966&filename=index> accessed 18 August 
2014 
47
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1097. 
48
 Promoters are like founders of a company. They must be ordinary persons (foreign nationals are 
permitted), not juristic ones, aged 12 and over.  
49
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1098 provides the list of items to be included in the 
memorandum: (1) the name of the company ending with “limited’”, (2) the address, (3) the 
objectives, (4) the statement specifying that shareholders have limited liability, (5) the initial share 
capital and the value of each share, and (6) the names, professions, addresses and signatures of the 
promoters as well as the number of shares they reserve to purchase. 
50
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1100.  
51
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1096. 
52
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1117. 
53
 Bank of England (n 8).  
54
 ibid.  
55
 The company registration fee is 500 baht (£10) for every 100,000 baht (£2,000) share capital. But 
the minimum fee is 5,000 baht (£100). This means that the maximum share capital for 5,000 baht 
registration fee is one million baht (£20,000). To put it another way, this minimum registration fee 
covers as much as one million share capital.  
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£10)56 increase in the registration fee for every additional 100,000 baht (around 
£2,000)57 of the registered share capital is required. Another reason is that if a 
company plans to raise the share capital in the future, it has to pay more fees and 
prepare more documents. Entrepreneurs might not have a cash amount of £20,000 
at the time of registration, but before registration all of the shares must be 
reserved,58 and a minimum of 25 per cent of the shares must be paid.59 In addition, 
from 5 January 2015 a company with a share capital of more than five million baht 
(around £100,000)60 is required to provide evidence of the source of such capital to 
prevent accounting frauds and money laundering.61  
 
After the subscription of shares, the promoters must without delay call a general 
meeting of subscribers62 to decide on matters such as the company’s constitution 
and the appointment of director(s) and auditor(s) and the specification of their 
powers.63 The registration of the memorandum setting up the company can be done 
on the same day if (1) all the shares have been reserved, (2) the general meeting has 
been held, (3) the promoters have handed over the business to the directors, and (4) 
at least 25 per cent of the shares have been paid.64  
 
In practice, the promoters are also the main subscribers of the company’s shares. 
Though the law requires that a general meeting on company creation be held, it can 
be easily done by just filling the meeting report form provided free of charge by the 
DBD. The registration process takes only a few hours if all the documents are 
correct and submitted in person at a registration office. Online registration is not 
yet available.   
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 Bank of England (n 8). 
57
 ibid.  
58
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1104. 
59
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, ss 1105 and 1110.  
60
 Bank of England (n 8). 
61
 ‘Regulations on, and Documents Required for, Limited Company Registration and Addition of 
Limited Company Share Capital’, Department of Business Development Order 2014, No 230/2557 
(18 December 2014). 
62
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1107. 
63
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1108. 
64
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1111/1.  
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6.2.2.2 Legal personality and limited liability 
 
A limited company must be registered to become a juristic person.65 Since the law 
deems that the company and its shareholders are not the same person, even if a 
shareholder dies or quits, this will not affect the existence of the company, as long 
as the number of shareholders is not lower than that required by the law.66 A 
company is not a property which is owned by the shareholders, and the property of 
the company is owned by the company, not shareholders: the shareholders actually 
own the shares in the company.67  
 
In addition to separate legal personality, a limited company also comes with limited 
liability. Each shareholder can own any number of shares, and liability is limited to 
the amount of, if any, the unpaid shares she holds. If a shareholder has already paid 
the full amount of shares she owns, then she is not liable to the obligations the 
company has incurred.68 As basic but necessary protection against risks offered by 
a limited company, legal personality and limited liability can have the important 
effect of attracting more investors and facilitating commercial transactions. As we 
have seen, although the limited partnership also offers such benefits, it does not 
provide every partner with full protection against risks. In contrast, the limited 
company can provide limited liability protection for all shareholders. 
 
 6.2.2.3 Raising of finance 
 
Another important reason why the limited company is desirable for traditional 
business as well as social enterprises is that it is believed to have easier access to 
finance, particularly the equity finance, by selling or increasing their shares, than 
any other legal form. Ratanakorn defines shares of a limited company as follows: 
 
Looked at from the company’s perspective, shares are the capital the 
shareholders have brought to the company for the pursuit of its business 
activities. From the viewpoint of the outsider or the company’s creditor, the 
shares are the guarantee for the payment of its debts. For the individual 
shareholders, the shares represent their stakes in the company.69 
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 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1015. 
66
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1237(4) specifies that the court can order a company to 
terminate if the number of the shareholders in the company is less than three. 
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 Ratanakorn (n 6) 209.  
68
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1096. 
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 Ratanakorn (n 6) 279. 
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A limited company is permitted to issue two types of shares, namely, ordinary 
shares and preference shares. Ordinary shares generally provide the owners with 
the right to receive a part of company’s profit in the form of dividend, to receive 
residual assets when the company is dissolved, to vote and to monitor the 
company’s management, and to receive protection involving the company’s 
benefits; whereas preference shareholders have the right to be paid a special or fixed 
dividend or company assets before ordinary shareholders, but they normally do not 
have a voting right.70  
 
The company must specify the qualifications of such shares in its constitution. After 
the shares are issued, they cannot be amended.71 Though the issue of preference 
shares is aimed at attracting more investors, particularly those who expect a special 
treatment such as a fixed dividend, such shares are not popular in practice. A fixed 
dividend is generally distributed with a rather low rate, and the shareholders also 
lose certain rights such as voting right. Moreover, preference shares cannot be 
converted into ordinary shares and vice versa.72 
 
Apart from offering different types of shares, limited company law also ensures that 
those shares are transferable to prevent shareholders from being locked in the 
company. This could attract more investors since the law provides them with an 
exit when they think the company is not operating in a right way. In particular, 
social investors can leave a social enterprise operating as a limited company which 
they are supporting, if they think that it is committing a mission drift. Shares are 
transferable without the consent from the company. However, the transfer must be 
made in writing, signed by the transferor, the transferee and at least one witness; 
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 Nonthawatch Nawatrakulpisut, Partnership, Company and Public Company Laws (3rd edn, 
Winyuchon 2015) 199-201. 
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 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1142.  
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 This is clearly not suitable for the changing conditions of the commercial sector, and ordinary 
shares do not always mean inferiority. Ratanakorn argues that section 1142 should not be interpreted 
as a complete ban on the amendment to preference shares. Since the establishment of a limited 
company involves a private agreement; hence, if all shareholders agree that the qualifications of 
preference shares be amendable, it should not be against this section. However, section 1142 still 
requires strict interpretation, but companies can choose to opt out as preference shares are default 
rules. Ratanakorn (n 6) 287-89. In my view, section 1142 should be brought up to date by 
transforming into an equivalent of section 65 of the Public Limited Company Act 1992, which 
allows the conversion of preference shares into ordinary shares, but which stipulates that this be 
clearly specified in the company’s articles.  
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otherwise it is void.73 Thailand also has bearer shares.74 However, though such 
shares are easy to transfer, most companies do not prefer issuing shares of this type, 
because they are difficult to check. From 26 May 2005, UK companies are no longer 
permitted to issue bearer shares in order to prevent illegal activities and promote 
transparency.75  
 
Clearly, not only does the law provide a limited company with an opportunity to 
raise capital, particularly share capital, but it also facilitates dealings on matters 
related to shares as well as shareholder protection. Even though some sections of 
Thai law might not be up to date, the limited company remains most effective for 
the pursuit of business activities, particularly in so far as capital and financial 
matters, which represent the artery of business, are concerned.    
 
Apart from share capital, limited company also has a better access to debt finance 
than any other legal forms (for example, given the familiarity of the form as well as 
the disclosure rules, which could make lenders especially banks feel assured). 
Together with both its corporate character and the “professionalisation” of its 
governance, which will be discussed below, the limited company represents 
perhaps the most effective means of mobilising both loans and share capital. 
 
6.2.2.4 Controlling agency costs 
 
It is required that a limited company has at least one director to manage the 
company in accordance with the company’s constitution, but the director(s) will be 
under the control and supervision of the shareholders.76 Though the shareholders 
have the right to appoint directors and even to amend the company’s constitution, 
they are required to relegate their management power to the directors77 acting as its 
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agents,78 which could clearly lead to agency problems. Let us briefly take a look at 
how Thai company law deals with agency costs.79 
 
It should be noted again that the law on company management attaches specific 
importance to the company’s internal agreement. Hence, most legal provisions on 
this matter are in the form of default rules. But if the company does not provide its 
own regulations on any specific matter, relevant provisions of the Civil and 
Commercial Code apply. After a company is registered, amendments to its 
constitution are not permitted80 unless it is approved by a special resolution; that is, 
the general meeting decides with at least a three-fourth majority of the shareholders 
who attend the meeting and who are eligible to vote.81  
 
In order to prevent some directors from influencing or monopolising control over a 
board of directors, one third of the directors must retire from office at the first 
ordinary meeting every year. In the first and second years the directors may simply 
agree among themselves, or draw lots to decide, who will retire, and in the 
subsequent year the directors who have been in office for the longest period will 
retire.82 However, the retiring director can be re-elected, and these rules only apply 
to a limited company having at least three directors.  
 
In addition, directors must manage the company with care, just like a careful 
businessman.83 Though company law does not expressly mention the fiduciary duty 
of directors, section 1167 of the Civil and Commercial Code 1992 allows the law 
of agency, which stipulates the fiduciary duty of agents, to be applied instead.  
Section 1168 further requires that directors must not compete with the company and 
must not become unlimited liability partners in a partnership which has a similar 
type of business. This prohibits directors from any conflict of interest, but directors 
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may be allowed to have conflicting interests if the general meeting of shareholders’ 
gives its consent. Finally, if a director incurs damages to the company, the latter 
might file a lawsuit against her for compensation.84 And if the company does not 
want to do so, a shareholder can file a lawsuit on behalf of the company instead.85 
The law even gives creditors the right to sue directors, but only if the company or a 
shareholder refuses to do so.  
 
Ratanakorn argues that section 1169 aims to clarify who has the right to sue 
directors, rather than about which actions of directors could cause damages.86 In my 
view, this section, in a way, serves as a warning to directors that if they seek 
personal benefits, they could face legal action. However, in practice, even when 
damages to the company have been done, it needs to be verified whether the 
damages occurred while the directors were performing their duty. The directors 
often receive protection from responsibility for damages to the company. 
Otherwise, few would be prepared to serve as directors, and those serving as 
directors would naturally tend to be risk averse.  
 
Clearly, the limited company cannot provide rules that could completely control 
agency costs. This is nevertheless not beyond expectation. My intention is to 
confirm that if a social enterprise takes a company form, it has to prepare for agency 
costs. However, in my view, the Thai limited company structure is likely to provide 
satisfactory rules on controlling agency costs. Let me move on to what the company 
form can offer in matters relating to the stakeholder needs of social enterprise. 
 
6.2.2.5 Asset lock and non-distribution constraint 
 
Thai company law permits the distribution of profit to shareholders in a form of 
dividend as return on their investment. It is a duty of directors to distribute 
dividends or interests,87 and the dividends must be paid according to the proportion 
of paid shares, unless otherwise decided in regard to preference shares.88 In 
addition, dividend payments must be approved by the general meeting of 
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shareholders, though directors may decide to pay shareholders interim dividends 
occasionally if it appears that the company has sufficient profits. However, no 
dividend shall be paid otherwise than out of profits, and when the company is facing 
loss.89 
 
Even though Thai company law does not impose limits on profit distribution like 
the CIC’s dividend cap, the company is required to set up a reserve fund of at least 
one-twentieth of the profits arising from the business of the company every time 
the dividend is paid until the reserve fund has at least reached one-tenth of the 
company’s capital.90 The higher rates are permitted but it must be prescribed in the 
company’s articles. However, the main purpose of the reserve fund is to protect 
creditors.91  
 
The reserve fund requirement might be treated as a constraint on profit distribution, 
but this would be ineffectual as such a constraint: the minimum rate of 10 per cent 
of the capital seems too low to make an effective reinvestment in a social business 
(90 per cent of all the profits will be given to shareholders). If a social enterprise 
sets the rate much higher, say, the reserve fund of 50 per cent of the capital, it might 
not be attractive to investors. This is a major drawback of a for-profit from being 
used by social enterprises.   
 
When a company is dissolved, all costs, charges and expenses incurred during 
dissolution must be paid before any other debts.92 Then the residual assets will be 
shared among the shareholders.93 Obviously, this means there is no lock on asset 
transfer in the company form. However, it might be possible to prescribe an asset 
lock in the company’s constitution, for example, by requiring that all the residual 
assets must be transferred to a non-profit or not-for-profit organisation. It might be 
useful to provide a shareholder agreement to this effect.94 In practice, it is unlikely 
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that companies will prepare a privately-drafted contract since it will be costly and 
unattractive. 
 
6.2.2.6 Social benefit requirement 
 
Thai company law makes it clear that companies are set up for the purpose of 
“sharing profits” derived from their activities. This might facilitate the 
entrepreneurial goals of social enterprises but is fundamentally incompatible with 
their social benefit requirement, which is commonly inherent in non-profit legal 
forms like the foundation and association. Social entrepreneurs who wish to adopt 
the company form will face such a dilemma and need to find a way to overcome 
this legal obstacle.  
 
Thai social enterprises have to use various methods to communicate to the public 
that they are not-for-profits. In practice, some introduce their not-for-profit position 
through social campaigns or set up a charitable subsidiary, whereas others can only 
try to explain to society how they are running social enterprises. They may also try 
to make their orientation clear by taking part in activities organised by the Thai 
Social Enterprise Office (TSEO). But it takes time before their companies are 
generally recognised as social enterprises. Still others avoid calling themselves 
social enterprises in order to not to create any misunderstanding or any 
complication and proceed fully as for-profits, even though they are actually social 
enterprises. 
 
In my view, a most suitable option for companies to deal with this problem is to 
add a social benefit section to their constitution. Adding a social benefit objective 
should be done at the statutory meeting, because amendments to the company’s 
constitution after the registration involve a rather complicated process. The law 
only permits the amendments by special resolution,95 which requires a three-fourth 
majority of those attending the meeting and being entitled to votes.96 After the 
social benefit clause is adopted, it must be registered within 14 days.97 Apart from 
these few options, the company form does not really offer anything else to facilitate 
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the social benefit orientation. This again confirms the need for a legal form specially 
designed for social enterprises in Thailand.  
 
6.2.2.7 Directors’ duties and competence 
 
If a company includes a social benefit requirement in its governing document, it 
then needs also to prescribe an extra-duty of directors in the constitution, that is, a 
duty to balance the conflicting objectives – the commercial objectives which are 
required by law and the social objectives prescribed by its internal regulations. In 
other words, the directors should be able to, at least in theory, serve both shareholder 
and stakeholder interests equally – this has already been discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Clearly, the Thai company form neither supports the hybrid nature of social 
enterprise nor facilitates directors in dealing with it. Though a company adds an 
extra duty to balance social and commercial objectives, it is not easy for directors 
to achieve it in practice. A detailed guideline with legal assistance will be needed, 
and different companies will devise their own regulations on this matter, which 
might not be based on the same standards, resulting in directors being unable to 
manage a social enterprise effectively. What the Civil and Commercial Code offers 
are section 1144, which requires that directors must manage the company in 
accordance with the constitution, and section 1168, which stipulates four specific 
duties of directors, namely, (1) to make sure that share prices are paid properly, (2) 
to prepare and keep the company’s account books and other documents required by 
law, (3) to distribute dividends or interests, and (4) to comply with the general 
meeting’s decisions.  
 
6.2.2.8 Stakeholder participation 
 
Some companies in Thailand, especially large public companies, are aware of the 
importance of stakeholder involvement. Some have shown an increasing concern 
for their public images and have thereby attempted to promote them through 
corporate social responsibility (CSR)98 and other activities. This could be 
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considered indirect stakeholder participation and it is not legally required. Though 
most of them are not really social enterprises, it shows that the limited company as 
a legal structure is, at least theoretically, flexible enough to allow for stakeholder 
participation. 
 
Though the company law does not really mention anything about stakeholder 
participation, this means that the law does not forbid it either. If a company wishes 
to involve stakeholders in its management, it can introduce this as an internal 
agenda at a general meeting, or make it more formal by inserting a stakeholder 
participation requirement in the company’s constitution, and register it, in much the 
same way as the asset lock or the social benefit requirement is incorporated into the 
company’s governing documents. Even though it seems that companies have 
freedom and flexibility to do this, in practice, I doubt how many social enterprises 
in a company form would bother such complication as well as costs. Also, will 
shareholders happily allow that?     
 
In Thailand a successful example of stakeholder participation might be found in co-
operatives in a form of employee participation. But in a limited company employee 
participation seems mainly to be used as a way to promote employees’ loyalty and 
devotion. In the end, it still aims for the company’s benefit, not a true stakeholder 
benefit.  
 
6.2.2.9 External regulator and public disclosure 
 
Let me briefly discuss the role of the Department of Business Development (DBD) 
as the agency overseeing business organisations, especially partnerships and 
companies. In this case, the DBD may be regarded as their regulator, though it does 
not function in the same way as the CIC Regulator does. Operating under the 
Ministry of Commerce, its authority mainly consists in taking care of business 
organisations, particularly in matters relating to their registration, providing 
information on how to set up a business organisation, and promoting the business 
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sector as a whole.99 It might seem that the DBD performs its functions quite 
independently of the Ministry of Commerce. Moreover, with fees on its services it 
might also seem that it does not entirely depend on the state budget. However, the 
Ministry of Commerce still has the final say on important issues or on dealing with 
conflicts.  
 
The Civil and Commercial Code 1992 clearly does not want a “regulator” to unduly 
interfere in the activities of business organisations. This is because in principle 
business involves private agreements; the regulator mainly attends to damages to 
the third parties. For example, sections 1215-1219 endow the Commerce Minister 
with the power to inspect the operation of limited companies, but section 1215 
provides that the inspection must be requested by shareholders having at least one-
fifth of all the shares. However, if the Minister deems it appropriate to inspect the 
operation of those organisations with a view to producing a report to the Council of 
Ministers, it has the power under section 1219 to do so without any request. In 
practice, the intervention in this manner occurs only in extremely serious cases, 
such as those threatening the peace of the country. The law however does not 
mention such inspection by the regulator in partnerships. In my view, it is 
appropriate the DBD assumes the role and responsibility now formally assigned to 
it.  
 
To conclude this sub-section, I would like to reiterate that the limited company form 
seems to provide satisfactory rules facilitating the business side of social enterprise, 
particularly the protection against risk, the raising of finance and the agency cost 
control. However, it clearly lacks social and stakeholder elements – which are the 
defining features of social enterprise. Social enterprises in the company form may 
have to specify in their constitution their objectives regarding, and regulations on, 
matters such as the transfer of assets, limited dividends, and stakeholder 
involvement, which are social enterprise benchmarks. This no doubt involves a 
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complicated process requiring legal assistance and how to explain it to for-profit 
shareholders.  
 
The strict legal and regulatory control under which limited companies operate is 
actually a crucial measure for their accountability. The accounting and auditing 
requirements provide a basis for disclosure and transparency. In practice, of course, 
the story may be totally different. The biggest shareholder often has dominant 
control; without built-in mechanisms like those of the CIC there is no guarantee 
that a social enterprise operating as a limited company will not have mission drift.  
 
All this is the reason why, in the British experience, it was ‘...necessary to use a 
structure other than a simple registered company to ensure that non-charitable social 
enterprises would maintain their identity and not be converted out of the social 
enterprise format.’100 In other words, to operate as a social enterprise, its credibility 
in the eye of the public who can then have trust in it is very important. If the public 
does not trust that a for-profit organisation now operating as a social enterprise 
would not later become a profit-maximising enterprise, it can hardly be expected to 
fare well as a social enterprise. 
 
6.3 Non-profit legal forms under the Civil and Commercial Code 
 
Having considered the for-profit or business organisations under the Civil and 
Commercial Code 1992, we now turn to the opposite end of the traditional 
dichotomy of legal entities – the non-profit or non-business legal forms, which are 
governed by the same Code. These are association and foundation. However, only 
the foundation will be dealt with here to see whether it is suitable as a legal form 
for social enterprises.  
 
6.3.1 Foundation 
 
Foundations in Thailand exist in a great number and are socially or community 
oriented in their goals and activities. They are mostly public charity- and/or public 
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service-oriented non-profit organisations. Section 110 of the Civil and Commercial 
Code 1992 provides the core elements of the foundation, defining it as consisting 
of properties or assets specially provided for public charity, religious, artistic, 
scientific, educational or other public purposes, not for profit sharing. The 
properties or assets must be managed strictly in accordance with the objectives of 
the foundation, and not for any personal benefit.  
 
The law sees the foundation as properties or assets, rather than a type of 
organisation. This might be to confirm that the foundation (as a juristic person) and 
its assets all belong to the public domain. Therefore, they must be managed only 
for the public benefit. Hence, very strict rules and regulations on foundations are in 
place to ensure that the public benefit is always prioritised.101 
 
6.3.1.1 Start-up process 
 
Despite the registration fee as low as 200 baht (around £4),102 the establishment of 
a foundation involves a rather complicated process. Foundation must have its 
regulations and a board of directors consisting of at least three persons.103 
Provisions on the registration of a foundation and registration fees are provided by 
the Ministerial Regulations on the Registration, Operation and Registrar of 
Foundations B.E.2545 (2002)104 and the Ministerial Regulations on the Registration 
Fees and Waivers of Fees Relating to Foundations B.E. 2545 (2002),105 
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respectively, as well as the Handbook on the Operation of Foundations and 
Association.106 
 
A foundation must be provided with a property or an asset that is used as an 
operating fund in the pursuit of its objectives, that is, a cash asset of at least 500,000 
baht (£10,000),107 or a cash asset of 250,000 baht (around £5,000)108 plus other 
assets. For foundations pursuing social welfare objectives, or promoting education, 
sports, religion, public disaster relief, or the treatment of, as well as research on, 
drug addicts and HIV/AIDS infected persons, or foundations established by a state 
agency, the minimum cash asset required for their registration is reduced to 200,000 
baht (around £4,000),109 or a cash asset of 100,000 baht (around £2,000)110 and 
other assets. However, foundations not belonging to the cases mentioned above may 
still submit a request for reduction of the required minimum cash asset to not less 
than 200,000 baht, which will be considered on a case-by-case basis.111 
 
In addition, a foundation must be able to provide evidence as well as supporting 
documents relating to its property and assets. For example, the foundation must 
specify the names of the property owner and the list of the property given to it.112 
This means the foundation must provide a bank statement certifying the owners’ 
bank account or a copy of the land title deed (in case the land is to be donated to the 
foundation). A promise to donate the property and assets to the foundation must 
also be made in writing signed by the property owner as the promisor, a director of 
the foundation as the party to which the promise is made, and two witnesses. The 
same process must be followed, in case the registration of a foundation is the 
consequence of a will inheriting assets to it.   
 
The requirement for a relatively large cash asset is likely to be beyond the financial 
means of most prospective social entrepreneurs, especially those of the younger 
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generations who should be encouraged to enter the sector. The complicated and 
expensive creation of this type of organisation would rather serve as a disincentive 
to their entrepreneurship. 
 
6.3.1.2 Legal personality and limited liability 
 
The law clearly states that a foundation must be registered,113 and once registered 
it becomes a juristic person.114 However, the law does not mention anything about 
limited liability. This is because as soon as the registration is completed, the 
foundation becomes the new owner of the donated property and assets. The former 
property owner has permanently relinquished ownership of the property; so even if 
the foundation is dissolved, she will have no right whatsoever on the property. 
Donors of cash to a foundation are neither investors expecting investment return 
nor members. They are simply donors or supporters donating cash, or any other 
type of assets, for public benefit.  
 
6.3.1.3 Raising of finance 
 
Section 110 of the Civil and Commercial Code implies that a foundation can make 
profit and generate income, but these must not be shared for personal benefit: all of 
them must be managed in accordance with the objectives of the foundation, which 
is mainly for public benefit. According to the model regulations, a foundation may 
acquire more assets and income in the following ways:115 1) cash or other assets 
inherited to it by a will or through other legal transactions without a commitment 
on its part to the responsibility for debts or any other obligations,116 2) donated cash 
or assets, 3) revenue from its assets, such as interests from cash deposits in banks 
or rents from the properties it has rented out, and 4) proceeds from activities or 
events it has organised to raise fund within the objectives of the foundation. 
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Foundations are not allowed to raise equity finance, and they also find it difficult to 
seek debt finance. Being non-profit (or providing social benefit) does not grant them 
any special privileges; instead this makes it difficult to convince banks that they 
could generate sufficient income to repay debts. Banks, therefore, are reluctant to 
give (business) loans to non-business organisations. It is even harder in the 
foundation case, since foundations are under much stricter rules and regulations. 
For example, foundations are under strict and direct oversight of the Registrar, 
whereas associations are mainly under the monitoring of their own members. This 
issue will be further discussed in the next sub-section. Consequently, most 
foundations in Thailand are facing the problem in raising finance and have to 
depend on grants and donations.  
 
6.3.1.4 Controlling agency costs 
 
There is a clear separation of management and control in foundations. Directors are 
agents of the foundation, but they operate under strict control by the Registrar since 
foundations have no members or shareholders who can monitor them. The Registrar 
obtains ‘the power to inspect, control and supervise the...activities of the 
foundation’ to ensure that these are ‘in conformity with the law and the regulations 
of the foundation’.117 For this purpose the Registrar is authorised to ask a director, 
officer, employee or agent of the foundation to account for the business of the 
foundation, including summoning her for enquiry or instructing her to provide 
accounting books and other documents of the foundation for inspection. The 
Registrar may also enter the office of the foundation between sunrise and sunset for 
the purpose of inspecting the business of the foundation.  
 
Such strict oversight and control by the Registrar are understandable. On the one 
hand, as a non-profit organisation, a foundation is strictly required to use its asset 
only for public charity purposes, particularly those relating to religion, art, science, 
literature, and education. Its asset can never be used to generate private benefits. It 
may acquire more assets or income in the ways cited above but, given its non-profit 
orientation, these must be put to use in accordance with its objectives and can never 
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be shared among its members. On the other hand, without any shareholders or 
members to monitor its operation, the monitoring and control task is left almost 
entirely to the state acting in the interest of the general public. This task is 
particularly important in view of the fact that the committee or board of directors 
of a foundation has extensive powers and responsibilities as normally specified in 
its regulations, including those relating to the control of the finance and assets of 
the foundation. Clearly, even in the case of non-profit organisations, the need to 
control the agency costs is relevant. However, under such strict state control and 
intervention, it is definitely difficult for social enterprises operating under a 
foundation structure to achieve their business goals.  
 
6.3.1.5 Asset lock and non-distribution constraint 
 
Foundations have both cash and other forms of assets, and the assets of some 
foundations are relatively large. Financial management and control are thus very 
important matters, for which the foundation committees or boards of directors are 
responsible.118 Even though foundations are subject to a total ban on the profit 
distribution, reasonable remunerations for persons providing services are legal.119 
But unreasonably high remunerations, especially for relatives of the committee 
members or other officers of the foundations, who have been recruited to work for 
the organisations, would amount to indirect profit sharing, which is against the law.  
 
Moreover, after the dissolution of a foundation, its remaining assets cannot be 
shared among the committee members or other officers. Provisions on liquidation 
of registered partnerships, limited partnerships and limited companies are 
applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the liquidation of a foundation following its 
dissolution.120 In addition, its remaining assets must be transferred to a foundation 
or a juristic person with charitable purposes as specified in its regulations; if such a 
foundation or juristic person is not specified in the regulations, a court order may 
be sought by the public prosecutor, the liquidator or any interested person for the 
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transfer of the assets to another foundation or juristic person, whose object is closely 
similar to that of the foundation being dissolved.121  
 
The rules on the asset lock and non-distribution constraint of our model legal form 
practically apply in the case of foundations. The applicability of such rules, though 
largely to non-profit organisations, suggests that they are not entirely unfamiliar in 
Thailand. Their incorporation into a legal vehicle for social enterprises, which will 
be proposed in Chapter 8, should thus be acceptable in this country. 
 
6.3.1.6 Social benefit requirement 
 
There is no question about the social benefit requirement of foundations. The law 
clearly stipulates that ‘a foundation consists of property specially appropriated to 
public charity, religious, art, scientific, education or other purposes for the public 
benefit and not for sharing profit’.122 Moreover, as in the case of the CIC, it is 
specified in the model regulations of foundations that they are not set up for any 
political purpose and ‘will not be involved in politics’.123 
 
The requirement for a strict adherence to this provision can be seen in official 
consideration of a foundation’s request to amend its regulations. The proposed 
amendment would allow it ‘to manage its cash and other forms of its financial assets 
in any way [other than depositing them in well established banks or financial 
institutions, or purchasing government bonds or bonds issued by state enterprises] 
with a strong guarantee [against risk], as its committee may unanimously see fit’.124 
In the opinion of the Ministry of the Interior’s Law Review Committee, the 
foundation could engage in various activities to generate its revenue, but such 
activities must fall under the scope of the object of its regulations, which must not, 
in turn, go beyond the object of section 110.125 In particular, if a foundation can 
undertake business activities in much the same way as partnerships or companies 
do, this is not only contrary to the object of the law providing for the establishment 
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 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 134. 
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 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 110.  
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 Handbook on the Operation of Foundations (n 109).  
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 Law Review Committee, ‘Minutes of the Meeting of the Ministry of the Interior’ (17 February 
2005) 5-8 <www.law.moi.go.th/22548021705t.doc> accessed 1 October 2014 
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of foundations but also involves it in risking the loss of all its assets in its 
possession.126  
 
A drift from the social benefit objective of foundations is clearly impossible. This 
mandatory rule ensures that a social enterprise operating as a foundation would 
never in practice become a business enterprise. However, this legal vehicle is 
evidently too restrictive for the business goal of social enterprises.   
 
6.3.1.7 Directors’ duties and competence 
 
The directors or committee members of a foundation operate under strict regulatory 
control. Such control also covers the personal status and conduct as well as 
qualifications of the individual directors. The Registrar will see to it that ‘the would-
be directors of the foundation’ have both personal status and conduct suitable for 
the task of carrying out its objectives. If not, ‘the registrar shall instruct the applicant 
to make correction or alteration’ before registration of the foundation.127 Moreover, 
the appointment of new directors of the foundation or any subsequent change must 
also be registered, and in this case if the Registrar considers that any of the directors 
proposed for registration does not have a personal status or conduct suitable for the 
pursuit of the objectives of the foundation, the registrar may reject the registration 
of any such director.128   
 
Evidently, the law attaches particular importance to the individual directors – 
especially their personal suitability for “implementing the object” of the foundation. 
The law presumably meets our requirement for “competence”, though in this case 
the focus is more on their status and moral character than other aspects of this 
requirement. Moreover, given the strict control over their activities, it is hardly 
possible for directors to deviate from their duties to carry out the tasks prescribed 
by the objectives of the foundation. 
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6.3.1.8 Stakeholder participation 
 
Being oriented towards the benefit of certain sectors or areas of activity in society, 
foundations have their clearly identifiable stakeholder groups. The law does not 
directly refer to the stakeholders of the foundations, but its stipulation that they 
direct their activities to the “public benefit” unmistakably implies that the general 
public, or more precisely the people in the specific areas of activity, are their 
stakeholders. 
 
Remarkably, whereas the law says very little, and only indirectly, about the 
stakeholders of foundations, the latter’s regulations normally provide for 
“stakeholder participation”. The model regulations authorise the committee to set 
up a sub-committee, or a number of sub-committees, to undertake certain specific 
activities under its control. In addition, it may also invite highly qualified persons, 
or those who provide support for the foundation, to be its honorary members; invite 
highly qualified persons to serve as its advisers; or invite a distinguished person to 
be the patron of the foundation.129 Those invited to fill the honorary members’ or 
advisory positions can undoubtedly come from the foundation’s stakeholder groups 
(foundations in Thailand prefer members of the Royal Family as their patrons). 
 
Foundations tend to invite eminent members of the public to join them in some 
capacities mainly for the purpose of boosting their image and prestige – and 
eventually contributing to their effort to raise finance from charitable sources. 
However, it is the sub-committee(s) that can be expected to make substantive 
contributions to the work of the foundations. So it is this functional “opening” that 
should at least be filled by people from the stakeholder groups. 
 
6.3.1.9 External regulator and public disclosure 
 
It has been pointed out that the task of monitoring and control of foundations is left 
almost entirely to the state. This is particularly due to both the nature of their work 
and the absence of shareholders and members to assume this task. There is not just 
one regulator as in the case of the CIC Regulator: the Registrar of foundations is 
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rather an “institution” involving ex officio responsibility residing in several persons. 
In Bangkok it is the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior who 
assumes this responsibility; in the provincial areas the provincial governors are the 
Registrars. However, ultimately, it is the Minister of the Interior who is the real 
Registrar of foundations. 
 
In this respect, the Registrar of foundations is different from the CIC Regulator; in 
practical terms the difference is evident in the rather “bureaucratic” orientation of 
the Registrar versus the so-called “light-touch” approach of the CIC Regulator. 
Needless to say, the difference has its practical effects. 
 
Like limited companies, foundations are subject to the public disclosure 
requirement; they are required to be transparent in the pursuit of their activities. It 
is required that by March every year foundations must submit a report on the results 
of its activities to the Registrar.130 The report must contain the following: 1) the 
activities they have undertaken during the past year, 2) the debit credit account and 
the balance sheet of the past year, which an auditor has properly certified, and 3) 
copies of the minutes of all the committee meetings during the past year. Clearly, 
this mandatory rule satisfies the requirement for both the report on the social benefit 
foundations have provided and their financial disclosure. 
 
6.3.1.10 Tax incentives 
 
As a legal form for social enterprises, the foundation also has other important 
advantages. Though foundations have a duty to pay income taxes, including taxes 
on revenue from rent, sales and services, they seem to enjoy tax incentives more 
than other forms of organisations. For example, they are exempt from income tax 
on registration or membership fees, grants, donations and gifts. Moreover, the 
foundations listed in the Royal Decree No. 317131 are entitled to VAT exemption 
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and those who make donations to them can have the donated amount deducted from 
their income as expenses, even though the deductible amount is limited. These are 
the main sources of income for associations and foundations, and donors are also 
rewarded with tax reductions. Apart from tax incentives, members, donors or 
philanthropist investors can at least rest assured that their contributions will not be 
used for private benefit even after a foundation is dissolved.  
 
A major drawback faced by foundations in operating as social enterprises is that 
they must be strictly non-profit making in orientation. As non-profit organisations 
they must be so but as social enterprises they have to suffer from this drawback. 
Social enterprises relying on such legal forms have much difficulty in coping with 
this limitation or indeed in struggling for their survival. This is mainly because the 
foundation as a non-profit legal structure is meant to serve as a business 
organisation, including a social business like social enterprise. 
 
Nonetheless, the foundation has some advantages over other legal structures. In 
particular, it meets the requirements for both their social benefit goal and non-
distribution constraint. 
 
From our consideration of the main legal forms available to Thai social enterprises, 
it is clear that despite its disadvantages, the limited company seems to offer the best 
option among the existing legal forms. This is mainly due to its flexibility as well 
as credibility. In this country, a social enterprise that operates in some other legal 
form might additionally need this for-profit legal structure to carry out its business 
activities. This experience was actually shared by social enterprises in the UK in 
the early 2000s, when different legal vehicles were used in “group or integrated 
structures”.132 In the UK and Thailand alike, the need to rely on more than one legal 
vehicle for the operation of certain social enterprises may reflect the need for 
operational flexibility.133 However, in Thailand, this may actually be taken as an 
indication of the shortcomings of the existing legal regime for the social enterprise 
sector in this country.   
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
I have identified the main legal structures within which Thai social enterprises 
operate. On the basis of the rules of the model legal form for social enterprise, I 
have been able to assess whether the existing main legal structures are more or less 
suitable for social enterprises. Thai social enterprises have actually benefited from 
the existence of various legal forms. We can even say that the diversity of legal 
vehicles represents the strength of the social enterprise sector itself. No one legal 
form adequately caters for the vast diversity of social enterprises. For example, a 
small community museum might find that it could most effectively operate as an 
unincorporated community enterprise. Or how could a social enterprise that 
functions as a provider of education or vocational training, legally do so if it has 
not been registered as a private school? However, there are limits to the usefulness 
of this diversity, and, on the basis of these limits, I shall propose in Chapter 8 a legal 
vehicle specifically designed for Thai social enterprises, together with an alternative 
arrangement to the same effect. 
 Chapter 7 
The Social Enterprise Landscape in Thailand 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
As has been indicated in Chapter 2 (section 2.5), social enterprises have been in 
existence in Thailand for some time. It is mainly through the worldwide expansion 
of interest in social responsibility and social innovation that social enterprise as an 
idea has been introduced to Thailand. Given the Thai familiarity with socially and 
environmentally oriented activities, it has not been difficult for this idea to gain 
growing acceptance in Thai society. However, to understand the Thai social 
enterprise, we need to examine how its development has been influenced by foreign 
as well as domestic ideas and practices. In particular, we need to touch upon the 
burgeoning public-policy infrastructure governing this movement, as well as 
support by the social enterprise networks in Thailand and abroad that have served 
as the backbone for the Thai social enterprise sector. 
 
We have already considered the concept and meaning of social enterprise in 
Thailand, as well as its problems and needs, in Chapter 2. This chapter thus begins, 
in section 7.2, with an analysis of the development of social enterprise in Thailand. 
Then, section 7.3 focuses on what I call the social and international network support 
for Thai social enterprise. Before the Thai government came up with some limited 
institutional support only a few years back, its mainstay had been the expanding 
networks of social and financial support that included those with links with the 
global social enterprise movement. It is thus necessary that we consider the origin 
and development of social enterprise in Thailand as being closely associated with 
these networks. Finally, section 7.4 touches upon the recent development of public-
policy infrastructure for this type of business, especially an important legislative 
development – the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill. 
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7.2 Development of social enterprise in Thailand 
 
Social enterprises have long existed in Thailand in various sectors: health 
promotion, green-product business, fair trade, welfare of the disabled, community 
finance, and community-scale renewable energy generation, among others. 
Pioneering Thai social enterprises (though until very recently they were never 
recognised as such) include the famous tourist attraction Ancient City, which was 
launched in 1972, and the Population & Community Development Association 
(PDA), which was founded in 1974 as an NGO to assist the government in its effort 
to promote family planning.1 
 
The story of PDA is particularly relevant to our understanding of the emergence of 
social enterprise in Thailand – a history of Thai social enterprise is still to be 
constructed. Since its inception PDA has expanded its interests to cover many 
activities, including primary healthcare, HIV/AIDS education and prevention, 
water resource development and sanitation, income-generation, environmental 
conservation, small-scale and rural enterprise promotion, gender equality, and 
education and youth development.2  
 
As the most diversified NGO in Thailand, PDA is completely self-sustaining 
mainly through its own social business, Cabbages & Condoms,3 whose profits have 
funded PDA’s social development programmes.4 PDA’s other business activity is 
its Business for Rural Education and Development (BREAD). By offering a 
logistics framework allowing Thailand’s rural poor to sell products and handicrafts 
to an international market, hence empowering them by income-generation, BREAD 
                                                                 
1
 Profiles of “50 good social enterprises” together with names and addresses of a large number of 
other social enterprises are available in Sarinee Achavanuntakul (ed), Thailand Social Enterprise 50 
(Krungthepturakit 2010) 10. 
2
 PDA, ‘Background’ (PDA, last update April 2012) <www.pda.or.th/e_index.asp> accessed 20 
August 2014; and Berenzon and others, ‘Social Enterprise in Thailand: From Profit to 
Responsibility’ (2011) Financiers Without Borders 10. 
3
 Set up in part to support PDA’s activities, Cabbages & Condoms consists of restaurants and resorts 
in several locations around Thailand, for example, the Cabbages & Condoms Restaurant and Birds 
& Bees Resort situated on Hu-Kwang Bay, in Pattaya, which is Thailand’s most famous seaside 
resort less than two hours drive from Bangkok; and the C&C Khao Yai Resort at Ban Saptai in Pak 
Chong District, Nakhon Ratchasima Province. 
4
 These programmes include the Population and Development International (PDI), Mechai Pattana 
School, the Village Development Partnership (VDP), Mechai Viravaidya Foundation, and the Green 
Village Toy Library. 
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at the same time provides PDA with funding to maintain its financial viability. It 
also provides professional consulting, such as CSR Advisory Services.5  
 
The importance of PDA to the development of social enterprise in Thailand can 
hardly be over-emphasised. Not only do its ‘history and diverse programmes offer 
lessons from its tried and tested practices…[especially in]…building sustainable 
social enterprises by recovering costs and generating revenues’,6 but its story also 
represents the early development of social enterprise in Thailand – that is, the 
development prior to the adoption of this very concept in this country. Hence, its 
founder has been recognised in the Special Agenda as being part of Thailand “social 
capital” for social enterprise.7 
 
It has been pointed out in Chapter 2 that the development of social enterprise in the 
UK essentially involved the institutionalisation of this type of business. With regard 
to Thailand, various types of social and public-oriented organisations, including the 
Buddhist monasteries and other religious institutions, have been identified as the 
social foundation for social enterprises in Thailand. This essentially represents local 
practices and innovations constituting the country’s “social capital”.8 It is upon this 
social capital that social enterprise as derived from ideas and practices developed 
elsewhere (especially, as we shall shortly see, the UK) has recently grown. Viewed 
in this way, the development of social enterprise in Thailand can be said to have 
resulted from the institutionalisation of both local practices and the imported 
concept and some forms of practice. 
                                                                 
5
 The person who has assumed a pivotal role in initiating and promoting these activities is Mr. 
Mechai Viravaidaya, well-known figure in Thailand, who has been a major force behind social 
activism and many NGO activities in this country. He has been persistently active all these years in 
his effort to envision social innovations and promote social enterprise in Thailand. Mechai 
Viravaidaya and his social and business activities have admittedly contributed to the development 
of social enterprise in Thailand by at least serving as models as well as inspiration. 
6
 INSEAD Knowledge, ‘Cabbages, Condoms and Bamboo Schools’   
<http://knowledge.insead.edu/node/1015/pdf> accessed 24 January 2016 
7
 National Reform Council, Special Agenda 1: Social Enterprise (Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives 2015) 2.  
8
 In addition to serving as a “social capital”, what I call the “social foundation”, actually has a very 
large financial asset. According to surveys by the Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) and the National Statistical Office, the civil society sector and non-
profit organisations together have savings of 70 billion baht (about US$1.94 billion) and an annual 
revenue of 200 billion baht (about US$ 5.56 billion), which mostly comes from donations. This is 
still not to mention a number of state-sector funds such as the 6,000 million baht (about US$166.96 
million) Fund for the Development of the Quality of Life of the Disabled and the private sector CSR 
budget which currently stands at more than 10 billion baht (about US$278.28 million). ibid 12.  
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Local practices in the form of various types of social enterprises being in existence 
in Thailand prior to 2010 have now been formally identified and categorised by 
publications such as Thailand Social Enterprise 50, Master Plan and SE Catalog. 
Master Plan, in particular, has categorised social enterprises in Thailand into six 
main types, according to their “ownership type”:9 
 
Type of owner Type of social enterprise Example of social enterprise 
Community network 
and organisation 
Community-based social enterprise Khlong Pia Savings Group 
Non-governmental 
organisation  
Business set up by and/or whose shares 
are owned by non-governmental 
organisation  
Cabbages and Condoms Restaurants 
and Resorts 
Government 
agencies/state 
enterprises 
Business set up by and/or whose shares 
are held by state agencies/state 
enterprises 
Chaophraya Abhaibhubejhr Hospital 
Foundation 
New social 
entrepreneur 
Business initiated and operated by new 
social entrepreneur 
OpenDream Co., Ltd 
Private business Corporate enterprise Lemon Farm 
Others Business set up by and/or in 
monasteries, educational or religious 
institutions, etc., are share-holders 
Thai Tribal Crafts Fair Trade (TTC) 
 
How social enterprise is defined and “institutionalised” is of special importance.10 
In particular, should social enterprise be defined in such a way as to incorporate a 
dividend cap and asset lock?11 The Social Enterprise Promotion Bill contains 
provisions for both social enterprises with a non-distribution constraint and those 
not subject to such a constraint.12 This means that both types of social enterprises 
are entitled to benefit from promotion under this law (following its enactment). 
                                                                 
9
 Thailand Social Enterprise Office (TSEO), Social Enterprise Promotion Master Plan 2010-2014 
(September 2010) 4-5. It should be noted, however, that Thailand Social Enterprise 50 has adopted 
a slightly different categorisation. Its four types of social enterprises are: 1) social enterprises set up 
by private sector organisations, including those growing out of their CSR activities; 2) social 
enterprises initiated by NGOs; 3) community-based enterprises; and 4) triple bottom line businesses. 
Given the great diversity of social enterprises, differences in their categorisation are understandable. 
It is simply impossible to work out a generally accepted categorization, Achavanuntakul (ed), 
Thailand Social Enterprise 50 (n 1) 24-25.   
10
 Special Agenda proposes a similar line of thought on the development of social enterprise in 
Thailand. That is, three factors have been identified: (1) how social enterprise is defined – 
particularly whether it is defined in such a way to include a dividend cap and asset lock, or whether 
to focus mainly on social purpose and re-investment; (2) support by the public sector; and (3) social 
awareness and enthusiasm. National Reform Council (n 7) 38-48.  
11
 ibid 38-39. 
12
 We still do not know how the law will eventually come out on this issue, but it is very unlikely 
that the “strict” definition of social enterprise (i.e. it must be statutorily incorporated with a non-
distribution constraint will be finally adopted. More discussion on the Bill is the subject of the next 
chapter.  
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Though the law is unlikely to impose a statutory requirement for a non-distribution 
constraint, the enactment of this law should be regarded as marking crucial progress 
in the development of social enterprise in Thailand. That is, following its enactment 
in the near future, non-distribution constraint will be formally recognised as 
forming part of social enterprise, even though its incorporation will still remain 
optional. 
 
Now we can see a much brighter prospect for the development of Thai social 
enterprise than even in only a few years back. Some critical analyses of the Thai 
social enterprise landscape dating back to only the early 2010s now seem to be not 
entirely justifiable.13 As will shortly be shown, local expertise in social 
entrepreneurship is now being developed, together with other types of government 
support and a growing enthusiasm for social entrepreneurship, especially among 
members of the younger generation.   
 
Problems and obstacles still exist in the development of social enterprise in 
Thailand. Thai cultural characteristics may have some influence,14 and other 
problems, including government policy inconsistency and the difficulty in gaining 
access to funding, might further dampen the prospect for this development. 
However, the growth of the sector so far, the basis now being laid for its further 
development and the strength of the existing social capital,15 all warrant optimism 
for this development. 
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 According to Berenzon et al, ‘the concept of Social Entrepreneurship is mostly foreign to the Thai 
business community’ … ‘There are few professors in entrepreneurship in Thailand, and, in 
particular, there is very little published academic literature and local expertise in social 
entrepreneurship. As a result, there is virtually no training and little awareness of the concept at 
present’. Berenzon and others (n 2) 1, 4 and 14.   
14
 Most fundamentally, the lack of public mindedness and volunteerism of the Thai people in general, 
and the Thai business culture that tends to focus on short-term financial returns with a blatant 
disregard for any social and environmental impact in particular, might not augur well for the 
promotion of social enterprise in Thai society. Said Irandoust has bluntly observed that ‘Thailand is 
by far one of the least developed countries in Southeast Asia in regards to corporate social 
responsibility, social enterprise and environmental sustainability’. Berenzon and others (n 2) 22, 
citing Said Irandoust of the Asian Institute of Technology in a meeting with the authors (date not 
provided).  
15
 The surveys referred to in (n 8) by NESDB and the National Statistical Office reveal that Thai 
society is endowed with both preparedness and potential for the growth of a large number of quality 
social enterprises. National Reform Council (n 7) 12.  
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The sector has grown spectacularly. It has been estimated that now there are about 
116,000 social enterprises in Thailand.16 A social enterprise certification system has 
already been in place, and there are now more than 400 formally certified social 
enterprises.17 This type of business is present in every region of the country, where 
a variety of social enterprises can be found. Social enterprises in each region have 
their own goals and characteristics developed in response to the specific problems 
and local contexts of specific regions.18 The most dominant areas of Thai social 
enterprises are sustainable tourism, healthcare, alternative energy and recycling.19 
According to Change Fusion’s Thailand Social Enterprise Landscape Report, the 
highest numbers of Thai social enterprises are in the agricultural and forestry 
sectors.20  
 
7.3 The Support by Social and International Networks    
 
Many factors have understandably contributed to the growth of the social enterprise 
sector in Thailand. The most significant of these is the support by the social 
enterprise networks – domestic as well as international. Moreover, I would also like 
to mention in this connection the support provided by the British Council as well as 
certain activities now organised rather regularly to promote social enterprise in this 
country. 
 
7.3.1 Support by social networks and activities 
 
In recent years Thailand has experienced the build-up of networks of individuals 
and organisations with shared concerns. An expanding social enterprise network is 
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 Claudia Cahalane, ‘Thai Social Enterprises are Booming Thanks to Strong Government Support’ 
The Guardian (Social Enterprise Blog, 7 September 2012)  
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 Sarunyikha Thiemboonkit, ‘An Exploratory Study of the Development of Social 
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one such network, which has provided a vital support for the incubation and of 
growth of social enterprises during the past decade or so. Moreover, the past few 
years have also witnessed important initiatives taken by the public sector in 
promoting Thai social enterprise. We focus now on the growing social enterprise 
network. 
 
The growth of social enterprises in Thailand during the past decade owes much to 
the work of a number of organisations that now represent a social network 
functioning as a crucial support mechanism for social enterprise in this country. 
This social network has provided guideline as well as financial support for social 
entrepreneurs, and served as a crucial social infrastructure for the incubation as well 
as operations of many new businesses in this sector. This network has indeed not 
only contributed to the development of the social enterprise sector in Thailand but 
actually formed part of it. The following are some of the most active supporters of 
Thai social enterprises. 
 
Change Fusion A non-profit organisation based in Thailand, Change Fusion 
operates with a mission is to foster innovative solutions to increasingly complex 
social and environmental challenges. It pursues this mission through the provision 
of social innovation design and investment services with a specific focus on high-
impact, scalable and sustainable social innovations and social enterprises.21  
 
Working in alliance with numerous partners,22 Change Fusion has now become ‘a 
major branch of a rapidly growing Social Enterprise network of innovative and 
socially responsible businesses’.23 In addition to building networks, particularly 
between financial investors and social entrepreneurs, Change Fusion also actively 
invests in social businesses. Its financial support for such businesses is provided 
mainly through UnLtd Thailand. 
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 Change Fusion Institute, ‘About Us’ <http://changefusion.org/about-us/?lang=en> accessed 15 
January 2016   
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 These include both Thailand-based organisations (Ayudhya Auto Leasing, the Central Group, the 
Moral Centre, NECTEC, National Science and Technology Development Agency, the Office of the 
Prime Minister, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Stock Exchange of Thailand, and 
Thai Health Promotion ) and foreign-based agencies (Enviu, FAO, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 
the Global Knowledge Partnership, Google.org, InSTEDD, Microsoft, Swiss Agency for 
Development Cooperation, Unreasonable Institute, and the World Bank, among others). 
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 Berenzon and others (n 2) 9.  
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UnLtd Thailand UnLtd Thailand operates under Change Fusion with the support 
of the TSEO.24 It also works in partnership with many organisations and networks, 
both inside and outside Thailand.25  In addition to financial assistance, social 
entrepreneurs also receive business consulting and knowledge provided by the 
UnLtd Thailand team and specialists in social entrepreneurship, covering business 
development, financial planning, financial mobilisation, human resource 
management, legal structure, corporate governance, marketing, social and 
environmental impact assessment. Moreover, they benefit from networking with 
other social entrepreneurs, consultants, social investors, and experts, as well as 
preparation for financial resource mobilisation, especially from social investors. 
 
Ashoka Thailand Ashoka Innovators for the Public was founded in 1980 in 
Washington, D.C., by Bill Drayton, and has since then established programmes in 
more than 60 countries and supported the work of over 2,000 fellows.26 Ashoka 
pursues its mission by searching the world over for leading social entrepreneurs. 
Called Ashoka Fellows,27 these entrepreneurs are provided with a living stipend for 
an average of three years, so that they can focus full time on building their 
institutions and spreading their ideas. Ashoka Fellows also benefit from access to a 
global support network of social entrepreneurs and partnerships with professional 
consultants. 
 
Based in Bangkok, Ashoka Thailand operates as a foundation. It started its 
operation with the election of its first Ashoka Fellows in 1989, and by the end of 
the 2000s it has had eighty Fellows, the fifth largest national fellowship in the 
world. These are individuals with diverse backgrounds, including those who are 
just launching their ideas and those who are more senior and are recognised 
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 UnLtd Thailand ‘About Us’ <www.unltd.in.th/> accessed 15 January 2016 
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 Its Thailand-based allies include the TSEO, Change Fusion, Social Enterprise Thailand, Social 
Enterprise Business Plan Competition (SEBP), Asian Knowledge Institute (AKI), and Opendream; 
its foreign-based partners are UnLtd UK, UnLtd South Africa, and UnLtd India. 
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 The organisation was named after King Ashoka (ca 304-232 B.C.), who, having unified the Indian 
sub-continent in the 3rd century B.C., renounced violence and dedicated his life to social welfare and 
economic development. For further information, see Ashoka, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ 
<https://www.ashoka.org/facts> accessed 15 December 2015 
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 On Ashoka Fellows see Ashoka, ‘Venture and Fellowship’ <www.ashoka.org/support/venture> 
accessed 15 December 2015 
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nationally for their contributions. During 2000-2006, three Ashoka Fellows served 
as elected Senators in the Senate, a prestigious body in the legislative branch of the 
country. Other Ashoka Fellows have served as advisors to the Thai government, 
helping to shape national social and economic policies.28 
 
To conclude this sub-section, I would like to briefly touch upon certain activities 
that are in my view contributing to the development of social enterprise in Thailand. 
These activities are of various types, and I shall mention only a few of them. One 
type of such activities involves seminars, workshops or similar functions – such as 
the one presented by Bob Doherty which has been referred to above (sub-section 
7.2.1).29 Another type of activity covers the more or less regular events.30 Still 
another type of activity I would like to mention here is the publication of “SE 
Magazine”,31 and “SE Catalog”,32 which can be regarded as another important 
“handbook” on Thai social enterprises.  
 
Together with press reports and comments (some of these have been reports and 
comments on activities such as seminars and social enterprise weeks), all these 
activities have had the important effect of disseminating the knowledge and 
understanding, and raising awareness, of social enterprise among the interested 
members of the public, especially those of the newer generations. According to 
Tommy Hutchinson, the founder of i-genius, a global network of social 
entrepreneurs, it is the younger generation of the Thai people that seems to be really 
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 On Thai Ashoka Fellows, see Ashoka Thailand, ‘Ashoka Fellows’ 
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enthusiastic about social enterprise.33 He has also claimed that the king is also an 
important backer of the social enterprise movement. 
 
7.3.2 Support provided by the British Council 
 
A special mention should be made of the contributions of the British Council in 
Thailand to the development of social enterprise here.34 The contributions have 
taken various forms. In October 2009 the Skills for Social Entrepreneurs (SfSE) 
programme was initiated, which has sought to develop new relationships and 
partnerships for Thai social entrepreneurs across the public, private and non-
governmental sectors in Thailand and the UK. Aiming to enable social 
entrepreneurs to address social, economic and environmental challenges, SfSE 
draws on UK expertise through efforts to share best practice and create 
opportunities between the UK and Thailand and other countries.  
 
During the past several years training programmes have been organised to empower 
Thai social entrepreneurs to enhance the impact of their work. For example, the 
“Unltd Campus & Skills for Social Entrepreneurs Capacity Building and Training 
Workshops” taught aspiring and practicing social entrepreneurs how to develop 
effective sales presentations, write strong business plans, gain advantages from 
social media, add value to products and services and raise funds. These workshops 
were held in collaboration with the TSEO and Change Fusion.35  
 
Networking for innovation represents another crucial contribution by the British 
Council in Thailand. For example, in March 2012 the British Council and i-genius 
organised an Asia Summit on Social Enterprise in Bangkok, in which 70 delegates 
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from governments, NGOs, corporations, financial institutions, universities, and 
social enterprises in China, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam participated. In addition to deliberating numerous 
issues, the event also witnessed the launch of the East Asian Enterprise Network. 
Also in March 2012 the British Council and CSR Asia co-hosted a separate event 
in Bangkok called “Strategic Partnerships: New Opportunities in CSR”, in which 
40 social enterprises, as well as a number of corporations, foreign chambers of 
commerce, cultural and educational institutions, and international NGOs, among 
other organisations, participated. 
 
The British Council attaches much importance to the role of higher education in 
nurturing social enterprise. In an effort to help Thailand develop its social enterprise 
sector, the British Council has fostered UK-Thailand cooperation on not only social 
enterprise policy support (which will be later touched upon) and social investment 
but also social enterprise education, especially at the higher educational level.36 
Activities to promote social enterprise education have so far included seminars and 
other functions. 
 
A British Council awareness raising programme organised university road shows 
promoting social enterprise and UK best practice. A Social Enterprise Job Forum 
was also held in 2011 that introduced social innovation and UK best practice to 
Thai audience. And in the past few years two important seminars have already been 
staged. Like those mentioned in the previous sub-section, the seminars sponsored 
or co-sponsored by the British Council have contributed much to cultivating 
knowledge and understanding and raising awareness of social enterprise in 
Thailand. 
 
One seminar was entitled “A Socially Enterprising University”, which was jointly 
organised by the British Council, the Knowledge Network Institute of Thailand 
(KNIT) and TSEO with the support of Global Social Venture Competition, Ashoka, 
                                                                 
36
 British Council, ‘Why Universities are Embracing Social Enterprise, from London to Chiang Mai: 
Five questions for Ana Lemmo Charnalia, UCL Business’ social enterprise business manager’ The 
Guardian (Social Enterprise British Council Partner Zone, 29 October 2014)  
<www.theguardian.com/british-council-partner-zone/2014/oct/29/why-universities-are-embracing-
social-enterprise-from-london-to-chiang-mai> accessed 3 September 2015 
220 
 
CSR Club, Chang Fusion, CPF (Thailand’s largest agro-industrial group), and the 
University of Northampton. Participants in the seminar, which was staged in 
Bangkok in May 2013, included those from the major academic authorities, 
institutions, and universities. They were provided with an opportunity to benefit 
from the expertise of a leading British scholar, Professor Simon Denny, Social 
Enterprise Development Director at the University of Northampton, and to look at 
the ways in which social enterprises in Thailand could be developed through the 
academic sector.37 
 
The other seminar, “Thailand-UK University Dialogue on Social Enterprise and the 
Role of Higher Education Institutions”, was held in March 2015 at Srinakharinwirot 
University in Bangkok. Featuring both Thai and UK speakers, the seminar probed 
important issues, particularly what role can universities play to support the social 
enterprise sector?38 
 
The British Council has also provided social enterprise policy support for Thailand. 
In 2010 it arranged a study tour in the UK for Thai government officials and 
reporters with a view to enabling them to learn about the development and impact 
of social enterprise in this country. Following this study visit, we have seen crucial 
developments, especially in relation to policy support for social enterprise in 
Thailand (to be dealt with in section 7.4). Most importantly, the Thai government 
established a Thai Social Enterprise Board, of which a British Council 
representative was invited to be a member. This national board then created the 
Thai Social Enterprise Office (TSEO) as a result of the British Council’s advisory 
work. The British support for the development of Thai social enterprise has 
continued since this crucial move on the part of the Thai side. In November 2011 a 
Social Enterprise UK delegation came to Thailand, and in June 2012 a delegation 
of Thai business leaders and an official from the Ministry of Commerce paid a visit 
to the UK. The purpose of this visit was to study British models of social enterprise 
and social finance and how the British social enterprise sector has contributed to its 
country’s economic development and how to integrate the social enterprise concept 
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into Thai SMEs and prepare them for the ASEAN Community,39 which formally 
came into being at the end of 2015.40 
 
The British Council’s support for the development of Thai social enterprise, which 
has been evident throughout the latter half of the 2000s, has naturally resulted in 
British influence in shaping the direction of this development. According to Change 
Fusion’s Thailand Social Enterprise Landscape Report of September 2012, most 
Thai social enterprises are set up “in a similar way to UK social enterprises”, 
though, in a definite departure from the British model, some social enterprises have 
been formed by the Thai government itself.41 No matter how much Thai social 
enterprise has been influenced by the British social enterprise concept and practice, 
its development owes much to the British support. 
 
7.4 Policy Support for Social Enterprise in Thailand 
 
Another type of support for the development of Thai social enterprise is the policy 
support by the Thai government itself. In this respect, it is gratifying to note that 
there have appeared encouraging signs of progress. Tommy Hutchinson, I-genius 
founder, who I have mentioned in sub-section 7.3.1, considers the government 
backing for social enterprise as a factor setting Thailand apart from the rest of East 
Asia. ‘…perhaps outside China and India, it has the most sophisticated structural 
support for social enterprise. There are lots of people building the sector’.42  
 
This section focuses on the development of the public-policy support for social 
enterprise in Thailand. We begin, in sub-section 7.4.1, with the consideration of 
what can be regarded as perhaps the most important development so far in so far as 
the public-policy support for Thai social enterprise is concerned, namely, the 
initiation of the Social enterprise Promotion Bill in 2015. I shall then proceed to 
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explore, in sub-section 7.4.2, what has been achieved in this respect, especially 
other policy measures that have been taken to promote social enterprise.  
 
7.4.1 An overview of the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill 
 
As pointed out above, perhaps the most crucial move now taking place in the 
development of Thai social enterprise is the initiation of a legislative project on 
social enterprise – the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill. It is important to note that 
though the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill does not satisfy the need for a specific 
legal form for social enterprise, as far as I can see from the Bill and the rationale 
for its introduction, it goes some way (once it is enacted) towards regulating social 
enterprises in such a way that they more or less meet both social entrepreneurs’ 
needs and stakeholding requirements as specified in our legal blueprint for social 
enterprise, especially if they incorporate as limited companies.  
 
As the Bill has not yet become law, and we cannot expect what the final legislative 
product would be like, I shall only very briefly touch upon some of its features, 
those I consider most directly relevant to my thesis. A critical analysis will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
 
Social enterprise has been conceived of by this legislative project as being 
incorporated with either “no-dividend and asset-lock” rules or social purpose and 
re-investment requirements. The no-dividend and asset-lock conception (the so-
called Social Enterprise Type A) must certainly have the social purpose and re-
investment objective as its characteristics, but social enterprises may also opt only 
for these characteristics (Social Enterprise Type B).43 
 
Clearly, the Bill formally provides for social enterprises operating with no-dividend 
and asset lock; in this case, they must be set up as limited companies under the Civil 
and Commercial Code 1992.44 It nevertheless recognises that social enterprises 
registered under this law may not opt for any agreement on non-distribution of 
profits to shareholders or partners. That is, they can distribute profit, and whether, 
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in doing this, they still remain entitled to benefit from the promotion under this law 
depends on the criteria, methods, and conditions to be set out and announced by the 
Social Enterprise Board.45  
 
The social purpose and re-investment type thus represent the fundamental 
requirements for an organisation to qualify as a social enterprise. Under the social 
enterprise certification scheme operated by the Thai Social Enterprise Office 
(TSEO) these are the requirements for a social enterprise to be formally certified as 
such. They are operationalised to include the following five social enterprise 
qualifications:46  
 
1) having a social purpose as the main goal of the enterprise;  
2) having the sale of goods or services as the main sources of its income (i.e. 
more than 50 per cent of the income coming from this source);  
3) relying on fair employment and trade, as well as a standard production process 
that is environmentally friendly;  
4) re-investing the majority of its profits back into the business in accordance 
with its social purpose or devoting them to activities that benefit society (not 
more than 30 per cent of the profits being allowed to be distributed as dividends); 
and  
5) having good governance and transparency.  
 
Special Agenda initiating the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill provides further 
detail on these five qualifications of social enterprises47 and reaffirms that the Social 
Enterprises Type A to be incorporated as limited companies ‘are easy to set up and 
flexible in its operation’ and at the same time have ‘mechanisms for easy 
monitoring and control’. In particular, they must be characterised by the following 
features: being formally certified as social enterprises, incorporated with rules on 
no-dividend distribution and an asset-lock mechanism.48 
 
The Bill provides for the registration of social enterprises by the TSEO; once a 
social enterprise has been formally registered as such, it must have a “social 
enterprise” tag attached to its business name. Under Section 8 of the Bill, no 
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organisation that has not properly been registered as a social enterprise or properly 
permitted by the TSEO can legally use the “social enterprise” tag attached to its 
business name.49 
 
It is clear that in initiating this legislative project on social enterprise promotion, 
the Thai Government does not opt for a new legal form for social enterprises but 
rather regulations that seem to amount to more or less the same effect. Particularly 
in so far as the provisions for the not-for-profit social enterprise, or Social 
Enterprise Type A, are concerned, this can certainly be regarded as an alternative 
to a new legal form for social enterprise. In Chapter 8 I shall actually propose such 
an alternative.  
 
The legislative project significantly supports my analysis in this chapter and 
Chapter 8 that the limited company form can best serve as the basis for both the 
proposed legal form for social enterprise and the proposed alternative to it. That is, 
it is my argument, which will be presented in Chapter 8, that in case it is not yet 
possible to introduce a legislation creating a specific legal form for social enterprise, 
an alternative is to rely particularly on the limited company form. Of course, this 
legal vehicle must be incorporated with a governing document providing for the 
stakeholder rules of social enterprise similar to those contained in our legal 
blueprint. As will become evident, my proposal for this alternative arrangement is 
in line with the legislative project being currently considered by the National 
Reform Council. 
 
It is important to emphasise in this connection that this legislative project does not 
invalidate my proposed need for a specific legal form for social enterprise. The 
argument presented in Chapters 3-4, in particular, has hopefully sufficiently 
explained why such a legal vehicle is required. I shall reaffirm such a need in 
Chapter 8. 
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7.4.2 Development of public-policy infrastructure for social enterprise in 
Thailand 
 
It must have become clear by now that much progress has been made in the 
development of social enterprise in Thailand. This sub-section explores what has 
been achieved, especially in terms of the development of public-policy support for 
Thai social enterprise. Special Agenda has identified various types of government 
policy support for social enterprise, namely,50 social entrepreneurship education, 
social innovation research system, social enterprise start-up grant programme, 
social enterprise certification system, social enterprise funding, social enterprise 
legal forms, sustainable procurement programme, tax relief for social enterprise and 
social investors, and social enterprise support organisations. I shall not go into detail 
on all these forms of government for policy support; only what has been achieved 
so far will be highlighted.  
 
Much progress has already been made during the past half decade or so. The years 
2010-2011, in particular, witnessed several public-sector initiatives that have had 
the important effect of laying the vital public-policy groundwork for the promotion 
of social enterprise in Thailand. The organisation that assumed a pivotal role in 
mobilising the efforts in laying this public-policy groundwork for social enterprise 
in this country is the Thai Health Promotion Foundation.51 Now let us take a look 
at some of the recent developments. 
 
Social enterprise education has made inroads into the basic as well as higher 
educational system. Mechai Patana Secondary School (or “Bamboo School”) in 
Buriram province focuses on social entrepreneurship at the secondary school 
level.52 Its 15 small affiliated schools have also offered this type of business 
education on an experimental basis. Arsom Silp Institute of the Arts in Bangkok 
offers an undergraduate programme in social entrepreneurship.53 Thammasat 
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University’s Global Studies School launched its undergraduate programme in 
social entrepreneurship in 2014.54 Finally, Srinakharinwirot University currently 
provides an eight-month social entrepreneurship incubation programme; those 
attending the programme are not required to have any formal educational 
qualification. An undergraduate programme on the same subject has been planned 
for delivery in 2015.55 
 
While formal study programmes in social entrepreneurship have already begun to 
take shape, research on social enterprise in general, and research oriented towards 
social innovation and social impact assessment in particular, remain insufficient. 
No research grant scheme for this specific purpose is currently available, apart from 
possible financial support from existing granting agencies like Thailand Research 
Fund. A social enterprise start-up grant programme also still does not exist, except 
in the form of support for social enterprises which have been successful in their 
application for certification (this type of support has been considered in relation to 
legal forms for social enterprises in the previous chapter). Now a 2 billion baht 
(about £39.7 million) Social Enterprise Credit fund has been set up to provide social 
enterprises with low interest rate credits (credits can be obtained with only 1 per-
cent interest rate if the repayment is made on schedule).56 Other major financial 
schemes to support social enterprise development now being planned include an 
Endowment Fund using unclaimed assets and a tax relief for social enterprises and 
social investors.57 
 
A very significant progress so far in the government policy support for social 
enterprise in Thailand has been the development of an institutional structure for this 
purpose since the early 2010s. A crucial move, which has already been pointed out 
in sub-section 7.3.2, was the establishment of the Thai Social Enterprise Board in 
2010 as a governing body of the social enterprise sector. Chaired by the Prime 
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Minister,58 the Board assumes policy, governing as well as consulting role. In the 
policy realm, its task is to prepare policy, strategies, and master plans for the 
promotion of social enterprise and submit them to the cabinet for endorsement. Of 
particular interest here is that, among other competences and functions, the Board 
is to propose to the cabinet new laws on social enterprise as well as revisions of 
existing laws, orders, regulations, or relevant cabinet decisions in line with the 
government policy to promote social enterprise in Thailand. As we have seen, a 
crucial development in this respect is the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill already 
submitted to the National Reform Council for consideration and enactment. 
 
Another crucial development, which has also been mentioned earlier, was the 
creation, also in 2010, of the TSEO. Operating under the Thai Social Enterprise 
Board, the TSEO has been meant to serve as an engine to move national policy on 
social enterprise ahead. For this purpose, it is tasked with the following functions:59 
(1) to implement the Master Plan in collaboration with partners in the various 
sectors, (2) to cooperate in setting out guidelines for efficient and sustainable 
management of social enterprise promotion funds, (3) to contribute to fostering an 
environment congenial to the development of social enterprise, (4) to assume 
responsibility for social enterprise certification, and (5) to link the needs, problems 
and obstacles to the policy level for additional support. 
 
Like the CIC Regulator Office, the TESO is a very small organisation headed by a 
director; the current director is Nathapong Jaruwannapong. His staff is comprised 
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of six members,60 who assume functions relating mainly to policy advice, finance, 
international cooperation, and social enterprise development.61 For the first phase 
of its operation roughly coinciding with the duration of the Master Plan, it was in 
2011 endowed with a 96 million baht (around £1.9 million)62 budget, which came 
from the Thai Health Promotion Foundation.63 
 
The TSEO’s work during this period consisted mainly of public relations campaigns 
to raise an awareness of, and create enthusiasm for, social enterprise and social 
entrepreneurship,64 and efforts to coordinate activities with various parties to 
promote social enterprise in Thailand. These include the universities, starting with 
Srinakharinwirot University, which has provided support and cooperation in several 
projects; NGOs and non-profit organisations, as well as community enterprises, 
especially in an effort to promote the social enterprise business model among these 
organisations.65 TSEO has also been collaborating with the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET), and the fruit of this cooperation is SET’s plan ‘to promote social 
enterprise to become a feature of SET-listed companies and to launch new rules for 
asset management firms creating the Social Enterprise Fund in the next few 
years’.66 A major function of TSEO is to provide certification for social enterprises. 
Now, as has been indicated in sub-section 7.2.2, more than 400 social enterprises 
have been formally certified.   This aspect of TSEO’s work is very important, 
because the certification system as envisaged under the Social Enterprise Promotion 
Bill has implications for how a social enterprise is to be incorporated. 
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It can be seen from the above brief survey of the social enterprise landscape in 
Thailand that a possible and hopefully appropriate direction for the development of 
social enterprise in this country has already been officially mapped out. Though 
how far the country could go in this direction in the near future remains to be seen, 
the fact that such a direction has been mapped out is a very encouraging 
development. Of course, like in most other countries in Southeast Asia, many other 
challenges still exist in Thailand. But in the past few years the country has been 
able to meet many of these and prove certain critical comments wrong, especially 
in so far as the government policy support is concerned.67 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
Clearly, a number of important components of a social and institutional 
infrastructure for social enterprise in Thailand have already been put in place. With 
regard to its social aspect we have seen the crucial role of social networks and 
support mechanisms. Most fundamental on the institutional side is the availability 
of a definition of social enterprise and strategies for its development. This is a vital 
step in the effort to promote this business. That is, not only has it been officially 
recognised as a new sector that needs public as well as private support but is also 
hopefully more recognisable as a new type of entrepreneurship in Thai society, 
especially among young people.  
 
The institutional infrastructure for social enterprise in Thailand, in particular, is 
certainly only at its formative stage. Nevertheless, we can say that a crucial initial 
groundwork has already been laid down for its further development. The Thai 
Social Enterprise Board with its policy-making, governing and consulting functions 
has as its executive arm TSEO. Designed to be in touch with all possible 
entrepreneurs and interested partners who have a particular interest in social and 
environmental issues, the TSEO aims to inspire social responsibility, stimulate 
cooperation among social enterprises and develop country-wide networks. It can 
                                                                 
67
 Another example of such comments runs like this: ‘Existing social enterprises and entrepreneurs 
who want to step into this field…must surmount new challenges, including lack of funding, weak 
capacity, lack of government support and lack of networks’. Pred Evans and Sumalee Amnuaiporn, 
‘Social Entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia’ 9 Trendnovation Southeast Asia 3.  
230 
 
thus be hoped that with both enabling social networks and mechanisms, together 
with this inchoate public policy framework, social enterprise is hopefully viable in 
Thailand. However, it must at any rate be admitted that major obstacles to the 
development of social enterprise in Thailand still exist. Most fundamental, from my 
point of view, is the lack of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for this 
type of business. I shall try to make this clear in the next chapter. 
 Chapter 8 
Developing a Legal Form for Thai Social Enterprises 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
I have made it clear that as stakeholder business organisations social enterprises 
require a legal form specifically designed to meet both their business and 
stakeholder needs. However, as we have seen in Chapters 6 and 7, Thai social 
enterprises, despite their existence going back several decades, still operate without 
a specific legal form and have to rely upon several legal structures. In particular, I 
have clearly demonstrated in Chapter 6 that none of the main existing legal forms 
currently used by Thai social enterprises is particularly suited to their stakeholder 
business orientation. Hence, in the present chapter, I shall propose a specially 
designed legal form for social enterprises based on the model legal vehicle I have 
developed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
While the requirement for such a legal form to meet the business-stakeholder needs 
of social enterprises has been made abundantly clear, I deem it necessary to provide 
further explanation for the importance of the legal form to the development of the 
social enterprise sector in Thailand. For this purpose, I shall focus mainly on the 
problem of social enterprise “branding”. 
 
My principal task in this chapter is thus twofold: (1) to propose a new legal form 
for social enterprises modeled upon the legal blueprint developed in Chapters 3 and 
4; and (2) to explain why such a legal vehicle is important to the development of 
the Thai social enterprise sector. I shall propose a new legal form and an alternative 
legal arrangement to more or less the same effect, in case it is still not possible to 
introduce a legislation creating such a legal form, in section 8.2. Then, in section 
8.3, I shall explain how such a legal form, or the alternative legal arrangement, 
provides a solution to the main problem facing social entrepreneurs in Thailand, 
that of “branding”. 
 
A reference was made in Chapter 7 to the new legislative project on social enterprise 
– Social Enterprise Promotion Bill. A regulatory arrangement forming part of this 
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project is for social enterprises to incorporate as limited company under the Civil 
and Commercial Code 1992 and operate as not-for-profits. This arrangement is 
essentially similar to the one I already have in mind – what I shall shortly propose 
as an alternative to my proposed new legal form for social enterprises. In discussing 
the problem of “branding”, I shall present a critical analysis of this legislative 
project, reaffirming, in particular, that the project does not invalidate my argument 
for developing a new legal structure for social enterprises. As indicated, its plan for 
social enterprises to incorporate as limited company and operate as not-for-profits 
actually supports my idea of using this corporate form as an alternative to my 
proposed development of a new legal form for social enterprises. 
 
8.2 For a new legal form for social enterprises in Thailand 
 
This section is devoted to the development of a legal form for Thai social enterprises 
based upon our ideal-type legal vehicle. An alternative legal arrangement will also 
be provided in case it is not possible to introduce a legislation creating a new legal 
entity. Even though it is designated as an optimal type, it has particularly been 
developed to meet the needs of Thai social enterprise. It is aimed, in other words, 
to serve as a blueprint, or a rational guideline, for the construction of a legal form 
for Thai social enterprise. Without such a model, needless to say, the development 
of a legal vehicle for Thai social enterprise would be rationally ungrounded. 
However, the legal blueprint I have developed can be expected to be applicable, 
mutatis mutandis, to other national contexts. 
 
This does not mean that a legal development project can ignore the peculiar national 
contexts and slavishly imitate a presumably “good” model. We have seen in 
Chapter 5 that the CIC does not fully match our legal blueprint. Hence, in 
contemplating the use of the blueprint as a model for developing a Thai legal form 
(or an alternative legal operational mode) for social enterprises, we need to carefully 
take the peculiar Thai national context into consideration. 
 
In proposing that Thailand develop a legal form for social enterprises to foster its 
social enterprise sector, I shall not suggest how a legislative initiative be taken for 
this purpose. The initiation of a legislative measure requires a political decision, 
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and this depends, in turn, on whether or not the government sees the need and has 
a clear rationale for such a measure. However, I do hope that this thesis goes at least 
some way towards clearly explaining the need, and thereby providing a rationale, 
for such a law. 
 
To my knowledge, only very few academic studies have been produced which touch 
upon the need for a legal form specifically designed for social enterprises in 
Thailand.1 Academic studies hopefully represent a first step towards expanding the 
public as well as official awareness of such a need, and my thesis will be by far the 
most substantive contribution to this still limited academic literature on social 
enterprises in Thailand. 
 
While not directly addressing the issue of initiation and legislation of the law, 
discussing the development of a legal form for social enterprises cannot avoid that 
of the architecture of legislation creating the legal form. This issue was touched 
upon in Chapter 3, where it was argued that the proposed legal form be created as 
a variant of the main corporate form rather than a “stand-alone” legal entity. In the 
UK the main corporate form is the limited liability company, and its Thai equivalent 
is the limited company. Following this strategy, I propose here that a legal form for 
social enterprises in Thailand be constructed as a variant of the country’s “core” 
corporate form – the limited company. 
 
In Chapter 7, I presented an overall picture of the Thai social enterprise landscape, 
and I shall not go over the specific conditions in Thailand again. I shall directly 
propose a new legal form for Thai social enterprises, starting in sub-section 8.2.1, 
with the issue of using the limited company as the basis for the new legal vehicle. 
                                                                 
1
 The only academic work I am currently aware of is Park Kanjanapaibul, ‘Legal Entity for Social 
Enterprise’ (LLM thesis, Thammasat University 2011). This thesis nevertheless provides no model 
legal form for social enterprise (though it proposes a new legal form called “public interest 
company”); nor does it engage in any in-depth analysis of social enterprise legal forms of other 
countries. It merely touches upon such legal forms in the United States and a few European 
countries. Its main analysis is devoted to the legal forms under the Civil and Commercial Code – 
both for-profits and non-profits – and how these would serve as legal forms for social enterprises. 
My thesis goes beyond this scholarly work in at least three respects. First, it provides a blueprint of 
legal forms for social enterprises. Second, it engages in in-depth discussion of the “stakeholder” 
nature of social enterprises. Finally, it presents an evaluation of the CIC and main legal forms 
available for Thai social enterprises (especially those under the Civil and Commercial Code) against 
the legal blueprint.  
234 
 
Sub-section 8.2.2 then examines the components of the proposed legal form. 
Finally, a strategy for using an existing legal form – one which is expected to more 
efficiently cater for the needs of social entrepreneurs – will be proposed in sub-
section 8.2.3.  
 
8.2.1 Limited company form as the basis for the new legal vehicle  
 
Our blueprint of a legal form for social enterprise is based on the corporate form, 
and in Thailand such a form already exists. Thus, at least in principle, creating a 
variant of this form seems to entail no major problem. Under the Civil and 
Commercial Code 1992, as we have seen in Chapter 6, there are already several 
types of business organisations; it thus should not be impossible to add another type 
of a similar nature. Clearly, as a matter of principle – and for all practical purposes 
– the proposed legal form for social enterprises in Thailand should be created as a 
variant of the country’s main corporate legal form – the limited company. 
 
As a business organisation, the proposed legal form will operate in much the same 
way as the existing limited company. In matters relating to governance, relevant 
provisions of the Civil and Commercial Code 1992 will apply, and, like the limited 
company, it will be subject to insolvency and tax laws. Only in matters relating to 
its social mission will the new legal form be governed by another set of rules – 
which are mostly mandatory in nature. 
 
The proposed legal form may be created by incorporating new sections into the 
Civil and Commercial Code 1992 or through the legislation of a new Act on social 
enterprise,2 in much the same way as the Public Limited Company Act 1992 was 
legislated to govern the public limited companies. Both options are acceptable in 
my view, but I prefer adding new sections: for reasons given in Chapter 3, it is 
preferable for the new legal form not to be a “stand-alone” one.3 These additional 
sections in the Code will provide the mandatory rules to ensure the orientation of 
                                                                 
2
 Office of the Council of State, Legislative Drafting Manual (Office of the Council of State 2008).  
3
 Kanjanapaibul proposes that a separate Act should be legislated because the new legal form could 
be adopted by both the private and public limited companies. The Act, in other words, would govern 
both types of companies operating as social enterprises. Kanjanapaibul (n 1) 108. 
235 
 
Thai social enterprises relying on the new legal form towards social and community 
benefits.  
 
However, given the traditional legislative process in Thailand, adding new sections 
to the Civil and Commercial Code is likely to be difficult. This is because, though 
social enterprises can be governed by the provisions on the limited company, by 
their nature they are not-for-profits, whereas the Code clearly states that there are 
only for-profit and non-profit entities. Hence, introducing amendments to the Code 
might be more complicated than initiating a new law, since this involves not only 
adding stakeholder elements to the Code but also amending or revoking certain 
sections which are in conflict with these elements. In fact, the initiation of the Social 
Enterprise Promotion Bill clearly signals that the social enterprise law is a stand-
alone one. Thus, it would not be surprising if a new legal form for social enterprise 
would eventually be introduced, it would be a new law. 
 
It is really not difficult to see how this proposed legal vehicle would look like. I 
have already characterised the ideal-type legal structure for social enterprise as a 
corporate-plus form consisting of a number of default and mandatory rules. The 
proposed legal form would thus basically contain all these rules. Moreover, in view 
of the problem of “branding” to be shortly dealt with, the new legal form should 
have a name that will make Thai social enterprises formally recognisable and at the 
same time give it a sense of familiarity in Thai society and the business community. 
I shall thus provisionally call this proposed legal form a “Social Interest Company” 
(SIC). While “social interest” clearly identifies its social mission, “company” is a 
more familiar term in use in Thailand. As in the case of the CIC, SIC must appear 
at the end of the names of social enterprises adopting this legal form. We can 
presume, indeed, that this “social interest company” tag is not simply a legal 
technicality, but, more significantly, it will make social enterprises in Thailand 
formally recognisable, giving the public a sense of familiarity with its nature and 
functions, and providing it with efficiency and legitimacy in functioning in Thai 
society. 
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8.2.2 Basic components of the Social Interest Company (SIC) 
 
The basic components of the proposed legal form, the SIC, are actually those of our 
blueprint of legal forms for social enterprises. However, we cannot presume that all 
these components are familiar features in Thailand. We shall thus need to examine 
if these components are more or less acceptable in Thai society. 
 
8.2.2.1 Legal personality and limited liability  
 
Both legal personality and limited liability are the principal features of Thailand’s 
main corporate form, the limited company. Being based upon this legal structure, 
the proposed legal vehicle for Thai social enterprises contain these two basic 
components, which form the basis of the country’s main business organisation. 
Businesspeople opting to operate within this legal structure actually require both 
the liability protection and perpetual succession it provides; they also need its 
flexibility and the opportunity for raising both loan and share capital which come 
with it. 
 
Many social enterprises in Thailand, including those formed as other legal entities, 
have adopted the limited company form (some social enterprises operating as other 
legal entities have also created a limited company as their commercial subsidiary). 
They presumably see the usefulness of this form as a legal structure within which 
to pursue their business objectives. These two basic components of the SIC will 
thus definitely be accepted as its essential part.  
 
8.2.2.2 Raising of finance  
 
Those who have chosen to pursue their business activities within the limited 
company form expect to benefit from the opportunity to raise both loan and share 
capital. Not only does the law permit a limited company to access private capital 
by issuing shares, but given its familiarity, credibility and hence “legitimacy” as 
Thailand’s main corporate legal structure, this legal form presumably functions 
more effectively than most other legal entities in acquiring loans from private 
sources – particularly banks and other financial institutions.  
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Of course, whether or not a business firm can obtain loans from a private source 
depends on many other factors, but operating within the limited company structure 
can be expected to provide one with a better opportunity for achieving this goal. 
Being based upon this structure, the SIC can be expected to meet this important 
need of social entrepreneurs as well.  
 
In Thailand a major problem for social enterprises is basically the same as that being 
faced by social enterprises in many other countries. This is related to social 
enterprises being mostly small businesses, which generally encounter difficulty in 
raising finance. As will be shown in the next section, this problem for Thai social 
enterprises has been exacerbated by that of social enterprise “branding”. Therefore, 
to the extent that the SIC can be expected to solve this problem, it can presumably 
relieve, at least to some extent, Thai social enterprises of the difficulty they 
encounter in raising finance. 
 
8.2.2.3 Asset lock and non-distribution constraint 
 
The asset lock and non-distribution constraint are central features of social 
enterprise; they must thus be incorporated into the SIC as one of its mandatory rules. 
This mechanism is understandably not part of the legal forms for for-profit 
organisations. However, the asset lock concept is actually not foreign to Thai 
society, particularly believed to be non-profit concepts.4  
 
The problem is thus how to incorporate these mechanisms, which the Thai people 
generally regard as being relevant only to non-profit organisations into the SIC, the 
new type of not-for-profit entity being proposed as a legal form for Thai social 
enterprises. This again confirms the importance of the SIC and social enterprise 
branding, which will be discussed later. In this respect, it is proposed that the SIC 
follow the CIC format; that is, not only are the asset-lock mechanisms designated 
as statutory requirements but they must also be included in its governing 
documents. This is because, as Kanjanapaibul has pointed out, general provisions 
                                                                 
4
 For example, the Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 134 requires that foundation specify its asset-
locked body in the constitution. After liquidation, the foundation must transfer its residual assets to 
the specified body. If the foundation has not specified any, the court can order a transfer of such 
assets to any foundation or legal person whose objectives are most compatible with the foundation 
being liquidated.  
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in company law are default rules, while the governing documents such as the 
memorandum or articles of association are genuine governing regulations. Hence, 
requiring a company to incorporate statutory clauses into its governing documents 
is a more effective measure than directly including such clauses in the law itself.5 
This leads to the way in which our new legal vehicle for social enterprises should 
be legislated: 
 
…the legislation of the new legal entity should create model provisions to be 
contained in the companies’ articles of association. Furthermore, the legislation 
must clearly state that such clauses cannot be amended or abolished, except in 
case…[of the clauses being amended to be more rigid]…6 
 
The main purpose of the asset lock and non-distribution constraint is to ensure that 
the assets are managed in a proper manner and for the benefit of stakeholders and 
the community. The assets here include income, profits or other surpluses generated 
by the SIC’s activities. The asset lock thus involves the transfer of assets under 
certain conditions. With regard to the transfer of the SIC’s assets, I do not intend to 
provide full details at this stage on how these rules be formulated but rather propose 
them as core concepts.  
 
In this regard, the CIC offers both a general principle and a practical guideline; that 
is, any of its assets cannot be transferred other than for full consideration to ensure 
that it receives a fair market value for the assets, and upon winding up, the residual 
assets must be transferred to specified asset-locked body (bodies), not shareholders. 
As in the case of the CIC, there are exceptions to this principle; for example, a 
transfer of assets may be made for less than full consideration to any specified asset-
locked body or made in any other way that amounts to a transfer of assets for the 
benefit of the community or society at large.  
 
It is also important to place a constraint on payment of dividends to shareholders as 
part of a lock on asset distribution/transfer. The constraint is designed to work in 
much the same way as the CIC dividend cap. However, not only are there different 
types of shareholders, but, in practice, it is difficult to determine the extent of such 
a constraint. The cap must not be too restrictive. In Thailand, where a cap on private 
                                                                 
5
 Kanjanapaibul (n 1) 110.  
6
 ibid. 
239 
 
profit sharing is still not a familiar practice,7 particularly among for-profit 
companies, a too restrictive cap would have an important effect of deterring private 
investors. But too generous distribution of dividends is not acceptable either. In my 
view, the dividend cap is not completely foreign to Thai social investors. There are 
cases where some shareholders, particularly social investors, agree to receive no 
dividend at all. However, I fear the dividend cap would become a major obstacle to 
attracting private investors into the social enterprise sector. That is why a scheme 
for the caps on payment of dividends must be carefully worked out, which also 
requires empirical research and state support. For practical purposes, I shall adopt 
the criterion for the CIC following the latest changes in 2014, which ensures that 
65 per cent of the SIC’s profits be retained for reinvestment back into the company 
or used for social benefits. Incidentally, this criterion is roughly in line with the cap 
on the distribution of profit stipulated by the Thai Social Enterprise Office (TSEO) 
for social enterprises applying for formal certification.  
 
Let us now turn to the issue of remuneration of directors. In this case, I shall again 
follow the general principle adopted for the CIC, which prescribes that the 
remuneration of directors should never be more than is reasonable, and 
arrangements for payment to directors should always be transparent. As is generally 
recognised, the remuneration of directors can be used as a way to avoid the non-
distribution constraint; in Thailand this could be a major problem since the country 
still does not have an independent external regulator who may take action if a 
director’s remuneration seems to be too high. This is nevertheless a problem for not 
only social enterprises but is generally recognised in the Thai business community.8 
There have thus been attempts to create a standard or “best practice” for director 
                                                                 
7
 The concept of profit distribution constraint in Thailand can be found in co-operatives. According 
to the Cooperative Act 1999, s 60, not less than 10 per cent of the annual net profit must be allocated 
to the reserve fund of the co-operative and not more than 5 per cent for subscription to the Co-
operative League of Thailand. The remaining profit can be distributed in the following manner: (1) 
dividends on paid-up shares not exceeding a designated rate; (2) patronage refunds to the members 
in proportion to their volume of business done with it during the year; (3) bonuses to the members 
of its board of directors and other personnel not exceeding ten per cent of the net profit; and (4) 
contributions to accumulated funds for carrying out any activity of the co-operative.   
8
 Before the financial crisis of 1997, remunerations for executives in large companies were generally 
known in some cases to be unreasonably high. This in a way reflected Thailand’s economic bubble 
before it burst. 
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compensation that might be used as a criterion for determining the remuneration of 
SIC’s directors.9 
 
8.2.2.4 Social benefit requirement  
 
This defining feature of social enterprises is not an unfamiliar aspect of Thai law. 
It is an integral part of non-profit structures like the foundation (though, naturally, 
it is not relevant to for-profit entities). Under the Civil and Commercial Code 1992, 
a foundation, in particular, cannot engage in activities other than those falling under 
the areas specified by the Code – i.e. activities undertaken for public charity, 
religious, artistic, scientific, educational or other public purposes. Moreover, as a 
non-profit organisation, it not allowed to engage in activities in those areas in any 
business-oriented way, that is, in any way amounting to private profit-
maximising.10 However, these rules are too restrictive for social enterprises, which 
should be allowed to pursue any business activity in any possible area, as long as 
such an activity is not against the law or detrimental to social order or good morality 
of the people – and, in particular, if it can be proven to contribute to social and 
community benefits. 
 
Most significantly, as already pointed in Chapter 7, the TSEO has adopted a scheme 
under which social enterprises can apply for certification as such. Social enterprises 
applying for such recognition must satisfy five main requirements, one of which is 
that they must set the social objective as their main goal.11 Therefore, in designing 
the SIC, I propose that we adopt this social objective requirement of the TSEO as 
one of its mandatory rules. Like the asset lock, this rule will be included in the 
governing documents of the organisations operating as SICs. By legally requiring 
an inclusion of this rule in the constitution of the organisations opting to operate as 
SICs, it will acquire a mandatory rule status.   
                                                                 
9
 For example, Thai Institute of Directors Association, Director Compensation Best Practice (Issue 
1/2006, 2006). 
10
 The association, another type of non-profit organisation, is limited in much the same way. 
11
 The other four requirements include: main revenue (more than 50 per cent of the total income) 
coming from trading in goods or services; fair employment and trade, and the production process 
being up to recognised standards and environment-friendly; most of the profit being reinvested in 
pursuit of the social objective of the organisation or contributed to social activity, with no more 30 
per cent of the profit being distributed for private benefits; and good and transparent governance. 
Thai Social Enterprise Office, ‘Application for Social Enterprise Certification’ TSEO News 
(Bangkok, 26 August 2015) <www.tseo.or.th/news/231672> accessed 20 December 2015 
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The law legislating the SIC could authorise the TSEO, or any other body to be set 
up as the SIC regulator, to “test” or verify the social or community orientation of 
organisations applying for registration as SICs. Most interestingly, the 
questionnaire the organisations applying for certification as social enterprises are 
required to fill is essentially the “test” of whether or not they satisfy the five 
requirements, including the social objective one. Hence, authorising the TSEO to 
assume responsibility for a statutory social benefit test for social enterprises simply 
amounts to further formalising what it is already doing. 
 
8.2.2.5 Stakeholder participation  
 
Our legal blueprint requires this as a mandatory rule for social enterprises. In 
Thailand, this requirement is not unfamiliar. Certain social enterprises have 
benefited from various forms of stakeholder involvement. Moreover, as a business 
operation norm or principle, stakeholder involvement is now generally 
acknowledged. A handbook prepared by the Department of Business Development 
for partnerships and private and public limited companies contains a separate 
section on “Ethical Standards of Business Organisations”. One of these ethical 
standards is the “participation principle”.12 
 
However, with regard to how this practice should be integrated into the SIC, I would 
suggest that it form part of the latter as a default rather than mandatory rule. Such a 
rule would provide Thai social enterprises with flexibility, because, as indicated in 
the case of the CIC in Chapter 5, it might not be possible for all social enterprises, 
most of which are small ventures, to accommodate the same extent and depth of 
stakeholder participation. 
 
                                                                 
12
 According to this principle, the administrators of business organisations must give the 
shareholders, partners, employees, and stakeholders an opportunity to participate in the management 
of the organisations through their participation in the making of the decisions that would have an 
impact on the business, interests, or livelihood of the stakeholders. Participation may be effected in 
the following ways: (1) provision of various channels for public hearings and expression of opinions 
and complaints, such websites, satisfaction surveys, or comment boxes, and (2) policy allowing or 
inviting [stakeholders or members of the interested public] to take part in the business organisations’ 
activities. Department of Business Development (DBD), Handbook on What to Know and Do upon 
Becoming a Partnership, a Private Limited Company, or a Public Limited Company (DBD 2015) 
42.    
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That means that the organisations opting to operate as SICs have the choice of 
whether or not to incorporate this requirement into their governing documents. 
Even if they decide to include the requirement in their constitutions, they still retain 
the flexibility of determining how to involve the stakeholders. For example, to 
follow the CIC Regulator’s guidance, it might be formally provided in their 
constitution that the stakeholders be consulted before the directors or members of 
the organisations make certain decisions and/or that stakeholders be invited to 
attend an open forum associated with their annual general meetings.13 Even though 
they do not want to incorporate the stakeholder involvement as a mandatory rule, a 
“strong” guidance on this matter may be adopted as a practical measure for more or 
less the same result. In particular, TSEO, or any other regulatory body to be set up, 
should “strongly” recommend to organisations opting to operate as SICs that they 
put in place some measures for stakeholder participation. 
 
8.2.2.6 Stakeholder board  
 
We have made it clear that as stakeholder entities social enterprises should not only 
cater for stakeholder participation in their activities but also involve the 
stakeholders at the governance level. I have extensively elaborated both the 
theoretical and practical aspects of this issue in Chapters 4 and 5. For the SIC, I 
propose, as in the case of stakeholder participation, that this feature of the legal 
blueprint be adopted as a default rather than mandatory rule.  
 
In Thailand, though the idea of creating a stakeholder board is not entirely foreign 
(a private school board is clearly of this type), it might not be generally practicable. 
It is quite normal to involve those who bring benefits to the organisations – 
especially in the form of knowledge and expertise, financial support, or even 
prestige coming with the participation of eminent persons in society. But bringing 
in people who may seem to be “outsiders”, and who cannot be expected to come 
with any clear benefit to the organisations (even though they are clearly identified 
as “stakeholders”), does not seem at present to be a practical measure. Perhaps only 
in certain circumstances would forming a stakeholder board seem practicable: in 
                                                                 
13
 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Information and Guidance Notes – 
Chapter 9: Corporate Governance (2013) 5-6. 
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particular, it seems possible for a community enterprise to initiate a stakeholder 
board by bringing in the people of its own community who, directly or indirectly, 
have a “stake” in its activities. 
 
Therefore, though I have already expressed my preference in the case of the CIC 
for a mandatory rule for stakeholder board, for practical purposes (i.e. to allow for 
flexibility required by SICs operating in different circumstances), I propose the 
adoption of this measure as a default rule. As in the case of stakeholder 
participation, the measure should be “strongly” recommended for SICs by the 
TSEO or any other regulatory agency to be set up. At least organisations like 
community enterprises can presumably be expected to see the benefit as well as the 
practicality of forming stakeholder boards. How this could be achieved – especially, 
who should be brought in to sit on the board – should be left to their discretion. 
 
8.2.2.7 Directors’ duties and competence  
 
Issues specifically relevant to the duties and competence of the directors of social 
enterprises were fully covered in Chapter 4 (sub-section 4.3.2.5), and in Chapter 5 
(sub-section 5.5.2.5). We have seen that it is the duties of the directors to seek not 
only to promote the success of the company by maximising shareholder value, but 
also, and more significantly, to balance it against stakeholder interests. The above 
discussion of the social benefit requirement has also made it clear that the duties 
and responsibilities of the directors must be mandatorily directed towards social 
and community benefits. All this involves the directors’ competence and how they 
should perform their duties especially in balancing the interests of the owners of the 
company against those of the stakeholders. As indicated in Chapter 5, we cannot 
expect the law to fully provide how the directors should perform their “balancing 
act”, but I shall here not go over the points I have already made in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
 
The directors’ duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis stakeholders must of course be 
statutorily provided for. How they perform their duties, as well as the issues of “the 
standard of care” and the level of competence expected of them, can be expected to 
be governed, more or less as in the case of the CIC, by relevant provisions of the 
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company law,14 court decisions, non-corporate laws, and standards of “best 
practice”.15 As will shortly be pointed out in relation to public disclosure, the Civil 
and Commercial Code 1992 imposes on the directors not only the “standard of care” 
but also the duties relating to financial disclosure to ensure transparency. 
 
8.2.2.8 External regulator and public disclosure  
 
Thailand still does not have a social enterprise regulatory regime. TSEO cannot be 
expected to function as an external regulator. Its role consists mainly in providing 
support for, and facilitating the operation of, social enterprises. The initiation of the 
SIC would not be possible without transforming the TSEO into a regulatory body 
or establishing a new organisation for this purpose. On the other hand, social 
disclosure has to some extent been provided for by the Civil and Commercial Code 
1992; these provisions would serve our purpose with additional requirements (i.e. 
in addition to financial disclosure). 
 
As pointed out above, the TSEO is remarkably assuming some de facto regulatory 
functions. The requirements it has set out for organisations seeking the social 
enterprise certification amount to setting the terms according to which they must 
operate. Of course, it has neither legal authority nor administrative capabilities to 
oversee their activities and take action if any of them has drifted from their social 
mission, but the existence of a body like the TSEO actually provides a necessary 
modicum for the development a regulatory regime. 
 
The law governing the SIC must give the TSEO a new mandate for its regulatory 
functions or establish a new body charged with the same functions. Our blueprint 
of the legal forms for social enterprises contains an ideal-type external regulator 
(sub-section 4.3.2.6) whose main features include the regulator’s independence, 
                                                                 
14
 Under Thai law it is only provided in the Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1168 that ‘The 
directors must in their conduct of the business apply the diligence of a careful business man; [i]n 
particular, they are jointly responsible for (1) for the payment of shares by the shareholders being 
actually made; (2) for the existence and regular keeping of the books and documents prescribed by 
law; (3) for the proper distribution of the dividend or interest as prescribed by law; [and] (4) for the 
proper enforcement of resolutions of the general meetings’. 
15
 The “Ethical Standards of Business Organisations” referred to above, which are principally aimed 
to govern the behaviour of the directors or administrators of these organisations, include adherence 
to the rule of law, moral principles, transparency, participation, accountability and value for money. 
DBD (n 12) 38-43. 
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accountability, roles and responsibilities, together with other aspects of the 
regulator’s duties and functions. My analysis of the CIC has found that the law 
governing the CIC Regulator practically incorporates all these features. The CIC 
Regulator can thus serve as a practical guideline for developing the SIC regulatory 
regime. Even the CIC Regulator’s “light-touch” approach may also be adopted. 
 
However, in view of corruption remaining one of Thailand’s major problems, the 
scope of the authority and functions, as well as the regulatory approach, of the SIC 
regulatory regime must be carefully devised. In particular, a “light-touch” 
regulatory approach might be necessary, in the sense that the regime should not 
impose a tight bureaucratic oversight but should instead leave social entrepreneurs 
with flexibility and freedom to pursue their business and social objectives. But 
unlike the CIC Regulator’s light-touch approach (sub-section 5.5.2.6), which 
‘…does not envisage pro-active supervision of individual CICs by the CIC 
Regulator’, the proposed SIC regulatory body needs to be significantly more pro-
active in executing both its regulatory and supervisory functions. 
 
A crucial function of an external regulator is both to promote and protect the social 
enterprise sector. As in the case of the CIC Regulator, the SIC regulatory body could 
have a critical role in protecting the sector by weeding out bogus social enterprises 
and eliminating fraudulent practices. This would have the important effect of 
protecting the image of, and maintaining confidence in, the SICs. The social 
enterprise sector as a whole would significantly benefit in this respect from the 
regulator’s roles and functions. With regard to the latter’s promotional role, the 
TSEO has already contributed much to the development of the social enterprise 
sector in Thailand, particularly by providing knowledge and information, and 
serving as a centre for coordination of the country’s social enterprise networks. 
 
At this juncture, a possible future issue should be mentioned. The Bill does not spell 
out how possible legal problems arising out of the creation and/or termination of 
social enterprises, or perhaps also their governance, would be dealt with. I presume 
that administrative regulations would be issued following the enactment of the law. 
Presumably, most regulatory problems would be solved in accordance with these 
regulations. We should nevertheless also anticipate legal conflicts. Civil cases 
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involving, say, breaches of contract, would be settled in the Civil Court. But how 
are conflicts between social enterprises and TSEO (or any regulatory agency to be 
set up) to be dealt with? 
 
Let me give just one possible conflict of this type, namely, the case of an application 
for the registration of a social enterprise being rejected by the regulatory agency (as 
in the case of the CIC, a dual registration can actually be expected, that is, 
registration as a limited company with the Department of Business Development 
and registration as a social enterprise with the social enterprise regulatory body). If 
the applicants do not agree with the rejection, what can they do? Of course, an 
appeal procedure would presumably form part of the regulations to be set out. 
However, the conflict might not end there; then, how could it be further dealt with? 
 
One possible way is for the applicants for the registration of the social enterprise to 
bring the case to Administrative Court – which in Thailand functions as a court of 
justice.16 This court is empowered to consider cases of conflict between (1) 
government agencies, (2) government employees and their organisations, and (3) 
private citizens/organisations and a government agency.17 Though presumably 
functioning autonomously, the social enterprise regulatory body to be set up will 
definitely be a government agency of one type or another. So, if a conflict arises 
between it and any social enterprise it will be governing, this might have to be 
finally settled in court. 
 
Finally, let us turn to the issue of social disclosure. As pointed out above, this 
requirement for the limited company is mandatorily provided for by the Civil and 
Commercial Code 1992 to ensure the transparency of its operation, especially in 
regard to financial matters. As a normal standard of practice, this involves the 
preparation of the annual financial statement, which needs ‘to be examined by one 
or more auditors and submitted for adoption by a general meeting within four 
months of its date’.18 It is the directors’ duty ‘to send to the Registrar a copy of 
                                                                 
16
 Office of the Administrative Court, Modes of Administrative Court Verdicts Volume 4 (Bangkok: 
Administrative Court 2013). 
17
 Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedures Act BE 2542 
(1999), s 9.  
18
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, ss 1196-1197.  
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every balance sheet not later than one month after it has been adopted by the general 
meeting’.19 The directors must also ensure that accounts be kept of the company’s 
revenue and expenses, as well as its assets and liabilities.20 ‘Every auditor shall at 
all reasonable time have access to the books and accounts’ and, moreover, ‘may 
examine the directors or any other agents or employees of the company’.21 Finally, 
the law provides for “public inspection of documents”; that is, on payment of a fee, 
‘every person is entitled to inspect the documents kept by the Registrar, or to require 
a certificate of the registration of any partnership or company, or a certified copy 
or extract of any other document, from the Registrar’.22 
 
However, I have made it clear in Chapters 4 and 5, social disclosure for social 
enterprises must also cover their reports on how, and how much, they have met their 
social benefit goals. For this purpose, the CIC’s approach may be adopted; that is, 
the SIC is mandatorily required to prepare and deliver annually to the Registrar: (i) 
the balance sheet, (ii) an annual SIC report and (iii) annual return. Alternatively, 
apart from the financial report to the Registrar, the SIC is mandatorily required to 
deliver an annual social benefit report to the TSEO or an external regulator to be 
set up to ensure that it continue to pursue its social goals. 
 
To conclude this sub-section, let me emphasise that the proposed legal form for 
Thai social enterprises, the SIC, has been designed in accordance with both the 
requirements of the ideal-type legal vehicle for social enterprises and the practical 
approach of the CIC. This proposed legal structure is presumed to be well suited to 
the practical conditions of the Thai social enterprise sector and Thai society in 
general. A number of the model components, most notably the social benefit 
requirement, the asset lock, the external regulator and social disclosure, must be 
statutorily provided for. With most of the components of the ideal-type legal vehicle 
for social enterprises being already more or less familiar features in some legal 
forms in Thailand, it is hoped that legislating this proposed legal vehicle for social 
enterprises in this country is a practical possibility. However, as I have stressed at 
the outset, the initiation of a legislative measure involves political decision. I wish 
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 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1199. 
20
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1206. 
21
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1213. 
22
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1020. 
248 
 
therefore to suggest an alternative to the initiation of a new legal form: this involves 
the use of an existing legal form to achieve more or less the same purpose. 
 
8.3 Alternative legal arrangement to the SIC  
 
I have earlier emphasised several times that contractual legal arrangements can be 
internally made among those forming a business venture. The law provides 
packages of rules mainly to facilitate its operation especially be reducing its 
transaction costs. Hence, as the initiation of the SIC depends on a future political 
decision, what social enterprises in Thailand can do now is to make internal 
arrangements for their proper operation as this particular type of business, for 
example, by imposing on themselves the social benefit objective, asset lock, 
dividend cap, and stakeholder participation, so that the Thai people can clearly 
distinguish them from for-profit and non-profit organisations. This sub-section aims 
to propose such an alternative legal arrangement for Thai social enterprises in the 
absence of a specifically designed legal form (social enterprises can actually opt for 
marketing or public relations approach rather than a legal arrangement of this type). 
 
My assessment of the existing legal forms under the Civil and Commercial Code 
1992 in Chapter 6 resulted in my proposal that the limited company form is most 
suitable for social enterprises. In view of this suitability, the limited company form 
has been adopted as the basis for the creation of the SIC in the previous sub-section. 
For the same reason this main corporate form will also be used as the “core” of an 
alternative legal arrangement to be proposed in this sub-section.  
 
A straightforward and simple legal arrangement is for a social enterprise operating 
within the limited company structure to include in its governing documents the 
main components of the blueprint of legal forms for social enterprises – especially 
the social benefit objective, the asset lock, dividend cap, and social disclosure.23  
The governing documents of the limited company include the memorandum of 
association and the articles of association.   
                                                                 
23
 Company law is part of Book III of the Civil and Commercial Code 1992, which covers contracts. 
This means that the provisions on this matter are default rules, which could differently have been 
agreed upon by the parties to the contract. Amendments to the company regulations can thus be 
made by the shareholders’ consent. 
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The memorandum is required for the registration of a limited company, which 
contains the name, the address, the objects of the company, as well as the statement 
of the limited liability of shareholders of the company, the number of shares and 
the details and signatures of the promoters.24 The company’s articles must be the 
first thing decided in the general meeting on the company’s establishment. It 
contains regulations or operating procedures involving the persons in the company, 
such as the powers of the directors, the meeting of shareholders, the appointment 
of auditors, the payment of dividends, the appropriation of reserve fund, among 
other matters. The memorandum is different from the articles in that while the 
former deals with the company’s activities involving external persons, the latter 
governs the company’s internal relationships.25  
 
The first thing that social enterprises can/should do in order to differentiate 
themselves from for-profit companies is to insert the social benefit requirement in 
the objectives, which are part of the memorandum. The law does not define the 
objects of the company in any specific way, and this endows the limited company 
form with flexibility. It is clearly the objectives that actually define the nature and 
purpose of the business. Hence, whether or not a limited company can be 
characterised as a social enterprise depends mainly on what it sets out at registration 
as its objectives.  
 
I studied a number of limited companies26 claiming to be operating, or being 
recognised, as social enterprises and found that all of them set forth a wide range of 
objects – that is, ranging from 23 to 41, which are mainly the model objectives. 
Rakluke Group is the only one among the companies I studied that has set out the 
most relevant objectives to its social mission. The company has added some social 
objectives such as operating as a consultant for participatory learning involving 
children, the family, society, and the community.27 Others have chosen to adopt the 
                                                                 
24
 Civil and Commercial Code 1992, s 1098.  
25
 Nonthawat Nawatrakulpisut, Law on Partnership, Limited Company and Public Limited Company 
(3rd edn, Winyuchon 2015).  
26
 These include Sungkhom Sukhaphab, Pen Tai Publishing, Open Dream, Rakluke Group, Suan 
Ngoen Mee Ma, and Rung Arun School. 
27
 From access to the company registration information source of the Registrar on 14 October 2015, 
Rakluke Group Co., Ltd was established on 17 November 1982, Registration no. 0105525042435.  
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model objectives (though some of the objectives are not relevant to their not-for-
profit activities at all)28 and added only one or two social activities. We hardly know 
from their profiles in the public record that they are social enterprises. In practice, 
most Thai social enterprises choose to inform society of their public- or community-
oriented activities through public relations outlets such as their websites or 
participation in public- or community-oriented events. 
 
Only pursuing the social benefit goal is certainly not sufficient for social 
enterprises. Other important features of the legal blueprint, notably the asset lock, 
stakeholder participation, and the stakeholder board, should also be incorporated 
into the limited company structure, so that it could serve as an adequate legal 
vehicle for social enterprises. A possible legal arrangement for this purpose is to 
include these features in the company’s articles. 
 
Though the law permits amendments to the articles (partly or wholly), it is 
recommended that social enterprises set forth those rules from the beginning since 
the amendment process is rather complicated and subject to fees.29 For example, 
the model articles, chapter 6, section 18, only provide that prior to the distribution 
of dividends an allocation to the reserve fund must be made under section 1202 of 
the Civil and Commercial Code 1992 but offer no detail on this matter. This means 
that social enterprises can determine their dividend cap rate, say, not more than 35 
per cent. However, any additional rules must not conflict with the Code, under 
which the limited company operates, and must not contradict the memorandum.  
 
Unfortunately, none of the social enterprises I studied30 chose to insert any 
stakeholder elements into their companies’ articles. However, this does not mean 
                                                                 
28
 For example, one of the objects of the company, Sungkhom Sukhaphab, meaning “healthy 
society”, is to operate a massage parlour, which is obviously not a respectable business. From access 
to the company registration information source of the Registrar on 14 October 2015, Sungkhom 
Sukhaphab Co., Ltd was established on 6 June 2003, Registration no. 0105546064969.  
29
 To amend the company’s articles, the following procedure must be followed: (1) issuing to 
shareholders a call for the meeting, which must be published in newspapers or sent to them by post; 
(2) holding the meeting whose decision requires a three-quarter majority vote of those attending the 
meeting and are entitled to vote; and (3) registering the amendment for which relevant documents 
and fees are required. Department of Business Development, ‘How to register the amendments to 
the limited company’s articles of association’  
<www.dbd.go.th/download/downloads/03_boj/intro_step_bj_change_010.pdf> accessed 12 
January 2015 
30
 (n 26). 
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that they are not trying to do anything about this. Instead, some of them probably 
favour an internal agreement over incorporation of the arrangement into the 
constitutional documents.  For example, Suan Ngen Mee Ma publishes on its 
website that 10 per cent of the profits from its business activities will be deducted 
as a donation to Satiragoses-Nagapradeep Foundation, which took part in the setting 
up of the company and which has provided it with support; 30 per cent of the profits 
will be deducted as the company’s reserve fund for its activities; and the rest 60 per 
cent of the profits will be distributed as dividends to two types of shareholders, i.e. 
1) those who do not expect such a benefit and 2) those who do so, in proportion to 
the number of shares they own. In addition, more than half of shareholders must be 
of the first type, and more than half of the directors are selected from among the 
shareholders who do not expect dividends.31 This arrangement clearly represents a 
good practice. 
 
To conclude this sub-section, we should note that there is at present a possibility 
that this alternative arrangement will be adopted as a not-for-profit mode of 
operation of Thai social enterprises under the new law to be enacted (Social 
Enterprise Promotion Bill, which will be discussed in section 8.3). Though it is 
seemingly not possible at present to create a new legal form for social enterprises, 
this alternative to a new legal vehicle can be expected to serve some useful 
purposes.  
 
However, whether social enterprises choose this alternative legal arrangement or 
make their own private agreements, there is always the possibility of converting the 
social enterprises to traditional profit-maximising ones (mission drift). 
Incorporating the social enterprise features into the constitutional documents only 
makes the convertibility more difficult but does not prevent it. This convertibility 
would undermine the credibility of the limited company with a social mission, thus 
representing a crucial drawback of operating the limited company as a social 
enterprise. But since it is still not possible to initiate a specific legal vehicle for 
social enterprises, the limited company with a social mission represents a possible 
alternative. In the end, a legal form for social enterprises is still needed.  
 
                                                                 
31
 Suan Ngen Mee Ma, ‘About Us’ <www.suan-spirit.com/about.php> accessed 18 February 2016 
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8.4 Branding and the development of social enterprise in Thailand 
 
As I have pointed out in Chapter 1, a legal form specifically designed for social 
enterprise is expected to meet a dual purpose of enabling social enterprises to 
function as genuine stakeholder entity and contributing to the fostering of the social 
enterprise sector. One crucial problem which has, in my view, inhibited the growth 
of social enterprise in Thailand is that of “branding”. We now consider how such a 
legal form can solve this problem and thereby contribute to the development of 
social enterprise in Thailand. 
 
In talking about the problem of “branding”, we must recognise that, in a number of 
cases, the legal forms Thai social enterprises have adopted seem to suit their 
respective social and/or business goals. A community museum operating more or 
less like a charity (i.e. earning only a small income from the sale of souvenirs and 
drinks and depending almost totally upon volunteers) has found that the association 
is a legal form best suited to its purpose.32 If it had opted to operate as a foundation, 
it would have been more heavily regulated, while a corporate form, particularly the 
limited company, is clearly unnecessary for its very limited commercial activities. 
Likewise, a home stay as a small venture based entirely on voluntary cooperation 
of community households33 simply does not want to be burdened with any formal 
regulatory control.34 
 
Nonetheless, despite the existence of such cases of compatibility between the 
objectives and activities of social enterprises and the legal structures within which 
they operate (if they opt to operate in any legal structure at all), the social enterprise 
sector in Thailand still faces the “branding” problem which has important 
implications for its development. The problem lies essentially in the continued 
reliance on the existing traditional legal forms, which makes the social enterprise 
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 Interview with Wanna Nawikamool, co-founder of House of Museum (Bangkok, Thailand, 10 
February 2013). 
33
 Interview with members of Ban Dong Home Stay’s executive committee (Prachinburi, Thailand, 
21 February 2013). 
34
 The home stay is not entirely “unregulated”. That is, although it is not regulated by any specific 
law, such as the company law under the Civil and Commercial Code 1992, its services are subject 
to the Home-stay Standard Certification by the Ministry of Tourism and Sports. 
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sector formally unrecognisable. Having a clearly defined social enterprise sector, it 
is argued, is crucial for its development. 
 
It might be asked whether this problem would be settled by the latest development 
in the government policy support for social enterprises – the initiation of Social 
Enterprise Promotion Bill. I shall shortly try to show that this new development 
does not invalidate my argument. Let me first deal with the problem how the 
continued reliance of Thai social enterprises on the existing legal forms impedes 
further development of the social enterprise sector. 
 
It is worth re-emphasising that social enterprises are not identified by the specific 
legal forms they have adopted but rather by their orientations, i.e. the objectives and 
activities they are pursuing (especially those characterised by the triple bottom line 
goals) and the manner in which they manage their profits – to what extent are the 
profits subject to non-distribution constraint? Practically, this does not seem to pose 
any serious problem. A social enterprise operating within any of the main legal 
forms can always continue to do so until it decides to cease its existence or to opt 
for other objectives. 
 
However, the problem of this continued reliance on the traditional legal forms 
seems obvious. That is, social enterprises operate formally either as for-profit or 
non-profit organisations. Despite their use of a legal form that can be regarded as 
“not-for-profit” in character, such as the co-operative, legally, they are not 
distinguishable from the traditional legal entities of all these types. The implication 
this has for the development of the social enterprise sector seems also clear. That 
is, if our goal is to develop the sector, particularly by bringing more people into it, 
it should be formally recognisable. Obviously, however, operating as traditional 
legal entities, they will continue to be undistinguishable from these entities in the 
eyes of the public, thereby failing to draw on them for the recruitment of future 
social entrepreneurs. 
 
There always are people who want to engage in not-for-profit or voluntary 
activities. We are indeed witnessing an emerging enthusiasm about social 
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entrepreneurship, especially among young people.35 But since this type of business 
is still new in Thailand, making it formally recognisable is very important. Most 
Thai people are still unfamiliar with the idea of business with a social mission.36 
For-profit enterprises are expected, or indeed destined, to perform as what they 
formally are – that is, profit-making ventures, whereas non-profits are expected, or 
even required, to depend on donations and grants rather than engage in business 
activities.  
 
With the Thai people generally remaining unfamiliar with the nature of social 
enterprise, and with the latter remaining formally unrecognisable, this type of 
business would be attractive to only a limited number of people. In other words, 
this continued state of affairs will fail to provide an incentive to social 
entrepreneurship, which is, in my view, a crucial condition for the growth and 
development of the social enterprise sector. According to a recent survey, this lack 
of incentive is a major obstacle to the development of social enterprise in 
Thailand.37 Without such an incentive, how could we promote this new sector in 
this country? 
 
In addition to its implications identified above, the problem of branding also poses 
serious practical difficulty for Thai social entrepreneurs. The difficulty is, again, 
related to the social enterprise sector still remaining formally and practically 
unrecognisable in Thai society. To highlight only one aspect of this difficulty, even 
                                                                 
35
 As Evans and Amnuaiporn have pointed out, ‘[i]n many Southeast Asian countries, the younger 
generation is paying increasing attention to social entrepreneurship. This new trend lends new hope 
that the solution to many problems faced by Southeast Asia’s disadvantaged will be tackled by those 
young social entrepreneurs…In Thailand…many competitions for young social entrepreneurs over 
the past two years have helped encourage young people to participate and develop their social 
business plans along the principles of social enterprises e.g. the Social Enterprise Business Plan 
Competition, arranged in collaboration with Chulalongkorn Business School, CYPN, British 
Council, Change Fusion and others’. Pred Evans and Sumalee Amnuaiporn, ‘Social 
Entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia’ 9 Trendnovation Southeast Asia 3.  
36
 The Thai people are of course becoming familiar with corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
are actually demanding further expansion of contributions, especially by large corporations, to the 
advancement of the common good of society. However, most people still know very little about 
social enterprise, and even the more knowledgeable of them still cannot see the crucial differences 
between CSR and social enterprise. 
37
 Change Fusion, Final Report on the Social Enterprise Promotion Research Project with the Moral 
Promotion Centre’s Fiscal 2009 Funding Support (2010) (the project was submitted to the Moral 
Promotion Centre).  
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social enterprises functioning as for-profit organisations tend to face greater 
difficulty than traditional businesses in securing funding.  
 
The reason for such difficulty seems clear. Not profit-maximising in their operation, 
social enterprises are mostly involved in “unprofitable” ventures, such as providing 
services to the disabled and other disadvantaged groups in society. Private financial 
sources like commercial banks are therefore justifiably reluctant to provide them 
with funding. On their part, social investors and philanthropists, who might 
otherwise be important alternative sources, are also justifiably reluctant to offer 
financial support to them – but for precisely opposite reasons. For social investors 
and philanthropists, the crucial problem is that there are no guarantees that social 
enterprises operating as the traditional for-profit entities will not later change their 
orientation and become profit-maximising. Hence, we may conclude, reliance on 
such legal forms does not permit social enterprises to be readily formally 
recognisable as such.  
 
One of the social enterprise operators I had an opportunity to talk with revealed real 
practical problems of this type being faced by Thai social entrepreneurs who have 
adopted the limited company form. The problem faced by the operators of Open 
Dream, a company engaging in IT business, is a case in point.38 The difficulty it has 
experienced in gaining access to funding is not directly related to the limited 
company form it has adopted but has rather been mainly caused by the “branding” 
problem. It is not clear for most people how an IT company could provide benefit 
to society.39 As the company is not generally seen as creating social impact, it is 
difficult for it to attract investment capital. Whereas private investors tend to view 
it as an NGO, philanthropic organisations often regard it as a for-profit company 
aiming to maximise profit rather than social benefits. This clearly shows that social 
enterprises in Thailand have a problem of clarifying their status and role in society 
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 Interview with Patipat Susampao, managing director of Open Dream (Bangkok, Thailand, 26 
February 2013) 
39
 The company’s main job is to assist those who directly work to create such benefits – such as in 
constructing the website for Mo Chao Ban [Doctors for the General Populace]. The website 
www.doctor.or.th now contains information derived from the magazine of this name which has been 
regularly published for more than 30 years. 
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– a state of affairs that definitely justifies the need to develop a legal form specially 
designed for social enterprises in this country.40 
 
I have so far focused on branding as being associated with the need for social 
enterprise to be readily recognisable (in particular, the need for it not to be mistaken 
for either an NGO or a traditional company, as the case may be), but the idea is not 
simply meant to be restricted to the need for social enterprise to be recognised as 
such. Branding is also conceived as a means of inspiring public trust and confidence 
arising from the social enterprise operating within a familiar legal vehicle, 
especially one which is well recognised for transparency and accountability.  
 
Whereas, as indicated above, the need for social enterprise to be readily 
recognisable was derived from my fieldwork in Thailand, there has so far been no 
study testifying to a legal form being capable of inspiring public trust and 
confidence. At this stage we can only expect that my proposed SIC, once it has been 
adopted as a legal form for social enterprise, would be recognised for its efficiency 
(in much the same way as the limited company has been widely so recognised in 
the business community in Thailand), as well as for its transparency and 
accountability, given its governance features and the regulatory regime in which it 
must operate. The experience of the UK’s CIC and charities might also be 
instructive.  
 
The CIC has experienced growing popularity, with the number of organisations 
registered as CICs already passing the 10,000 mark in November 2014, and their 
‘…increased recognition has…had an impact on the NHS, with the majority of 
health spin-outs choosing the CIC brand as their way forward’.41 On the other hand, 
a recent study on public trust and confidence in charities in the UK has identified, 
among other factors, the public concern whether charities are “well managed”. This 
particularly involves their transparency and accountability: ‘Concerns about how 
                                                                 
40
 According to the managing director of Open Dream, 80-90 per cent of Thai social enterprises 
operate as non-profit organisations and only about 10 per cent of them are for-profit businesses with 
social purposes. Such a situation reinforces the belief or understanding that if one wants to help other 
people, one should not make profit but, like a charitable organisation, rather seek grants and 
donations. Such a view does not augur well for the development of the social enterprise sector. 
41
 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Annual Report 2014/2015 (10th 
Anniversary edition, BIS 2015) 16-17. 
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charities spend their money are felt widely’.42 In Scotland a similar research has 
produced a similar research finding, i.e. the public concern that money go ‘to good 
causes, rather than staff salaries’.43 From such findings we may infer that a legal 
vehicle specifically designed to suit both the commercial and stakeholding needs of 
social enterprise can be expected to inspire public trust and confidence. 
 
It is not difficult to see how practical difficulty faced by social enterprise operators 
would impede the growth of the social enterprise sector. The difficulty in accessing 
funding sources would of course have a crucial implication in this respect. But the 
fact that the sector is still formally unrecognisable would also seriously affect the 
efforts of social entrepreneurs and their supporters to create popular awareness of, 
and enthusiasm for, this type of business. Needless to say, popular understanding 
and support is a really crucial ingredient in the development of the social enterprise 
sector. 
 
Funding is a fundamental problem being faced by small businesses in general, 
including social enterprises. However, in so far as the problem of “branding” is 
concerned, a legal form like the proposed SIC can be expected to relieve Thai social 
enterprises of at least some difficulty. Social investors and consumers or users of 
its services and products will know that a company operating a SIC is truly social 
benefit-oriented, while prospective loan providers will not mistaken it as an NGO. 
At this point, we might ask if the current legislative project, the Social Enterprise 
Promotion Bill, would invalidate the argument I have made thus far. In particular, 
it is very important to make clear if certain regulatory arrangements being planned 
under this project would result in changing the situation I have described. 
 
One such arrangement is the social enterprise certification system. Indeed, under 
the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill (still to be enacted), only the social enterprises 
registered under this law are permitted to use the “social enterprise” tag in their 
business names. Moreover, there is also an arrangement for social enterprises to 
incorporate as limited companies under the Civil and Commercial Code 1992 and 
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 Charity Commission, Public trust and confidence in charities: Research conducted by Populous 
(Populous, 2016) 4. 
43
 OSCR: Scottish Charity Regulator, Scottish Charity Surveys 2016 – General Public Research 
Findings, June 2016 10. 
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hence to operate as not-for-profits (that is, as what has been referred to as “Social 
Enterprise Type A”). Together, such arrangements would have the important effect 
of formalising the social enterprise sector (i.e. making it more formally recognisable 
among members of the general public) and incorporating Thai social enterprises 
with a crucial stakeholder feature – the non-distribution constraint (the no-
dividend/asset-lock mechanisms). 
 
We cannot certainly deny that once the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill becomes 
law the Thai social enterprise movement would experience a very significant 
progress, not only in terms of public policy support for social enterprises, but also 
in so far as the sector’s legal status is concerned. However, the legislative project 
has important limitations: in my view, it does not adequately address the need to 
formalise the social enterprise sector – which, as I have been trying to demonstrate, 
would have significant implications for its growth. 
 
We should not forget that the certification system (which has already been 
implemented) serves principally as an administrative mechanism for providing 
financial support for social enterprises. Even though once the system is further 
formalised under the Social Enterprise Promotion Act (when it is enacted) social 
enterprises will be formally registered, there is no guarantee that the social 
enterprise sector will become more formally recognisable. Let me further elaborate 
on this point. 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 7, the law (as it is being conceived) allows social 
enterprises to be registered as either Social Enterprise Type A (no dividend/asset 
lock) or Social Enterprise Type B (social purpose/re-investment). I nevertheless do 
not agree with the idea of reserving the label “social enterprise” for only those 
enterprises registered under this law. In so far as in the UK, for example, “social 
enterprises” are not limited to those incorporated as CICs, so “social enterprises” in 
Thailand should not be restricted to the so-called Type A and Type B entities. Any 
enterprise, even a small unincorporated organisation, should be able to call itself 
“social enterprise” as long as it pursues its goals and activities in a manner 
warranting it being referred as such. Such a restrictive legal provision would have 
an important effect of restricting, rather than expanding, the social enterprise sector. 
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Of course, there is a tricky issue here. Without such a restriction, the social 
enterprise sector would suffer from greater confusion. The variety of social 
enterprises would be expanded, with two additional types of social enterprises, the 
Social Enterprises Type A and Type B, coming into being. However, my point here 
is that even a restrictive legal provision as it is being conceived is not likely to result 
in the social enterprise sector becoming more formally recognisable than it is now. 
As we have seen, the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill expects social enterprises 
registered under it to operate within some legal form or another (if they want to rely 
on any legal vehicle at all), and the Social Enterprises Type A, in particular, are 
expected to register as limited companies under the Civil and Commercial Code 
1992. However, I do not see that these social enterprises, even with the legally 
required name tag “social enterprise”, are likely to be more formally recognisable 
as such. This is essentially because they are at the same time the legal entities under 
other laws – the Civil and Commercial Code or any other law. For example, Social 
Enterprises Type A incorporated as limited companies are likely to be perceived as 
such by members of the public (who are still unfamiliar with social enterprise), 
despite the “social enterprise” label they are carrying. So now we are back to where 
we started: without a legal vehicle specially designed for social enterprises, the 
sector is likely to remain formally unrecognisable. 
 
To conclude this section, let me briefly explain how such a legal vehicle would 
solve this “branding” problem. In my view, at least two factors are of decisive 
importance. The first factor involves the need for a specific “brand”: the CIC, for 
example, is definitely a social enterprise, in the sense that it is not at the same time 
any other legal entity. The other factor involves the brand that is associated with a 
specific “legal form”: to what extent is it designed to incorporate the essential 
features of social enterprise, such as those identified in Chapters 2-4? A legal form 
that has been designed to sufficiently represent the nature, and facilitate the 
operation, of social enterprises would have an important effect of inspiring the 
confidence of social entrepreneurs (and those interested in or contemplating 
entering the social enterprise sector) in using it as well as the public trust that the 
organisations operating within it are authentic social enterprises. It is the confidence 
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and trust in both the “brand” and the “legal form” associated with it that provides a 
crucial condition for the growth of the sector.  
 
The CIC is again a case in point. Though not all social enterprises in the UK operate 
as CICs, the growing confidence and trust it has inspired must have importantly led 
to the spectacular rise in the number of CICs during the past decade. We can even 
foresee that, while the social enterprise sector in this country will remain diverse 
with social enterprises assuming various legal structures, the sector will be 
increasingly associated with the “CIC brand”. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
My primary purpose in this chapter is to propose a new legal form for social 
enterprise that is modeled upon the legal blueprint developed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
While this new legal form is required because it is one which embodies the essential 
features of social enterprises and which meets the needs of social entrepreneurs, I 
have also reaffirmed this requirement in view of its implications for the problem of 
“branding” and the development of the Thai social enterprise sector. That is, I have 
argued that if our goal is further develop the sector, we need a legal form 
specifically designed for social enterprises. I have tried to explain how such a legal 
form is associated with the problem of social enterprise branding and the 
development of the social enterprise sector. I have also pointed out that the initiation 
of the new legislative project on social enterprise does not satisfy my argument for 
the need for such a legal form. 
 
I have thus presented both the case for such a legal vehicle, which I provisionally 
propose to call a “social interest company”, or SIC, and its design. In proposing this 
legal vehicle, I have considered whether or not its main components are already 
familiar to the Thai business community and Thai society in general. This is to make 
sure that the SIC in its proposed form is hopefully workable and acceptable as a 
legal vehicle for social enterprises in Thailand. 
 
I recognise that the introduction of legislation on a new legal vehicle for social 
enterprises requires a political decision. Hence, one alternative arrangement for the 
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use of the limited company form has also been proposed, which basically 
transforms it into a limited company with social mission. The advantages of this 
corporate legal form have been confirmed by the new legislative project, which 
proposes a similar arrangement – that is, an arrangement for social enterprises to 
incorporate as limited companies and operate as not-for-profits. Other arrangements 
for a creative use of the existing legal forms are possible, but this arrangement under 
the new legislative project, which will hopefully become law in the near future, 
seems to have settled our choice. 
 Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Taking the legal forms for social enterprise as its central theme, this thesis has 
emphasised the importance of a legal form specifically designed for this type of 
business. Indeed, the availability of such a legal vehicle is considered very 
important to the operation of social enterprises and the development of the social 
enterprise sector itself. The initiation of the community interest company (CIC) in 
the United Kingdom in the mid-2000s unmistakably testifies to this importance. 
 
I have stressed that the social enterprise sector requires a diversity of legal structures 
to meet its vast and varied nature. However, a legal vehicle specially tailored to the 
needs of social enterprises not only satisfies their hybrid nature evident in their 
pursuit of both business and social goals but also provides the sector with 
“branding”. Thailand still does not have such a legal vehicle, and this shortcoming 
has provided a rationale for my proposal in this thesis for its development. 
 
The CIC can actually serve as a “model” or “blueprint” for the development of a 
Thai version of this legal vehicle for social enterprise. But I have deemed it more 
appropriate to design an ideal-type legal form for this type of business rather than 
adopt a legal-transplant approach. The ideal-type is of course based on my 
understanding of social enterprise in the real world – i.e. understanding of its origin 
and development, as well as its characteristics and orientation. This is admittedly 
the Euro-Atlantic world, where social enterprise as a concept has most clearly 
developed. Social enterprise thus developed has now been generally accepted in 
other parts of the world, and the ideal-type derived thereof can presumably be 
expected to have, mutatis mutandis, universal applicability. 
 
Designing this ideal-type, or blueprint, of legal forms for social enterprises 
represents the central part of my thesis. The blueprint incorporates the 
characteristics essential for the operation of social enterprise as understood in this 
thesis. It thus provides a conceptual framework for both analysis and organisation 
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of the thesis’s subject-matter. In particular, the analysis of the CIC and the main 
legal forms adopted by Thai social enterprises and the designing of a legal vehicle 
for social enterprises in Thailand have been undertaken within this framework. The 
thesis is divided into four parts; sub-sections 9.2.1-9.2.4 below provide a synopsis 
of what has been achieved in each respective part. 
 
9.2 What Has Been Achieved? 
 
9.2.1 Social enterprise as understood in this thesis 
 
In Part 1 of the thesis, which has provided a conceptual perspective (including a 
framework for analysis), I have addressed a crucial issue of how we can understand 
social enterprise. Instead of trying to come up with a rigorous definition, I have 
opted to understand social enterprise in terms of its origin, development, as well as 
characteristics and orientation. I first dealt with the confusion surrounding social 
enterprise and other related terms – notably “social entrepreneurship”, “third 
sector”, “social economy”, and “non-profit sector”.  
 
I have used the term “social enterprise” as a type of business; hence, it is clearly not 
part of the non-profit sector. It rather needs to be “enterprising” or “entrepreneurial” 
(i.e. innovative and creative) like any business. But unlike a traditional, profit-
maximising business, it is not-for-profit in its orientation. That is, while it generates 
revenue through commercial activities and needs to be financially viable, the 
revenue thus generated is not meant for private profit-sharing. Part of the profit 
must be re-invested in further development of its business or used for community 
benefit. Social enterprise is thus hybrid in nature, lying somewhere between the 
traditional for-profit business on the one hand, and the non-profit sector on the 
other. 
 
The term “not-for-profit” more or less characterises this hybrid nature of social 
enterprise. Confusion nevertheless remains with terms such as the social economy 
and the third sector. The latter term is clearly associated with the idea of the “three 
sector economy” comprising the private sector, the public sector and the third 
sector. But whereas the social economy is similarly understood as occupying the 
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intermediate space between the private and public sectors, it is also sometimes 
characterised as part of the third sector – i.e. functioning as its “trading side”. 
Confusion has arisen – whether the third sector and the social economy are more or 
less the same; or, if not, how they are different. 
 
The purpose of my thesis is not to theorise about the relationship between the third 
sector, the social economy and social enterprise. However, to minimise the 
confusion associated with these terms and to provide a theoretical grounding for my 
understanding of social enterprise, I accept the idea of it being associated with the 
“new entrepreneurship” that developed within the third sector. Lying on the 
intermediate space between the public and private sectors, the third sector is 
generally understood as providing goods and services that are not delivered by the 
market and the state. It fills the gaps left by these two main sectors in society.  
 
But a crucial nuance has been introduced here. In particular, the difference between 
the third sector and the private sector is not simply one between the for-profit and 
non-profit sectors. Essentially in the European context, the difference is rather one 
between the “profit-oriented” and “social” economy. The difference is particularly 
influenced by the predominantly European social economy tradition, which is 
evident in the “democratic” aspect of the third sector in the UK and elsewhere in 
Europe. I have further developed this “third-sector” dimension into a crucial aspect 
of social enterprise – i.e. its “stakeholding” nature – in Chapter 4. 
 
A problem faced by the third sector is that it needs to be financially viable, and as 
grants and donations have been drying up, it needs to be more entrepreneurial in its 
orientation. That is why “new entrepreneurship” developed from within this sector. 
Of course, other factors have also been relevant, such as the influence of the “new 
public management”, but all this has resulted in the increased reliance on the 
revenue generated through trading. Social enterprise has, from this theoretical point 
of view, developed as such a new entrepreneurship. 
 
It needs nevertheless to be emphasised that one central aspect of this “new 
entrepreneurship” is the requirement (absolute or partial) for the production of 
surplus to be “socialised”, i.e. re-invested in further development of the enterprise 
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or used for the benefit of the community. It is this “social” or “stakeholding” aspect 
of the new entrepreneurship that characterises social enterprise, especially in so far 
as this involves its “democratic” governance in addition to its “triple bottom line” 
(social, commercial and environmental) objectives. 
 
An understanding of social enterprise in this way points to its characteristics and 
orientation. I have identified three general orientations, namely, the “social 
purpose” perspective inherent in it being a business with a social mission, the 
“socialisation” perspective rooted in what I call its stakeholding aspect, and its 
economic or “entrepreneurial” orientation. On the basis of these orientations of 
social enterprise I have characterised it as having three central features that mark it 
off from other socially beneficial activities: (1) entrepreneurial orientation, (2) 
social purpose, and (3) social control over its assets and activities. The 
environmental goal which normally forms part of its triple bottom line is here 
subsumed under its social purpose characteristic. 
 
Finally, I have considered the development of social enterprise in the UK with a 
view to understanding social enterprise in a specific national context. I have pointed 
out that the emergence of social enterprise in the UK, as in most other OECD 
countries, is the result of the institutionalisation of this movement, I have then 
traced its development at various stages from about the end of the 1990s. The 
landmark of this development is the establishment of the meaning and orientation 
of social enterprise in the early 2000s, culminating in the initiation of the CIC in 
2005. 
 
9.2.2 Designing a legal form for social enterprise 
 
My understanding of social enterprise described above has led me to develop an 
ideal-type, or a blueprint, of legal forms for social enterprise in Part 2 of the thesis, 
which includes Chapters 3 and 4. The purpose is to use it as an ideal-type legal 
vehicle against which existing legal forms such as the CIC and a number of legal 
structures currently used by Thai social enterprises can be evaluated, and as a 
blueprint for the development of a legal form for social enterprises in Thailand. 
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On the basis of my understanding of social enterprise I have identified the most 
important features such a blueprint of legal forms for social enterprise should 
possess. Chapters 3 and 4 have been devoted to the development of this blueprint, 
which involves a conceptual analysis of the essential components, in the form of 
normative legal requirements, which should be incorporated into a legal vehicle for 
social enterprise. The blueprint serves as an analytical and organisational 
framework for all subsequent chapters, except Chapter 7, which presents the Thai 
social enterprise landscape. 
 
Essentially, I have explored two aspects of a legal form for social enterprise – the 
facilitative and regulative rules. Like all other organisations, large or small, a social 
enterprise requires both types of rules: the facilitative rules primarily reduce the 
transaction costs incurred by its internal as well as external contractual relations, 
and the regulatory rules provide appropriate protection for those involved in its 
operation. 
 
I have explored certain conceptual issues relating to legal forms for organisations 
(together with a synoptic view of existing legal forms) and the needs of social 
entrepreneurs from their legal form (mainly an organisation with its own legal 
personality, protection against risk, the raising of finance, and longevity). But given 
the stakeholding nature of social enterprise, a crucial part of its legal aspects 
consists of the rules to assure accountability to stakeholders. I have proposed these 
as mandatory requirements for a legal vehicle for social enterprise.     
 
The blueprint is based on the limited liability company form, which already 
provides it with the fundamental needs of social entrepreneurs indicated above. Its 
mandatory rules, on the other hand, include the agency cost reduction, the asset 
lock, the social benefit objective, stakeholder participation and the stakeholder 
board, the directors’ duties and competence, the external regulator and social 
disclosure. 
 
These requirements may be characterised as normative in nature – i.e. features that 
should be incorporated into the legal form as its essential part. In certain national 
contexts it might not be possible for all these features to be incorporated as statutory 
267 
 
rules. Some of them might still need to remain optional or default rules. As an ideal-
type, the blueprint includes all of them as mandatory requirements. 
 
I have concluded this crucial part of my thesis with a reference to the stewardship 
model on governance, because a question is raised whether it might be more 
appropriate to view social enterprise from a more positive perspective on human 
nature offered by this model. Managers are here presumed to be good stewards 
diligently working to maximise the company’s profit. They are thus viewed as 
trustworthy and should be fully empowered. They are also presumed to have a wide 
range of motives beyond self-interest, such as the desire for achievement and 
recognition, the intrinsic satisfaction of good performance and success, and so forth. 
 
However, I have raised a problem with this governance model. In particular, the 
assessment of trust, which is an abstract idea, is not easy. Whether in reality 
managers would always act in accordance with the model is thus questionable. Even 
in social enterprises, where we might be tempted to expect managers to act 
altruistically, we cannot take this for granted. Hence, since we cannot expect agents 
in social enterprises to be more altruistic and trustworthy, the social enterprises, like 
all other organisations, require effective governance that is not simply based on 
trust. Indeed, in so far as the stakeholder requirements are concerned, mandatory 
rules to ensure compliance are necessary. 
 
9.2.3 Existing legal forms for social enterprise evaluated 
 
Comprising Chapters 5 and 6, Part 3 of the thesis has evaluated existing legal forms 
for social enterprises in the UK and Thailand. From among the UK legal forms only 
the CIC has been selected for this purpose, whereas the assessment of Thai legal 
forms has covered both the for-profit and non-profit structures, i.e. the partnership, 
the limited company, and the foundation. 
 
The CIC is a legal form specifically designed to suit the characteristics and 
orientation of social enterprise. I thus deem it useful to see how much the CIC 
matches the ideal-type legal blueprint. This exercise is useful not just as a test of 
the blueprint’s applicability to the real world of social enterprises. Equally 
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important, as the CIC has already been in use for about a decade, if it more or less 
marches the blueprint, then this could be of much practical value to the development 
of a legal vehicle for social enterprises in Thailand. This means that we shall be 
able to benefit from both a “theoretical model” in the form of the blueprint and a 
“practical guideline” provided by the CIC. 
 
I have considered the CIC in Chapter 5, starting with its initiation and legislation in 
the early 2000s. I have pointed out that the initiation of the CIC was closely 
associated with the belief that creating an entrepreneurial culture could help deliver 
social justice to society, locally and nationally. With this belief, the New Labour 
Government committed itself to building a more enterprising society, creating 
opportunities for all and tackling barriers to a successful enterprise. This eventually 
led to the legislation of a custom-made legal form for community and social 
enterprises called “Community Interest Company”. The rationale for the creation 
of such a legal form involved the difficulties faced by social enterprises in 
explaining their business model to stakeholders, especially funders, who might 
suspect that the funding they provided might end up in private hands. The CIC was 
thus expected to bring about crucial improvements in access to finance, the asset-
lock approach and branding. 
 
CICs would be formed as companies under the Companies Act 2006 rather than a 
product of a “stand-alone” legislation. I have explored the advantages of a corporate 
legal vehicle being legislated in this way in Chapter 3 (the same strategy has been 
proposed for the legislation of a Thai legal form for social enterprise in Chapter 8).  
 
Following this brief presentation of the initiation and legislation of the CIC, I have 
explored in depth how this legal vehicle meets the needs of social entrepreneurs and 
to what extent it satisfies the mandatory rules especially those assuring its 
accountability to stakeholders. With regard to social entrepreneurs’ needs I have 
pointed out that as limited companies, CICs are provided with a separate legal 
personality and limited liability protection, that they follow the same incorporation 
and reporting procedures as other companies, and that they have the same 
provisions on directors’ duties and members’ rights and duties. I have also 
elaborated the CIC start-up process and rules facilitating its operation, especially 
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those embedded in the model memorandum and articles. In addition, in order to see 
how, and to what extent, CICs operate their business for the benefit of the 
community and the wider public, I have fully explored provisions ensuring their 
operation in this direction. 
 
I have found that the CIC as a legal form for social enterprises more or less meets 
most of the mandatory stakeholding requirements, particularly those involving the 
agency cost reduction, the asset lock, the social benefit objective, directors’ duties 
and competence, and the external regulator and social disclosure. Nonetheless, the 
CIC is not subject to statutory provisions on stakeholder participation and the 
stakeholder board. I have expressed my view, in this regard, that whereas the CIC 
Regulator provides useful voluntary rules on the CIC’s relations with stakeholders, 
it is unfortunate that a mandatory rule for a stakeholder board has not been included 
in the CIC structure, which would otherwise have made it most distinct from other 
legal forms adopted by social entrepreneurs. 
 
Without a CIC equivalent, Thai social enterprises still rely on a number of legal 
forms, none of which is particularly suitable for this type of business. I have found 
that six legal structures serve as vehicles for Thai social enterprises, and that many 
social enterprises do not operate as any legal entity at all. Moreover, incorporated 
or unincorporated organisations can register as community enterprises under the 
Community Enterprise Promotion Act 2005. My analysis of the legal forms for Thai 
social enterprises has been limited to only the two for-profit legal forms, the 
partnership and the limited company, and one non-profit structure, the foundation. 
 
The limited company form more or less meets social entrepreneurs’ needs for an 
organisation with a separate legal personality, limited liability protection, the 
raising of finance, longevity, agency cost reduction, some extent of directors’ duties 
and competence and social disclosure. The ordinary partnership form, either 
registered or unregistered, hardly meets these needs, whereas the limited 
partnership, which bears a close resemblance to the limited company, only partially 
satisfies the requirement for limited liability protection. 
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Neither the partnership of any type, nor the limited company, however, meets the 
model legal vehicle’s mandatory requirements to assure accountability to 
stakeholders, namely, the asset lock, the social benefit objective, stakeholder 
participation and the stakeholder board, and the external regulator. The regulatory 
deficiency in this respect can be expected: the rationale for the partnership and 
company law is to facilitate the running of purely for-profit enterprises. Its 
orientation is obviously incompatible with the nature of social enterprise. 
 
On the other hand, as a non-profit, the foundation more or less meets most of the 
blueprint’s mandatory requirements, particularly the social benefit objective, the 
non-distribution constraint, directors’ duties and competence, stakeholder 
participation, the external regulator and social disclosure. Like a limited company, 
the foundation is an organisation with a separate legal personality; the individual 
members of its committee are provided with limited liability protection. However, 
as a non-profit, it is severely handicapped in raising finance and generating revenue. 
 
Clearly, the two traditional types of legal structures, the for-profit and non-profit 
legal forms, are not particularly suitable for the business with social mission nature 
of social enterprises. However, I have argued that the limited company form offers 
the best option among the existing legal forms. For this reason I have proposed, in 
Chapter 8, an arrangement for the use of this corporate form as an alternative to a 
specially designed legal vehicle for social enterprises (which I deem imperative to 
both the operation of social enterprises and the development of the social enterprise 
sector), in case the initiation of this specific legal vehicle is still not possible. The 
Social Enterprises Type A as being conceived under the legislative project to be 
touched upon in Chapters 7 and 8 is more or less the same as this alternative 
arrangement. 
 
9.2.4 Surveying the Thai social enterprise landscape and creating a legal form 
for social enterprises in Thailand 
 
The last part of the thesis has examined, in Chapter 7, the Thai social enterprise 
landscape. The question I have addressed in this chapter is how Thai social 
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enterprises emerged, and how the public-policy infrastructure for this type of 
business has developed during the past few years. 
 
The Thai social enterprise sector is different from its British counterpart, in that it 
does not have an equivalent of the CIC. My analysis of the existing state of the Thai 
social enterprise sector has reaffirmed the need for a legal structure tailor-made to 
suit the needs of Thai social enterprise. 
 
My exploration of the Thai social enterprise landscape in Chapter 7 has found that 
though social enterprises, in some form or another, have been around since about 
the 1970s, the concept “social enterprise” has only recently been introduced into 
Thailand. In particular, the triple bottom line objectives of social enterprise have 
been generally accepted, even though “social enterprise” as a concept remains 
unfamiliar in Thai society, where most people, at best, are likely to confuse it with 
corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
 
However, there has developed a social-support infrastructure in the form of social 
enterprise networks providing various types of support, including funding for start-
up enterprises. Moreover, a public-policy infrastructure for social enterprises has 
emerged in the form of Cabinet regulations, a Master Plan for Social Enterprise 
Development and the establishment of the Thai Social Enterprise Office (TSEO). 
Most recently, a legislative project, the Social Enterprise Promotion Bill, has been 
initiated. Under this new law (still to be enacted) social enterprises may be 
registered as Social Enterprises Type A (no dividend/asset lock) or Social 
Enterprises Type B (social purpose/re-investment). Type-A social enterprises, 
which must also have social purpose and reinvestment as their fundamental 
features, are expected to incorporate as limited companies and operate as not-for-
profits. All these developments represent crucial progress in fostering the Thai 
social enterprise sector, but I have pointed out that they are still not sufficient to 
further develop the sector. 
 
Together with my analysis of the main legal forms for Thai social enterprises in 
Chapter 6, the finding of this shortcoming has given me a rationale for the 
development of a specially designed legal vehicle for Thai social enterprises in 
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Chapter 8. This rationale has been reaffirmed by my exploration in this chapter of 
the importance of “branding” to the growth of the social enterprise sector.  
 
The problem Thai social enterprises are currently facing are significantly related to 
the sector not being more clearly defined. More specifically, reliance on the existing 
legal forms does not permit social enterprises to be recognisable as such in Thai 
society. I have pointed out that, though the new law being prepared on social 
enterprises represents crucial progress in the development of government policy 
support for this type of business, the registration of social enterprises as Type A and 
Type B under the new law (following its promulgation) does not solve the social 
enterprise “branding” problem. The social enterprise sector is not likely to be more 
formally recognisable, and this, I have argued, has significant implications for the 
growth of the sector. 
 
Both the unsuitability of the existing legal structures for social enterprises and the 
“branding” problem provide, in my view, an enhanced rationale for my proposal 
for a specially designed legal vehicle for social enterprise – or, alternatively, certain 
legal arrangements for this purpose. I have provisionally termed such a legal vehicle 
“Social Interest Company (SIC)”. 
 
The “blueprint” for the creation of this proposed legal vehicle is naturally the ideal-
type legal form I have developed in Chapters 3 and 4. The ideal-type is based on a 
corporate legal form, and in Thailand such a form already exists; hence, the legal 
vehicle for Thai social enterprises is proposed to be created as a variant of the main 
corporate legal form – the limited company.  
 
As a business organisation, the proposed legal vehicle will operate in much the same 
way as the existing limited company, benefiting from the latter’s flexibility and 
familiarity in the Thai business community. In matters relating to governance, 
relevant provisions of the Civil and Commercial Code will apply, such as those on 
the powers and duties of the board of directors and the shareholder meeting; and, 
like the limited company, it will be subject to the insolvency and tax laws. Only in 
matters relating to its social and stakeholding missions will the legal vehicle be 
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governed by another set of rules – i.e. the mandatory requirements of the ideal-type 
legal form. 
 
It is not really difficult to see how this proposed legal vehicle would look like; so I 
shall not further elaborate on its main features, which are essentially modelled upon 
the blueprint. What should be noted is that these features are mostly not foreign to 
Thai society; they are actually present in some legal structure or another. They can 
thus be expected to be workable and acceptable. 
 
I have nevertheless admitted that initiating a new corporate legal form cannot be 
expected to be easily accomplished. I have thus proposed a “creative use of the 
existing legal forms for social enterprises”. Only one possible arrangement for this 
purpose has been suggested. 
 
As I have pointed out above, this is an arrangement for social enterprises operating 
as limited companies to include in their governing documents the main components 
of the ideal-type legal form for social enterprises – particularly the social benefit 
goal, the asset lock and social disclosure (i.e. the delivery of an annual social benefit 
report in addition to the balance sheet). Given the flexibility of the limited company 
structure, especially in terms of its capacity to accommodate the normative 
requirements of the ideal-type legal form for social enterprises, it should most 
suitably serve as a legal vehicle for Thai social enterprises. As I have also indicated, 
the Social Enterprise Type A as being conceived under the new law is actually 
similar to this proposed alternative arrangement. Therefore, I have not proposed 
any other possible arrangement, because this Type A concept seems to have settled 
our choice. 
 
9.3 Where shall we go from here? 
 
I have made it clear in Chapter 8 that in proposing that Thailand develop a legal 
vehicle to foster the social enterprise sector, it is not my intention to suggest how a 
legislative initiative could be taken for this purpose. I have admitted that the 
initiation of a legislative measure involves a political decision, and this depends, in 
turn, on whether or not the government sees the need and has a clear rationale for 
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such a measure. What I have hoped to achieve is rather to explain the need for a 
legal form specifically designed for social enterprise and supply one such a legal 
form based on the blueprint I developed in this thesis. 
 
I have pointed out that, to my knowledge, there are presently very few substantive 
studies on social enterprises in Thailand – let alone those that analyse the legal 
aspects of this type of business, as I have done in this thesis. There is no question 
about the Thai government seeing the need to promote the role of the social 
enterprise sector (although the inconsistency of government policy remains a 
problem). Its perception of such a need is evident in the recent development of a 
public-policy infrastructure for social enterprise. However, what I have not yet seen 
is a substantial effort to address the issues relating to the need for a legal form 
specially designed for social enterprise (I have so far come across only one study 
on such issues) – particularly why a legal form specifically designed for social 
enterprise is essential to the development of the sector, and what such a legal vehicle 
would look like. 
 
I am confident that by far my thesis offers the most substantive analysis of the legal 
forms for social enterprise. I also hope that the UK experiences in the initiation and 
legislation of the CIC serve as both valuable practical rationale and guideline for 
why and how a specific legal vehicle for social enterprise should be created. This 
is my rather modest aim in pursuing this comparative study of social enterprises in 
the UK and Thailand 
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Appendix 
 
1. Chao Phraya Abhaibhubes Hospital Foundation 
 
1.1 Origin and development 
 
In the late 1990s, when Thailand was suffering from a severe financial crisis, greater 
self-reliance in healthcare represented a viable approach to sustainable restoration 
of its economy. Seeing this self-reliance potential, the government supported Chao 
Phraya Abhaibhubes Hospital in creating a demonstration project on a 
comprehensive promotion of herbal medicine products.1  
 
A personal interest in herbal medicine led Dr. Supaporn Pitiporn,2 the hospital’s 
pharmacist, to engage in in-depth study of Thai traditional herbal medicine with 
local specialists in this field. She found a large number of herbal plants that could 
be used as medicine, food and cosmetics. In 1986, Clinacanthus nutans Zburm.F.X 
Lindau, a little known herb then, was chosen and developed into a glycerine 
preparation. Today it is one of the approximately 30 herbal medicine products of 
Chao Phraya Abhaibhubes Hospital approved by Thailand’s Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).3 
 
Since then other products have been developed, ranging from non-aerosol mosquito 
spray to cough syrup. Moreover, herbal extracts have also been prepared for the 
production of numerous personal care products ranging from facial creams, lotions 
to soaps. All its skin care products passed non-irritation tests by the Medical Science 
Department. Another important aspect of the project involves its relations with the 
local community and the environment. Adhering to the principle of community 
involvement and fair trade, the hospital buys herbal materials directly from the 
farmers. The volume, quality and prices of these materials are jointly determined 
for fairness. Moreover, given its concern for the environment, organic farming has 
been adopted to ensure that the cultivation of herbal plants is ecologically sound 
and environmentally friendly, as well as safe for farmers and consumers alike.4   
 
1.2 Organisation and management 
 
For legal and administrative purposes, Chao Phraya Abhaibhubes Hospital 
Foundation (CAF) was set up in 2002 to operate the herbal medicine development 
project. As a non-profit organisation, the foundation can register its products with 
the FDA and legally place them on sale. CAF runs its activities under the 
supervision of the foundation committee. 
 
To meet the need for the development and production of quality herbal medicine, 
in 2003 CAF set up a pharmaceutical factory well equipped with production 
                                                                 
1
 Abhaibhubes, ‘History of the Organisation’ <www.abhaiherb.com/about/history> accessed 15 
March 2013 
2
 Interview with Dr Supaporn Pitiporn, Head Pharmacist, Abhaibhubes Hospital (Prachinburi, 
Thailand, 18 February 2013)  
3
 Abhaibhubes, ‘About Us’ <www.abhaiherb.com/en/about> accessed 15 March 2013 
4
 ibid. 
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machinery, quality control inspection tools, and a microbiological laboratory. It has 
since developed its production and testing processes, and has continually passed 
GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) inspections in the categories of herbal 
medicine, cosmetics, and health beverages. 
 
CAF’s income comes mainly from the sale of the herbal medicine products. 70 per 
cent of the profit goes to the hospital to help cover its medical expenses, and the 
remaining 30 per cent is reserved for reinvestment in the development herbal 
medicine products and in running the foundation’s social activities. At present, 
according to Supaporn, CAF does not have any serious financial problem since it 
makes profit every year. It also does not rely on grants and donations. It is currently 
satisfied with its sustainable growth and performance, though it does not plan to 
expand the business now.  
 
CAF has been attempting to educate people about benefits of traditional herbal 
medicine and also to encourage them to take herbal drugs as the first resort when 
attending to minor illnesses such as colds, aches and allergies. As has been 
indicated, it produces and sells its herbal medicine by itself. It directly buys herbs 
from local farmers (who grow organic herbal plants under its supervision) with 
prices that are slightly higher than the market ones. This helps create income and 
employment in the community. In Thailand “Abhaibhubes” has already become a 
very well-known brand for high-quality, low-price herbal medicine products. 
 
1.3 CAF as a social enterprise 
 
According to Supaporn, CAF views itself as self-evident social enterprise in 
healthcare services. It focuses on social benefits in terms of both community well-
being and environmental conservation. It is at the same time entrepreneurial in its 
orientation. However, as part of the hospital, CAF’s management, particularly in so 
far as decision-making is concerned, is still run more or less like a government 
agency rather than a business organisation. Supaporn understands well that being a 
non-profit relying only on grants and donations is not financially viable and difficult 
to grow. She also realises that if CAF is separated from the hospital, for example, 
by setting a company to manage the business, it can grow bigger and at the same 
time create more benefits to the community. However, she insists that she is happy 
with the way the foundation is doing now – small but stable and sustainable.  
 
In her view, CAF has reached its main aim of helping people. There is still no reason 
or motivation to change anything including its legal form and management style. 
However, it does not mean that she does not want to help more people, but it needs 
more people like her who have the same passion and readiness to work for public 
benefits. She also notes that no matter how perfect the law or management is, if 
people in general are not aware of social problems and do not care to help one 
another, then it means nothing.  
 
Supaporn admits that strict rules and regulations governing foundations impose 
limits on CAF’s expansion in production and investment. Moreover, a foundation 
is not automatically entitled to tax exemption. CAF still has to pay taxes at a two 
per-cent rate of the revenue from its sales. In addition, since the foundation is part 
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of hospital, the management and decision-making processes suffer from the normal 
bureaucratic red tape. 
 
Contact: Dr Supaporn Pitiporn 
Address: Abhaibhubes Hospital 
32/7 Moo 2 Prachin Anusorn Road, Tambon Tha-gnam, Muang District, 
Prachinburi Province 25000 
Tel: (037) 212 716 or (037) 211 088 Ext. 2171, 2172 
E-mail: webmaster@abhaiherb.com 
 
2. Anantarakkarnboriban School 
 
2.1 Origin and development 
 
Anantarakkarnboriban Health Training School (Anantarak for short) was set up in 
2006. The idea of its founder, Pornrawee Seeluangsawat,5 was to provide young 
Thai people, mostly girls, with a decent career that is currently in great demand in 
Thailand – that of caregivers for children and the elderly. Pornrawee saw that a lot 
of people in these two categories have not been properly taken care of. An 
increasing number of the elderly have been left alone. In 2007 about 600,000 of 
these people were left to live on their own. Pornrawee had thus embarked on a study 
of professional care for children and the elderly before she set up the school.6 
 
The school aims to produce personnel well trained as professional elderly and child 
caregivers. It now provides a six-month training programme covering healthcare 
and elderly and child care, as well as a programme in healthy hotel and 
accommodation management for youths, students and people of 18-35 age groups. 
The first half of the training is devoted to the study of theory and principles of care 
providing services, and, during the latter three months, the trainees engage in actual 
practice in giving such services. Each year only 4-5 training classes are offered, 
each consisting of 7-8 students. So the school annually produces about 30-40 
professional caregivers, for whom it also makes arrangements for job placement. 
Those who have decided to join the training programme can thus be confident that 
they will find a job upon completion of the training.7 
 
Apart from organising professional training, Anantarak offers paid services. It can 
provide assistant nurses to look after patients at various health institutions or 
anywhere as required by the patients’ relatives. In Hua Hin, a very popular seaside 
resort city about 200 kilometres from Bangkok, where the school is located, 
professional care and transport services for elderly or disabled visitors are available 
to enable them to have a truly pleasant and healthy stay in the area.8 
 
 
                                                                 
5
 Interview with Pornrawee Seeluangsawat, Founder and Manager, Anantarakkarnboriban School 
(Prachuabkirikhan, Thailand, 7 March 2013) 
6
 Sarinee Achavanuntakul (ed), Thailand Social Enterprise 50 (Krungthepthurakij 2010) 64. 
7
 ibid 64-65. 
8
 The Family Trees, ‘Anantarak…a great team to help seniors enjoy Hua Hin, <www.familytree-
huahin.com/1/post/2013/02/anantarak-a-great-team-to-help-seniors-enjoy-hua-hin.html> accessed 
15 March 2013 
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2.2 Organisation and management 
 
Anantarak is a private school formally established under the Private School Act 
B.E. 2550 (2007). As a juristic person with a formal school license, it has been 
allowed to run as a healthcare training school and issue certificates recognised by 
the Ministry of Education, and which qualify those who have completed the training 
course to work as caregivers in Thailand and abroad. The Ministry still maintains 
regular supervision and monitoring of its activities. 
 
According to Pornrawee, Anantarak is formally run by an executive committee. 
However, it is her “passion” for it and the existing resources of her family that are 
crucial for its operation. She does not have to pay rents for the school premises, 
which belong to the family; and the latter’s businesses, including operation of a 
youth camp resort and daycare and tours for children and the elderly, provide a 
professional and business foundation for her own business. The training programme 
organised by the school is thus relatively cheap – that is, tuition fees of 30,000 baht 
(around £600)9 for which the Government Savings Bank provides loans for those 
who need them.  
 
The main revenue of the school comes from this source. Even though Anantarak 
was set up as a school to help underprivileged children to become professional 
caregivers, the school has to pay taxes like any other mainstream private schools, 
which are normally run as private businesses. But since 2010 it has begun to gain 
some marginal profits (it suffered a net loss of 250,757 baht (around £5,015)10 in 
the previous year). Its main expenses are salaries of teachers and staff. 
 
2.3 Anantarak as a social enterprise 
 
Pornrawee emphasises that the purpose of the training programme is not simply to 
equip trainees with knowledge and skills but also to inculcate in them the right 
attitude and passion. In her view, one should not expect a huge profit from running 
a social enterprise, which is to help other people. It is thus the huge passion for the 
job that is specifically required. The school thus regularly offers free services for 
poor people, schools, hospitals, etc., in Hua Hin.  
 
From Pornrawee’s point of view a social enterprise needs to be operated as if it 
were a “business-oriented foundation”: despite its social orientation, it must be able 
to financially sustain itself and compete with for-profit companies. In the case of 
Anantarak, it is fortunate that it neither has to pay rent nor ask for grants and 
donations. It is partly supported by the founder's family-run resort business and 
other businesses.  
 
Pornrawee nevertheless recognises that as Thailand is becoming an aging society, 
she is likely to face an increasing number of profit-oriented competitors. The 
question is how to make a distinction between a social enterprise like Anantarak 
and the profit-maximising businesses. It is for this reason that there should be a 
specific legal form for social enterprises. However, she is concerned that having a 
                                                                 
9
 Bank of England, £1 can be exchanged for 50.43 Thai Baht (10 March 2016) 
10
 ibid.  
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strict law could also be a hindrance to the development of the social enterprise 
sector. In particular, the law should not impose heavy restrictions on those who want 
to enter the sector since it might discourage real social entrepreneurs while 
encouraging those who simply want to be called social entrepreneurs without the 
real intention to be so. That is why she still enthusiastically maintains that one must 
really have a “passion” for what one does as a social entrepreneur. 
 
Any law for social enterprise must, in her view, make it clear where the profit should 
go. Moreover, it should support rather than control this sector. No matter what legal 
forms we may set up for this purpose, the passion to help other people and 
transparency in running a social enterprise are most important. She thus sees the 
need for social entrepreneurs to “prove” themselves in this respect in some way or 
another for at least three years. 
 
Contact: Pornrawee Seeluangsawat 
Address: 60/71-72 Chomsin Road, Hua Hin, Prachuabkirikhan Province, 77110 
Tel: 0-3253-1166, 0-3251-4100, Fax: 0-3251-4100 
Website: www.anantarak.com 
 
3. Ban Dong Home Stay 
 
3.1 Origin and development 
 
Ban Dong Home Stay is a community project originated at Ban Tai Dong village of 
Ban Dong Kratong Yam sub-district in Srimahaphot District of Pachinburi 
Province, which lies to some 136 kilometres to the east of Bangkok. The people of 
Ban Dong Kratong Yam are descendants of “Tai Puan”, an ethnic Tai group whose 
ancestral land is in today’s Xiangkhouang province of Lao PDR.11  
 
Like the majority of Thai people in the rural areas, those of Ban Dong Kratong Yam 
engage in rice farming and cultivation of other crops, but Ban Tai Dong village 
specialises in the production of sieves used in boiling noodles before they are 
prepared as meals. In 2006 the village participated in a national contest of OTOP 
villages,12 and was awarded an OTOP Village Champion certificate. As a result of 
this success, not only this village but also the sub-district itself became more widely 
known nationally. Moreover, since the area is endowed with cultural (especially Tai 
Puan) and natural resources for tourism, several groups of people including those 
from government agencies began to make study-visits to it.13 
 
As a result of these experiences, the sub-district administration organisation (SAO) 
                                                                 
11
 A famous place in this province is the Plain of Jars, now listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site, 
which was not only heavily bombed by the United States but also witnessed fierce battles during the 
Vietnam War. 
12
 OTOP is an acronym for “one tambon [sub-district] one product”, a project which was launched 
about a decade ago to promote community enterprises. The idea is for a community to offer at least 
one local product to the national or even global market. 
13
 Ban Dong Kratong Yam Sub-district Administration Organisation (SAO), ‘Document submitted 
as part of the request for the assessment of Ban Dong Home Stay’ (2012) 2. 
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of Ban Dong Kratong Yam led by Mrs Ratchanee Senkhao,14 took the initiative in 
setting up a home stay as a community enterprise managed by the people in the 
community. The primary purpose was to encourage the local people to acquire 
supplementary income through this activity and thereby to upgrade their well-being.  
 
Ban Dong Kratong Yam SAO has encouraged the villagers to develop their home-
stay services in accordance with the standards established by the Ministry of 
Tourism and Sports.15 Ban Dong Home Stay passed its first assessment in 2010 for 
the period 2010-2012: eleven households were certified as meeting the home-stay 
standards.16 Now, according to Ratchanee and Mrs Duanpen Khanthong, 
chairperson of the Home Stay Executive Committee, more households are joining 
the home-stay group and being officially certified. 
 
3.2 Organisation and management 
 
Ban Dong Home Stay is a typical community enterprise. According to Ratchanee 
and Duanpen, it is functioning as a local collaborative activity without any 
particular legal structure. It is nevertheless operated by a committee chaired by 
Duanpen, a retired teacher of the local school. The committee is under an advisory 
body chaired by the SAO chief and comprising six other local officials, including 
the director of Ban Dong Kratong Yam School. The committee itself is composed 
of 17 members, plus 40 members of the households participating in the home stay 
enterprise. 
 
Ban Dong Home Stay provides more than basic room rentals. Apart from necessary 
accommodation facilities, it offers various activities that enable the visitors to 
absorb the way of life of the local people and their cultural heritage, namely: visiting 
Tai Puan Museum at Wat [Buddhist temple] Mai Dong Kratong Yam; observing the 
production of sieves, the main product of Ban Tai Dong village; experiencing Thai 
traditional massage for health; observing the processing of Prachinburi jasmine 
rice; and cycling around the Ban Dong Kratong Yam area to experience its scenic 
landscape and the living cultural life of the local people. 
 
3.3 Ban Dong Home Stay as a social enterprise 
 
The main purpose of the home stay project is to enable the villagers to acquire 
supplementary incomes. However, as a collaborative enterprise, it has also 
benefited the community: not only has it encouraged the development of 
community spirit resulting in fair distribution of financial benefits but also 
essentially contributed to the conservation of local cultural resources and the 
environment. 
 
                                                                 
14
 Interview with Ratchanee Senkhao, Chief of Ban Dong Kratong Yam SAO, and Duanpen 
Khanthong, Chairperson of Ban Dong Home Stay Committee (Prachinburi, Thailand, 21 February 
2013) 
15
 These standards, together with forms for the request for home-stay assessment, are available at 
Department of Tourism, Ministry of Tourism and Sports, ‘Home Stay Standards Thailand’  
<http://maehongson.mots.go.th/images/intro_1219219438/Download1.PDF> accessed 28 February 
2013 
16
 Ban Dong SAO (n 13) 4.  
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Moreover, even though the home stay project now provides only small 
supplementary incomes for the villagers, what these people have perhaps more 
significantly gained from participation in this community enterprise is in learning 
how to live sustainably and independently. In other words, they have been 
encouraged to learn to develop their local community on their own rather than 
depend only on government assistance.  
 
The main problem of the home stay (and many other community projects) is that it 
lacks skilled personnel who can manage the project professionally. For example, 
the home stay is just a gathering of a number of village households ready and 
willing to develop to meet the home-stay standards. They collaborate in operating 
this community enterprise without any legal advice. The home stay has so far been 
known only to a few groups of customers/tourists because those who manage it do 
not know how to promote it. In addition, it is hard to survive on a long-term basis, 
that is, how to survive its founders, some of whom are already in their late sixties. 
 
It does not matter if the operators of Ban Dong Home Stay – who are ordinary 
villagers (though some of them are former school teachers) – really know much 
about social enterprise – or whether they know anything about the British CIC. 
What they currently engage in is without doubt a social enterprise. The crucial 
problem is that a social enterprise like this, if it is to become viable on a long term 
basis as a community enterprise, needs to be run within a more formal structure.     
 
Contact: Mrs. Ratchanee Senkhao, Chief of Ban Dong Kratong Yam SAO 
Mrs. Duanpen Khanthong, Chairperson of Ban Dong Home Stay Committee  
Address: Office of Ban Dong Kratong Yam SAO, Si Mahaphot, Prachinburi 25140 
Tel: 037-572 318, 081-720 3020 
 
4. Green Net Co-operative 
 
4.1 Origin and development 
 
Green Net Cooperative is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) specialising in 
marketing farm products by directly linking producers in alternative agricultural 
networks and community business groups to consumers. It focuses on promoting 
organic farming and developing alternative markets for organic and natural 
products that are safe for consumers as well as the environment. Green Net operates 
as a distribution centre for various products including rice, cereals, fruits and 
vegetables, herbal tea, processed foods, and eco-friendly local textiles.17 
 
The agricultural sector in Thailand has been suffering from a whole range of 
problems – drought, agricultural water scarcity, soil degradation, inefficient 
production and distribution, and decline of commodity prices, among others. Vitoon 
Panyakul18 and his friends saw these problems and believed that organic farming 
represented a possible alternative in the effort to solve them. They thus decided to 
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 Green Net Co-operative, ‘About Us’ <www.greennet.or.th/about/greennet> accessed 20 March 
2013 
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 Interview with Vitoon Panyakul, President, Green Net Co-operative (Bangkok, Thailand, 19 
March 2013) 
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start a business specialising in marketing organic products.19 
 
Green Net started its business in 1993 by collecting farm products such as chemical-
free vegetables from farmer groups in various provinces for sale through a sort of 
“mobile flea markets” held at government and business organisation offices, home 
and office delivery for members, and various green and health shops in Bangkok as 
well as provincial towns. In 1994 it opened its own “Green Net Shop” in Bangkok 
and Natural Food Co-operative Shop Limited was set up to accommodate the 
growth of its business. The following year Natural Food Co-operative Shop Limited 
registered with the Ministry of Commerce as a rice exporter, and, with the 
expansion of the scope of its business activities, it changed its name to Green Net 
Co-operative in 2001. 
 
In 2000, Sayai Phandin Foundation (or Earth Net in English) was established to 
help support the work of Green Net. Now the foundation focuses on educating 
farmers, providing them with advice, creating farmer networks and links between 
farmers and consumers, as well as publishing books and articles, particularly those 
on organic farming and fair trading. In addition, according to Vitoon, a new limited 
liability company has recently been set up to manage a new product, namely coffee 
beans.  
 
4.2 Organisation and management 
 
Green Net was incorporated on 10 May 2001 as a co-operative under the Co-
operative Act 1999 (now Co-operative Act 2010). It now operates in co-operation 
with Earth Net Foundation. Earth Net Foundation is responsible for agricultural 
promotion and development whereas Green Net focuses on product distribution, 
namely, marketing, wholesaling, operating Green Net shop, exporting, engaging in 
fair trade deals, and serving as a rice packaging centre. 
   
Now almost all Green Net products have been accredited and certified under the 
IFOAM Accredited Organic Programme. More than 1,200 households of 
agricultural producers all over Thailand are Green Net Cooperative members. It has 
also been assisted by fair trade groups in distributing products to over 10 countries 
in Europe, including France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the UK. Apart from 
business activities, Green Net organises venues for exchange of knowledge and 
experience in organic farming and seeks co-operation with foreign resource 
persons.20 
 
Green Net as a corporate entity is actually comprised of three organisations, namely, 
Green Net Co-operative, Earth Net Foundation and the newly set-up company. 
Operating within different legal structures, these three organisations are run 
independently of one another. However, some persons, including Vitoon, are 
involved in all three organisations, as directors or shareholders.  
 
According to Vitoon, the main reason for setting up this company is related to the 
inflexibility of the Co-operative Act and co-operative auditing rules and regulations. 
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Since Earth Net is a non-profit foundation, it is not allowed to trade and make 
profits. Its main funding source is Green Net’s revenue, together with grants and 
donations. The money Green Net Co-operative transfers to Earth Net Foundation 
cannot be treated as donations, which otherwise would entitle the co-operative to 
tax reduction or exemption. This is because the foundation has not been included in 
the list of the Revenue Department for this purpose. The amounts transferred to 
Earth Net are generally declared as Green Net's expenses instead.   
 
4.3 Green Net Co-operative as a social enterprise 
 
It is clear that a social enterprise in Thailand faces difficulties if operates as a co-
operative. Again according to Vitoon, a co-operative form may be able to survive 
in the market. However, if they want to grow, they must overcome a lot of obstacles. 
The law is, in his view, outdated and not compatible with practices, especially if a 
co-operative wants to engage in business activities, which have become 
increasingly complicated. The Co-operative Auditing Department (CAD)’s strict 
supervision and requirements, such as a double-entry bookkeeping system and 
shareholding, pose one such obstacle. 
 
Vitoon points out that the definition of social enterprise is loose and unclear, and 
this provides those who are not genuine social entrepreneurs with an opportunity to 
take advantage of the term. However, he disagrees with the term being defined by 
law as it could impose constraints on social entrepreneurs. Instead, he prefers social 
enterprise being certified or accredited by an independent and reliable organisation 
in a way similar to certification and accreditation by the World Fair Trade 
Organization (WFTO).   
 
Contact: Mr. Vitoon Panyakul 
Address: 6 Soi Piboonupatham-Wattananives 7, Sutthisarn Road, Huay Kwang 
District, Bangkok 10310 
Tel: 02-277 9380-1, 02-277 9653, Fax: 02-277 9654 
Website: www.greeenet.or.th 
 
5. House of Museums 
 
5.1 Origin and development 
 
Located in the southwest of Bangkok, a little way off the main road leading to 
southern Thailand, House of Museums was founded by a famous collector and 
author, Anek Nawikamool, and his wife Wanna,21 who is a lecturer at the Faculty 
of Humanities, Kasetsart University. House of Museums was officially opened on 
14 July 2001 and has since then become one of the most well-known and still 
thriving community museums in the country. 
 
By its very name, House of Museums is intended to be a house where the everyday 
Thai life going back to the late 1950s is portrayed through collections of articles 
such as household utensils, books, cameras, toys, advertising boards, gramophones, 
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 Interview with Wanna Nawikamool, Director, House of  Museums (Bangkok, Thailand, 10 
February 2013) 
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films, tables, cabinets and many others, as well as through model shops and displays 
of certain everyday activities such as market life. Most of the articles have been 
donated, and some of them have been purchased. The idea is that these articles, 
which would have normally been thrown away, should be preserved as a record of 
the memory of the past that would otherwise have been forever lost. Its slogan is: 
“Keep it today and it will be an antique tomorrow!” 
 
House of Museums began as a private collection club and was later transformed 
into an association called Kijwatanatham. Though privately initiated, this 
community museum came into being largely through a “public” or collective effort. 
Together with most of the collections it houses, the land on which it is located was 
donated; the plans and designs of its two buildings, as well as the display designs 
for the collections, were all the results of collective voluntary efforts. 
 
5.2 Organisation and management 
 
Since there is no law for the setting up and operation of museums in Thailand, 
according to Wanna Nawikamool, House of Museums was registered as an 
association. The main reason for the decision to opt for this particular legal form, 
rather than that of a foundation, was to avoid the strict rules and regulations 
governing such organisations. 
  
According to Wanna, running this community museum as an association has certain 
advantages. In particular, though it is mainly dependent on grants and donations, it 
can gain supplementary income from admission fees, sale of souvenirs and books, 
and operating a coffee shop. If the museum was set up as a foundation, it would not 
be allowed to earn extra income besides grants and donations. The only main 
advantage of being registered as a foundation is its being entitled to a full income 
tax exemption.  
 
However, even though in running a community enterprise like House of Museums, 
the legal form of association is more flexible than that of the foundation, there are 
some restrictions, which clearly show the disadvantages of the unavailability of a 
proper legal form for social enterprise.  
 
First and foremost, since the museum is being operated as a private organisation, it 
is difficult to ask for governmental support, though it has clearly been set up for 
community and social benefits. Financial support from the government is possible 
only in certain cases, such as for the purpose of hiring museum guides, but in such 
cases the benefits go to those guides rather than directly to the community 
enterprise. Of course, it could be argued that this form of governmental support also 
benefits the community if the museum guides are recruited from among the 
community people: this would have the effect of promoting employment in the local 
area. Nevertheless, such an impact would be minimal, and this is not the main 
purpose of House of Museums, which is to serve the Thai populace in general rather 
than only its local community. 
 
Moreover, unlike foundation, House of Museums is not entitled to issue any receipt 
to those who donate money to it. This means that those who have made such 
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donations cannot apply for tax refund. This makes it even more difficult for the 
museum to receive grants and donations – which are definitely crucial for its future 
expansion. It currently relies exclusively on volunteers who are not in any way 
remunerated, except those who benefit from donations to support their education.  
 
5.3 House of Museums as a social enterprise 
 
Wanna enthusiastically affirms that House of Museums is a social enterprise. She 
knows very well that such an enterprise must be self-sustaining, while at the same 
time being able to contribute to the community. She is nonetheless aware of the 
important issue of social enterprise branding and how this is related to the future 
development of House of Museums. 
 
In the first place, she recognises that the branding of social enterprise involves its 
credibility: both those who are prospective donors and/or backers and those who 
would benefit from its activities want to know its pedigree – especially whether it 
could be trusted as a socially- or community-oriented enterprise.  
 
Moreover, House of Museums has a plan for future development – that is, for an 
expansion that would transform it from a “house” into a “Little Market” occupying 
a much larger land area. The most important challenge is whether the legal form of 
association under which House of Museums is now operating is appropriate for its 
expansion. 
 
For this purpose House of Museums must definitely be more entrepreneurial in its 
orientation, but among major obstacles is the lack of funding and skilled 
management. Wanna and her husband are admittedly not prepared to go it alone for 
such an enterprise and an association would not be able to overcome those obstacles 
through mobilisation of fund and acquiring a professional management team. 
Among other conditions a more appropriate legal form is required for future 
development of this community museum. 
 
Contact: Mrs. Wanna Nawikamool 
Address: 170/17 Moo 17 Soi Klongpo 2, Salathammasop Road, Taweewatana, 
Bangkok 10170 
Tel: 08-9200-2803, 08-9666-2008, Fax: 0-2869-6281 
Website: http://houseofmusuems.siam.edu 
 
6. Khaokwan Foundation 
 
6.1 Origin and development 
 
Khaokwan Foundation began its activities as a non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) specialising in the development of technology, rice seeds and other local 
crops appropriate for specific localities. It also engaged in research on the impacts 
of agricultural chemicals and the search for possible alternatives for farmers who 
did not want to use chemicals in their agricultural production. In 1984, operating as 
part of Appropriate Technology Association (ATA), it launched a rice-fish farming 
project, together with other integrated farming activities, in northeast Thailand. In 
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1989, it separated itself from ATA and formed its own organisation – Technology 
for Rural and Ecological Enrichment Centre (TREE) – before eventually registering 
as a Khaokwan Foundation in 1998 with an office in Suphanburi Province, which 
lies about 100 kilometres to the west of Bangkok.  
 
The person instrumental in establishing and developing Khaokwan Foundation is 
Decha Siripat. His purpose was to relieve the problems most Thai rice farmers have 
been facing almost all through their lives – problems that have resulted in the steady 
decline in their livelihood. The most serious problem the accumulation of debts 
rather than profits. Most of their children thus do not want to inherit rice-farming 
occupation from their parents.   
 
Rice farming has been part of Thai culture and society for a very long time. The 
problem, in the opinion of Ananya Hongsa,22 is that they have neither proper 
knowledge nor a “heart” for rice farming. The foundation thus aims at educating 
farmers (mainly in Suphanburi Province) by providing a rice farming study 
programme covering everything about rice including how to use organic fertilisers, 
how to develop rice seeds, and etc. It is free of charge for the participants who are 
farmers since it is financially supported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-
operatives.  
 
So far more than 300 farmers have graduated from the foundation’s intensive 
training programmes, whereas more than 3,000 have attended short-term training 
courses. Several of those who attended its training programmes have been selected 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives for awards as “Distinguished 
Farmers”. It also offers similar training to farmers from foreign countries, including 
Bangladesh, India, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Moreover, the foundation 
has succeeded in developing a rice-farming system relying on insect-resistant rice 
strains requiring no use of agricultural chemicals. The system results in high yields 
at low labour and other costs with no serious environmental impacts.23 
 
6.2 Organisation and management 
 
Khaokwan has registered as a foundation with Decha Siripat serving as its director. 
Now apart from offering several training programmes in rice farming and other 
related activities, it also sells many organic farm products including jasmine brown 
rice, jasmine white unpolished rice, quality paddy rice seeds, and vegetable seeds. 
Moreover, the foundation has been involved in the restoration and conservation of 
ancient festivals related to farming. 
 
According to Ananya, the foundation is not responsible for the marketing of the 
farm products. Its main purpose is to educate the farmers, so that they can educate 
more farmers. The foundation has also filed petitions against the use of chemicals 
in agriculture and for the cancellation of tariff exemption and reduction for chemical 
products. Luxury taxes should be imposed on chemicals and their prices should be 
controlled. This will help farmers in the long run. The government's current rice 
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 Interview with Ananya Hongsa, Manager, Khaokwan Foundation (Suphanburi, Thailand, 6 
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23
 Achavanuntakul (n 7) 84-85.   
287 
 
project (rice pledging scheme) does not solve the problem at its root. Those who 
have benefited most from the scheme are still the middlemen.  
 
Therefore, what the foundation is trying to do is to change the attitude of the farmers 
towards rice farming. The foundation has set up a forum where farmers in 
Suphanburi can share their opinions and problems of growing rice. The forum has 
also helped create a network of farmers which widens the same understanding and 
provides mutual support among fellow farmers. The foundation hopes that farmers 
will be proud of what they are doing and will be released from their debt burden 
and from being “slaves” in the sense that they are always told what to do. For 
example, they are told by the government or merchants to use chemicals and certain 
rice seeds to maximise products. Those who sell chemicals never farm, but farmers 
tend to believe them. 
 
6.3 Khaokwan Foundation as a social enterprise 
 
Since Khao Kwan was set up as a foundation, it is a non-profit organisation. The 
main revenue has come almost entirely from grants and donations. For example, its 
office building was donated by the Japanese government in 2002. Even though the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives provides fund for its courses every year, 
the fund is limited to only 200 participants. Also every baht spent has to be declared.  
 
According to Ananya, the foundation still faces loss and lacks access to capital. As 
a foundation, it is not allowed to take loans from banks, nor can it make profits from 
selling rice. Khaokwan has tried hard to solve its financial problems by taking 
private loans, that is, those made in the name of the founder, Decha, not the 
foundation since it cannot rely on grants and donations all the time. Those who 
work for Khaokwan are treated like members of the same family. They all have a 
heart to work for social benefits. Some of them are rice experts who can earn much 
more if they work for a private company. Therefore, in order for the foundation to 
survive, its people need a decent living too. 
 
This clearly shows the limitation of being set up as a foundation. What the 
foundation is planning to do in a year or so is to build a factory for the improvement 
and production of rice seeds and organic fertilisers. The factory will be set up as a 
limited liability company which allows it to make profits. However, all of the profits 
will be reinvested into the factory and sent to the foundation. Khaokwan is not 
concerned about being viewed as a for-profit organisation since it believes in its 
transparency and honesty. The income and profits will be declared and explained 
professionally and honestly. Anunya strongly believes that a legal form like the 
British CIC will be a suitable structure for social enterprise. She said ‘[CIC] is 
exactly what we want now!’   
 
Contact: Ms. Anunya Hongsa 
Address: 13/1 Moo 3, Thedsaban Tha Sadet 1 Road Soi 6, Sarkaew Sub-district,  
Muang District, Suphanburi Province 72230 
Tel/fax: (035) 597193, 084-6465908, 089-8367006 
E-mail: daycha@loxinfo.co.th 
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7. Lemon Farm 
 
7.1 Origin and development 
 
Lemon Farm Patana Co-operative Limited was set up in 1999 by Monkolchaipatana 
Co., Ltd. and Bang Chak Petroleum Plc. as a mechanism connecting farm producers 
in the rural areas with consumers in the urban areas, and promoting their mutual 
help in strengthening community health and social well-being, and preserving local 
culture. The main concern of Lemon Farm’s founders was that Thai people had only 
limited access to chemical-free foods: agricultural produce, in particular, was 
contaminated with chemicals, especially insecticides, that were harmful to the 
health of both producers and consumers. 
 
The first Lemon Farm shop was opened on an experimental basis at the Bang Chak 
Petrol Station in Bangkok. The shop was meant to serve as an outlet for organic 
farm and other chemical-free products, including agricultural processed goods, 
from local communities, as well as to promote popular livelihood on the basis of 
“sufficiency economy” advocated by His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej.24 
Now in addition to its head office, Lemon Farm has opened nine branches almost 
all over Bangkok. It is the first organic farming co-operative that has achieved 
success at the national level.25 
 
7.2 Organisation and development 
 
Lemon Farm has been set up as a co-operative. Its core workforce consists of former 
employees at Bang Chak Petroleum, who followed Sophon Suphapong, their CEO, 
when he quit the company to assume a full-time work in community development. 
These people only wanted to pursue a career in this area and provide Thai society 
with a development alternative that did not rely on the market and the business 
competition on which it is based.26 
 
At present Lemon Farm has authorised Sungkhom Sukhaphap Co. Ltd. to assume 
responsibility for the management of its business activities. According to Suwanna 
Langnamsung,27 managing director of Sungkhom Sukhaphap, the popularity of 
organic farm products is currently rising; Lemon Farm is thus planning to open new 
branches in Bangkok to meet the rising demand. It must nevertheless be stressed 
that the success of Lemon Farm as a co-operative has relied very much on 
Sungkhom Sukhaphap, a subsidiary in a limited company form, which is 
responsible for its business management, especially in retail marketing.  
 
7.3 Lemon Farm as a social enterprise 
 
Lemon Farm is a good case of social enterprise providing social benefits in terms 
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of good health and well-being of the people, as well as environmental protection, 
while being viable as a business venture. However, while as a co-operative it has 
provided benefits to a large number of households that are its members, it needs to 
operate as a business organisation, through Sungkhom Sukhaphap, in order to be 
financially sustainable. 
 
According to Suwanna, the problem is that farmers (particularly those who produce 
organic farm products) lack market outlets for their products, especially outlets with 
direct access to consumers. There are middlemen who make profit from purchasing 
the products from farmers at relatively low prices and selling them to consumers at 
much higher prices. This is clearly unfair to both farmers and consumers. In order 
to earn more, farmers have to produce more in a shorter time. That is how chemicals 
come into play. As a result, it is consumers who have to pay for food and products 
that are harmful to their health and the environment. Those who get the most benefit 
are the middlemen. 
 
Thai co-operatives law does not support co-operatives in competing in this kind of 
business, whose nature has been changing. For example, it is not easy to declare 
and explain the losses caused by fresh foods being rotten or stolen. Doing so will 
cost even more than the losses. Limited company form is more suitable because it 
is more flexible in running the business and helps reduce the risks of losses for its 
members/shareholders. Given its flexibility, this legal form is far better suited to the 
changing nature of business, which involves increasingly complicated transactions 
in the present business environment, whereas the Co-operative Act still maintains 
strict control over business activities of co-operatives.   
 
Suwanna believes that social enterprise is a good concept but its meaning and 
operational modes are still unclear. Lemon Farm stopped selling Coke in its shops 
even if it made good profit, because it views a social enterprise as not involving 
only making profit to survive, but also concern for the well-being of people and 
society. In her view, a legal form like the CIC might encourage more people in 
Thailand to become social entrepreneurs. However, such a law should support 
(rather than control) social enterprise with such measures as tax incentives, 
marketing channels and business know-how.  
 
Contact: Ms. Suwanna Langnamsung 
Address: 104/34 Moo 1, Chaengwatana Road, Laksi District, Bangkok 10210 
Tel: 02-575 2222, Fax: 02 575 3789 
Website: www.lemonfarm.com 
E-mail: Lemonfarm2004@yahoo.com 
 
8. Opendream 
 
8.1 Origin and development 
 
Founded in 2008, Opendream was initially aimed to be a company offering services 
in designing and constructing websites for social firms and business organisations 
that at the same time engaged in socially and community-oriented activities. Its 
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founders, Patipat Susampao28 and Patcharaporn Pansuwan, saw that despite their 
contributions to society and the community, these organisations were not generally 
known. “Information is power”;29 therefore, organisations with no means of 
disseminating information on their missions and activities would be deprived of a 
major power capability. 
 
Dissemination of information on the Internet is now cheaper than through other 
even less effective channels. Moreover, internet and other types of IT technology 
could be extensively exploited by social sector organisations for their powerful 
impacts on society and the community. Patipat and Patcharaporn decided to leave 
their promising careers in large companies to pursue this business line for 
commercial and social purposes. However, when they came into contact with 
Change Fusion, they decided to transform their business into a social enterprise 
specialising in delivering IT services mainly to organisations in the social sector. 
Though the company also offers services on a purely commercial basis, 80-90 per 
cent of its works have been delivered to those organisations. 
 
Since its founding Opendream has accomplished more than 90 IT projects for 
organisations of this type and CSR agencies of many large companies, together with 
more than 50 website design and construction works. All these accomplishments 
have significantly contributed to the empowerment of such organisations. 
 
A very good example is the construction of “Mo Chao Ban” (or Doctor for the 
General Populace in English) website. The website now contains information 
derived from the magazine of the same name that has been regularly published for 
more than 30 years. Opendream has digitalised the contents of the numerous issues 
of this magazine, transforming them into digitalised and soft-file databases, which 
are easy to download. Given this easy access, the number of people who visit the 
website has increased from about 1,000 per month to about 1,000,000 per month. 
Helping to popularise this IT instrument has indeed resulted in dissemination of 
knowledge on healthcare and medical problems in everyday life to a very large 
number of people. 
 
8.2 Organisation and management 
 
Opendream has been incorporated as a limited company. Patipat has been the 
company’s managing director since its establishment. What is particularly notable 
about this company is that it is very clear about its mission and activities: ‘We are 
a social enterprise with expertise in Internet solution development and information 
design...’ and its aim, the company boldly states, is to ‘deliver the information, 
change the world’.30 Working through its networks of friends in NGOs, the new 
media, high-tech firms, research institutes, and software developers, it has provided 
not only the efficient solution but also the gateway to wider new opportunities of 
collaboration, extending and enhancing the reach of our client-friends. 
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Founded with a start-up funding of 350,000 Baht (around £7,000)31 under the Youth 
Social Enterprise Initiative (YSEI), it earned 222, 681 Baht (around £4,450)32 
within one year, and its earning tripled in the year after that. It now develops its 
own products with a view to taking good care of itself and its team, so that they 
become financially viable. According to Patipat, one of the main problems involves 
the lack of capital and access to finance. The company does not have investment to 
run a bigger venture or compete with bigger for-profit companies. Its profits have 
been divided in the following proportion: 30 per-cent reinvestment, 30 per-cent cash 
flow, 30 per-cent social benefits, and 10 per-cent dividends (not guaranteed every 
year).   
 
8.3 Opendream as a social enterprise 
 
The lack of capital has been mainly caused by the “branding” problem. It is still not 
clear, Patipat admits, how an IT company could provide benefits to society. The 
company's main job is to assist those who directly work for social benefits. Mo 
Chao Ban website is a good example. Since Opendream is not generally seen as 
creating clear social impacts, it is difficult for the company to gain investment 
capital. While private investors tend to view the company as an NGO, philanthropic 
organisations often regard it as a for-profit company aiming to maximise profit 
rather than social benefits.  
 
This clearly shows that social enterprises in Thailand have a problem of clarifying 
their position in society. According to Patipat, 80-90 per cent of Thai social 
enterprises operate as non-profit organisations and only 10 per cent of them are for-
profit businesses with social purposes. Such a situation reinforces the belief or 
understanding that if one wants to help other people, one should not make profit 
but, like a charitable organisation, rather seek grants and donations. Such a view 
clearly does not augur well for the development of the social enterprise sector. 
 
Contact: Mr. Patipat Susampa 
Address: 299/92 Town Home Areeya Mandarina, Suthisarn Road, Huay Kwang, 
Bangkok 10310 
Tel: 02-274 8534 
Website: www.opendream.co.th 
 
9. Rakluke Group 
 
9.1 Origin and development 
 
The “Rakluke” brand came into being in 1982, when Plan Publishing Co., Ltd. was 
set up, with a clear purpose which the group has retained since then: the company 
would engage in media business that contributes to the betterment of society and 
not in maximising profits. Those joining in the development of this venture were 
young men and women who were intent upon creating a better society33 with a 
belief that still guides the group’s business line: ‘the leaning process is a tool driving 
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the family, society, community and the country in the direction of sustainable 
development’.34 Or in the words of Subhawadee Harnmethee,35 CEO of Rakluke 
Group, who reaffirmed this belief in a recent interview with KPMG Thailand: ‘Our 
belief is “Learning Makes Change”’.36 
 
Plan Publishing started with producing various types of “good media” including 
print media (especially magazines and handbooks), radio and TV programmes. But 
what could be regarded as its “flagship product” was the magazine Rakluke (or 
“love for one’s children” in English]. The purpose of all these products was to create 
and encourage learning activities between parents and their children. With the 
advent of new technology, especially the ICT, the company shifted its attention to 
“social learning”. The name of the group was changed from Plan Publishing to 
Rakluke Group, so that it more clearly reflected the group’s vision to become ‘a 
leader in creating all aspects of learning for Thai families through the media and 
various creative activities’.37 
 
9.2 Organisation and management 
 
Rakluke Group has been incorporated as a limited company. Since the early 2000s 
it has diversified into various subsidiaries which cover different aspects of social 
learning in our age of technology. However, its main product, the magazine 
Rakluke, has remained most popular among publications of its kind in Thailand 
during the past 30 years. The subsidiaries include Rakluke Discovery Learning, 
Rakluke Edutex, and Rakluke Human and Social Innovation (all set up in limited 
company form).  
 
9.3 Rakluke Group as a social enterprise 
 
Rakluke Group as a social enterprise had come into existence long before this term 
was known in Thailand. Operating as a well-organised and full-fledged business 
enterprise, the group has become financially viable, and with a clear goal of being 
oriented to creating social and community benefits rather than becoming a profit-
maximising venture, it has been widely recognised for what it does and the 
contributions it has made – though initially not as a social enterprise. Now that 
social enterprise as a term as well as concept has gained wider circulation, it is now 
more or less generally known as such. 
 
According to Subhawadee, Rakluke clearly sees itself as social enterprise since its 
business is mainly for educating and helping parents and children (any family-
related issues). It is social enterprise not because it makes a lot of donations; rather 
it does not earn enough to do that. It is social enterprise because the company 
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believes that what it is doing is for public benefit.  
 
Most of its profit has been reinvested in the company, particularly for social 
development projects which hardly make profit at all. However, many people 
including clients or business partners still see Rakluke not different from a for-profit 
company. Therefore, it is difficult for Rakluke to clarify its position since Thai 
people still do not understand the definition and concept of social enterprise, 
resulting in the company missing an opportunity to manage certain government 
projects.  
 
Such a problem of misunderstanding is sometimes so serious that profit-making 
companies like Rakluke are not permitted to take part in certain government 
projects. Only so-called non-profit enterprises are allowed to do so. But in reality, 
sometimes such enterprises are not capable enough to handle the social 
development projects. To avoid such trouble, the company can only become the 
sub-contractor and the primary contractor would take some commission fees (being 
a middle man). In the end, the budget to manage the projects is not enough to make 
any profit. 
 
In order to avoid such problem, Rakluke has been registered with the Finance 
Ministry as an expert/adviser in a particular field (children/parents/family). This 
will help make it easier for the company to explain its position to the public. 
Rakluke uses business methods in managing its projects. If it deals with educational 
institutions, they would focus mainly on training, research etc. If it is business, they 
would find an effective management system to run the projects nationwide with the 
same standard. Rakluke does not make a huge profit, though enough to survive. 
Some projects tend to provide hopeful profit, while social development projects 
almost gain none. Therefore, for the company, helping people and society does not 
mean how much they donate. Rakluke looks at itself as social service provider for 
society. 
 
Contact: Rakluke Group 
Address: 932 Prachachuen Road, Wongsawang Sub-district, Bang Sue District, 
Bangkok 10800 
Tel: 02-913 7555, 02-831 8400 
 
10. Rung Arun School 
 
10.1 Origin and development  
 
A problem of schooling in Thailand is that it focuses more on providing children 
with substantive knowledge and strengthening their competitive capability 
(especially for their eventual success in the university entrance examination) than 
developing them physically, emotionally and morally. Moreover, the school system 
has not been properly adjusted to suit the social conditions that have been changing 
rapidly and have become increasingly complicated.  
 
Many educational specialists, academics, parents, and other concerned individuals 
were fully aware of this problem. Seeing that no effective move had been taken to 
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solve it, Prapapat Niyom,38 a former associate professor at the Faculty of Education, 
Chulalongkorn University, took the initiative in establishing a school that would 
meet the nature of human learning needs and serve as a concrete example of the 
move towards the development of Thai education in a new direction. As a result of 
these concerns and the search for an alternative to mainstream schooling in Thai 
society, Rung Arun School came into being in 1997.39 
 
Rung Arun School was therefore set up to provide a new alternative schooling – 
one which follows a Buddhist way of life and which aims to fill the gaps left by the 
mainstream school system. Unlike the mainstream approach with its focus on 
competitive examinations and separation of academic knowledge from real life, this 
new alternative schooling provides a teaching and learning method that enables 
students to learn, think, and do by themselves, especially by integrating what they 
have learned into the pursuit of their daily life.40 
 
The name of the school was given by Professor Dr. Praves Wasi, a highly respected 
educator and medical specialist, whose intention was for the school to represent 
“the Dawn of Wisdom” and to serve as a pilot move towards a best possible way of 
developing and providing education in Thailand. As he at that time put it, ‘...Rung 
Arun School will not only provide best teaching and learning for a number of 
students but will also create specialists in this new way of providing education, who 
will help train teachers of both state and private schools, so that this way of teaching 
and learning would eventually be adopted all over the country. Rung Arun is not 
just a school but rather a national intellectual strategy’.41 
 
10.2 Organisation and management 
 
Even though the school did not originate from a profit-making incentive, Prapapat 
needed loans from banks for the construction of the buildings and the coverage of 
initial administrative costs. Moreover, an innovative method of financial 
mobilisation was also introduced: it created understanding and trust among the 
parents of its students, and this led to advance payment of the school fees, which 
were then used as part of the funding for its expansion. This method has had the 
important effect of avoiding the risk of heavy reliance on bank loans and ensuring 
the school’s future revenue.42 
 
The founding of Rung Arun School thus represented a collaborative venture of 
various sectors in society, particularly between the not-for-profit organisations and 
private businesses and financial institutions. Set up under the Private School Act,43 
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the school has been accredited by, and operating under the supervision of, the Basic 
Education Commission of the Ministry of Education. As a private school, it needs 
also to be run as a business, and for this purpose Rung Arun School Co., Ltd. was 
established. However, since the school was purposely set up as a not-for-profit 
organisation, a foundation was also created in 2003 to promote its educational and 
other related activities including provision of social services such as training of 
personnel and volunteers in government agencies and not-for-profit organisations.44 
 
At present Rung Arun School has more than 1,000 students and consists of three 
sections, namely, the kindergarten (pre-school grades 1-3), the primary level 
(grades 1-6), and the secondary level (grades 1-6). In founding and running Rung 
Arun, Prapapat was also inspired by Waldorf education, particularly the Waldorf 
School of Southwest London, but she has modified the English version of this 
“alternative education” to suit Thai society.  
 
10.3 Rung Arun School as a social enterprise 
 
As clearly stated in its website, Rung Arun School is ‘a not-for-profit organisation, 
which means an organisation that engages in revenue- and profit-generating 
activities, but that does not transform these profits into private assets of the 
shareholding individuals or legal persons. Rather, the profits are used in developing 
the missions of the organisation, which include developing its human and other 
resources, as well as its work system and other aspects of the organisation. The 
purpose is to further develop the latter on a sustainable basis’.45 There is thus no 
question about the school being run as a social enterprise. According to Prapapat, 
the problem is to find a legal structure within which to run the school as a not-for-
profit. Since she was not able to find such a legal form, it has now to operate under 
various laws and legal forms. 
 
Contact: Rung Arun School 
Address: 391 Rama II Road, Soi Wat Yai Rom, Thakham Sub-district, Bang 
Khuntian District, Bangkok 10150 
Tel: 02-870 7512-3, 02-867 0903, Fax: 02-870 7514 
E-mail: info@roong-aroon.ac.th 
  
11. Suan Ngoen Mee Ma 
 
11.1 Origin and development 
 
Established in 2001, Suan Ngoen Mee Ma Co., Ltd. was, according to its manager, 
Wallapa van Willenswaard, originally conceived of in the late 1990s as a way out 
of, or an alternative to, consumerism.46 During that time the term “social enterprise” 
or “social entrepreneurship” was still unknown in Thailand, but the booming 
economic activities (before the onset of the financial crisis in July 1997) did not 
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deter certain groups of people from their determination to search for such an 
alternative.  
 
Still uncertain about what an “alternative business” would be like, Wallapa sought 
advice from Mr. Sulak Sivaraksa, a well-known social critic and writer in Thailand. 
Through this consultation it was decided that a limited company would be set up. 
What it would engage in that would not come to be solely profit-oriented needed to 
be thought out. Eventually three main types of activity were chosen to represent the 
company’s business and social activity lines, namely: publishing, serving as an 
outlet for community products, and providing a venue for conferences and 
seminars, where knowledge and experiences would be exchanged. Since then a 
number of related enterprises and activities have developed. 
 
A major outlet for the company’s publications is Suan Ngoen Mee Ma Bookstore, 
which sells books mainly of alternative types. Through social marketing in the form 
of group discussions and talks on new publications and other related matters it is 
now relatively well known that if one wants books of new paradigms or alternative 
types, she must visit Suan Ngoen Mee Ma Bookstore. 
 
Initially providing an outlet for community products from organic cotton, Green 
Suan Ngoen Mee Ma Store now sells many organic products from community 
sources and small producers, serving at the same time as a learning source on 
organic farming and for Community-Supported Agriculture (CSA), which has been 
conceived of as a mechanism to promote organic farmers through advance payment 
by consumers to the farmers to support the latter’s organic farming. 
 
11.2 Organisation and management 
 
Suan Ngoen Mee Ma has been incorporated as a limited company, and its founder, 
Wallapa van Willenswaard,47 now serves as manager. Its initial funding came partly 
from non-governmental organisations such as Sathirakoses-Nagapradeepa 
Foundation, and partly from the Social Venture Network group. Given the absence 
of the term “social entrepreneurship” at the time of its founding, Wallapa’s idea for 
the organisation she was about to set up was that of merging NGOs’ financial 
support with the business sector’s funding. 
 
This idea actually reflected her understanding of “social enterprise” when the 
concept had not yet gained circulation in Thailand: that is ‘the idea of bringing 
together funding by charitable and non-governmental organisations and capital 
from the business sector, in the form of an alliance among the various sectors in 
society that want to see the latter develop in a sustainable direction’.48 
 
Suan Ngoen Mee Ma has gained a distinct image of an enterprise that offers new 
alternatives. In addition, given the trust it has created among consumers, it now 
enjoys the latter’s confidence in it as a “social entrepreneur”.49 Its revenue leaped 
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from 4.7 million baht (around £94,000)50 in 2006 to 20.9 million Baht (around 
£418,000)51 in 2007 – a 336 per cent increase in one year.52 Though the company 
was severely hit by political instability in the country begun in 2008, it still has been 
running at a profit. 
 
11.3 Suan Ngoen Mee Ma as a social enterprise 
 
In certain important respects, Suan Ngoen Mee Ma is typical of Thai social 
enterprises: it operates within a network of allied organisations that have worked 
together to support some of the activities it is engaging in. The “Green Market” 
under the Community-Supported Agriculture scheme typically operates in this way. 
The market started as a group of organic farmers with the support of a network of 
foundations and allied organisations, and the consumers are mostly urban dwellers 
who take good care of their health. A market committee sees to it that the quality 
and prices of the products are in accordance with the required standards. 
Pathumthani Hospital, for example, is a permanent marketplace where organic farm 
products are on sale. Farmers come to sell their products as a group now consisting 
of about 90 producers, whose revenues are fairly shared.  
 
Apart from the products, the group also sells its “Green Market” brand (now being 
diversified into sub-groups such as “Green Hut Village”). The idea is that the 
products come directly from farmers, who are mostly small producers, and the 
profits should go directly to them. However, the lack of capital remains the principal 
problem, and with this shortcoming the Green Market farmers cannot compete in 
the capitalist free-market system, in which an increasing number of commercial 
firms claim to be organic farm producers. Wallapa admitted that she was not aware 
of a legal form for social enterprise like the CIC. However, she believes that a legal 
framework that enables producers to develop themselves in the same way would 
contribute to the solution of at least some of the problems. 
 
Contact: Mrs. Wallapa van Willenswaard 
Address: 77, 79 Fuang Nakhon Road, Rajabopit Sub-district, Phra Nakhon District, 
Bangkok 10200 
Tel: 02- 622 0955, 02-622 0966, 02-622 2495-6, Fax: 02-622 3228 
 
12. Udomchai Farm 
 
12.1 Origin and development 
 
Udomchai Farm started its business in 1960. Its founder, Udomchai, was an 
overseas Chinese and represented the first generation of the Sangvatanakul family 
who owns the farm. According to the farm manager, Dr. Papis Sangvatanakul,53 
D.V.M. and MVPH, a veterinary and third generation member, the family started 
with pig farming with funding from loans. Then, about 30 years ago, it wound up 
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this business and embarked on a new one – that of poultry and egg farming. It 
learned to raise chickens mainly by experiences. When it turned to focus only on 
egg farming, it raised up to 500,000 egg-laying hens. 
 
In 2003 Udomchai Farm faced a major crisis – the outbreak of avian influenza. At 
roughly the same time, a family crisis also took place. It was at this time that the 
family decided to turn back to look after itself. It was good health, and the happiness 
it gave rather than wealth, that was now sought after. The family business was thus 
downsized, with the number of egg-laying chickens reduced from 500,000 to 
50,000, so that it could focus more on the quality of farming. Hence, with the 
expanding encroachments of large egg industries, Udomchai Farm decided to shift 
to organic farming. It gradually upgraded itself in terms of quality without being 
dominated by big companies.  
 
The farm did this by reducing the use of antibiotics, before eventually replacing 
them with bio-extracts and local medicinal herbs. This resulted in the chickens 
acquiring a strong immunity to diseases. Moreover, organic chicken feed was used, 
along with an organic farm environment – that of a free-range egg farm.  
 
In 2008 Udomchai Farm entered the egg market with its own brand and slogan: 
“Ploikai Udomchai Farm” (Udomchai Free-Range Farm) offering “organic eggs 
from good-tempered hens”. With this brand and image, the farm has persistently 
maintained its free-range egg farming with humane treatment of the chickens – 
raising them with quality organic chicken feed in a clean, chemical-free farmyard 
located on a large land area of more than 40 acres. Certified by the Bureau of 
Livestock Standards and Certification, it has been promoted as an outstanding 
health farm by the FAO networks. 
 
12.2 Organisation and management 
 
Udomchai Farm has been registered as a limited partnership (LLP). For Papis this 
legal form is suitable for the business, since it is a family-run business whose 
partners are all relatives. Decisions are normally made in a non-business like family 
manner, relying on informal discussion among family members. With a dramatic 
reduction of the number of chickens, the farm has had to make sure that its income 
is enough to continue the business and take care of all the workers, some of whom 
have worked for it for more than 30 years. In addition, finding markets for the 
organic free range eggs is not that easy. Most consumers will normally find the eggs 
smaller and more expensive than regular eggs, which are mostly supplied by big 
companies. Fortunately, Udomchai Farm has been in the business for a long time; 
it is thus able to find buyers and business partners like Lemon Farm, who care more 
about health than prices. However, it will be quite difficult for those who want to 
start an organic farm: not only is the business highly competitive but it is also 
monopolised by only a few big farms. 
 
One of the problems of becoming organic is that you cannot do everything alone. 
Udomchai Farm has been trying to grow organic corns themselves but the products 
are not enough to feed all the chickens. Local farmers are not interested in growing 
organic corns or other organic crops because this involves a slow and complicated 
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production process with poor harvests. They prefer using chemical fertilisers in 
growing crops for abundant yields.  
 
12.3 Udomchai Farm as a social enterprise 
 
Though in Papis’s view a social enterprise cannot go it alone, she believes that it 
must be able at least to some extent to sustain itself financially. Udomchai Farm’s 
main business ally is Lemon Farm, who well understands the situations of organic 
farmers. For example, if the eggs produced by these farmers are relatively small, 
they could compensate for this by adding the number of eggs in a pack, say, 
increasing it from 10 to 15, so that by weight a pack of 15 eggs is equivalent to a 
pack of 10 eggs. However, even a good business alliance is not enough for this kind 
of enterprise. 
 
The biggest problem is that Thailand’s livestock industry is currently dominated by 
only a few large companies. To gain market access to main department stores is 
very difficult. Therefore, if one wants to embark upon organic farming, one must 
be clear about what to produce and where one could find market outlets for the 
organic products. This is still not to mention the subtly complicated production 
process. 
 
To be financially viable, Papis suggests, the business needs to operate within some 
suitable formal structure – one which would enable it to operate efficiently, such as 
a company form. If one relies on only the “heart”, that is, good intention and 
personal devotion, any success, if at all, could last only as long as one still has the 
“heart” for it. Apart from operational efficiency, honesty and ethical integrity are 
also required for this kind of business. For Udomchai Farm, a family business being 
operated as a social enterprise, profits have been partly invested in the family 
welfare (education and healthcare) and partly reinvested in further developing the 
quality of its organic products – the free-range eggs. Its goal is to maintain good 
health of both the family members and customers. In this way, Papis believes, it has 
contributed to the “health” of both society and the environment.  
 
Contact: Dr. Papis Sangvatanakul 
Office: 64 Moo 10, Paholyothin Road, Phraputtabat District, Saraburi Province 
18120 
Tel: 085-488-7280, 081-319-5690 
Website: www.ploikai.com 
 
 13. WAY Magazine   
 
13.1 Origin and development  
 
A variety magazine published by Pen Thai Publishing Co., Ltd., WAY first came 
out in 2006. The magazine features documentaries, individuals, society, and 
lifestyle, combing pictures and substantive contents in a way that appeals to various 
groups of readers, especially those who want both in-depth stories and insightful 
analysis.  
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WAY came into being when a group of young men and women, who are magazine 
and print media specialists, formed a team led by Athikom Kunawut.54 The 
magazine has also brought together Thailand’s leading writers and columnists. In 
2012, which marked the 6th anniversary of its birth, WAY launched its 
www.waymagazine.org as a window for online communication.55 
 
According to Athikom, founder and managing editor of the magazine, he 
emphasised that because the world is information, WAY aims to encourage the Thai 
people to read more and consume information which is not misleading or influenced 
by profit-oriented magazine publishers. WAY is different from mainstream general 
knowledge/entertainment magazines in both its size and contents: being smaller, 
containing fewer advertisements, featuring no advertorials, and etc. 
13.2 Organisation and management 
 
Pen Thai Publishing, which is WAY’s publisher, was set up as a limited company. 
Apart from WAY magazine, the company also produces other print media to fill the 
gap in this sector in Thailand – the shortage of media of this type that do not seek 
to maximise profits through advertisements or confuse readers with the blurring 
spaces between advertisements and contents. The start-up fund for WAY was 
donated by Prof. Dr. Praves Vasee, a highly respected medical doctor who has been 
widely involved in social and community-oriented projects and activities in 
Thailand. 
 
The cost of publishing a magazine is very high, while profits that can be made from 
such a venture are generally low. Hence, Athikom has pointed out, in order to 
survive in the competitive business, many publishing companies have to heavily 
depend on the revenue from advertisements. Those who want to have their products 
or services advertised in a magazine would normally demand big spaces for their 
advertisements or “advertorials” – advertisements in a newspaper or magazine that 
are made to look like normal articles. WAY finds advertorials not honest to the 
readers. It wishes to be an independent magazine that is able to express honest 
opinions to the readers and free from the influence of money. However, since WAY 
does not want to depend on advertisements, it does not make much profit, and even 
faces losses sometimes. Owing to lack of capital and cash flow, the magazine 
publishing was halted for a while. In order to continue the business, the company 
has had to find other jobs, such as graphic design services, to help support the 
magazine. 
 
13.3 WAY as a social enterprise 
  
According to Athikom, WAY does not view itself as social enterprise since it does 
not create a huge and direct social impact and the definition of social enterprise in 
Thailand is still unclear. However, he does not disagree with the concept of social 
enterprise and believes that it is still better to have an idea/desire to help society and 
other people no matter what it is called than having nothing at all. And we may add 
here that no matter how we call WAY, it serves a useful social purpose in filling the 
“gap” mentioned above. Athikom is also concerned that in so far as social enterprise 
                                                                 
54
 Interview with Athikom Kunawut, Founder, WAY Magazine (Bangkok, Thailand, 8 March 2013) 
55
 WAY, ‘About Us’ <http://waymagazine.org/about/เกียวกบัเรา> accessed 26 March 2013 
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needs to trade like a business, some businesspeople may have ulterior motives and 
take advantage of the term – that is, running a normal business under the cover of 
“social enterprise”. In any case, he realises that to be a social enterprise, only a 
dream is not enough. Social enterprise in Thailand still has a long way to go.  
 
Contact: Mr. Athikom Kunawut 
Address: 137 (1139/14) Lad Prao 101, Khlongjun, Bang Kapi, Bangkok 10240 
Tel: 02-736 9918, Fax: 02-736 8891 
E-mail: waymagazine@yahoo.com 
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